Judgment :- 1. Both these Civil Revision Petitions arise out of proceedings for eviction of two tenants under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (hereinafter called the Act). The tenants are revision petitioners in CRP. No. 507 of 1979, while the landlords are the revision petitioners in CRP. No. 588 of 1979. The building concerned was taken on lease as per Ext. A-1 dated 9-10-1969 by the petitioners in CRP. No. 507 of 1979.1 will be referring to the parties on the basis of their position in CRP. 507 of 1979. Notice of eviction was sent on 12-7-1976, wherein it had been stated that the landlords required the building for their bona fide need. The Rent Control Court found that they did not have any bona fide need for eviction and that the 2nd petitioner was mainly depending upon the income from the schedule premises for his livelihood. However, eviction was ordered under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act holding that the 2nd petitioner was possessed of a building which was suitable for carrying on the trade, which is being conducted in the scheduled premises. 2. Appeals were taken to the Sub Court by both the landlords and the petitioners. The Sub Court reversing the decision of the Rent Controller found that the landlords were entitled to eviction on the ground of bona fide need. However, as the 2nd petitioner was entitled to protection of the second proviso to S.11(3), eviction therefore on the ground of bona fide need was refused. But eviction was granted again under S 11 (4) (iii) of the Act. There was a revision taken to the District Court under S.20 of the Act and in revision the District Judge held that though the landlords have got bona fide need, the tenants are not liable to surrender in view of the protection under second proviso to S.11 (3) of the Act The District Court however confirmed the findings of the lower authorities that eviction can be sustained under S.11 (4) (iii) of the Act. This decision has given rise to the Civil Revision Petitions. 3. What is contended by the tenants before me is that S.11 (4) (iii) of the Act is not attracted and would not apply to the facts and circumstances of the case. This decision has given rise to the Civil Revision Petitions. 3. What is contended by the tenants before me is that S.11 (4) (iii) of the Act is not attracted and would not apply to the facts and circumstances of the case. The 2nd petitioner, it is alleged, did not have any rights in building No. 9/252, which according to the court below and the lower Tribunals is a building reasonably sufficient for the requirements of the tenants and their occupation in the same town. It is urged that neither on the date of the application for eviction or on the date when the order for eviction was passed the 2nd petitioner had that right. It is their contention that the authorities below have erred in taking the property of the wife as the property of the husband. It is also urged that in any view of the matter on the date when the order was passed by the District Court the 2nd petitioner could not be held to be in possession of the building as there had been a transfer of his wife's right in the building before that date and long before he himself had surrendered his tenancy right. It is also pointed out that there was no consideration of the suitability of the building for the purpose of S.11(4)(iii) of the Act. Another contention that was put forward was that the notice that was issued by the landlord before the proceedings marked in this case, Ext. A-2, there was no claim for eviction under S.11 (4) (iii), that was because the landlords knew very well that the petitioners did not have any other suitable building to attract S.11 (4) (iii) of the Act. It is the tenants' case that the District Court failed to note that the petitioners had to surrender 9/252 when registered notice was sent by the original landlord and the assignee on 3-6-1976 and the surrender was on 21-6-1976. The finding of the courts below that the landlords' claim for eviction for bona fide need was sustainable is also attacked contending that the evidence on this aspect has been misread. 4. The finding of the courts below that the landlords' claim for eviction for bona fide need was sustainable is also attacked contending that the evidence on this aspect has been misread. 4. In the revision filed by the landlords a contention that is taken up is that the finding of the courts below is vitiated by material irregularity and illegality since the correct principles of law applicable to the facts of the case as laid down in the decision of this court in Kochappan Pillai v. Chellappan (1976 KLT.1) had not been appreciated and applied. It is contended that there was no acceptable evidence in the case justifying the conclusion that the tenant is depending for his livelihood on the income obtained from the trade conducted in the premises sought to be evicted. In the absence of the account books relating to the trade and in the absence of legal and cogent evidence regarding the total income and expenditure of the tenant, the court below should have drawn an adverse inference against the tenants. It should have been inferred that the accounts if produced would not substantiate the plea of the tenant under the second proviso to S.11(3) of the Act. It is also landlords' case that the courts below having found that the tenants have in possession another building situated in the same town which is reasonably sufficient to meet their requirements should have consistently held that the tenant is not entitled to the protection of the second proviso of S.11(3) of the Act. It is alleged that on a harmonious interpretation of S.11(4)(iii) and S.11(3), a tenant who is liable to be evicted under S.11(4)(iii) of the Act cannot claim protection of the second proviso of S.11(3) of the Act. Another contention that the landlords have taken up in the matter is that the finding of the courts below that no alternate building in the locality is available rested exclusively on Exts. B-10 and B-11 which had come into existence during the pendency of the litigation. Another contention that the landlords have taken up in the matter is that the finding of the courts below that no alternate building in the locality is available rested exclusively on Exts. B-10 and B-11 which had come into existence during the pendency of the litigation. Apart from the fact that no reliance ought to have been placed on these documents as they were not proved in accordance with law, the landlords' plea is that even assuming that these documents are admissible in evidence without proof the said documents can only show that the vacancy of any other building was not reported to the Accommodation Controller and not that no other building was really vacant. It is further pointed out that the courts below have not correctly posed the question as to whether the tenant had discharged the onus of proof cast on him by the second proviso of S.11 (3) of the Act and the courts below have drawn on conjectures and surmises in entering an adverse finding against the landlords, regarding the applicability of the said proviso. 5. In this case it has come out in evidence that the 2nd petitioner had taken out a building-door No. 9/252-or the purpose of his business. One Rohini Amma was the owner of this building. She sold the building to the wife of the 2nd petitioner. According to the 2nd petitioner, who had been examined in this case as RW.1, he surrendered the building to the owner prior to Ext. A-2 notice. As the courts below had held, there is absolutely no record which would indicate that there had been such surrender. It might be noted that the landlord, at the time of the alleged surrender, was none other than the 2nd petitioner's wife. In regard to the necessity for surrender what is stated is that there had been a notice issued by the original and his assignee landlords for surrender and as pointed out earlier the assignee landlord is the 2nd petitioner's wife. Therefore it is difficult to accept the case of the tenants that there had been a surrender of that building to its landlord. I am sitting in revision and see no reason to interfere at all with the finding of fact namely that there had been no such surrender. Therefore it is difficult to accept the case of the tenants that there had been a surrender of that building to its landlord. I am sitting in revision and see no reason to interfere at all with the finding of fact namely that there had been no such surrender. Then what is strongly put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the tenants, is that in any view of the matter at the time when the District Court passed the order the petitioners ceased to have any right over the same, because the 2nd petitioner's wife had sold the building and given possession to the assignee. According to Sri. Bhaskaran Nambiar, learned counsel for the petitioners, this is a case where tire court should take the subsequent events, in moulding the relief and in this connection he referred to the decisions of the Supreme Court in P. Venkateswarlu v. Motor & General Traders (AIR. 1975 SC. 1409) and Rameshwar v. Jot Ram (AIR. 1976 SC. 49). In this connection he emphasised on the wording in S.11(4)(iii), which reads as follows: "(4) A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building, (iii) if the tenant already has in his possession a building or subsequently acquires possession of or puts up a building, reasonably sufficient for his requirements in the same city, town or village;" According to Mr. Nambiar, this would indicate that the court should take due note of a subsequent acquisition of possession of a building by the tenant which in the circumstances would only mean a subsequent acquisition after the petition had been filed. He would say that if subsequent acquisition can be taken note of a subsequent dispossession of the building or giving possession to another has also to be taken into account. Even assuming the interpretation that is put upon S.11(4) is acceptable, I find it difficult to accept the plea that the court should refuse to grant relief to a landlord on the basis of the tenant giving up of possession of a building which is reasonably sufficient for the tenant's requirements in the same town or city just to escape eviction when the landlord approaches the court under S.11(4) of the Act. It might be noted that the Supreme Court decision refers to the following quotation from the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Patterson v. State of Alabama (1934) 294 US 600) at page 607, which explains the principle on which subsequent events are taken into consideration. It might be noted that the same passage had been followed by Gwyer C. J. in Lachmesawar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhuri (AIR. 1941 FC 5). The said passage reads as follows: "We have frequently held that in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct error in the judgment under review but to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. And in determining what justice does require, the Court is bound, to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened since the judgment was entered". It has been put in very clear and precise terms in Rameshwar v. Jot Ram (AIR 1976 SC. 49), where justice Krishna Iyer said: "It is important that the party claiming the relief or change of relief must have the same right from which either the first or the modified remedy may flow. Subsequent events in the course of the case cannot be constitutive of substantive rights enforceable in that very litigation except in a narrow category (later spelt out) but may influence the equitable jurisdiction to mould reliefs. Conversely, where rights have already vested in in a party, they cannot be nullified or negated by subsequent events save where there is a change is the law and it is made applicable at any stage Courts of justice may, when the compelling equities of a case oblige them, shape reliefs-cannot deny rights-to make them justly relevant in the updated circumstances. Where the relief is discretionary, courts may exercise this jurisdiction to avoid injustice. Likewise, where the right to the remedy depends, under the statute itself, on the presence or absence of certain basic facts at the time the relief is to be ultimately granted, the Court, even in appeal, can take note of such supervening facts with fundamental impact. Where a cause of action is deficient but later events have made up the deficiency, the Court may, in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation, permit amendment and continue the proceeding, provided no prejudice is caused to the other side. Where a cause of action is deficient but later events have made up the deficiency, the Court may, in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation, permit amendment and continue the proceeding, provided no prejudice is caused to the other side. All these are done only in exceptional situations and just cannot be done if the statute, on which the legal proceeding is based inhibits, by its scheme or otherwise, such change in cause of action or relief. The primary concern of the court is to implement the justice of the legislation. Rights vested by virtue of a statute cannot be divested by this equitable doctrine." (Emphasis mine). On the basis of the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court it is difficult to accept the contention that when the tenant gives up his right to a building in his possession just before the final order in the proceeding so as to defeat the rights of the landlord the court should take note of that in moulding the relief and refuse the landlord's prayer for eviction. There was no case that the 2nd petitioner and his wife are not staying together and not on good terms. In fact the evidence clearly indicates that they are living together. In the circumstances the assignment by the lady can only be considered to be to escape eviction of her husband in the present proceedings. There is no evidence to show any necessity for the assignment at that time. 6. I must also consider in this connection a contention that was seriously pressed before me by the learned counsel for the petitioners that it is a case of co-tenancy where both the petitioners are the tenants. The fact that the 2nd petitioner has got possession of another building suitable for his business might not be enough to grant relief of eviction of both the tenants. No doubt this contention would have been worthy of serious consideration, but for the fact that the Ist petitioner himself while supporting the contentions raised by the 2nd petitioner had stated in his written statement that at present he has no interest in the tenancy. It is useful to quote the relevant passage in his written statement. No doubt originally there is a case of co-tenancy. It is useful to quote the relevant passage in his written statement. No doubt originally there is a case of co-tenancy. What he states is: Apart from the fact that he is a person who could complain of in the matter on the basis of the alleged co-tenancy that he cannot have access to the building, which might be in the possession of the 2nd petitioner he has unequivocally stated that he has no interest in the tenancy as such. The 2nd petitioner himself also proceeds on the basis that he is only a person now interested in the matter. He states in his written statement: In his evidence also the 2nd respondent has stated that he is selling books in the scheduled premises. He further states that after the issue of the notice for eviction he approached the landlords, who on that occasion demanded an enhancement of rent. He agreed to pay rent at an enhanced rate. He further states: "I was running it in partnership with the 1st respondent. The Ist respondent has ceased to function as a partner. T am alone doing the business now." In his cross-examination it is specifically stated: "I am alone in possession of the schedule premises now. I went to the applicants for settlement after my reply notice. When I went to the applicants with the rent for August, I had the idea to have a settlement. I had assured pw. 2 to give an enhanced rent." In view of this it is too late for him to contend that the 1st petitioner is a co-tenant of the property and merely because he alone (2nd petitioner) had got possession of another building, the court could order eviction. Therefore I have no hesitation in confirming the decision of the District Court in regard to the claim for eviction of the landlords under S.11 (4) (iii) of the Act. 7. However, I have to consider the other question also whether the landlords are entitled to eviction under S.11 (3) of the Act in view of the revision petition that has been filed by the landlords in the matter. 7. However, I have to consider the other question also whether the landlords are entitled to eviction under S.11 (3) of the Act in view of the revision petition that has been filed by the landlords in the matter. In regard to the contention raised by the landlords that the burden in the matter is on the tenants for getting the benefit under second proviso to S.11 (3) there cannot be any serious controversy now in view of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Kochappan Pillai v. Chellappan (1976 KLT.1). What was mainly contended before me in this connection was that on a harmonious interpretation of S.11(4)(iii) and S.11(3), a tenant who is liable to be evicted under S.11(4) (iii) of the Act cannot claim protection of the second proviso of S.11(3) of the Act. I have earlier quoted S.11(4)(iii). I shall quote S.11(3) with provisos. "(3). What was mainly contended before me in this connection was that on a harmonious interpretation of S.11(4)(iii) and S.11(3), a tenant who is liable to be evicted under S.11(4) (iii) of the Act cannot claim protection of the second proviso of S.11(3) of the Act. I have earlier quoted S.11(4)(iii). I shall quote S.11(3) with provisos. "(3). A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if be bonafide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him: Provided that the Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction if the landlord has another building of his own in his possession in the same city, town or village except where the Rent Control Court is satisfied that for special reasons, in any particular case it will be just and proper to do so: Provided further that the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business: Provided further that no landlord whose right to recover possession arises under an instrument of transfer inter vivos shall be entitled to apply to be put in possession until the expiry of one year from the date of the instrument: Provided further that if a landlord after obtaining an order to be put in possession transfers his rights in respect of the building to another person, the transferee shall not be entitled to be put in possession unless he proves that he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him." If the tenant has in his possession a building reasonably sufficient for his requirements in the same town, what Mr. Govinda Wariyar, learned counsel for the landlords, contends is that the tenants could not take advantage of the second proviso. Govinda Wariyar, learned counsel for the landlords, contends is that the tenants could not take advantage of the second proviso. One should take note of the fact that the question is whether there is any suitable building available in the locality and it will be sufficient for rejecting the tenants' claim under the second proviso to come to a decision that the tenant has in his possession a building in the same town, city or village. No doubt in this case the building is reasonably sufficient for the tenants' requirements and is in the same locality and in the same town. Probably that would be sufficient to reject the tenants' claim for benefit under the 2nd proviso A building that is reasonably sufficient for his requirements is certainly a suitable building, but the question has not been considered in that aspect. I see no reason for remitting back the matter for that purpose in view of the fact that even otherwise the landlord is entitled to get eviction under S.11(4)(iii) itself Therefore, the Civil Revision Petitions are dismissed, confirming the decision of the District Court. The petitioners in CRP. 507 of 1979 will pay the costs of the landlords, respondents in that CRP. There will be no order as to costs in the other CRP. Issue carbon copy of this order to counsel on both sides on payment of the requisite charges. Dismissed.