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1979 DIGILAW 80 (ALL)

MANJU RANI v. SARDAR MAN SINGH

1979-01-16

H.N.MITTAL, H.N.SETH

body1979
JUDGMENT : H.N. Seth, J.—This first appeal u/s 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act is directed against an order passed by the District Judge, Meerut dated 11-10-1968, acting as the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Meerut. By the impugned order the learned Judge held that the claim petition filed by the Appellants was barred by time. 2. An accident by a motor vehicle in which one Mr. Hari Shanker Goel lost his life, took place on 21-12-1968. According to the claimants, in the month of April 1967 Mr. Bhagwat Dayal, father of the deceased, contacted Mr. Dharam Vir Premi and Mr. Jai Prakash Jain, Advocates, with a view to file a suit for damages against the owner of the vehicle. The two lawyers advised him that limitation for filing a suit for recovery of damages was, under the old Limitation Act, one year but under the act as amended such a suit could be filed within two years of the date of accident. Mr. Bhagwat Dayal, then gave certain instructions to his lawyers, who in the meantime sent notices to the owner of the vehicle. The claimants being simple persons did not contact their lawyers any further till 20-12-1967, when they contacted them for filing the suit. At this stage they were advised by their counsel that as Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal for Meerut had been constituted on 24-4-1967, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try such a suit would be barred. Accordingly Sri Bhagwat Dayal, got the claim petition drafted and filed it before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal on the same day. Sri Bhagwat Dayal, mentioned all these facts in the claim petition, and prayed that in the circumstances the claim made by him may be entertained, even though the same has been presented beyond six months of the accident. The application was opposed on behalf of the opposite parties, primarily on the ground that the advice given to the claimants by his lawyers did not appear to be bonafide, and that there was no reason as to why the claimants did not contact their counsel in between the month of April 1967 and December 1967 when they presented the claim petition. 3. During the course of arguments before the Claims Tribunal, it was pointed out that the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Kumari Sushma Mehta Vs. 3. During the course of arguments before the Claims Tribunal, it was pointed out that the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Kumari Sushma Mehta Vs. Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd. and Others, and Dr. Omprakash Mishra Vs. National Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. and Others, , has held that in a case where the accident involving a motor vehicle took place prior to the constitution of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, a suit for recovery of damages for the loss sustained by reasons of such accident is maintainable. In the circumstances it cannot be said that advice given to Sri Bhagwat Dayal, by the two lawyers was not bonafide. 4. The Claims Tribunal observed, that wrong advice given by a counsel could constitute a good ground for condoning the delay if it could be shown that the counsel had, in giving that advice, acted with due care and diligence. It pointed out that there were decision to the contrary by Madras, Bombay and Punjab High Courts, wherein it had been held that even in a case where the accident took place prior to constitution of Claims Tribunal, it is the Tribunal and not the civil court which will have jurisdiction to deal with the claim. It held that the advice given by the counsel ignoring the views of there High Courts did not appear to be bonafide and that no case for condoning the delay in presenting the claim petition had been made out. 5. After hearing learned Counsel for the parties, we are of opinion that the order passed by the Claims Tribunal cannot be sustained. It has been very clearly laid down in the case of Palani Ammal v. Safe Service Ltd. and Anr. 1966 A.C.J. 19 that where the accident takes place before constitution of Claims Tribunal, the limitation for presenting a claim petition as laid in Sub-section 3 of Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act does not apply and that claims in regard to such accidents have to be made before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal within a reasonable time. The Supreme Court further indicated that normally in such cases the period mentioned in Section 110-A (3) of the Act computed with effect from the date of constitution of Claims Tribunal, can be considered to the reasonable time within which the claim should be preferred before the Tribunal. The Supreme Court further indicated that normally in such cases the period mentioned in Section 110-A (3) of the Act computed with effect from the date of constitution of Claims Tribunal, can be considered to the reasonable time within which the claim should be preferred before the Tribunal. It also held that even where such application is presented beyond the period stated above, it is open to the Tribunal to, in suitable cases, condone the delay in presenting the same. 6. In the instant case the accident took place on 21-12-1966, and the Claims Tribunal was constituted on 25.4.1967. The bar of limitation as provided in Sub-section (3) of Section 110-A will, therefore, not apply in the present case. Further, according to the affidavit filed by Sri Bhagwat Dayal he contacted the two lawyers for initiating proceedings with a view to recover compensation from the opposite parties in the beginning of April 1967 and that they advised him that limitation for filing the suit for compensation was two years from the date of accident. There is no reason to doubt the correctness of this averment. At that time the Claims Tribunal had not been constituted. Accordingly, only advice which in the circumstances of the case could be given by the lawyers at that time was that according to amended limitation Act the period of limitation for filing a suit for damages for loss sustained by reasons of the accident was two years from the date on which such accident took place. As the advice when it was given by the two lawyers was quite sound and correct, it cannot be said that it lacked bonafide or that it had not been given with a sense of responsibility. 7. Keeping in view the aforementioned advice given by the two lawyers, it cannot be said that Bhagwat Dayal, who represented the claimants who were the widow and minor children of the deceased, acted negligently in approaching the lawyers for filing the suit in the month of December, 1967. In the affidavit filed by him Bhagwat Dayal stated that he came to know about constitution of the Claims Tribunal only in the month of December 1967, when he approached his counsel for filing the suit. The averment made by Bhagwat Dayal appears to be true. In the affidavit filed by him Bhagwat Dayal stated that he came to know about constitution of the Claims Tribunal only in the month of December 1967, when he approached his counsel for filing the suit. The averment made by Bhagwat Dayal appears to be true. Once the lawyers advised Bhagwat Dayal that suit for damages could be filed within a period of two years from the date of accident, he had good reason to act in the way in which he claims to have acted. So long as he did not meet his lawyers, it is quite probable that he did not come to know either about the constitution of the Claims Tribunal or that his remedy lay in prefering a claim before it. In the circumstances, it can be said that there was good reason to the claimants not to prefer their claim within six months of constitution of the Claims Tribunal. 8. We are accordingly of opinion that as provided in Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, the delay in filing the claim petition deserved to be condoned, and that the Claims Tribunal erred in rejecting the prayer in this regard made by the Appellants. 9. The appeal, therefore, succeeds and is allowed. The order of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal dated 11.10.1968, is set aside. The matter will go back to the Claims Tribunal, Meernt for deciding the claim of the Appellants in accordance with law. The Appellants are entitled to their costs which shall be assessed as in a First Appeal from order.