JUDGEMENT Order :- This is an application in revision by the petitioner for setting aside the order passed on 6th of January, 1978 by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharsa. It appears that this petitioner was also an accused in Saharsa P. S. case No. 6 (1) 75 under S. 396 of the Indian Penal Code. The Police after investigation submitted charge-sheet against other accused persons but did not send up the petitioner. The charge-sheet was put up before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharsa, who, by his order dated 1st of July, 1977 held that there was prima facie material against the petitioner also in the case diary to put him on trial and as such he directed to issue non-bailable warrant of arrest against him. The petitioner being aggrieved by the said order went in the revision before the Sessions Judge, Saharsa, who, by his order dated 29th of November, 1977, set aside the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate passed on 1st of July, 1977 and sent back the case to him for reconsideration in the light of the observation made by him in his order. When the case again went back to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Saharsa, he, after discussing, in the impugned order, passed on 6th of January, 1978, the order of the learned Sessions Judge, again passed order for issue of non-bailable warrant of arrest against the petitioner. Hence this application in revision by the petitioner. 2. Learned counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has submitted that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has shown utter disregard to the order of the learned Sessions Judge and has virtually sat in judgment against the order passed by the learned Sessions Judge when he should have followed the direction given by him. He has also submitted that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has not correctly followed the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra (AIR 1868 SC 117). In that case the Supreme Court has held that a Magistrate has no power expressly or impliedly to call upon the police to submit charge-sheet. He has also submitted that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has not correctly followed the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra (AIR 1868 SC 117). In that case the Supreme Court has held that a Magistrate has no power expressly or impliedly to call upon the police to submit charge-sheet. The Supreme Court has further held that the Magistrate is not bound to accept the report of the police and so, if he suspects that an offence has been committed, he is entitled, notwithstanding the opinion of the police, to take cognizance under S. 190 (1) (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the Supreme Court at that time was considering the provision of S. 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Now, there has been slight change in that and in S. 190 (1) (c) of the new Code the words 'or suspicion' have been omitted. Formally under the old Code S. 190 (1) (c) read as follows :- "190 (1). Except as hereinafter provided, any Presidency Magistrate, District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, and any other Magistrate specially empowered in this behalf, may take cognizance of any offence. - (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion, that such offence has been committed." Now, under the new Code, cl. (c) of Section 190 (1) reads as follows :- "(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed." From the above quotations it is clear that the words "or suspicion" have now been omitted and so while discussing the provision under the old Code the Supreme Court has observed that a very wide power is conferred on the Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence not only when he receives information about the commission of an offence from a third person but also where he has knowledge or even suspicion that an offence has been committed. Now, under the new Code the Magistrate can take cognizance on receiving information about the commission of an offence from a third person or also where he has knowledge that an offence has been committed and not on suspicion. Now, under the new Code the Magistrate can take cognizance on receiving information about the commission of an offence from a third person or also where he has knowledge that an offence has been committed and not on suspicion. So, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Chief Judicial Magistrate was certainly entitled not to agree with the final report submitted in regard to the petitioner and not sending him up for trial but he should have directed the police to make further investigation or he should have proceeded against the other accused persons against whom police had submitted charge-sheet and, in case, in course of the trial of the other accused persons the trial court would have found any evidence against this petitioner also, then the trial Court under S. 319 of the Code would have summoned him to stand his trial. 3. Section 319 (1) of the new Code of Criminal Procedure runs thus :- "Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the courts may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed." Learned counsel for the petitioner thus submitted that the petitioner even though not put on trial immediately along with the other accused persons can be subsequently put on trial along with them if in course of the trial it appears from the evidence adduced that the petitioner had also committed the offence. In my opinion, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is well founded. The learned Magistrate could have taken cognizance against the petitioner only if there was either charge-sheet submitted against him or there was any protest petition under Sec. 190 (1) (c) on his own knowledge but not on his mere suspicion. 4. In the result, the application is allowed, the impugned order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate is set aside and the case is sent back to him to proceed with it in accordance with law. Application allowed.