JUDGMENT: S. Shamsul Hasan J. This is an application by the landlord arising out of proceeding under the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947, (herein after to be referred to 1947 Act,) in relation to holding nos, 524 and 525 under ward no. 3 of Halwatta Mahalla within Biharsharif Municipality. The petitioner has prayed for quashing of an order dated 21. 11.77 (Annexure-1) passed by the Commissioner, Patna Dvn. arising out of a revision from the order of the District Magistrate, Nalanda dated. 17.6.1975. 2. Briefly stated, facts are that the respondent no. 1. (Inder Deo Prasad) was the tenant in holding nos. 524 and 525 aforesaid on the strength of a registered agreement entered into on 5.12.1973, (or a period of 11 years by which a rent of Rs. 265/-per month besides municipal taxes, was agreed to be paid by respondent no. 1. Subsequently, respondent no. 1 filed a petition before the Sub-divisional officer, Biharsharif, for fixation of fair rent under section 8 (b) of the 1947 Act which was numbered as Nalanda case no. 2 (H. C.) of 1974. This case was decided exparte on 22.6.74 and the rent was fixed at Rs. 521 per month. The order of the Sub-divisional Officer is AnnexuIc-2. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order the petitioner filed an appeal In the court of Collector, Nalanda at Bibarsharif, which was numbered as Misc, Appeal no. 32 of 1974,. The Collector Nalanda by his order dated 17.6.1975 held that the house Controller had no jurisdiction in the case and. accordingly set aside the order fixing fair rent of the house. Respondent no. 1 then filed a revision application before the Commissioner Patna Division against the order of the Collector which was numbered as Revision Case no, 99 of 1975, The Commissioner by the impugned order (Annexure 1) set aside the order passed by the Collector and restored the order passed by the Sub-divisional Officer. 3. It may be stated here that the Sub-divisional Officer bad reduced the rent to Rs. 52/-per month on the ground that the fair rent of the building in respect of which there is municipal assessment, would be 1/10th of, the amount of such assessment. 3. It may be stated here that the Sub-divisional Officer bad reduced the rent to Rs. 52/-per month on the ground that the fair rent of the building in respect of which there is municipal assessment, would be 1/10th of, the amount of such assessment. The learned Collector held that the Sub-divisional Officer bad no jurisdiction to fix rent since the period of lease was for 11 years and although the rent was payable month to month, It was not a month to month tenancy as envisaged In the 1947 Act. 4. The order of the Commissioner has been assailed in this application on the following grounds. (i) During the pendency of the application before the Commissioner, 1947 Act lapsed by efflux of time. The Commissioner, therefore, was no longer empowered to dispose of the revision and the proceeding was not saved by the provisions of clasuse (c) of' the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 1 of 1947 Act: (ii) The application before the Commissioner was time barred and no specific order condoning the delay was passed by the commissioner : and (iii) The Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1977 (hereinafter to be referred to as 1977 Act') was not applicable to Biharsharif. 5. I will take up ground no. (i) first, For proper appreciation of the points Involved In the case It will be necessary to reproduce below the relevant provisions of both the 1947 Act and the 1977 Act. Section 1, Sub section (3) proviso (i) (b) and (c) of 1947 Act read as under: (3) It shall remain in force up to and including the 31st March, 1971. (i) Provided that the expiration of this Act under the operation of this sub section shall not. . . . xx xx xx (b) affect any liability Incurred under this Act, or any punishment incurred In respect of any contravention of this Act or any order made there under: or (c) affect any investigation or legal proceeding in respect of any such liability or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation or legal proceeding may be instituted, continued or enforced any such punishment may be imposed, as if this Act had not expired' . The relevant provision of 1977 Act applicable to this case is section 17 sub-section (3) which is as follows :- "(3) Section 25 shall come into force at once and the remaining provisions of this Act shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st April, 1976, and the Act shall remain in force up to and including the 31 st Much, 1981.; Provided that the expiration of' this Act shall not- (a) render recoverable any sum which during the continuance thereof was irrecoverable or affect the right of a tenant to recover any sum which during the continuanance of this Act was recoverable there under; or (b) affect any liability incurred under this Act or any punishment incurred in respect of any contravention of this Act or any order made there under or (c) affect any investigation or legal proceeding in respect of any such liability or punishment as afore• said and any Such investigation or legal proceeding may be Instituted, continued or enforced and any such punishment may be imposed, as if, this Act had not expired; Provided further that the expiration of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (Bihar Act III of 1947) between the period commencing from the 1st of April, 1976, and the commencement of this Act shall not- (a) render recoverable any sum which during the continuance there of was irrecoverable or affect the right of a tenant to recover any sum which during the continuance of that. Act was recoverable by him there under; or (b) affect any liability incurred under that Act or any punishment incurred in respect of any contravention of that Actor any order made there under; or (c) affect any investigation or illegal proceeding in respect of any such liability or punishment as aforesaid and any such investigation or legal proceeding may be instituted, continued or enforced any such punishment may be Imposed as if that Act had not expired." 6. From a mere reading of the provisions of 1977 Act it is clear that there is no hiatus between the 1947 Act and the 1977 Act. A legal fiction has been introduced by Section 1 (3) of the 1977 Act that all its provisions, except section 25, shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st April, 1976, the 1947 Act having expired on the 31st March, 1976. A legal fiction has been introduced by Section 1 (3) of the 1977 Act that all its provisions, except section 25, shall be deemed to have come into force on the 1st April, 1976, the 1947 Act having expired on the 31st March, 1976. This means that although the provisions were actually not in existence when the 1977 Act was passed, they should be presumed to be there during the entire period. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the provisions of 1977 Act, except section 25, came into force with effect from 1st April, 1976. It cannot, therefore, be argued that there was no enactment when the Commissioner disposed of the revision application. I am supported in my view by a Bench decision of this court in Ahmad Raza Khan V Bhola Pd.1 disposed of on 24.8.1978. The matter has been dealt with at great length in that decision and that does not warrant repetition here. 7. It was next urged that in view of section 1 of 1947 Act what was saved was any liability incurred under the Act. Since a decision in a fair rent proceeding did not create any liability against the petitioner the proceeding before the Commissioner could not be saved by operation of section 1 of 1947 Act. In my view there is no substance in this submission. I have already held that 1977 Act is a continuation of the said Act by virtue of section 1 (3) of the said Act, Harmonising the provisions of 1947 Act and 1977 Act, since the entire statute continued to be in existence there is no question of saving any liability that were incurred. By this retrospective application all pending proceedings automatically became alive. If once it is held that 1977 Act came into force with effect from the 1st April, 1977, then the provision of section 23 of the 1977 Act. which is similar to section 18 B of the 1947 Act will be deemed to be in existence on and from the 1st April, 1976, and therefore, the impugned order cannot be held to be illegal on that ground. 8. There is also no substance in the second point raised by learne1 counsel for the petitioner. The revision as filed under section 18 B of 1947 Act. 8. There is also no substance in the second point raised by learne1 counsel for the petitioner. The revision as filed under section 18 B of 1947 Act. This section lays down that the Commissioner may either of his own motion or on application made to him in this behalf, revise any order passed by the Controller or by the appellate authority on appeal under the Act, Rule 6 of the Bihar Buildings (L. R. E.) Control Rules, 1955 prescribes a period of fifteen days from the date of passing of that order after deducting the time occupied in obtaining copy of the order for filing an application before the Commissioner. It has also been provided that the Commissioner may entertain an application in revision after the expiry of the said period of fifteen days if he is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the application in time. The application under section 18 B of 1947 Act against the order of the collector was filed on 17.7.1975. It is mentioned in the order sheet that the application is time barred and 21.7.75 was fixed for hearing on the point of admission. The matter was heard on 19.8.75 when the application was admitted after hearing the petitioner. Records were called for and notices were issued to the opposite party. Neither does it appear from the order sheet nor from the order of the Commissioner that the petitioner raised any objection to the admission of the application on the ground that the application was time barred. The petitioner had appeared and contested the application on merits. In my view, therefore, the petitioner is precluded from raising this objection at this stage in the present application. Apart from this the commissioner has power to entertain an application suo motu. It is true that no specific order of condo-nation of delay has been passed by the Commissioner. Rule 6 itself does not prescribe the necessity of passing a specific order condoning the delay. The fact that the Commissioner entertained the application, in my view, would amount to his being satisfied that the delay was due to reasonable cause. There is, therefore, no substance in this ground also. 9. On behalf of the respondents the decision reported in the case of Sualal Yadav. V The State of Rajasthan2 was relied upon. The fact that the Commissioner entertained the application, in my view, would amount to his being satisfied that the delay was due to reasonable cause. There is, therefore, no substance in this ground also. 9. On behalf of the respondents the decision reported in the case of Sualal Yadav. V The State of Rajasthan2 was relied upon. In that case a revision application arising out of a departmental inquiry was made to the Governor after lapse of two years, and therefore the High court dismissed the writ application holding that the delay was unreasonable. The application had been filed in the High Court against the order of the Governor who refused to review the order of dismissal The Supreme Court held that since the Governor had not dismissed the review application on the ground of delay and having entertained the same and disposed it of on merit holding that it was not a fit case for review. It was not open to the High Court to resurrect the ground of delay in filing the review application and make it a ground for dismissing the writ application. The Supreme court was pleased to remit the writ application for disposal in accordance with law. Applying the principle of this case also there will be no justification for interfering with the order of the Commissioner. 10. The last submission of learned counsel for the petitioner was that 1977 Act does not apply to Biharsharif as the name of Biharsharif Municipality does not appear in the Schedule under section 1 (2) of the 1977 Act. The order of the Commissioner was passed On 21.11. 77 and it was only on 13.12. 77 that Biharsharlf was included in the schedule vide notification no. S. E. 1974 dated 13.12.77. It has been submitted by learned counsel for the respondent that Biharsharif was already included in the schedule of 1947 Act by virtue of the notification dated 4.10. 1947 published in the Bihar Gazette dated 15.10.1947 (part II, page 1951), and since the operation of the Act has been saved by Section 1 of 1941 Act, the schedule will also apply. When 1977 Act was introduced, the schedule under section 1 (2) thereof did Dot contain Biharsharif amongst the local area to which the Act applied This Act (1977 Act) was made applicable from 1. 4. 1976. When 1977 Act was introduced, the schedule under section 1 (2) thereof did Dot contain Biharsharif amongst the local area to which the Act applied This Act (1977 Act) was made applicable from 1. 4. 1976. 1947 Act along with the Schedule expired by efflux of time and without any bias the new Act along with the new schedule had been introduced. Undoubtedly, therefore, as far as the new Act is concerned, It was not applicable to Biharsharif till 12.12.1977. The respondent no. 1 however, is entitled to take advantage of section 1 (3) of the 1947 Act, clauses (b) and (c) which saves any liability incurred under the Act or any pending investigation and legal proceeding in respect of that liability. 11. It his been submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner, as already stated, no liability is incurred so far as the petitioner is concerned and the pending proceeding is saved only to the extent of protecting those proceedings by which liabilities are created. The word 'liability' bas been defined ill Oxford English Dictionary as follows:- "1. Condition of being liable or answerable by law or equity; 2. Condition of being subject to something; apt or likely to do something 3. That for which one is liable, like debts, pecuniary obligation. In Chamber 20th Century Dictionary 'Liability' has been defined to mean- "State of being liable: That for which one, is liable, a debt, etc." 'Liable' has been defined to mean: Subject to an obligation: exposed to a possibility or risk". Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that liability means any obligation that requires the person affected to be under some sort of strain or loess which means obligation to make payments by way of rent etc. In a matter relating to fixation of fair rent the liability in any event is of the tenant and not of the landlord. 12. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is fallacious because it gives a very narrow construction to the word. The extended meaning of the word 'liability' bas to be given to the statute. Liability is a relative word controlling both the landlord and the tenant. It may be that the landlord also has the obligation to receive less rent when a lower rate is fixed. The extended meaning of the word 'liability' bas to be given to the statute. Liability is a relative word controlling both the landlord and the tenant. It may be that the landlord also has the obligation to receive less rent when a lower rate is fixed. It cannot be said that the word liability applies only to the tenant and not to the landlord in view of the wide meaning of the word 'liability'. The proceeding, therefore, before the Commissioner was saved by section 1 (3) (b) (c) of 1947 Act and it cannot be said that the Commissioner had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. 13. In the result, there is no merit in the application and it is, accordingly, dismissed, but without costs. Application dismissed.