JUDGMENT - AGGARWAL R.L., J.: - The claimants M/s. Voltas Limited have taken out this Notice of Motion for a decree in their favour in terms of the Award dated 12th April 1976 made and published by the learned Umpire Shri R. J. Kolah. 2. Mr. Gala, learned Advocates appearing for all the respondents, con-tended that the Notice of Motion is liable to be dismissed and that a decree in terms of the award cannot be passed because the 2nd respondent Suryakant Rawji Shah is entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the Maharashtra Debt Relief Act, 1975, As the 2nd respondent is A worker within the meaning of that Act and that his earning for livelihood by working As A broker /commission agent since 1973 has not exceeded Rs. 5,000 in any year, and that he has no immoveable property whatsoever and that the only move-able property owned by the 2nd respondent is household furniture and personal belongings of an aggregate value of Rs. 2,300, and that the claimants claim is for price of the goods And interest thereon, which claim is in the nature of a loan and, therefore, the money awarded under the award or As payable under the award is A debt within the meaning of the said Act. For these reasons, according to Mr. Gala, the claimants debt stands wholly discharged and, therefore, the decree As prayed for cannot be passed. Mr. Gala also referred to section 11 of the said Act which bars the jurisdiction of Civil Courts As no Civil Court has jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Authorised Officer under Chapter III of the said Act dealing with “Liquidation of certain debts”. Reference was Also made by Mi. Gala to the provisions of section 12 of the said Act, which provide for stay of a suit by Civil Court involving any issues which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Authorised Officer. Relying upon these provisions, Mr. Gala contended that this Court has no jurisdiction and in any event, the present Notice of Motion is liable to be stayed and the matter referred to the Authorised Officer for his determination. 3. Relying upon these provisions, Mr. Gala contended that this Court has no jurisdiction and in any event, the present Notice of Motion is liable to be stayed and the matter referred to the Authorised Officer for his determination. 3. When questioned by me if there was Any documentary evidence in the nature of books of accounts to show that the income of the 2nd respondent did not exceed Rs. 5,000 per annum since 1973 As claimed by the 2nd respondent, Mr. Gala, on taking instructions from the 2nd respondent sitting in Court, stated that no such books of accounts were maintained. It was also stated on behalf of the 2nd respondent that no books showing the receipt of brokerage or commission were maintained by the 2nd respondent, nor could he furnish the name of the person or persons from whom such broke-rage or commission was earned by him since 1973. 4. In order to show that the debt is A liability arising out of a loan so that the 2nd respondent could take the benefit of having the debt wholly discharged, reliance was placed on clauses 6 and 7 of take agreement dated 5th July 1970 between the parties. Clauses 6 and 7 are in these terms:- “6. PRICES :-The sale of the goods by the Company to the Stoc-kist shall be made at prices established by the Company from time to time for supplies to the Companys Stockists(generally referred to As “Stockist prices”) and in force on the date on which the goods leave the godown of the Company or the Manufacturers As the case may be. In order to protect the interests of consumers, it is Agreed between the Company and the Stockist that the Stockist shall not resell the goods At prices higher than the trade prices notified by the Company from time to time. Nothing contained in this Agreement shall prevent the Stockist from reselling the goods At prices lower than the trade prices Aforesaid. 7. PAYMENT:-The Company will either present the despatch documents And invoices direct to the Stockist or at the Companys option negotiate the same through a Scheduled Bank and the Stockist shall make payment against such invoices in accordance with the terms of payment notified by the Company from time to time. 7. PAYMENT:-The Company will either present the despatch documents And invoices direct to the Stockist or at the Companys option negotiate the same through a Scheduled Bank and the Stockist shall make payment against such invoices in accordance with the terms of payment notified by the Company from time to time. Delay in receipt of payment by the Stockist from customers whether the supplies have been made by the Stockist against orders booked by the Companys And /or the Manufacturers representatives or otherwise or any other reason whatsoever shall not entitle the Stockist to delay any payment due to the Company.” 5. These two clauses show that the transaction between the parties was one of sale of goods And the respondents as stockists became owners of the goods. Though they had agreed not to resell the goods at prices higher than trade prices notified by the claimants from time to time, nonetheless they were at liberty to do so Clause 7 speaks of the modes of payment. 6. The definition of the word “debt” in section 2(e) of the said Act, so far As it is relevant for our purposes, is that “debt” means Any liability, in cash or kind, outstanding on the appointed day, being a liability arising out of a loan(with interest if the loan is taken by a worker, and with or without interest, in any other case), whether secured or unsecured. According to Mr. Gala, the 2nd respondent is A worker and he has taken loan of the goods from the claimants, inasmuch As the payment was to be made against Hundis or by post-dated cheques And, therefore, the goods taken from the claimants, would constitute a loan within the meaning of section 2(e). 7. It is not possible to accept the interpretation suggested by Mr. Gala. The word “debt” speaks of a liability arising out of a loan. We all understand what the word “loan” means, when we lend a coin or a book. We give it on the understanding that the borrower will pay back the money or return the book. This is A loan in cash or kind. It is given on the faith of repayment or return. So do we understand the word “loan” when we approach friends or moneylenders for borrowing money. The former gives loan without interest and the latter invariably charges his rate of interest. This is A loan in cash or kind. It is given on the faith of repayment or return. So do we understand the word “loan” when we approach friends or moneylenders for borrowing money. The former gives loan without interest and the latter invariably charges his rate of interest. But when we enter into a transaction of buying or selling an article, we are not taking it on loan or giving it on loan. It is A simple sale. Price may be paid against delivery or the payment of the price may be after a certain number of days or at some further date. The word “loan” is not given any special or artificial meaning under the Act. The Legislature has intended to give to the word “loan” its ordinary meaning. 8. The ordinary meaning of the word “loan” given in the Concise Oxford Dictionary of current English, 5th edition, is “thing, esp. sum of money, lent to be returned with or without interest; lending or being lent; money contribution from individuals or public bodies to State expenses Acknowledged As debt; arrangement or contract by which a government receives or advances money usually for stipulated interest.” Mr. Thakkar, learned counsel appearing for the claimants, referred to Jowitts Dictionary of English Law, Volume 2, 2nd edition(1977), page 1110. It says, “loan” is Anything lent or given to another on condition of return or repayment. 9. The case of the 2nd respondent in his Affidavit in reply is that the claim in question is for the price of goods And interest thereon, but he describes it “in the nature of a loan”. The reasons given by Mr. Gala for treating the price of goods on the footing of a loan are far-fetched and utterly untenable. Clauses 6 and 7 of the agreement relating to prices And payment make the argument unsustainable. The Legislature had no intention to give relief to farmers, rural artisans And labourers And workers by freeing them from their honest everyday liability or indebtedness incurred in respect of things that they bought to keep the life going. The relief was restricted to liabilities Arising out of “loans only”(See the preamble). The Legislatures intent is further crystallised from the exemptions specified in section 22. The Act does not affect the debts And other liabilities of any debtor falling in the numerous categories mentioned in section 22. The relief was restricted to liabilities Arising out of “loans only”(See the preamble). The Legislatures intent is further crystallised from the exemptions specified in section 22. The Act does not affect the debts And other liabilities of any debtor falling in the numerous categories mentioned in section 22. Clause(g) thereof is :- “22. Without prejudice to the provisions of section 19, nothing in this Act shall affect the debts And other liabilities of any debtor or small farmer falling under any of the following matters, namely :- (a) to(f)... ... ... ... ... ... ... … (g) any claim arising out of contract or transaction not connected with money lending.” 10. Apart from saving the application of the Act under section 19 to a decree in favour of trusts or for maintenance or for damages for tort etc., mortgage decrees or awards And decisions of various Tribunals etc., the Legislature exempted various debts under section 22 due to Government, local authority by way of tax, cess or fee, Banking Companies, financing institutions And amount recoverable by way of arrears of land revenue. It also took care to exempt claims unconnected with moneylending. This exemption includes all mercantile transactions, As otherwise it would have given rise to chaos in the life of the community and possibly killed the mercantile goose which too lays the golden eggs. Thus, a claim which is not connected with moneylending cannot enjoy the benefit of its being wholly discharged under section 4 of the Act. In view of the above discussion, I hold that the claim before me is one arising out of the non-payment of the price of goods sold and delivered to the respondents. There is no material before me to suggest that any part of the claim is connected with money-lending. In the circumstances, the respondents were not entitled to have their debt statutorily discharged and remain liable to the claimants. 11. Coming to the question of bar to the jurisdiction of the civil Court and the stay of the suit As laid down in sections 11(1) and 12(I) of the said Act, the terms of these provisions Are these:- “11.(1) No civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Chapter required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Authorised Officer. 12.(1) If a suit instituted in any civil Court involves any issues which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with, by the Authorised Officer under this Act, the civil Court shall stay the suit, and refer such issues to the Authorised Officer for determination.” 12. The Civil Court is not to decide or deal with what is required to be decided or dealt with by the Authorised Officer. Likewise, a suit which involves issues to be decided or dealt with by the Authorised Officer is to be stayed so that those issues can be referred to the Authorised Officer for his determination. Therefore, I must not do or determine what is required to be done and determined by the Authorised Officer. In order to debar the Civil Court or to stay the suit, it must be shown that a particular question under Chapter III(Liquidation of certain debts) arises or any issue under the Act arises which is within the domain of the Authorised Officer. Civil Courts retain jurisdiction to adjudicate upon and adjudge all claims, questions and disputes which are not required to be dealt with or determined by the Authorised Officer. In(Pramod v. Sukhdeo)1, A.I.R. l977 Bom. 42. a single Judge has held that the provisions of sections 11 and 12 of the Act do not extend to the cases of unsecured debts or debt-Aspects of secured debts, which matters being within the purview of clauses(a),(b),(c) and(d) of section 4, have to be dealt with by the Civil Courts concerned. 13. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Thakkar on another decision of this Court in(Punamchand v. Dattatraya)2, 1978 Mh. L.J. 158 = A.I.R. 1978 Bom. 103. The opinion expressed by the Division Bench in this case is that the provisions of the said Act do not include any section which permits the Authorised Officer to go beyond the transaction and find out the real nature thereof. In that case, the borrower had executed a regular sale-deed of a; house for a consideration of Rs. 8,000 and the purchaser was put in possession. The two sons of the borrower Asked for restoration of possession of the house under the Act on the grounds, among overs, that the sale-deed was forcibly obtained and that the house was in fact mortgaged. The enquiry was held by the Tahsildar who held that transaction of sale was a transaction of mortgage. The two sons of the borrower Asked for restoration of possession of the house under the Act on the grounds, among overs, that the sale-deed was forcibly obtained and that the house was in fact mortgaged. The enquiry was held by the Tahsildar who held that transaction of sale was a transaction of mortgage. The order of the Tahsildar was quashed as he could not adjudicate that the transaction was one of mortgage. That was A matter within the powers of the Civil or Criminal Courts. On the authority of the above decision, it is clear that the Authorised Officer cannot go behind the transaction of sale between the parties and take upon himself the task of determining the true nature of the transaction. 14. In the light of the earlier discussion, I am of the opinion that the transaction, between the parties is one purely of sale of goods and that claim is in respect of the price of goods including interest. The transactions between the parties cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be described As “loan” transactions so As to confer the benefit of the Act on the 2nd respondent. 15. The second contention of Mr. Gala arises out of the provisions of section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Mr. Gala contended that in the instant case, an appeal is pending against the order dismissing the application to set Aside the award and, therefore, the appeal would constitute an application for setting Aside the award within the meaning of section 17. According to Mr. Gala, judgment cannot be pronounced in accordance with the award until the appeal is disposed of. Mr. Gala had to concede(though not referred to in the affidavit in reply) that he had taken out a Notice of Motion in the appeal for stay of further proceedings, but the appeal Court refused to grant ad interim stay. According to him, it was not necessary to apply for ad interim stay of further proceedings As section 17 by itself implies statutory stay, inasmuch As on an application to set Aside the award the Court cannot pronounce the judgment according to the award until the application is disposed of. Likewise, since the appeal is filed against the order refusing to set Aside the award, on the same analogy, argued Mr. Likewise, since the appeal is filed against the order refusing to set Aside the award, on the same analogy, argued Mr. Gala, no judgment can be pronounced in terms of the award till the disposal of the appeal. Mr. Gala pointed out that it was not necessary to apply for ad interim stay in view of the built-in statutory stay under section 17, but he did so by way of abundant precaution. Now, barring the ipse dixit of the learned counsel, nothing was shown to me in support of these submissions. Section 17 is in the following terms:- “17. Judgment in terms of award.-Where the Court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for re-consideration or to set Aside the award, the Court shall, after the time for making an application to set Aside the award has expired, or such application having been made, after refusing it, proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow, and no appeal shall lie from such decree except on the ground that it is in excess of, or not otherwise in accordance with the award.” The section provides for judgment in terms of award. It speaks of two situations in which the Court should proceed to pass judgment in terms of the award, firstly, where the Court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration or to set Aside the award after the time for making an application to set Aside the award has expired, and secondly, where an application to set Aside an award having been made after the same is refused. It is upon these remedies being exhausted that the Court can proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award and upon the judgment so pronounced, a decree follows. 16. Section 17 has put two constraints As indicated above on the Court and once those constraints Are removed, the Court is free to pronounce judgment according to the award. There is nothing in the section, either expressly or by implication, to justify the view that an appeal against an order refusing to set Aside the award would constitute an application to set Aside the award. There is nothing in the section, either expressly or by implication, to justify the view that an appeal against an order refusing to set Aside the award would constitute an application to set Aside the award. Even Assuming that the restraints on the Court can be treated in the nature of stay in pronouncing judgment according to the award, once the Court sees no cause to remit the award or any of the matters referred to arbitration for reconsideration or to set Aside the award or after the application for setting Aside the award has been refused, no impediment remains in the way to pass A decree in terms of the award. I, therefore, do not find any force in the second contention. 17. The third and the lAst contention raised by Mr. Gala half-heartedly was that the award is void on the same ground which he had urged for setting Aside the award and, therefore, no decree can be passed. The sub mission is merely to be stated and rejected in view of the application to set Aside the award having been refused. 18. In the result, I make the Notice of Motion absolute in terms of prayer(a). 19. Mr. Thakkar submitted that having regard to the frivolous contentions raised by the respondents, they should be ordered to pay compensatory costs. Mr. Gala contends that the respondents were justified in raising these contentions. In my opinion, this is not a fit case for granting compensatory costs. The respondents to pay to the claimants the costs of the Notice of Motion in one set. 20. Mr. Gala states that the Notice of Motion taken out in the appeal is returnable on 2nd April 1979 and, therefore, the operation of the present order be stayed. Stay refused. Order accordingly. ------