JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. ( 1 ) A Bench of this Court has referred the" following questions for opinion of a Full bench : (1) Where the issue regarding the tenancy framed in a suit has been referred to and answered by the Munsiff- tribunal prior to the coming into force of Act 1 of 1974 and the decision has been affirmed by the appellate authority, namely, the Dist. Judge also prior to the coming into force of Act 1 of 1974 and has become final, whether such an issue should again be referred to the tribunal consequent on the amendment of the provisions of S. 91 of Act 1 of 1974 ? (2) Is the jurisdiction of the Civil judge in this case to dispose of the suit in accordance with the decision of the dist. Judge given under S. 118 of the kar. Land Reforms Act on the question of tenancy affected by Act 31 of 1974 ? ( 2 ) THE facts are fully set out in the order of reference, and for the purpose of our decision, we may recapitulate only those which are relevant. The petitioners are legal representatives of the plaintiff in OS No. 2 of j 967. The suit was for recovery of possession of certain agricultural land bearing Sy. No. 48/2 of Kadirenahalli in Govribidanur Taluk. It was instituted its the Court of Civil judge, Kolar and is still penaing there. The case of the plaintiff was that in 1958 59, there was an agreement between him and the defendant to exchange their lands and in pursuance of which, he took possession of the land of the defendant, while putting the latter in possession of the suit land. The defendant, however, committed breach of the contract and disposed of his land to a third person who in turn dispossessed the plaintiff. The suit was accordingly filed for recovery of possession and mesne profits. The defendant, inter alia, contended that there was no agreement as stated by the plaintiff and that he was a tenant or deemed to be a tenant of the land, On these rival contentions, one of the issues settled related to the question of tenancy pleaded by the defendant, viz,, whether the defendant was a tenant or deemed to be a tenant of the land. That issue was referred to the munsiff, Chikkaballapur for a finding according to the then existing provisions of the Kar. Land Reforms Act (called shortly as 'the Act' ). ( 3 ) IT is not in dispute that the Munsiff was competent and was the only then authority to decide the said question of tenancy. On 20th Nov. 1970, the Munsiff determined that issue holding the same against the defendant. The said finding was taken in appeal before the Dist. Judge, kolar, in MA No. 3/71. On 16th Aug. , 1973, the appeal was finally deposed of affirming the finding of the Munsiff. It appears that the descendant filed a revision petition challenging the said finding in this Court, but did not pursue the matter and the question was thus concluded before 1st March, 1974. ( 4 ) TLCREUPON, the Civil Judge posted the suit for trial on other issues. During the progress of the suit, the defendant filed an application IA No. I contending that consequent or the amendment of S. 133 of the Act by Kar. Act 1 of 1974 and S. 91 there of, the issue of tenancy should be referred to the newly constituted Land tribunal after vacating the aforesaid orders. That application was opposed on behalf of the plaintiff. But the learned civil Judge accepted the plea of the defendant and made an order dt. 8th Jan. , 1975 stating that the said issue should again be determined by the Land Tribunal. It is against this order that the revision petition has been preferred by the plaintiff. ( 5 ) WHEN the revision petition came up for disposal before Vcnkatachaliah, J. , the learned Judge felt that having regard to some of the observations of this Court in bandu Hamasinga Danawade v. Sashi kumar (1) the matter shall be disposed of by a Bench and accordingly, referred the petition to a Division Bench for disposal. When the petition came up before and division Bench for disposal, the learned judges felt that the issue of tenancy which was determined and concluded by March 1974, need not again be dealt with and determined by the Land Tribunal. They also felt that some of the observations in danawade's (1) case are of sweeping nature and may therefore require re-consideration and accordingly they referred the said two questions for the opinion of a Full Bench. They also felt that some of the observations in danawade's (1) case are of sweeping nature and may therefore require re-consideration and accordingly they referred the said two questions for the opinion of a Full Bench. ( 6 ) AS a preliminary to the consideration of these questions, it would be necessary to advert to some of the amendments made to the Act. The Act was amended by Kar. Act No. 6 of 1970 ("act 6 of 1970") retrospectively with effect from 15th Jan. , 1970. S. 32 thereof provides for transfer of certain pending proceedings:"32. 'transfer of pending proceed' ings :- (1) AH statements; applications and proceedings pending before a Tribunal or other judicial officer exercising the powers and performing the duties and functions of a Tribunal before the date of commencement of this Act, shall as from the said date stand transferred to the Court as defined in the principal Act as amended by this Act or the Tahsildar as the case may be and shall be continued and disposed of by such Court or tahsildar, as the case may be, in accordance with the principal Act as amended by this Act, as if such statements, applications and proceedings had been filed or commenced before such Court or tahsildar. (2) As from the date of commencement of this Act, all appeals and proceedings connected with it pending before the Appellate Authority specified under sub -sec. (1) of S. 118 as the appellate Authority before the commencement of this Act shall on that date stand transferred to the Dist. Court having jurisdiction over the area, and shall be continued and disposed of by it as if such appeals had been filed before it". S. 33 provides for validation. "validation:- (1) All proceedings taken and decrees and orders passed before the commencement of this Act by a tribunal exercising or purporting to exercise jurisdiction to decide whether a person is a tenant or not shall notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court be deemed to be as good and valid in law as if the Tribunal exercising or purporting to exercise such jurisdiction had been duly conferred with such jurisdiction by the principal act". Sub-sec. Sub-sec. (2) of S. 33 provides :"notwithstanding anything contained in the principal Act, where before the date of commencement of this Act, statements and application filed or proceedings pending before a Tribunal or Munsiff have been transferred to a Munsiff or a Tribunal or a new Tribunal, as the ease may be, such statements, applications or proceedings shall be deemed to have been validity transferred and no order made by such Munsiff or Tribunal in respect of such statements, applications or proceedings shall be questioned in any Court only on the ground that such ttansfer was not in accordance with law". ( 7 ) THE combined effect of the above provisions, as it appears to us, is that applications and proceedings pending before a Tribunal or judicial officer exercising powers and performing duties and functions of a Tribunal before the date of the commencement of Act 6 of 1970 shall stand transferred to the Court as defined under the Act, as amended by Act 6 of 1970. The word 'court' was defined under s. 2 (9) (a), which was also inserted by Act 6 of 1970, to mean the Court of Munsiff within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situate. It is also seen that before the commencement of Act 6 of 1970, if any application or proceeding has been transferred to a Munsiff, such matters shall be continued as if they have been validly transferred, and no order made by such Munsiff in respect of those matters shall be questioned in any Court on the ground that such transfer was not in accordance with law. The effect of the validation provided by Act 6 of 1970 is exerthat all proceedings taken and decrees and orders passed before the commencement of act 6 of 1970 by a Tribunal exercising or purporting to exercise jurisdiction in respect of a tenant shall be deemed to be good and valid in law as if the Tribunal exercising or purporting to exercise such jurisdiction has been duly conferred with the power to determine such questions under the Act. ( 8 ) THESE, then, are the effect of Act 6 of 1970. ( 8 ) THESE, then, are the effect of Act 6 of 1970. It may be pertinent to state that the issue of tenancy raised in the suit had been referred to a Munsiff Court before act 6 of 1970 came into force although the decision of the Munsiff was rendered on 20th Nov. , 1970, that is, after the coming into force of Act 6 of 1970. But, in view of the provisions of the said Act, the order made by the Munsiff was saved as being well within its jurisdiction. ( 9 ) THE question now to consider is whether the order made by the Munsiff on the question of tenancy has been nullified by subsequent amendments to the Act. In this regard, we may turn to the Kar. Act 1 of 1974 ('act 1 of 1974') which came into force with effect from the 1st March, 1974. Quite a number of new provisions were added to the Act by this amendment. But, we are concerned only with regard to amendment to S. 133 and substitution of s. 91. By S. 88 of Act 1 of 1974, sub- sec. (1) of S. 133 of the Act was completely omitted and in sub sec. (2) thereof the word 'court' was substituted by the word 'tribunal'. S. 91 again provides for disposal of pending proceeding. It reads :"91. Disposal of pending proceedings :- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the principal Act or in the kar. General Cls. Act, 1899, the provisions of the principal Act as amended by this Act shall be applicable to all proceedings commenced before the date of commencement of this Act and pending before any Court, Tribunal or other authority as if the principal Act as amended by this Act was in force when the right accrued or liability was incurred and every Court, Tribunal or other authority shall deal with the proceedings accordingly". Sub sec. (3) thereof, provides for transfer of pending proceedings. It reads :"all applications or proceedings other than those referred to in sub sec. Sub sec. (3) thereof, provides for transfer of pending proceedings. It reads :"all applications or proceedings other than those referred to in sub sec. (2), pending before any Court or authority immediately before the date of commencement of this Act, which are required to be decided or disposed of by the officer or authority specified in the principal Act as amended by this Act, shall, with effect from that date, stand transferred to such officer or authority, as the case may be, and shall be disposed of as if they had been instituted or commenced before such officer or authority". However, neither S. 91 nor sub sec. (3) thereof is attracted to the case on hand, since the issue relating to the tenancy has already been decided by the Munsiff Court on 20th Nov. , 1970 and by the Dist. Court on 16th Aug. , 1973. ( 10 ) THE Act was again amended by kar. Act 31 of 1974 (Act 31 of 1974' ). It was also brought into force retrospectively with effect from 3rd Aug. , 1974. S. 2 of act 31 of 1974 has effected certain changes in S. 133. Sub sec, (2) of S. 133 after the said amendment provides as follows :"if any suit instituted in any Civil court involves any issues which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Tribunal or any suit is instituted in any such Court for possession of or injunction in respect of an agricultural land on the allegation that the defendant has trespassed or is trying to trespass on such land and the defendant denies the said allegation and claims that he is in possession on the strength of a tenancy existing from prior to 1st march 1974, then the Civil Court shall stay the suit and refer such issue or the claim, as the case may be, to the Tribunal for decision". S. 3 thereof provides for disposal of certain proceedings. It reads :"3. Disposal of certain pending proceedings etc. :- (1) Notwithstanding anything in any law for the time being in force, the provisions of Cl. (a) of sub- sec. (2) of S. 133 of the Kar. Land Reforms Act, 1961 (Car. S. 3 thereof provides for disposal of certain proceedings. It reads :"3. Disposal of certain pending proceedings etc. :- (1) Notwithstanding anything in any law for the time being in force, the provisions of Cl. (a) of sub- sec. (2) of S. 133 of the Kar. Land Reforms Act, 1961 (Car. Act 10 of 1962) as amended by this Act, shall be applicable to all proceedings commenced before the date of commencement of this Act, and- (a) pending before any Civil Court ; (b) pending in appeal or revision against the judgment or order of the civil Court ; or (c) finally disposed of by such Courts after the first day of March 1974, as if the said clause as amended by this Act was in force when the right accrued or the liability was incurred and every such court shall deal with the proceedings accordingly and any interim or final order or judgment passed by such Court or appellate authority shall be reopened and the suit or the appeal shall be disposed of in accordance with the said amended clause". The result of the aforesaid amendment is that no Civil or Criminal Court or Authority shall, in any suit, case or proceedings concerning a land shall decide the question whether such land is or is not agricultural land, and whether the person claiming to be in possession is or is not a tenant of the land from prior to 1st March, 1974 and such Court or Officer or Authority shall stay such suit or proceedings in so far as such question is concerned and refer the same to the Tribunal for decision S. 5 of Act 31 of 1974 further amended s. 91 of Act 1 of 1974. Sub-sec. (3) of S. 91 after amendment reads:"all applications or proceedings other than those referred to in sub-sec. Sub-sec. (3) of S. 91 after amendment reads:"all applications or proceedings other than those referred to in sub-sec. (2) which are required to be decided or disposed of by the Tahsildar or the Tribunal specified in the principal Act as amended by this Act, - (a) x x x x (b) having been disposed of by the munsiff Court, are pending in appeal or revision, such appeal or revision shall abate without prejudice to the question involved in the applications or proceedings giving rise to such appeal or revision, beir-g commenced afresh before the tahsildar or the Tribunal as the case may be, as if the amendments made by this Act to the principal Act were in force at the time the right for making such applications or commencing such proceedings accrued". ( 11 ) IT is seen from these provisions that if in any suit or proceedings a question which is required to be decided by a Land tribunal has already been decided by the munsiff Court, but pending in appeal, or revision, such appeal or revision shall be disposed of in accordance with the amended provisions of S. 133 as if the amendments were in force at the time the right to commence or institute such proceedings accrued. S. 3 of Act 31 of 1974 provides for reopening of only those matters which have been finally disposed of after 1st day of March, 1974. The matter which has been disposed of and concluded prior to 1st March, 1974 apparently has been kept undisturbed. We have earlier stated that the question relating to the tenancy pleaded by the defendant in the instant case has been set at rest prior to the coming into force of Act 31 of 1974. That question therefore was not an open question and could not be reopened under S. 3 of Act 31 of 1974. This was also the view taken by Venkataramlah, J. In Venkanna. v. Fakirappa (2 ). Dealing with the scope of sub- sec. (3) of S. 91, the learned Judge said :"sub-SEC. (3) of S. 91 which was in force when the first respondent made his application before the Tahsildar does not state that all orders and decrees which had been made prior to the coming into force of the Act 1 of 1974 would become void and unforceable. (3) of S. 91, the learned Judge said :"sub-SEC. (3) of S. 91 which was in force when the first respondent made his application before the Tahsildar does not state that all orders and decrees which had been made prior to the coming into force of the Act 1 of 1974 would become void and unforceable. It only provides that where any proceedings other than those referred in S. 91 (2) are pending before any Munsiff, they shall stand transferred to the Tahsildar or the tribunal as the case may be as required by Cl. (a) of S. 91 (3) and where having been disposed of by the Munsiff are pending in appeal or revision such appeal or revision shall abate without prejudice to the question involved being agitated before the Tahsildar or the Tri bunal again as stated in Cl. (b) of S. 91 (3 ). The appeal and revision referred to in Cl. (b) are those before the Dist. Judge and the High Court as the case may be. In the instant case no appeal or revision was pending before the Dist. Judge or High Court on 3-8-1974 on which date Act 31 of 1974 is deemed to have come into force". Learned counsel for the respondent, however, placed reliance on sub sec. (3) (b) of S. 91 as amended by Act 31 of 1974. He urged that even though the question relating to the tenancy was disposed of by the Munsiff Court, it shall abate as provided by the said sub-section and the matter therefore falls to be re-examined by the Land Tribunal as required under S. 133. We do not think that there is any substance in this contention. Cl. (b) of sub-sec. (3) of S. 91 covers matter which have been disposed of by the Munsiff and pending in appeal or revision, and it is- only such appeal or revision shall abate without prejudice to the question involved. The abatement always presupposes the existence of some pending matter before any Court or tribunal and there cannot be any question of abatement of a matter which has been finally disposed of. ( 12 ) THIS takes us to the correctness of the decision In Danawade's (1) case. The learned Judges who made this reference have felt that some of the observations ia 'that case are of sweeping nature and may therefore require re-consideration. ( 12 ) THIS takes us to the correctness of the decision In Danawade's (1) case. The learned Judges who made this reference have felt that some of the observations ia 'that case are of sweeping nature and may therefore require re-consideration. On the scope of S. 133 (2) and S. 91 (3) of the act, it was observed in Danawade's (1) case as follows:"the retrospective effect of S. 133 as amended is further emphasised by the requirement of sub-sec. (1) of S. 3 of the amending Act of 1974 that S. 133 as amended should be applied by reopening any interim or final order or judgment passed by the Civil Court or the appellate authority. In view of the clear and unambiguous language employed in sub sec. (1) of S. 3 of the second amendment Act, 1974, S. 133 as amended shall have to be deemed to have been in force when the right accrued or the liability was incurred. It is on that basis that all cases, to which sub-sec. (1) of S. 3 of the second amendment Act, 1974, applies, have to be disposed of. Having regard to the facts of each case S. 133 shall have been in force on the date on which the right accrued or the liability was incurred in that case, provided of course the other conditions specified in sub-sec. (1) of S. 3 of the second amendment Act, 1974 are satisfied". (Underlining (italics) is ours ). ( 13 ) IF one closely examines these observations, it becomes clear that learned judges restricted the applicability of S, 133 to a case where sub -sec. (1) of S. 3 of Act 31 of 1974 is attracted and not any other case. That means the proceedings involving the issue which is required to be decided by the Tribunal must be pending before Civil Courts in appeal or revision, or finally disposed of by such Court after 1st March, 1974. In the instant case, there was no such proceedings pending in any one of the Courts or disposed of after the 1st March, 1974, There is. therefore, no scope for attracting the provisions of s, 3 (1) of Act 31 of 1974 That means, S. 133 has no part to play and cannot be invoked to reopen the concluded issue of tenancy. ( 14 ) THAT, however, is not the end of the matter. therefore, no scope for attracting the provisions of s, 3 (1) of Act 31 of 1974 That means, S. 133 has no part to play and cannot be invoked to reopen the concluded issue of tenancy. ( 14 ) THAT, however, is not the end of the matter. It has been stated in Danawade's (1) case that S. 133 as amended regulates the procedure to be followed by the Court of first instance in which the suit is instituted and hence for giving effect to S. 133 as amended by Act 1 of 1974, all proceedings taken after the stage of the applicability of S. 133 have to be set aside. It was observed :"the Court, whether original, appellate or revisional can properly give effect to S. 133 as ame ded by the second amendment Act, 1974 read wish S. 3 of the said Act, by setting aside the findings or decisions rendered in contravention of s. 133 as amended and regulating the further proceedings of the suit in accordance with the said S. 133 of the Act". The learned Judges before reaching the above conclusion, however, felt that such a step would cause great hardship to parties, but they said that it could not, be avoided in view of the retrospective operation of S. 133. With utmost respect, we do not think that that would be the correct view of the law. ( 15 ) S. 133 as it now stands, provides that no Civil or Criminal Court or officer or Authority shall in any suit, case or proceedings concerning a land decide the question whether such land is or is not agricultural land and whether the person claiming to be in possession is or is not a tena. it of the said land from prior to 1st march, 1974 ; and such Court or Officer or authority shall stay such suit, or proceedings and refer the same to the Land Tribunal for decision. No doubt, the section in explicit terms does not deal with appeal or revision. But when the section refers to "such Court" or ' Officer or Authority", we can reasonably infer that such court means the Court where the matter involving "such question" is pending; that is the quesfion which is required to be decided by the Land Tribunal. S. 3 of act 3i of 1974 also lends support to this view. But when the section refers to "such Court" or ' Officer or Authority", we can reasonably infer that such court means the Court where the matter involving "such question" is pending; that is the quesfion which is required to be decided by the Land Tribunal. S. 3 of act 3i of 1974 also lends support to this view. It provides for disposal of pending proceedings commenced before the date of the coming into force of Act 31 of 1974 and pending before any Civil Court in original suit or proceedings, appeal or revision. It provides for disposal of such suit, appeal or proceedings in accordance with the said amended section. It appears to us that neither S. 133 nor S. 3 (1) of Act 31 of 1974 bars appellate or revisional court to dispose of the matter pending before it by following the prescribed procedure under S. 133 The dominant purpose of S. 133 is that the Civil Court shall not try the issue or question which is required to be decided by Land Tribunal. It does not expressly provide for the total nullification of the adjudication on all other istues made by competent Courts or authorities. If the words are literally applied, it would produce a wholly unreasonable result. The judgments and decrees of courts of competent jurisdiction on all other issues have to be tried de novo by the Court of first instance. It would cause irreparable injury to the litigant public if the entire matter has to be tried de novo after a long lapse of time. The party may not be able to prove the case again for paucity of evidence. We do not think that such was the intention of the Legislature. It seems to us that S. 3 of Act 31 of 1974 was only intended to change the forum for deciding the specified questions. To achieve that obvious intention and produce reasonable result, we must try to put a fair meaning on the words used in their proper context. We therefore, with deference dissent from the view taken in Danawade's (1) case. We make it clear that every appellate or revisional Court could deal with such matters pending before it in accordance with the provisions of S. 133 of the Act without setting aside the judgment and decree under appeal or revision provided the other conditions specified in sub sec. We make it clear that every appellate or revisional Court could deal with such matters pending before it in accordance with the provisions of S. 133 of the Act without setting aside the judgment and decree under appeal or revision provided the other conditions specified in sub sec. (1) of S. 3 of Act 31 of 1974 are attracted. ( 16 ) IN the result, and for the reasons stated above, our answers, to the questions referred to us are as follows : (1) If an issue regarding tenancy framed in a suit has been referred to an officer or Munsiff Tribunal prior to the coming into force of Act 1 of 1974, and the decision has also been affirmed by the appellate authority, namely, Dist. Judge prior to coming into force of Act 1 of 1974, and if that decision has become final, then, it will not be necessary again to refer the said issue to the tribunal consequent on the amendment to S. 133 of the Act and by virtue of S. 91 of Act 1 of 1974. (2) The jurisdiction of the Civil judge in the case in question to dispose of the suit in accordance with the decision of the Dist. Judge given under S. 118 of the Kar. Land Reforms Act as it then existed on the question of tenancy pleaded by the defendant has not been affected by Act 31 of 1974. ( 17 ) IN the circumstances, we make HO order as to costs. --- *** --- .