JUDGMENT : S.D. AGARWALA, J. 1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution arising out of proceedings for release of a portion of a house "Ganga Guru Niwas" situated in Bara Bazar, in the city of Haridwar u/s 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, U.P. Act XIII of 1972-hereinafter referred to as the Act. 2. The Petitioners are the landlords and Brindaban Respondent No. 1 is the tenant of the said accommodation. The Prescribed Authority by his order dated 20th Oct. 1976 rejected the release application. In appeal u/s 22 of the Act the District Judge has agreed with the prescribed authority and dismissed the appeal on 29th April 1977. The Petitioners have challenged the orders dated 20th October 1976 and 29th April 1977 by means of the present writ petition in this Court. 3. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners has urged that the appellate order dated 29th April, 1977, passed u/s 22 of the Act is wholly an arbitrary order. No reasons have been given for holding that the need of the Petitioners was not genuine and neither any evidence has been considered by the appellate court. 4. In the entire judgment of the District Judge except the last paragraph the effect of Explanation (iv) of Section 21 of the Act has been considered. 5. In Ram Kumar vs. First Addl. District and Sessions Judge and Others, (1978) AWC 405, a Pull Bench of this Court had held that the deletion of Explanation (iv) of U.P. Act 28 of 1976 was retrospective in nature as it relates to a matter of procedure. In this view of law, the question of the applicability of Explanation (iv) does not arise. 6. The only question relevant for deciding the release application is as to whether the need of the landlord is bona-fide or not. The bona-fide need of the landlord has been considered in the last paragraph of the judgment and has been disposed off in the following words: As regards the need of the Appellants, the other ground mentioned in the release application, it was held rightly by the prescribed authority that the Appellants have enough accommodation in their accommodation cannot be said to be genuine. 7. This is the entire portion of the judgment considering the bona-fide need of the landlord. 7. This is the entire portion of the judgment considering the bona-fide need of the landlord. There is no discussion of any evidence on the record. No reason has been given except that the District Judge had agreed with the prescribed authority. In Smt. Sampat Devi and Others vs. Smt. Santosh Kumari and Others, (1979) AWC 601, I had held that: The intention of the Legislature in providing this right of appeal against the order of the Prescribed Authority is with a view to enable the District Judge to judicially consider the facts on record and thereafter examine the findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority. This is the only appeal provided under the Act and as such it is the duty of the District Judge while deciding the appeal to consider all the relevant facts and circumstances and then give his decision. It is not to be lightly treated because after this appeal there is no further right of appeal granted to any other court. 8. Under Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC the appellate court is required to state the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the said decision. Reasons can only be given when the relevant and material evidence on record is considered by the appellate court. The duty of the appellate court in this matter is important. As observed above, the legislature has provided only one appeal. The duty cast upon the appellate court which is the only court where appeal lies on facts is very onerous and must be discharged with a full sense of responsibility. The patties to the litigation must be satisfied that their case had been properly dealt with and they have received justice in accordance with law. 9. In the case of a quasi-judicial authority, a Full Bench of our Court in Haji Manzoor Ahmad vs. State of U.P. 1968 AWR 524 has held that in a case where the order is of affirmance and the superior authority finds the reasons of the inferior authority acceptable to it the superior authority need not specify the reasons in its order but may merely refer to the reasons given by the inferior authority or give an outline of the process of reasoning by which it finds itself in agreement with the inferior authority. 10. 10. The duty cast upon a judicial appellate court is still greater in the case of affirmance. It is not necessary that every piece of evidence is considered once again but there must be sufficient discussion to show that the court has applied its own mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. The appellate court should also state the reasons why it finds itself in agreement with the prescribed authority. This procedure will enable the High Court to examine the impugned judgment more effectively and get an idea of the mind of the appellate court. In its absence it is not possible to find out what circumstances weighed with the court below making it to come to a certain conclusion. This will further ensure that no arbitrary order is passed by the appellate court. 11. Summing up, the following procedure should be adopted by the appellate court white disposing of an appeal: (1) Where the judgment of the appellate court is of reversal, the appellate court should consider all the relevant and material evidence on record and thereafter give reasons for the said decision. (2) Where the judgment of the appellate court is of affirmance it is not necessary that every piece of evidence is considered once again but there must be sufficient discussion to show that the court has applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. The appellate court should further state the reasons why it finds itself in agreement with the prescribed authority. 12. In view of the above, I agree with the submission made by the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner. The judgment of the District Judge is no judgment in the eye of law. 13. In the circumstances, I allow the petition, quash the judgment of the appellate court dated 29th April 1977 and remand the case for decision afresh in accordance with law. In the circumstances of the case parties are directed to bear their own costs.