JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a second appeal against the Judgment and decree dated November 2, 1972, passed by Sri C.E. David, Additional Commissioner, Allahabad Division, in appeal No. 170 Kanpur arising out of an order dated December 21, 1971, passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st class, Kanpur, in a suit under Section 229-B of U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. The Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur, filed an appeal on March 9, 1972, against the Judgment and decree dated December 21, 1971, passed by the Assistant Collector, 1st Class, Kanpur, in suit No. 209 of 1971, under Section 229-B, U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. The learned Additional Commissioner has held that the appeal is time barred and dismissed it on this ground. This order has been challenged in the second appeal. 4. The ground taken in the second appeal is that the affidavit filed on behalf of Nagar Mahapalika remained unrebutted and as such the learned Additional Commissioner acted illegally and with irregularity and arbitrarily exercised jurisdiction in refusing to condone the delay and in dismissing the appeal as time barred. Now the record shows that the Judgment of the trial court was dated December 11, 1971. The date of application of the copy of Judgment is January 6, 1972 and the date of delivery is shown to be January 11, 1972. The counsel for the Nagar Mahapalika has, along with the appeal, filed in application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This affidavit has not been countered and contradicted by any counter affidavit on behalf of the respondent, Balgovind and, therefore, must be believed. In para 8 of the affidavit it is stated that the copies were actually delivered in March 7, 1972 though the date of delivery is shown as January 20, 1972. In other words the period January 6, 1972 to March 7, 1972 should be excluded while counting the period of limitation for filing the appeal. If this period is excluded, the appeal was filed within time. Apart from that the law of limitation is not to be applied mechanically. In other words the period January 6, 1972 to March 7, 1972 should be excluded while counting the period of limitation for filing the appeal. If this period is excluded, the appeal was filed within time. Apart from that the law of limitation is not to be applied mechanically. Every court has to keep the interest of justice paramount and if the court feels that sufficient cause has been made out, then the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be given. In this connection the learned counsel for the appellant has cited 1979 A.W.C. in which Hon'ble Justice R.M. Sahai has considered sufficient cause for the purpose of Section 5 of the Act and has observed as follows:- "The expanses of the words, 'sufficient cause' engulfs in its fold good or just, bona fide, honest individually and collectively. Any cause which prevents a person approaching the court within time is sufficient. In doing so it is the test of reasonable man in normal circumstances which has to be applied." 5. The mere fact that a person with exceptional speed or superhuman effort could have approached is no ground for refusing relief to another whose only fault may be lack of resources of poor advice etc. An illiterate litigant residing in a village unaware of the niceties of law needs a reasonable if not better treatment than a big business magnate or commercial head fighting his cause through law officer of the State Government or Union Government Manning its litigation through an entire law department. If an explanation given by the law officer of a company or a superintendent in the law department that the delay was caused due to correspondence and obtaining expert advice or instruction from the Government can be considered honest, just and bona fide. It is indeed callous to disregard the explanation of a poor. Illiterate ignorant villager whose total wealth is the land and to protect which runs from pillar to post and is exploited at all hands whether it be the court staff or the lawyers, chamber. 6. As far back as 1962 the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Lal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 361 approved the classic passage from the Full Bench Judgment of the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chelappar, I.L.R. 13 Mad. 269. 6. As far back as 1962 the Supreme Court in the case of Ram Lal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 361 approved the classic passage from the Full Bench Judgment of the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chelappar, I.L.R. 13 Mad. 269. "Section 5 gives the court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood the words 'sufficient cause' receiving liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice with no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide as imputable to the appellant." The learned Additional Commissioner has failed to exercise the criteria laid down by the Supreme Court which has been reaffirmed in the above Judgment of the Allahabad High Court even if he considered that there was a few days delay in filing the appeal, there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The order of the learned Additional Commissioner dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation is arbitrary. 7. The result is that I hereby allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order of the learned Additional Commissioner. The learned Additional Commissioner is directed to entertain the first appeal and to condone the delay, if any, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and thereafter hear and decide it on merits.