JUDGMENT Murlidhar, J. - This is a plaintiffs second appeal arising out of a suit for cancellation of a sale deed dated 9-2-1967 executed by Smt. Bhuri in favour of the defendants and for possession. The plaintiffs failed in both the courts below. 2. The relevant facts are that Ali Mohammad who died in 1953 left behind him five sons of whom three are the plaintiffs and a widow Smt. Bhuri. The two remaining sons Rashid and Shaukat were apparently Smt. Bhuris own sons while the three plaintiffs were her step sons. Following the death of Ali Mohammad the names of all the heirs were ordered to be entered on the holding vide copies of orders dated 1-12-1953 and 7-3-1954 on record. It may be noted that in those days the authority to decide ex parte mutation cases had been vested in the Panchayats. Thus the name of the widow, Smt. Bhuri, even though she was not an heir under the tenancy law came to be recorded along with the five sons over the holding of deceased Ali Mohammad. About seven years later in 1960 during consolidation proceedings in the village apparently there was again a controversy over the title of Smt. Bhuri. This was resolved by a compromise. The parties, namely, Smt. Bhuri and all the sons agreed that certain plots with a total area of four Bighas and three Biswas be mutated in the name of Smt. Bhuri while the rest of the holding be allotted to the five brothers in equal shares. Further that Smt. Bhuri would have no right to sell or gift the land entered in her name in any way and after her death the other branches of five brothers would be entitled to get this property also as heirs (Haqdar wa waris honge). Notwithstanding this compromise Smt. Bhuri by the sale deed of 1967 transferred the property to her grand children who are the defendants in this case and happen to be sons of Rashid and Shaukat, brothers of the plaintiffs, and apparently the own sons of Smt. Bhuri. The plaintiffs case was that in the face of the compromise the transfer by Smt. Bhuri was illegal. 3. The plaintiffs case was that in the face of the compromise the transfer by Smt. Bhuri was illegal. 3. The courts below have taken the view that under the compromise Smt. Bhuri was given absolute rights in the property mutated in her name and the restriction on transfer by sale or gift purported to be imposed by the compromise was hit by Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act and was void as a restriction against alienation. Also that such restriction was void being against the provisions of U. P. Act 1 of 1951. The lower appellate court has also held that the defendants were bona fide purchasers for consideration without notice of the restriction. This view is attacked in second appeal. 4. At the outset it may be stated that the finding of the defendants being bona fide purchasers for consideration without notice of restriction is unsustainable. All the six defendant vendees barring one major son of Rashid are minor sons of Rashid and Shaukat, brothers of the plaintiffs, who were parties to the compromise. Not only this all the minors have in the transaction of sale been represented by their fathers Rashid and Shaukat, as their guardians and are described as such in the sale deed itself. Since Rashid and Shaukat were also parties to the compromise, this one circumstance alone is sufficient to demolish the finding of the vendees being bona fide purchasers without notice of restriction. In fact the position seems to be just the contrary. It is a case where two brothers with a view to deprive the other three have managed to secure the sale deed in the names of their descendents. Therefore, neither Section 41 nor the ground of absence of notice of the restriction on transfer can be of any help to the defendants. 5. The crucial questions, however, are (1) whether the compromise mentioned above should be treated to be a case of an absolute transfer with restriction on alienation or transfer of a mere personal possessory life interest, and (2) whether giving of a mere life interest to a Bhumidhar was impermissible under the provisions of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act. On the first question it seems to me that in view of the background that the widow was not an heir in the Bhumidhari property and her name over some of the plots was allowed to be recorded merely as a gesture of goodwill by the five sons in the compromise which was more or less in the nature of a family settlement, the proper view to take would be that only a personal right of enjoyment during her lifetime was transferred to Smt. Bhuri and not the absolute status of a Bhumidhar with certain restrictions. The compromise merely states that her name be retained over specified plots (Rakli Diva Tai). This was because she had erroneously been recorded as a co-tenant in 1954 mutation of heirs. There can be no doubt that this could not create any title in Smt. Bhuri. During the consolidation proceedings the whole matter regarding title was open for re-exami-nation and the language of the compromise cannot be interpreted to mean that full-fledged Bhumidhar status of the widow was either recognised or conferred by the compromise. Lachlimeshwar Sahai v. Mt. Moti Rani Kunwar ( AIR 1939 PC 157 ) may be referred to in this connection. There too the language of the deed was ambiguous and a life interest was given to the widow denying the power of making a transfer. The Privy Council held that the intention of the deed was to give her for her maintenance a personal right to appropriate the net profits of her husbands share after his death. In this connection their Lordships of the Privy Council observed : "Inartificial (inartistic) language may be construed in the light of the circumstances and given a meaning applicable to the subject matter." 6. I am of the opinion that in the circumstances of this case, by the compromise a mere personal right of enjoyment was conferred on Smt. Bhuri and the fact that her name was allowed to be mutated as Bhumidhar did not imply conferment of the status of a Bhumidhar on her. 7. The next question is whether such a state is permitted under the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act. Learned counsel for the respondents has strongly urged that U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951 makes the interest of a Bhumidhar transferable and there is no provision contemplating any life interest as Bhumidhar. 7. The next question is whether such a state is permitted under the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act. Learned counsel for the respondents has strongly urged that U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951 makes the interest of a Bhumidhar transferable and there is no provision contemplating any life interest as Bhumidhar. Life interest in this case if it could be regarded as that, was created by a compromise and there would seem to be no bar against such a compromise binding the parties in the provisions of the Act. The real point, however, is' about the effectiveness of the restriction on transfer. In the view I have taken of the compromise it does not remain a case of Smt. Bhuri having got the status of a Bhumidhar for life but merely of personal enjoyment of the property for life with the illegal entry of her name as an heir of Ali Mohammad being allowed to continue in the papers. At any rate, this would be the position as amongst' the parties to the compromise and none of them can be allowed to resile from this position. It may be that vis-a-vis third persons the entry of Smt. Bhuris name as Bhumidhar in the papers would lead to different considerations and in appropriate cases Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act may be applicable, but persons who had knowledge of all the facts cannot claim protection of that provision for Smt. Bhuri had no real title to the property and mere entry in papers cannot create title. Only a personal right and the entry of Smt. Bhuris name as Bhumidhar did not, in view of the compromise, carry with it all the rights of a Bhumidhar. Since it has already been found that the defendants in this case are not bona fide purchasers without notice, they cannot acquire any title under the sale deed in question. The sale deed, however, is liable to cloud the correct position and thereby prejudice the plaintiffs rights and, therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to its cancellation to the extent of their share. 8. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs throughout. The judgment and decree of the courts below are set aside. The sale deed, however, is liable to cloud the correct position and thereby prejudice the plaintiffs rights and, therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to its cancellation to the extent of their share. 8. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs throughout. The judgment and decree of the courts below are set aside. The plaintiffs suit for cancellation of the sale deed dated 9-2-1967 and possession over the plaint property is decreed to the extent of ?th share.