Judgment Hari Lal Agrawal, J. 1. -this application in revision is directed against an appellate order passed by the 4th Additional District Judge, Patna, directing the petitioners to deposit the arrears of house rent from 15-11-1973 to 15-1-1978 as well as future rents at the rate of Rs.800/- per month in accordance with section 11-A of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control act, 1947 (to be referred here inafter as "the Act") 2. The petitioners challenged the order on the ground that the court of appeal below had no jurisdiction to make direction for payment of arrears of rent for a period prior to the filing of the appeal in that court. 3. The plaintiff opposite-party filed the title suit in question on 19-9-1968 against the petitioner for their eviction from the ground floor of a double-storeyed building situated in the town of Patna on the ground of expiry of the period of lease and default in payment of rent and other grounds. 4. The trial court dismissed the suit on 22-12-1973 on merits and thereafter the plaintiff filed the title appeal in question on 4-3-1974 in the court of appeal below. On 11-10-1974 the plaintiff-appellant filed an application under section 11-A of the Act for an order to the petitioners to deposit the arrears and future rents. In the rejoinder the petitioner contended that they had deposited the rents upto the period 14-11-1973 in pursuance of a similar order passed by the trial court, dated 22-7-1969, and thereafter had been remitting the rent by money order to the plaintiff landlady who had been refusing the same, and accordingly they pleaded that in view of the full Bench decision of this Court in Ram Nandan Sharmas case (A. I. R.1975 Patna 283), they were entitled to the refund of Rs.4,900/-, being the rent lor the period 15-3-1968 to 18-9-1968 which was a period prior to the institution of the title suit in question they further pleaded that arrears of rent from 15-11-1973 to 3-3-1974, amounting to Rs.2,842/-, which again was a period perior to the filing of the title appeal in question, could not be ordered to be deposited. Yet another plea which was raised by them, was that no order could be passed to deposit the rent at the rate of Rs.800/- per month as the original rent of the premises was only Rs.600/- and its increase being illegal, the increased rent could no be made the basis of the order under challenge. 5. Mr. Amla Kanth Choudhary, appearing in support of this application, challenged the order of the court of appeal below on all the three grounds indicated above. The first ground that the petitioners were entitled to a set off of Rs.4,900/-being the rent deposited by them for the period prior to the institution of the suit, is misconceived. The trial court had passed the order on 22-7-1969, much before the judgment of the Full Bench in Ram Nandan Sharmas case (supra)which was in accordance with the express view of this Court declared in several decisions, all of which were overruled by the Full Bench in the above case. That order of the trial court not having been challenged and, on the other hand, having been complied with by the petitioners, they cannot claim any adjustment of set off for the payments made in pursuance of that order. 6. In support of his second ground of attack that the court of appeal below could not have made an order of depositing the arrears of rent for a period prior to the filing of the title appeal itself, learned counsel referred to the following observations made in the Full Bench case ; ". . . . . . It is therefore just and proper that the arrears of rent occurring in section 11-A must bo interpreted to mean arrears of rent falling due during the period of the suit, which expression, in certain circumstances, may mean period of appeal or appeals, on the basis of the well-known principle that an appeal is a continuation of the suit. . . . . . " According to the admitted case of the petitioners, they had deposited the rent for the period covering upto 14-11-1973 in the trial court itself and as the suit waa dismissed they need not have deposited any further rent and therefore, they started remitting rent by money order which was refused. It therefore, remains undisputed that rent from 15.11-1973 was in arears. It therefore, remains undisputed that rent from 15.11-1973 was in arears. The question, that however, been raised is as to whether the court of appeal below had to confine the period of arrears of rent only from the date of institution of the appeal or could order for any pariod prior to the same which the matter was pending in the trial court. It has been observed times without number as well as in the very Full Bench decision referred to above, that appeal is a continuation of the suit. The expression just extracted from the full Bench decision cannot be construed in the sense the learned counsel for the petitioners intends. One of the question that was mooted before the full Bench was as to whether any period of limitation would apply at the time of passing an order under section 11-A of the Act or not. In that context it was observed that "filing of an application under section 11-A of the Bihar act is not circumscribed by any pariod of limitation, and all arrears of rent accruing during the pendency of suit, which expression in certain circumstances may mean pendency of appeal or appeals. . . . . . can be ordered to be deposited" This observation to my mind was made to indicate that even the long pendency of a suit during its appellate stages, which may spread over to several years, would not stand in the way of the landlord to obtain an order under section 11-A of the Act for the entire period of the pendency of the list and no question of limitation would arise. This view can be supported from a further observation made in the same judgment at a later stage where referring to the provisions of section 11-A, it was observed that "by providing for filing of an application under section 11-A to be filed at any stage of the suit, the Bihar Legislature intended such an application to be not circumscribed by way of limitation. " the observation made in the Full Bench, relied upon by Mr. " the observation made in the Full Bench, relied upon by Mr. Ghoudhary, cannot be construed to mean that in an application made by the landlord under section 11-A of the Act in an appellate court, the appellate court could not make any order for arrears of rent for a period prior to the filing of the appeal when the matter was pending in the trial court. In my opinion, such a construction is not possible and on examining the scheme of the provisions of section 11-A of the Act and the observations of this Court in Ram Nandan sharmas case (supra) I am of the view that an order under section 11-A of the act can be made by the first or the second appellate court against a tenant directing him to pay the arrears of rent for the entire period from a date subsequent to the institution of the suit. A somewhat similar view has already been taken by me in an unreported decision in the case of Keshar Sah V/s. Hira Lal and others, in Civil Revision no.1128 of 1974 disposed of on 17-9-1975. 7 Now remains for consideration the last ground as to whether the court could have made an order to deposit the arrears at the rate of Rs.800/-per month. It is no doubt true that at one time a Bench of this Court in the case of Manoranjan Nath Patra V/s. Kashi Prasad Sah (A. I. R. Patna 421)had taken a view, as contended by Mr. Chowdhary, that no order under section 11-A of the Act could be made at the rate of rent which was different from the original rate of rent, being opposed to the provisions contained in section 4 of the Act, the said decision has been overruled by a Full Bench of five Judges in the case of N. M. Verma V/s. Upendra Narain Singh (A I. R.1978 patna 101), where it has been clearly laid down that the only thing to be looked into by the court at the time of passing an order under section 11-A of the Act was to see as to what was the last paid rent Admittedly in this case, rs.800/- was the rate at which the petitioners were paying the rent at the time when the order was passed. The third ground also, therefore, had got no substance. 8. The third ground also, therefore, had got no substance. 8. The result of the above discussions is that all the three points urged on behalf of the petitioners having been found to be without any substance, this application must fail. The application is accordingly dismissed with costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs 55/- only. Application dismissed.