ORDER Gopi Nath, J. -This is a landlords application in revision from a revisional order passed by the District Judge, Lalitpur dated 2-3-1977 dismissing their suit for ejectment of the defendants. 2. The plaintiffs were the landlords of the premises in suit which were leased out to one Madanlal in pursuance of an allotment order passed in his favour. According to the plaintiffs, the premises in suit were let out for running a shop for repair of guns, and subsequently the same were used for working a lathe machine. Thus, the premises, according to the plaintiffs, were used for a purpose inconsistent with one for which the same were originally let out. Madanlals tenancy was determined by the plaintiffs by a notice dated 16-7-1973. It appears that he died on 20-8-1973. His heirs having failed to vacate the premises, the instant suit was filed against them for their ejectment and recovery of rent and damages for use and occupation. The defence delivered was that the premises had not been used for a purpose inconsistent with the one for which the same were let out. The premises were subject to the provisions of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, and the defendants were, accordingly, entitled to the benefit of the provisions of that Act, and since no case was made out against the defendants under Section 20 (2) (d), the suit could not be decreed. The trial court dismissed the suit holding that the premises were not used either by Madanlal or his heirs for a purpose other than the one for which the same were let out, and since the building was governed by the provisions of Act No. 13 of 1972, the suit could not be decreed for the eviction of the defendants. As no rent was found due from the defendants, the suit was dismissed in toto. On revision the Court below concurred with the findings recorded by the trial court, and affirmed its decree. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs have come up in revision. 3. The only question canvassed by the learned counsel for the applicants was that Madanlal being a statutory tenant of the premises in dispute, his heirs did not inherit the tenancy rights, and Mandanlals tenancy having been determined by a valid notice under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the defendants were liable to ejectment by the suit. 3. The only question canvassed by the learned counsel for the applicants was that Madanlal being a statutory tenant of the premises in dispute, his heirs did not inherit the tenancy rights, and Mandanlals tenancy having been determined by a valid notice under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the defendants were liable to ejectment by the suit. Thus the question falling for determination is whether the defendants inherited the tenancy rights of Madanlal, and could be constituted as tenants of the premises in dispute after Mandanlals death. Learned counsel for the applicant urged that since Madanlal occupied the premises in pursuance of an allotment order passed in his favour, he was a mere statutory tenant, and was not a contractual tenant, whose tenancy could devolve on his heirs after his death. A statutory tenant, it was urged, is not a tenant in the eye of law, and he does not acquire the status of a contractual tenant, on whose death the tenancy rights could devolve on his heirs. Reliance was placed by learned counsel on Keeves v. Dean, (1924) 1 KB 685; Carter v. S. U. Carburetter Co., (1942) 2 KB 288; Baker v. Turner, (1950) AC 401 and J. C. Chatterjee v. Sri Kishan Tandon, AIR 1972 SC 2526 . In Keeves v. Dean (supra) it was held that the right of a statutory tenant under the Increase of Rent Act, 1920, is merely a personal right to retain possession of the premises, and it cannot be assigned to another person. At p. 690 of the report it was observed that"........... His right is a purely personal one, and as such, unless the statute expressly authorises him to pass it on to another person, ceases the moment he parts with the possession or dies". Scrutton L. J. while referring to the objection raised by Bankes L. J. to a statutory tenant being called a tenant, observed at page 694 of the report as follows. "My Lord has objected to his being called by that name, on the ground that he is not a tenant at all. Scrutton L. J. while referring to the objection raised by Bankes L. J. to a statutory tenant being called a tenant, observed at page 694 of the report as follows. "My Lord has objected to his being called by that name, on the ground that he is not a tenant at all. But it is a convenient expression, and, although it is true that before the passing of these Acts no one would have spoken of a person who after the expiry of his tenancy remained in possession against the will of his landlord as a tenant, Parliament has certainly called him a tenant, and he appears to me to have something more than a personal right against his landlord/' The statute under consideration in that case was found not to have authorised the tenant to pass on his interest to another person. The case of Carter v. S. U. Carburetter Com. (supra) was concerned with the fixation of standard rent and the liability of a limited company in regard to its ejectment and payment of rent. The phrase statutory tenancy was explained as meaning a right to retain possession by a lessee in view of the protection granted by a statute. In that connection an observation was made that a statutory tenant has merely a personal right of occupation by virtue of the protection granted by an Act under which his eviction is prohibited so long as the conditions under that Act are not fulfilled and he goes on paying the stipulated rent. In the case of Baker v. Turner (supra) it was observed at page 436 of the report that "It has long been settled that the Rent Acts do not prevent an owner from terminating the tenancy of his tenant in the ordinary way: what they do is to give to a person who has been tenant a right to remain in possession after the tenancy has gone. A person with such a right is commonly called a statutory tenant." In the case of J. C. Chatterjee v. Sri Kishan Tandon (supra) it was held that "a person remaining in occupation of the premises let to him after the determination of or expiry of the period of the tenancy is commonly, though in law not accurately, called a "statutory tenant" He has merely the protection of the statute in that he cannot be fumed out so long as he pays the standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and performs the other conditions of the tenancy. His right to remain in possession after the determination of the contractual tenancy is personal: it is not capable of being transferred or assigned, and devolves on his death only in the manner provided by the statute. The question for consideration in this case was whether the defence of want of bona fide requirement by the landlord was a defence personal to the statutory tenant, or whether 011 his death, the same was open to his legal representative as well. It was held that under the general law the heirs of a statutory tenant were not entitled to the protection afforded to him under the statute, and since under the Act the rights of the statutory tenants were not heritable, the pleas open to him under the statute were not open to his heirs and legal representatives. It was observed that in the definition of the word tenant given in S. 3 (vii) of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act (No. 17 of 1950), the heirs of a statutory tenant were not included, and since they did not fall within any part of the definition of word tenant under that Act, they could not in their own right claim to be tenants within the meaning of the Act, and claim the protection of the same. 4. The question, therefore, is whether under the definition of the word tenant in Act No. 13 of 1972, the heirs of a statutory tenant are included. 4. The question, therefore, is whether under the definition of the word tenant in Act No. 13 of 1972, the heirs of a statutory tenant are included. Tenant is defined in S. 3 of the Act as follows:- "In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires: (a) "tenant" in relation to a building, means a person by whom its rent is payable, and on the tenants death- (1) in the case of a residential building, such only of his heirs as normally resided with him in the building at the time of his death; (2) in the case a non-residential building, his heirs:........" It will be seen that the heirs of a tenant are included in the definition of word tenant in the Act. The further question is whether a statutory tenant is a tenant within the meaning of this Act. S. 16 of the Act deals with allotment and release of vacant building. Sub-sec. (1) of S. 16 provides:- "Subject to the provisions of this Act, the District Magistrate may by order; (a) require the landlord to let any building which is or has fallen vacant or is about to fall vacant, or a part of such building but not appurtenant land alone, to any person specified in the order (to be called an allotment order): (b) release the whole or any part of such building or any land appurtenant thereto, in favour of the landlord (to be called a release order): Sub-section (8) then provides: "The allottee shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (5) and S. 18, be deemed to become tenant of the building from the date of allotment or, where he is unable to obtain possession by reason of a stay order of any other person having occupied or continued to occupy the building, from the date on which he obtains possession", Sub-section (8) of Section 16 thus calls the allottee a tenant. 5. In L. Prem Prakash v. Kent Control and Eviction Officer (1967 All LJ 985) it was held that if an allottee in occupation of the premises in question pays rent to the landlord who without any protest accepts the same, a contract of tenancy can be spelt out between the two. 5. In L. Prem Prakash v. Kent Control and Eviction Officer (1967 All LJ 985) it was held that if an allottee in occupation of the premises in question pays rent to the landlord who without any protest accepts the same, a contract of tenancy can be spelt out between the two. In Ratti flam v. Mitthan Lal (1961 All LJ 124) it was held that notwithstanding the determination of a tenancy by a notice under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act the relationship of Landlord and Tenant continues. It was observed :- "The true position is that when once the relationship of landlord and tenant has come into existence that relationship continues for the purposes of S. 3 (1) of the Rent Control and Eviction Act ..............." In Ram Pratap v. Panna Lal (1956 All LJ 787' it was held that in spite of the expiry of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and the application of (he provisions of Section 111 of that Act, the tenant does not cease to be a tenant till the bar to his ejectment laid down in Section 3 of the U. P. Temporary Control of Rent and Exaction Act is lifted. In Chaudharan Smt. Bhartoo v. Mst. Asa Devi (1966 All WR (HC) 55) it was held that the possession of a tenant after the determination of his lease by virtue of the protection given by a statute confers on him the status of a statutory tenant which is not capable of being transferred or assigned, and can devolve on his death only in the manner provided by the statute which gave him the protection against eviction. 6. The question, therefore, is what is the true scope and construction of the word tenant in Act No. 13 of 1972. As seen earlier, it includes the heirs of the original tenant. In Act No. 3 of 1947 the definition of word tenant did not include his heirs. That definition was as follows:- "Section 2 (g). "Tenant ", means the person by whom rent is, or but for a contract express or implied would be, payable for any accommodation". The definition of the word, tenant in Act No. 13 of 1972 enlarges the scope of [that word by including his heirs in it. That definition was as follows:- "Section 2 (g). "Tenant ", means the person by whom rent is, or but for a contract express or implied would be, payable for any accommodation". The definition of the word, tenant in Act No. 13 of 1972 enlarges the scope of [that word by including his heirs in it. An allottee of a building under S. 16 (8) of the Act has been termed as tenant. The word tenant in Section 3 (a) of Act No. 13 of 1972 thus seems to include a statutory tenant as well. It seems to me that the definition of word tenant was enlarged under the new Act to get oxfer the difficulties faced by the heirs of a statutory tenant after his death. Since statutory tenancy was not heritable, and in the case of contractual tenancy' also if the tenancy was determined before the death of the tenant, no interest devolved on his heirs in view of certain authorities, the Legislature stepped in to protect their interest by enlarging the scope of the word tenant. Madanlal being a tenant of the premises in suit, his heirs, after his death, in view of the definition of tenant in S. 3 (a) of Act No. 13 of 1972, became tenants of the building in question, and were entitled to the protection afforded by that Act. The Courts below accorded them the protection conferred by Section 20 of the Act and I have found no legal infirmity in their conclusion. 7. The revision, accordingly, fails and is dismissed with costs.