Judgment :- The land owners have approached this Court questioning the decision on an application initiated under S.80B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act (hereinafter called the Act) by the 1st respondent for purchase of his alleged kudikidappu. The 1st respondent in his application had stated that he has been residing in the premises from 1952 onwards as a kudikidappukaran. That application was opposed by the 1st petitioner herein, who was alone on the party array as the respondent. She contended that the house referred to in the petition had been entrusted to the father of the 1st respondent, one Neelakantan. After his death, the 1st respondent alone is not entitled to file the application without other legal heirs of deceased Neelakantan. Regarding the value of the building also there was some dispute. She had also contended that the paramba in which the building is situate had been gifted to his son, Manu, and after his death his wife was in possession of the property and she was a necessary party to the proceeding. Consequently that party was also impleaded, who now figures as the 2nd petitioner in the Civil Revision Petition. The Revenue Inspector estimated the cost of the building at Rs. 702.50 and estimated the old age as 25 years. Accepting this report, the Land Tribunal declared the 1st respondent as a kudikidappukaran and 9 cents was allowed to be purchased by him adjoining the kudikidappu. The matter was taken up in appeal and the Appellate Authority confirmed the order of the Land Tribunal. 2. What was mainly contended before me in this Civil Revision Petition was that there was no entrustment of the house to the 1st respondent and therefore the 1st respondent cannot claim to be a kudikidappukaran. It was contended that the lower tribunals erred in holding that the 1st respondent is a kudikidappukaran, as the entrustment was only to his father. It might be useful in this connection to say how the appellate authority has discussed this question. What that authority states is that: "The case of the petitioner in the application is that he obtained the building in question about 45 years back. That the petitioner is in possession and occupation of the petition building is not disputed. That the entrustment was to the father of the petitioner has not been established by the production of any document. That the petitioner is in possession and occupation of the petition building is not disputed. That the entrustment was to the father of the petitioner has not been established by the production of any document. As such the contention that the application is bad for non joinder also cannot be upheld." What Smt. Sumathi Dandapani, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended before me was that it is for the applicant to establish that he is a kudikidappukaran, as his allegation that he was entrusted with the building had been denied. In the absence of positive proof with regard to that the Tribunals below should not have allowed the application for purchase. She also contended that the applicant would not be entitled to take advantage of the Explanation.lIA to S.2(25) of the Act, which defines a kudikidappukaran. It is no doubt true that the permissive nature of his occupation is an essential element for claiming to be a kudikidappukaran. Though in Explanation HA it had been stated that notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court, a person, who, on the 16th day of August, 1968, was in occupation of any land and the dwelling house thereon (whether constructed by him or by any of his predecessors-in-interest or belonging to any other person) and continued to be in such occupation till the 1st day of January, 1970, shall be deemed to be a kudikidappukaran, a person whose occupation has not commenced with the permission of the land owner will not be entitled to take advantage of that explanation. The decisions reported in Janardhanan v. Chinna (1972 KLT. 207), Chinnan v. Gopinathan (1975 KLT. 50). Mohamed Mytheen v. Sreedharan (1976 KLT. 919) and Sankaran v. Kumaran (1977 KLT. 275) are to that effect. Then, here the question is, can it be said that even on the basis of the petitioners' contention the 1st respondent could be said to be a person who is in occupation of the building without the permission of the landowner. According to the petitioners, the permission was granted to the father of the Ist respondent to reside in the premises and it is also stated before me that permission had been granted to the respondent's father to have the use and occupation of the land for the purpose of erecting a homestead. There is no evidence in the case as to when the respondent's father died. There is no evidence in the case as to when the respondent's father died. If it is a case where the respondent's father died after the Act, then under S.78 his right would have devolved on his heirs. S 78 says that the rights of a kudikidappukaran in his kudikidappu shall be heritable but not alienable except to any person mentioned in sub-clause (a) or sub-clause (b) of Clause (i) of sub-section (1) of S.75. If he had died before the Kerala Land Reforms Act came into force, he was a kudikidappukaran in the nature of the permission granted to him under the general law and under the general law the position of the kudikidappukaran is more or less in the nature of a licencee who in pursuance of the licence had put up a building on a land. If a building had been put up in pursuance of such licence the licence had become irrevocable as between the original parties. It is well settled that the right of such a licensee is heritable though not alienable. (See Amjad Khan v. Shafiuddin Khan (1925 All. 203) It is useful to refer to Nasirul Zaman Khan v. Azimuilah (28 All. 741), Motilal v. Kabi Mandar (19 C.L.J. 221), Surnomoyee v. Chandar (12 C.L. J. 443) etc.. cases referred to by Katiar in his " Law of Easements and Licenses", 3rd Edition, at page 405. In Narayana Prabhu v. Ratna Bai (XVI CLR. 438) an eminent judge of the erstwhile Cochin Chief Court, Justice P. Narayana Menon, has equated the position of a kudikidappukaran to that of a licensee and said that his license is irrevocable, since even a mere license becomes irrevocable, when the licensee, acting upon the license, has executed work of a permanent and substantial character and has incurred expenses in so doing Though on the main question in the case, the other two equally eminent judges did not agree with Justice Narayana Menon, one of them Justice Varugis also stated that a license in pursuance of which a house was built on a land, is irrevocable as between the original parties. But then he said that it cannot be binding on a person who has purchased the grantor's right in court auction. A learned judge of this Court had occasion to consider the position of a kudikidapdukaran under the general law. But then he said that it cannot be binding on a person who has purchased the grantor's right in court auction. A learned judge of this Court had occasion to consider the position of a kudikidapdukaran under the general law. I am referring here to the decision of Justice Varadaraja Iyengar in Gangadharan v. Mominic Gomes & Others (1958 KLJ. 481), where the learned judge said: "According to the learned counsel, the only right claimable by the respondents was against eviction from the site of the house and reference was made to the provision in S 3 of the Travancore-Cochin Prevention of Eviction of Kudikidappukars Act, 13 of 1955 that every "kudikidappukaran" in occupation of a "kudiyirippu" shall have a right of permanent occupancy in his kudiyirippu, which under the definition in S.2(c) comprised only the site of a homestead. But this argument overlooks the rule as to accessory licenses, that when the use of a thing is granted, everything is granted by which the grantee may have and enjoy such use. That is to say, when a person is entitled to the enjoyment of any interest or to the exercise of any right, he is deemed to be entitled to do all acts which are necessary for such enjoyment or exercise, except it may be, to the extent of any express reservation requiring the grantee not to do certain acts. See S.55 of the Indian Easements Act, which provides: "All licenses necessary for the enjoyment of any interest, or the exercise of any right are implied in the constitution of such interest or right." So when the owner of a flat leaves it to a tenant for him and his family's residence he must be deemed to have given permission for what is reasonably necessary for the reasonable use and enjoyment of the flat for that purpose. Butterly Co. Ltd. v. New Huck-wall Colliery Co. (1910) A. C. 381. And these accessory licenses continue so long as the interest or the right to which they are annexed continue. Butterly Co. Ltd. v. New Huck-wall Colliery Co. (1910) A. C. 381. And these accessory licenses continue so long as the interest or the right to which they are annexed continue. So if the original license cannot be revoked, e.g. when the licensee acting upon the license has put up a permanent structure, the accessory licenses cannot likewise be revoked (i.e.) they can both be enforced against all transferees of the property, whether or not a license is an appurtenance to the property transferred so as to run with it like any other appurtenance thereto, is always a question of fact which depends on the examination of all the relevant circumstances attending a particular case. The respondents cannot therefore be denied a right of action against the 1st defendant, if their accessory licenses are disturbed by any action of his." The above discussion would lead to the conclusion that even assuming the petitioner's case is true that permission had been granted to the father of the respondents, the father's right as a kudikidappukaran had devolved on the 1st respondent and his other legal representatives. It cannot therefore be said that the 1st respondent was in possession without permission of the land owner. In this context the learned counsel for the petitioner referred to the decision of this Court in CRP. No. 1659 of 1976 In that case a person began to reside with his brother to whom permission had been granted for occupying a hut. That person by himself had not got any permission. It had been contended in that case that by no stretch of imagination could it be said that the particular person who had been staying along with his brother till 1958 and thereafter without his brother could be characterised as a trespasser, and he would be entitled to take advantage of Explanation IIA in S.2 (25) of the Act. In meeting this contention, Justice Bhaskaran observed: "It may be that it was with permission of his brother that the revision petitioner was staying with him from 1943 onwards. In meeting this contention, Justice Bhaskaran observed: "It may be that it was with permission of his brother that the revision petitioner was staying with him from 1943 onwards. All the same, in the eye of law, such occupation by him cannot be treated as with permission of the landlord, whose permission alone matters as far as the kudikidappu right is concerned as long as there is no evidence to show that permission was granted by the landlord." The learned judge there had quoted with approval the following observation of Justice Madhavan Nair in Janardhanan v. Chinna (1972 KLT. 207): "A person in occupation by virtue of a right vested in another, e.g. a wife, child, member of the family, or servant residing in a building or outhouse in virtue of a right in the husband, parent, manager of the family or master, cannot claim the statues of a kudikidappukaran." I do not think this decision would be applicable in this case. In this case the right is claimed by the legal representative of deceased kudikidappukaran. In regard to the contention of the petitioners that the petition is not maintainable in the absence of the other legal representatives, there is no evidence in this case to show that the 1st respondent's father had left other legal representatives. In the circumstances of the case, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned order. The Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Dismissed.