JUDGMENT : S.D. AGARWAL, J. 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of proceedings for release of the accommodation in dispute. The property in dispute is situate on Station Road, Kotdwara, Garhwal. It consists of two separate accommodations. One accommodation is in the tenancy of opposite party no. 3 and the other in the tenancy of opposite parties nos. 4 and 5. The Petitioner is the landlady. 2. The Petitioner landlady moved an application u/s 3 of the U.P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 on 26.6.1971 for permission to eject the tenants. During the pendency of this application U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, U.P. Act XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) came into force and the U.P. Act III of 1947 was repealed. The application moved by the Petitioner u/s 3 of U.P. Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947, was continued by the Petitioner under the provisions of the new Act. 3. The Prescribed Authority, Lansdowne, Garhwal allowed the application and directed the Respondents Nos. 3 to 5 to vacate the premises within one month. In fact, there were two applications u/s 3 of the Act against the two sets of the tenants. Both separate tenants filed appeals before the District Judge, Pauri Garhwal being Civil Appeal No. 9 of 1977 and Civil Appeal No. 10 of 1977 which came up for hearing before the District Judge, Pauri Garhwal, who by his judgment dated 3.5.1978 allowed both the appeals and dismissed the application of the Petitioner u/s 21 of the Act. Both the appeals were decided by a common judgment as they were consolidated. The Petitioner has impugned the order of the District Judge dated 3rd March, 1978 by means of the present petition. 4. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has challenged both the findings recorded by the appellate court. His contention in regard to the first finding is that the application for release was both u/s 21(1)(a) and 21(1)(b) of the Act. The appellate court while considering the bona-fide need u/s 21(1)(a) of the Act has not considered the need in the light of the fact that the Petitioner requires the building after demolition and new construction, for the purposes of augmenting her income. The appellate court while considering the bona-fide need u/s 21(1)(a) of the Act has not considered the need in the light of the fact that the Petitioner requires the building after demolition and new construction, for the purposes of augmenting her income. It is further stated that the husband of the Petitioner had died even before the order passed by the i Prescribed Authority, while the appellate court has rejected the need of the Petitioner on the ground that the husband Amar Singh being a man of considerable property can easily make arrangement for the maintenance of the Petitioner and her children. This is wholly irrelevant circumstance as the husband was already dead. 5. In regard to the second finding the Learned Counsel has urged that the appellate authority has wrongly interpreted Section 21(1)(b) of the Act and has therefore, wrongly held that the building is not in a dilapidated condition. 6. In regard to the first submission made by the Learned Counsel, I find that the prescribed authority in his order has stated that the husband of the Petitioner has died after filing of the, application. The District Judge in his order dated 5th March, 1978 has not accepted the bona-fide need of the Petitioner holding as follows: Amar Singh was possessed of considerable moveable and Immovable property. He stated in his cross-examination that he had about Rs. 20,000/- to Rs. 25,000/- in cash with him. He had also 2 kg. of gold and 5 kg of silver. This means that Amar Singh is a man of considerable property and he can very easily make arrangement for the maintenance of his wife and children. 7. This finding of the bona-fide need of the Petitioner has gone against her because of the above finding. Amar Singh had already died and as such the fact that Amar Singh was possessed of property and that he could make arrangement for the maintenance of the Petitioner and her children was not a relevant consideration for arriving at the finding. The finding in regard to the bona-fide need is, therefore, vitiated in law. 8. In Champa Kuer Trust vs. D.J. 1976 AWC 200 , K.C. Agarwal, J. considered the effect of both Section 21(1)(a) and 21(1)(b) of the Act. The finding in regard to the bona-fide need is, therefore, vitiated in law. 8. In Champa Kuer Trust vs. D.J. 1976 AWC 200 , K.C. Agarwal, J. considered the effect of both Section 21(1)(a) and 21(1)(b) of the Act. He has held that even if the landlord is not able to make out a case u/s 21(1)(b) the property could be released to the landlord if it was found that the landlord immediately requires the building for demolition in order to fulfil his requirement, then he is entitled to get an order of eviction u/s 21(1)(a) of the Act. The appellate court has not considered this aspect at all as to whether even if the building is not in a dilapidated condition, the Petitioner bona-fide requires the building in order to demolish it and thereafter fulfil her requirement. This matter needs reconsideration. 9. In regard to the second submission the question which has to be examined is as to what is the meaning of the expression dilapidated condition used in Section 21(1)(b) of the Act. The District Judge has taken the view that the word dilapidated should be given a meaning that the building has gone to waste and was in ruins. In fact what the District Judge implied by giving this meaning to the word dilapidated was that the building was not in use at all and has fallen down. In my opinion the District Judge has put a wholly erroneous interpretation on the word dilapidated condition. 10. The word dilapidated has not been used singly. It has been used in conjunction with the word condition. The expression used is the building is in a dilapidated condition. The words used clearly imply that the building must be in existence in some form, otherwise, the question of release does not arise. Its condition must be dilapidated in nature. The words which require interpretation are dilapidated condition. 11. When a word is not defined in the Act itself it is permissible to refer to dictionaries to find out the general sense in which that word is understood in common parlance. Its condition must be dilapidated in nature. The words which require interpretation are dilapidated condition. 11. When a word is not defined in the Act itself it is permissible to refer to dictionaries to find out the general sense in which that word is understood in common parlance. It is further settled law that in selecting one out of the various meanings of a word regard must always be had to the context as it is a fundamental rule that the meanings of words and expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear. 12. In Section 21(1)(b) the expression dilapidated is used for the building and it is, therefore, necessary to find out what meaning should be given to the word dilapidated in such a context. In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Third Edition, the word dilapidated has been defined to bring (a building) into a state of decay or of partial ruin. The other meaning given is to fall into ruin, decay, or disrepair. In the dictionary when the word dilapidated is used in relation to a building the definition is into a state of decay or of partial ruin, the word dilapidated cannot possibly mean complete ruin. 13. In my opinion the proper meaning which should be given to the word dilapidated in the present context is a building which is in a state of decay or of partial ruin or disrepair. A building though it may stand but if it is lying in a very bad condition due to no repairs at all it would come in the category of dilapidated. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. There may be a building in which the walls are cracking, portions of roofs are likely to fall down, the beams have been eaten away by the white ants etc. This will be a case of a building being in a dilapidated condition though it may still be inhabited by people. It may also be possible that a part of the building may be in a dilapidated condition when too Section 21(1)(b) will fully apply because partial ruin also comes within the definition of dilapidated, but that does not mean that only a small insignificant portion or an out-house is in a dilapidated condition. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 14. It depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. 14. In view of the wrong interpretation put by the learned District Judge on the expression dilapidated condition the finding recorded that the building was not in a dilapidated condition is vitiated in law and is liable to beset aside. 15. In the circumstances, I find that both the submissions made by the Learned Counsel have substance. The application for release was moved as far back as in 1971. Eight years have already elapsed. Petitioner's husband has died. Fresh events have taken place and in the circumstances, I think in the interest of justice that the parties be permitted to file fresh evidence by way of affidavits to establish their respective cases. 16. In the result, I allow the petition and quash the judgment of the District Judge dated 5th March, 1978 and direct that the appeals (C.A. Nos. 9 of 1977 and 10 of 1977) be decided afresh in the light of the observations made above. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.