JUDGMENT Yashoda Nandan, J. - Petitioner, Baleshwar Pandey was employed as a permanent Lecturer in History at Maninath Intermediate College, Nanapar, tahsil Salempur, district Deoria in the year 1971. It appears that in the year 1971 there were disputes between two rival persons named Batuk Deo Tripathi and Sri Parmanand Tripathi and both claimed to be the Manager-cum Secretary of the Committee of Management of the College concerned. It appears that there were rival Committee of Management also. A civil suit was consequence of this dispute in which one Sri Gopal Misra, Advocate was appointed as Receiver. It appears that the individual, who held the post of Receiver, was not pleased with the petitioner and consequently suspended him from service on various occasions Ultimately on 13th February, 1973 after making an enquiry against the petitioner, the Receiver decided that the petitioner was liable to b: dismissed from service on account of misconduct and by means of a letter dated 13th February, 1973 he sought approval of the District Inspector of Schools, Deoria to the proposed action against the petitioner. The District Inspector of Schools, Deoria, by an order dated 16th February, 1973 declined to accord approval to the dismissal of the petitioner from service. The Receiver, who was functioning as Manager of the Committee of Management, appealed against the order of the District Inspector of Schools Deoria, before the Deputy Director of Education, Gorakhpur Region. Gorakhpur. By order dated 7/13th December, 1973, the Deputy Director of Education, allowed the appeal preferred by the Receiver against the order of the District Inspector or Schools, r.fusing permission to the proposed termination of the petitioner's service and accorded permission sought for by the Receiver. The petitioner alleges that consequent upon the appellate order of the Deputy Director of Education, the Committee of Management of the institution took no steps to serve an order terminating fee petitioners service on him. On 18th December, 1973 the petitioner instituted a civil suit (Civil Suit No. 1265 of 1973) in the court of the learned Munsif. Deoria, against Maninath Intermediate College, Deoria through the Manager Siksha Samiti Nonapar, tappa Bhatni, pargana Salempur Majhauii. On 18th December, 1973 the petitioner instituted a civil suit (Civil Suit No. 1265 of 1973) in the court of the learned Munsif. Deoria, against Maninath Intermediate College, Deoria through the Manager Siksha Samiti Nonapar, tappa Bhatni, pargana Salempur Majhauii. district Deoria and the Silsha Samiti mantioned above praying for an order of injunction restraining the defendants to the suit from giving effect against the plaintiff to the order of the Deputy Director of Education dated December, 7/13-1973 and further for an injunction to the effect that the defendants to the suit do not serve a notice of dismissal on the plaintiff and remove him from service. On 19th February, 1974 a compromise was filed in the suit signed by the applicant and one Parmanand Tripathi describing himself as the Manager of the respondent as well as the Manager of Maninath Intermediate College, Deoria. In this document it was stated that the compromise had been arrived at between the parties to the suit and it had been decided that the plaintiff to the suit would continue as a lecturer of Maninath intermediate College and was entitled to his entire salary in that capacity and further that the charge-sheet framed against him and the order of his dismissal which had been served on the plaintiff, were baseless and ineffective. A prayer was made that the decree be passed in terms of the compromise and the compromise may be form part of the decree. On 5th March, 1974 the petitioners sup was decreed in terms of the compromise against the defendants. The decree itself was formally signed on 26th March, 1974. It appears that armed with the decree the petitioner succeeded in obtaining an order dated 2rd October, 1975 re-instating him in service as a lecturer. The order passed by the then Receiver Sri Bansidhar Singh dated 23rd October, 1975 specifically mentions that in view of the decree, a copy of which had been produced before him, the petitioner was being directed to be re-instated into service with immediate effect. During the period when the petitioner was under suspension and enquiry proceedings were pending against him. Respondent No. 5 Sri Rama Shanker Tewari. who was a permanent teacher in the L.T. grade in the College, had been promoted to the post which was held by the petitioner as lecturer in history in his vacancy. During the period when the petitioner was under suspension and enquiry proceedings were pending against him. Respondent No. 5 Sri Rama Shanker Tewari. who was a permanent teacher in the L.T. grade in the College, had been promoted to the post which was held by the petitioner as lecturer in history in his vacancy. On 29th January, 1976, the District Inspector of Schools sent a communication to the Principal of the College to the effect that the Receiver had in accordance with the decree of the Civil court reinstated the petitioner in service in the lecturers grade with effect from 24th October. 1975. It was further stated that respondent No. 5, Sri Rama Sanker Tewari had been approved by an order dated 23rd November, 1973 in temporary capacity till final decision of the case of Sri Baleshwar Pandey. the petitioner. The District Inspector of Schools went on to state since the reinstatement of Sri Pandey, the continuance of payment of lecturers salary to Sri Tewari, was illegal and contrary to the rules. It was directed that with effect from the date of the petitioners having been reinstated on lecturers post, the respondent No. 5 stood reverted to the L.T. grade. The excess salary paid to Sri Tewari, respondent No. 5 was directed to be adjusted in his salary bill for the month of January, 1976. Aggrieved by the order of the District Inspector of Schools, dated 29th January, 1976, mentioned above, respondent No. 5 Sri Rama Shanker Tewari appealed to the Deputy Director of Education. By means of an order dated 23rd February, 1976 addressed to the District Inspector of Schools, the Deputy Director of education, intimated to the District Inspector of Schools that he had received an appeal from respondent No. 5 in which it had been asserted that the decree which had been obtained by the petitioner from the civil court was based on a compromise which had been entered into by one who was not competent to represent the Committee of Management of the College. It was stated that if the allegations made by respondent no. 5 in his appeal were correct, the District Inspector of Schools should stay his order dated 29th January, 1976 so that legal and financial problems may not arise subsequently. The District Inspector of Schools was required to send his comments on the appeal filed by respondent No. 5 within a week. 5 in his appeal were correct, the District Inspector of Schools should stay his order dated 29th January, 1976 so that legal and financial problems may not arise subsequently. The District Inspector of Schools was required to send his comments on the appeal filed by respondent No. 5 within a week. Against the above mentioned communication of the District Inspector of Schools the petitioner has hied Misc. Writ Petition No 441-A of 1976 which was admitted and an interim Older was granted staying operation of the order of the Deputy Director of Education dated 23rd February, 1976. The interim order by this Court in the writ petition was passed on 20th May, 1976 Respondent No. 1. Deputy Director Education, Gorakhpur Region by order dated 6th October, 1977 has allowed the appeal of respondent No. 5. This appeal was allowed after notice had been issued to the petitioner and he had b en given an opportune y of being heard. During the appeal one of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner was that in view of the interim order granted by this Court in Writ Petition No. 441-A of 1976., it was not open to the Deputy Director of Education to proceed to hear the appeal and decide it on merits The Deputy Director of Education rejected the contention holding that no interim order has been passed by this Court prohibiting him from proceeding to decide the appeal on merits. The Deputy Director of Education proceeded to consider the question as to whether the decree obtained by the petitioner in Civil Suit no. 1265 of 1973 from the court of the learned Munsif, Deoria on the basis of which the petitioner had been reinstated in service and as consequence of which respondent No 5 Sri Rama Shanker Tewari had been reverted to L T. grade, had any binding effect on the department and was legal. It was held that in the suit in which the decree had been passed neither the District Inspector of Schools, nor respondent No. 5 Sri Rama Shanker Tewari. nor the Stale oi U.P figured as parties. They were not parties to the compromise decree. It was held that in the suit in which the decree had been passed neither the District Inspector of Schools, nor respondent No. 5 Sri Rama Shanker Tewari. nor the Stale oi U.P figured as parties. They were not parties to the compromise decree. The Deputy Director of Education further held that the services of the petitioner, Sri Bileshwar Pandey, had been terminated as a result of his order dated 7/13th December, 1973 and yet he also had not been impleaded as a party to the suit nor had any knowledge of its institution and pendency. Their defendants to the suit were Siksha Samiti and the college through the Manager of Siksha Samiti and consequently the decree had no legally binding effect on the department or Deputy Director of Education, or the District Inspector of Schools, or respondent No 5. On an examination of evidence produced before him, the Deputy Director of Education further held that the gentleman who had entered into the compromise on behalf of the college, was at the relevant time not the manager t f the institution and the compromise decree bad been obtained by the petitioner by practicing fraud on the court. As a consequence of the findings recorded, as mentioned above, the Deputy Director of Education, come to the conclusion that on the basis of the compromise decree in the Civil suit, the District Inspector of Schools was rot justified in treating the petitioner as having been reinstated in service on the post of lecturer in (he Institution and consequently his order directing the reversion of Sri Rama Shanker Tewari to the post of L.T grade in spite of his having been confirmed as lecturer, was also legally unsustainable the appeal was consequently allowed and the order of the District Inspector of Schools dated 29th January, 1976 was set aside with effect from the date the petitioner had taken charge of the post of lecturer in History in the College. The Deputy Director of Education held that the services of the petitioner would not be recognised. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner has filed this writ petition and has prayed that the order of the Deputy Director of Education dated 6th October, 1977 be quashed by means of appropriate writ or order. Certain miscellaneous relief have also been prayed for in this writ petition. 2. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner has filed this writ petition and has prayed that the order of the Deputy Director of Education dated 6th October, 1977 be quashed by means of appropriate writ or order. Certain miscellaneous relief have also been prayed for in this writ petition. 2. Learned counsel, appearing for the petitioner, has challenged the order of the Deputy Director of Education on various grounds. He firstly contended that respondent no. 5. had been only temporarily promoted to the post in the lecture is grade during the pendency of the proceedings against the petitioner and consequently no appeal lay against the order of the District Inspector of Schools by which be had been merely reverted to the post on which he had a lien since the order of the District Inspector of .Schools did not amount to an order of punishment. Respondent no. 5 had challenged the order of the District Inspector of Schools dated 29th January, 1976 on the allegations that he had been confirmed in the lecturers grade as the petitioners services had been finally terminated and consequently his reversion to the post in the lecturers grade, amounted to a punishment. Respondent no.5 had not accepted the petitioners case that had been only temporarily promoted. The question as to whether any appeal lay at the instance of respondent no. 5 or not, has to be decided on the basis of the stand taken by him in the appeal and not on the basis of the allegations made by the petitioner. The Deputy Director of Education by means of the impugned order has also found that, in fact, respondent no. 5 had been confirmed on the post of lecturers grade. If this finding is correct, there can be no doubt that the order of the District Inspector of Schools dated 29th January, 1976 directing his reversion to the post in the lecturers grade amounted to an order visiting him with penal consequences and consequently was appealable. 3. It was next contended that assuming the Deputy Director of Education was right in his conclusion that respondent no. 5 had been promoted permanently to the post of lecturer in the college, it did not necessitate the termination of the petitioners services. On the finding recorded that respondent no. 3. It was next contended that assuming the Deputy Director of Education was right in his conclusion that respondent no. 5 had been promoted permanently to the post of lecturer in the college, it did not necessitate the termination of the petitioners services. On the finding recorded that respondent no. 5 had been confirmed in the post of lecturer, it was urged that he should have been adjusted in some other lecturers pest and it was illegal for the Deputy Director of Education to have directed the termination of the petitioners service. This submission, in our opinion, is without any merit. The Deputy Director of Education has not directed the removal of the petitioner from his service. He came to the conclusion that respondent no. 5 was a confirmed lecturer. It has been found by the Deputy Director of Education that the petitioners services had been terminated earlier as a result of the approval accorded by the Deputy Director of Education himself and that his reinstatement on the basis of the compromise decree was illegal. The termination of the petitioners service is not the consequence of respondent no. 5 having been found to be a confirmed lecturer, but according to the finding of the Deputy Director of Education on account of an earlier order and his re instalment was obtained on the basis of a fraudulently obtained compromise decree which was not binding on the department or on the Deputy Director of Education, or even respondent no. 5. It was also urged that the Deputy Director of Education erred in law and acted contrary to the principal of natural justice by recording a finding that the compromise had been entered into by Sri Parmanand Tripathi, who was net at the relevant time, the Manager of the Committee of Management without notice having been served to the Committee. This plea is not available to the petitioner. It was open to the Committee of Management to have challenged the order of the Deputy Director of Education on the ground raised by the petitioner. The Committee of Management, however, has not challenged the order impugned and has submitted to it. The petitioner consequently can have no grievance against the order on the ground that it was passed without hearing the Committee of Management when he himself had been heard and had been given opportunity of producing material in his support. 4. The Committee of Management, however, has not challenged the order impugned and has submitted to it. The petitioner consequently can have no grievance against the order on the ground that it was passed without hearing the Committee of Management when he himself had been heard and had been given opportunity of producing material in his support. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, next contended that the order of the Deputy Director of Education dated 7/13th December, 1973 was an order merely approving the proposal of the Committee of Management to determine the services of the petitioner and it did not automatically operate as an order of dismissal of the petitioner from service. It was submitted that the approval granted by the Deputy Director was never given effect to by service on the petitioner of any order terminating his services. Relying oh Section 16-G(3)(a) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act. the learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that even after the appeal has been allowed by the District Inspector of Schools the law requires that an order in accordance with the appellate order approving the proposed termination of service of a teacher must be passed by the District Inspector of Schools and the order of the Deputy Director of Education, does not operate as an order approving the proposal to terminate the services of a teacher. It was further urged relying on words used in 16-G (3)(a) of the Act that the services of Principal, Headmaster or teacher are not determined till such time as he has been served with a notice of termination of service after approval in writing of the Inspector. In our opinion none of the various facts of these arguments have any merit. Section 16-G(4) of the said Act is in the following terms : "(4) An order made or decision given by the competent authority under sub section (3) shall not be questioned in any court and the parties concerned shall be bound to execute the directions contained in the order or decision within the period that may be specified therein." 5. The Deputy Director of Education is unquestionable one of the authorities mentioned in sub section (3) of the said Act. The Deputy Director of Education is unquestionable one of the authorities mentioned in sub section (3) of the said Act. A decision by him according approval to the proposal of the committee of Management to determine the services or a Principal, Headmaster or teacher under sub-section (4) as quoted above, the parties to the proceeding are bound to execute the order within the time specified therein or in the absence of any time being specified as soon as possible. A reading of sub-section (4) of Section 16-G makes it abundantly clear that the Committee of Management which is one of the parties to the proceedings either before the District inspector of Schools or in the event of an appeal, before the Deputy Director of Education, is bound to give effect to the approval or disapproval of the proposed action against a teacher. Once a approval to the termination of service of the Principal, Headmaster or teacher has been given by the District Inspector of Schools or in appeal by the Deputy Director of Education, the Committee of Management which sought approval, has no option left but to execute the order Law compels the execution of the order by the Committee of Management. The Committee of Management consequently had only to discharge a ministerial sanction to communicate a formal order terminating the petitioners service. We shall assume for the purpose of this case that the order determining the service of a Teacher, Principal or Headmaster being an executive order, cannot be effective till such order is communicated to the person concerned. However, if there was failure on the part of the Committee of Management in carrying out its statutory duty, the petitioner cannot be allowed to take advantage of such a situation. There are proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution and in the exercise of our discretionary jurisdiction we are not inclined to allow the petitioner to take the advantage of a dereliction of duty on the part of the Committee of Management. On the basis of such omission by the Committee of Management, the petitioner cannot be allowed to obtain relief of reinstatement and of quashing the order of the Deputy Director of Education VII Circle, Gorakhpur Region, Gorakhpur, which on the findings recorded by him, is imminently just. 6. On the basis of such omission by the Committee of Management, the petitioner cannot be allowed to obtain relief of reinstatement and of quashing the order of the Deputy Director of Education VII Circle, Gorakhpur Region, Gorakhpur, which on the findings recorded by him, is imminently just. 6. It was stranuously urged by the learned counsel, appearing for the petitioner, before us that the Deputy Director of Education acted without jurisdiction and committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record in holding that compromise decree, which had been given effect to by the District Inspector of Schools, was of no binding consequence on respondent no. 5, or on Deputy Director of Education or the Department. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 5, relying on the words used in Section 16-G (4) which has been quoted above, contends that the suit itself was not maintainable and consequently the decree passed, if any. either in compromise or otherwise, was of no legal consequence and was a nullity. According to sub-section (4) of Section 16-G which has been quoted in the earlier part of this order, an order made or decision given by the competent authority under subsection (3) shall not be questioned in any court. Similar words also occur in subsection (7) of Section 16-G of the Act. Interpreting sub-section (7) it was observed by the Honble Supreme Court in Syam Lal Yaaav and other v. Smt. Kusum Dhawan and others 1979 ALJP 785) that a suit for injunction which involved challenge to an order suspending a teacher which had found approval of the District Inspector of Schools, is not maintainable and is barred by sub-section (7) of Section 16-G of the Act Though towards the end of of the judgment it has been observed that the expression of views with regard to the maintainability of a suit of the character in which the interim injunction before the Supreme Court was not being finally decided, the observations contained in the judgment lend support to the contention raised by the learned counsel for responder t no. 5 that the suit instituted by the petitioner was not maintainable. In any event, as has already been noticed, the defendants to the suit were the college through the Secretary of the Siksha Samiti and the Siksha Samiti itself. 5 that the suit instituted by the petitioner was not maintainable. In any event, as has already been noticed, the defendants to the suit were the college through the Secretary of the Siksha Samiti and the Siksha Samiti itself. It may be stated that the Siksha Samiti is the society which runs the college and is not the same as the Committee of Management constituted under the provisions of the Act. The gentleman, who signed the compromise decree, was described in the plaint itself as the Manager of the Siksha Samiti and not the Manager of the College. The Committee of Management itself was not impleaded, consequently the decree has no binding effect on the Committee of Management which is responsible for taking disciplinary action against the Principal, Headmaster or teacher. As a result of the compromise decree, respondent no 5 had to leave his post as permanent lecturer and to revert to a post in the lecturers grade. He also was not impleaded as a party to the suit and consequently the compromise decree could have no effect on him. The Deputy Director of Education, who had accorded approval to the proposed dismissal of the petition r from service, was also not impleaded as a defendant to the suit and was consequently unaffected by the compromise decree passed in consequence thereof. 7. In these circumstances, in our opinion, the Deputy Director of Education rightly held that the reinstatement of the petitioner to service as lecturer in the college concerned on the basis of the compromise decree, which has been further found to have been obtained by practising fraud on the court, was illegal. 8. For the reasons given above; we find no merit in this Writ Petition which is being dismissed with costs to the opposite parties. Interim order, if any, is hereby vacated.