JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - This second appeal raises an interesting question as regards the validity of a custom prevailing in tire community of Domes in the district of Tehri Garhwal. It arises in this way. The plaintiff respondent is admittedly the son of one Smt. Thumma who was the widow of one Som Das. The appellants are collaterals of Som Das being the grandchildren of one Kaldo who was the uncle of Som Das aforesaid. Som Das died young leaving behind a young issueless widow namely Smt. Thumma aforesaid. In accordance with the custom prevailing amongst the members of tire community to which the parties belonged, Smt. Thumma took one Kamal Das as her Kathala. Kathala is a person who is taken by a widow after the death of her husband for procreating children for her deceased husband. Commentators say that the widow is permitted by the custom to do this in order to continue to remain in the home of her deceased husband with a view to procreating children for her deceased husband as also for the purpose of preventing the property of her deceased husband from being claimed by others. According to the custom which is also known as "Tekwa" or "Tikwa" sometimes even during the lifetime of the husband a woman with the consent or at the instance of the husband, takes another man for procreating children for her husband. This latter practice was followed, where the husband was found impotent or otherwise infirm or incapable. 2. Out of the union of Smt. Thumma and Kamal Das, Uttam Das, the plaintiff was admittedly born. Uttam Das filed the present suit against the appellants and claimed that under the custom mentioned above he had become entitled to all the rights of Som Das and was, therefore, entitled to the agricultural property which belonged to Som Das. 3. The suit was contested by the appellants who questioned the existence of the custom and the right of the plaintiff to inherit the property of Som Das. They also alleged that Smt. Thumma had left her deceased husbands home and gone over to live with Kamal Das aforesaid and that consequently the plaintiff was not entitled to rely on the custom of Kathala mentioned above, even if it be assumed that such a custom did exist. 4. They also alleged that Smt. Thumma had left her deceased husbands home and gone over to live with Kamal Das aforesaid and that consequently the plaintiff was not entitled to rely on the custom of Kathala mentioned above, even if it be assumed that such a custom did exist. 4. Both the courts below have, on the-consideration of both oral and documentary evidence as well as examination of the opinions of acknowledged commentators on the subject, arrived at the concurrent conclusion that such a custom as set up by the plaintiff respondent did exist in the community of Domes (a scheduled caste), inhabiting areas falling in the district of Tehri Garhwal where such custom has been recognised for a considerable length of time. Both the courts below have consequently decreed the plaintiff-respondents suit for possession over the agricultural plots in dispute and hence this second appeal. 5. Though in the memorandum of second appeal, most of the grounds were confined to the factum of Smt. Thumma having taken Kamla Das as her Kathala as well as the fact whether Smt. Thumma had taken Kamal Das with the consent and permission of the collaterals of Som Das, learned counsel for the appellants confined his arguments mainly to die validity of the custom. He did not challenge die factum or existence of such a custom nor did he attempt to argue that Kamal Das had been taken by Smt. Thumma otherwise-than in accordance with the prevalent custom of Kathala or Tikwa mentioned above. His main argument was that the custom ought not to be recognized, as it was opposed to morality. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at some length, I am clearly of the view that this appeal has no force and that it is liable to be dismissed. 7. Both the courts below have concurrently found that Smt. Thumma had taken Kamal Das as her Kathala in accordance with the custom prevailing among the members of the community of Domes in an area where that custom had been recognised as valid for a long time. The courts below have referred to the oral evidence consisting of statements made by several witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff, decision in a previous suit to which the appellant, Thumma and Kamal Das also happened to be the party in which such a custom was judicially recognized. The courts below have referred to the oral evidence consisting of statements made by several witnesses on behalf of the plaintiff, decision in a previous suit to which the appellant, Thumma and Kamal Das also happened to be the party in which such a custom was judicially recognized. The courts below have expressly rejected the testimony of the witnesses examined on behalf of the appellant trying to prove that such a custom did not exist. The courts below have also repelled the allegation that Smt. Thumma had left her deceased husbands home and gone to live with Kamal Das. They have further found that the plaintiff was horn out of the union of Smt. Thumma and Kamal Das. The Courts below have also referred to the commentary on this subject, namely, Narendra "Hindu Law" in which customs and usages prevailing among the inhabitants of Tehri Garhwal have been complied by Pt. Hari Krishan Raturi, a member of the Council of Regency of Tehri Garhwal State. This publication is of the year 1978. It is a treatise which has been officially sanctioned for use as a work of reference and guidance by all courts of the erstwhile State of Tehri Garhwal. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent strongly objected to the appellants counsel raising a new point, namely, whether the above custom should be recognised on the alleged ground of being opposed to morality. He urged that this question is not a pure question of law and that had it been raised in the courts below, the plaintiff-respondent would have led evidence to establish that the custom is not opposed to morality. As, however, both learned counsel referred me to the views of commentators of renown on this subject and as the matter is of some importance which is possible to be decided on the materials placed before me in the form of commentaries and judicial authorities, I permitted the appellants counsel to raise this point. I shall now proceed to decide the same. 9. I shall now proceed to decide the same. 9. Sri Hari Krishan Raturi in his aforesaid treatise has observed at pages 172 to 175 that though the custom of a young widow taking a Kathala after the death of her husband for the purpose of procreating children might appear as abhorrent to many civilised and cultured societies, among the communities and societies of Khasias, Khas Brahmans, Khas Rajputs andi Domes this custom is not looked down upon or disapproved. The learned author says that on the contrary, the custom of a young issueless widow taking a Kathala is -considered legitimate among these people. The learned commentator has said that' such a custom is fairly widespread and common among the inhabitants of the subdivisions of Jaunpur and Takhaur in the district of Tehri Garhwal and that it prevails also at other places in lesser degree in various families of the district of Tehri Garhwal. The learned author after considering the material which he gathered says that having regard to the fact that such a custom has been prevalent and recognised as valid among the communities mentioned above, it would not be proper to deny legitimacy to such sons' and that if one were to take the custom to its logical end, the sons born out of such unions ought also to be treated as the sons of the deceased husband of the widow who-takes a Kathala. Sri Raturi says that in the said custom procreation of sons for her deceased husband being the object of the custom, sons born out of the said union ought to be and are treated as sons of the deceased husband for the purpose of inheritance of the property of deceased husband. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent: also invited my attention to the commentary entitled, 'The Khasa Family Law' by Shri L. D. Joshi, a noted authority on the subject. The work, The Khasa Family Law is really a thesis on the basis of which the Degree of the Doctor of Laws was awarded to the author by the University of London. Learned counsel invited my attention to pages 98 to 101 of this book which is a publication of 1929. In this book the learned author has analysed the opinions of various authors and also adverted to the opinions of Manu, Vashishta, Gautam and Narada. Learned counsel invited my attention to pages 98 to 101 of this book which is a publication of 1929. In this book the learned author has analysed the opinions of various authors and also adverted to the opinions of Manu, Vashishta, Gautam and Narada. And after a learned treatment of the subject observed as follows: "Eliminating the spiritual advisers among-the unsacerdotal Khasas, we find a similar practice of the appointment of a Tekwa by the family council of the reversioners or next-of-kin. We should remember, .however, that the Niyog of the Dharmasastras is confined to a sonless widow and terminates when a child is begotten, while the appointment of a Tekwa is not confined to a sonless widow, but has secular needs in view." 11. Sri L. D. Joshi has also noted some striking similarities between this custom and Niyog sanctioned in ancient times of an issueless widow being commanded to take the brother of the husband or some person chosen by the spiritual guru for the purposes of begetting one or two children for her husband for spirituous need. Sri Joshi has said that among the Khasas, also the widow is asked or permitted to take another person as her Tekwa or Kathala and the sons bom of such union are given the status of a son known as Kshetraj among the Hindus entitled to succeed to the property of the deceased husband. To my mind, the difference between Niyog of the ancient times and Tekwa or Kathala of the present time is that under the former the custom was resorted to in order to fulfil the spiritual, needs of the deceased husband, which needs could be satisfied or performed only by a son whereas the latter custom prevailing among the Khasas is based upon the abovementioned secular needs, which needs are and have been regarded as legitimate by those people. 12. It would thus appear that, the custom of taking Kathala has its roots in the ancient times and is really a form of Niyog as practised and sanctioned in ancient times. It has been in existence for a sufficiently long time to assume legitimacy, judged by the standards of the society in which it has been in existence. 13. 12. It would thus appear that, the custom of taking Kathala has its roots in the ancient times and is really a form of Niyog as practised and sanctioned in ancient times. It has been in existence for a sufficiently long time to assume legitimacy, judged by the standards of the society in which it has been in existence. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant placed strong reliance on a decision of Madras High Court reported in Balusami v. Bala Krishna ( AIR 1957 Mad 97 ) in which the court was called upon to consider the validity of a custom which was claimed to be prevailing among the Reddiars of South India, according to which a man could marry his own daughters daughter. The learned Judges of Madras High Court refused to recognise such a custom on the ground, inter alia, that such a custom was clearly opposed to public policy being abhorrent to decency and morality. The learned Judges observed that a civilised and cultured society should not approve of incest which would not find favour even amongst the primitive societies. The facts of the Madras decision are entirely different. In that case, -the party relying on the custom had failed to prove that the custom was either ancient or certain or reasonable. It was observed by the learned judges, that there were only very few instances in a community microscopical in nature and that, consequently, such a custom could not be recognized. It was in addition to these deficiencies that the learned Judges held that the custom seemed abhorrent to them. The position of man marrying the daughter of his own daughter is a very different from the present situation. In the present case, the custom has been proved to have had its roots in ancient times and its prevalence and acceptance by the members of the community in which it exists has been established by ample evidence and authority. The Madras case is, therefore, distinguishable. 14. The Madras High Court, however, has relied upon an earlier decision of that Court reported in AIR 1921 Mad 326 (2) and observed that as to the test of morality it must be determined by the sense of the community as a whole and not by the sense of a section of people. With great humility, I do not agree with this broad statement of the law. With great humility, I do not agree with this broad statement of the law. In my judgment the lest of morality has to be applied from the standards of morality of the community or section of the people in which the custom in question has been in existence or recognized. For, concepts of morality are not fixed notions unchangeable with the times. They change from generation to generation, from one society to another and, even in the same society from time to time, polyandry, for example, may shock the morals and sensibilities of many a society. But there are parts of the world where it has acquired perfect legitimacy. Likewise, there are many social customs which may be regarded as sacrilege in one society but in the society in which the said custom has prevailed and been accepted as legitimate, the custom may not be regarded as opposed to morality. Morality is, therefore, a term of relative import and is not capable of being expressed or defined in absolute or abstract terms. 15. In my, judgment, therefore, when a question arises whether a custom is opposed to morality one has to view the problem through the eyes of the particular society in which the custom prevails. Viewed from that angle, I do not think that the custom of Kathala is opposed to morality. There is therefore, no substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants. 16. Learned counsel for the appellants next contended that in the Bhumi Sam-fcandhi Adhikar Niyam, an order has been .prescribed in which hereditary tenancy rights devolve among the various kinds of heirs of the deceased. He urged that the first among such heirs is mentioned as son. The learned counsel contended that the son means [the natural son and not a Kshetraj son. I do not agree. Once it is held that according to the custom prevailing in the area to which tire aforesaid tenancy law is applicable, a son born out of a union between a widow and her Kathala is regarded as a Kshetraj son, we must give an extended meaning to the word son as it is understood in that area. Consequently a Kshetraj son would equally be entitled to inherit as a son of the deceased hereditary tenant. Consequently a Kshetraj son would equally be entitled to inherit as a son of the deceased hereditary tenant. Learned counsel referred me to the tests laid down for recognising an adopted son for the purposes of inheritance of tenancy rights under the aforesaid Act. He submitted that before an adopted son can succeed, he must have a registered deed of adoption in his favour. The argument was that when such a rigorous test is laid down for an adopted son, it must be presumed that the legislature intended that a Kshetraj son would not fall within the definition of a son. In my view, the argument is fallacious. From the mere fact that for recognition of an adopted son some formalities have to be strictly proved, it does not follow that a Kshetraj son must be regarded as having Been excluded impliedly. Oftentimes a dispute arises about whether a person claiming to be an adopted son was really adopted. In case of a Kshetraj son no such dispute is likely to arise. The Kshetraj son is born out of a recognised union. Besides, learned counsel for the respondent invited my attention to the position of a Kshetraj son as has been recognised by various authorities such as Manu, Narada, Gautam etc. This order is laid down at page 201 of the aforesaid commentary Narendra, "Hindu Law" and in this a Kshetraj son takes a place much above an .adopted son. Consequently a Kshetraj son cannot be deemed to have been excluded from the definition of son in the aforesaid tenancy law. 17. The learned counsel for the appellants then contended that the suit at the instance of Uttam Das was not maintainable as his mother is alive and a widow takes precedence over a son. This point was not taken in the courts Below. However, the argument is fallacious. Once the plaintiff is recognised as a Kshetraj son, he would be deemed to succeed to the interest of the deceased husband of his mother from the date on which the said deceased husband died in the same way as an adopted son who is taken in adoption by a widow after the death of her husband. See the cases reported in Sawan Ram v. Kalawanti ( AIR 1967 SC 1761 ) and Chettiar v. Chettiar ( AIR 1978 SC 1051 ). See the cases reported in Sawan Ram v. Kalawanti ( AIR 1967 SC 1761 ) and Chettiar v. Chettiar ( AIR 1978 SC 1051 ). Both these cases fully support the submission of learned counsel for the respondent namely that the plaintiff-respondent was entitled to file the suit and that he succeeded to the interest of Som Das even though born after the death of Som Das of the union of Smt. Thumma and Kamal Das. 18. My conclusion, therefore, is that the custom of Kathala or Tekwa is valid and that plaintiffs suit has rightly been decreed by,me courts below. 19. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no orders as to costs.