Judgment This Rule has been obtained by an applicant for per-emption under Section 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, (hereinafter referred to as the Act). On March 30, 1970 the opposite party No. 2 sold his 1/4th share in plot No. 468 appertaining to R.S. Khatian No. 2 along with other plots to the opposite party No. 1. The petitioner wanted pre-emption of the plot on the ground that he was a co-sharer in the holding and also on the ground that he had land adjacent to the disputed plot. The application was contested by the opposite party No. 1 on the ground that it was not maintainable and also that it was barred by limitation. 2. The application under Section 8 of the Act was filed on July 5, 1971 before the Revenue Officer, Contai. On July 15, 1972 the records were transferred to the Munsif, Contai, in view of the amendment to section 8 brought about by the Amending Act XII of 1972. On behalf of the applicant for pre-emption it was urged before the learned Munsif that the applicant was kept out of knowledge of the transfer as that opposite party No.1 did not exercise any act of possession in the disputed plot. This contention was not accepted by the learned Munsif who came to the conclusion that it was impossible that the applicant came to know of the transfer for the first time on 1st Jaistha, 1378 B.S. The learned Munsif dismissed the application for pre-emption on the ground that it was barred by limitation. Against this order the petitioner filed an appeal before the lower appellate Court which was heard by the learned Additional District Judge, Midnapore. The learned Additional District Judge concurred with the findings of the learned Munsif and dismissed the appeal. Against the said order the petitioner has obtained the present Rule. 3. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Advocate for the petitioner has contended that the Courts below were wrong in dismissing the application on the ground that it was barred by limitation in view of the fact that the petitioner had no knowledge of the transfer and as such the last date for filing the application was 3 years from the date of his knowledge and the present application having been filed on July 5, 1971, it was well within the period of limitation. 4. Mr. 4. Mr. Bhunia, learned Advocate for the opposite parties, contested the Rule contending, inter alia, that the disputed plot of land being a doba, the instant application for pre-emption was not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 8 read with cl. (7) of Section 2 of the Act; Section 8 of the Act creates right of pre-emption in favour of a co "sharer raiyat of the holding a share or portion of which may be transferred by another co-sharer to a third party. It also creates a right of pre-emption in favour of a raiyat possessing land adjacent to such holding. Clause (7) of Section 2 of the Act defines 'land' as meaning agricultural lend (other than certain classes of lands mentioned in the said clause). It was contended that the disputed plot not being land within the definition given in the Act, it was outside the purview of Section 8 of the Act. It has also been contend that a tank is non-agricultural land and it is outside the purview of Section 8 of the Act. In support of this contention Mr. Bhunia relied upon the decisions in (1) Kalipada Ghosh v. Dulal Chandra Ghosh and also (2) Prufullabala Devi v. States of West Bengal. Mr. Bhunia also contended that if the petitioner was claiming pre-emption on the ground of vicinage, he was not entitled to an extension or time in view of the decision in (3) Sm. Ashalata Bairagya and another v. Gopal Chandra Chakravarti and ors. (1) 82 CWN 950, (2) 80 CWN 544, (3) (1975) 1 C.L.J. 494 . The next contention of Mr. Bhunia is that apart from Plot No. 468 there were other plots conveyed by the opposite party No.2 to the opposite party No. 1 by Ext. 1, the sale deed dated March 30, 1970. The petitioner was seeking to pre-empt only plot No. 468 and not other plots. It was argued that such a partial pre-emption was not contemplated by the Act. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the decision in (4) Board of Revenue for Rajasthan, Ajmer and ors. v. Rao Baldev Singh and ors. Mr. The petitioner was seeking to pre-empt only plot No. 468 and not other plots. It was argued that such a partial pre-emption was not contemplated by the Act. In support of this contention reliance was placed on the decision in (4) Board of Revenue for Rajasthan, Ajmer and ors. v. Rao Baldev Singh and ors. Mr. Bhunia has argued that if the petitioner wants to exercise his right of pre-emption under the Act, he must pre-empt the entire sale covering all the plots and he is not entitled to pre-empt only some of the properties covered by the sale. The next contention of Mr. Bhunia was that the application for pre-emption filed before the Revenue Officer was incompetent in view of the amendment of the Act (Amending Act, XII of 1972). It was provided by the said amending Act, that in place of the application under Section 8 being filed before the Revenue Officer as provided by the Act as originally stood before the amendment, such application would have to be filed before the Munsif having Jurisdiction over the property sought to be preempted. This Amendment Act came into force on February 15, 1971. It was contended that the present application having been filed on July 5, 1971, the application before the Revenue Officer was incompetent and the transfer of the records purported to have been made would not cure this defect, as the Amending Act provides that all pending applications will be transferred. But in the present case there was no application pending at the relevant time. The contentions urged on behalf of the opposite parties by Mr. Bhunia have considerable force and must be given effect to. 5. Mr. Mukherjee learned Advocate on behalf of the petitioner made a prayer that his client should be given an opportunity to file an application under sec. 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in presenting the application. This prayer has been made at a very late stage. In order to decide whether the petitioner was entitled to the condonation of delay, it would be necessary to go into facts, and, in my view, it is not possible to allow the petitioner to take up this point at this stage. The matter appears to be concluded by finding of fact arrived at by the Courts below. (4) AIR 1968 SC 898 . The matter appears to be concluded by finding of fact arrived at by the Courts below. (4) AIR 1968 SC 898 . This Rule is, therefore, liable to be and it is accordingly discharged with costs.