JUDGMENT N.N. Mithal, J. - The defendants-appellants in this second appeal have lost in both the two courts below in a suit for ejectment which was filed against them by the plaintiffs on the ground of default in the payment of rent. 2. Briefly stated the facts are that Bandhu Lal was the original owner of the disputed property. He transferred this property to the plaintiff by sale deed dated 12-3-1963. The plaintiff allegedly served a notice of demand coupled with a notice terminating the tenancy under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on 13-3-1989 which is said to have been received by the defendant No. 1 on 17/18th March 1969. It is further alleged that since ti)e defendant did not make the payment . as demanded in the notice she had committed default and was, therefore, liable for ejectment. The defendant No. 2 is the daughter of defendant No. 1 and since she had started living in the house during the period when defendant No. 1 was undergoing jail sentence she has also been impleaded as a party to avoid any future complications.- 3. The suit was contested by both the defendants who submitted their separate written statements papers Nos. 42 Ka and 10 Ka. It was pleaded in defence by the defendant No. 2 that the suit had been filed in collusion with the previous owner and that the defendant No. 2 was also a tenant from the time of the previous landlord and that one year prior to the filing of the written statement defendant No. 1 had ceased to be a tenant in the house. In this manner she had no concern left with the payment of rent etc. It is further stated that both the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 had been initiated in the house as co-tenants and after defendant No. 1 had been sentenced to jail defendant No. 2 alone was the tenant in the house in question continuing from the time of Bandhu Lal. It is further clarified that the defendant No. 2 was living in the house with her mother from the .very beginning as her dependant but as a co-tenant and right from the beginning she had been living as a member of the family in the said house. It is further clarified that the defendant No. 2 was living in the house with her mother from the .very beginning as her dependant but as a co-tenant and right from the beginning she had been living as a member of the family in the said house. After defendant No. 1 had gone to the jail she became sole-tenant and she had been in occupation of the house by payment of rent and Bandhu Lal also had been treating and accepting her as tenant of the house. The suit was, therefore, barred due to estoppel and acquiescence. It is further alleged that defendant was not liable to ejectment and she had not committed default. It was said that the plaintiff had not given any notice under Section 106 or 111 of the Transfer of Property Act to defendant No. 1 nor any such notice had been served on defendant No. 2. It is further said that no reply of notice was sent by defendant No. 2 to the plaintiff as was wrongly mentioned in the plaint. She has merely pleaded that rent was sent by her on coming to know of the transfer of the plaintiff and that no default had been committed and the suit was not maintainable. The defendant No. 1 in her written statement 42-Ka also pleaded in defence on the same lines but she has also contended that after being released from the jail she had again become a tenant and she is entitled to the benefit of Sec. 39 of the U. P. Act 13 of 1972 as she had already deposited the entire amount due from her. 4. Both the courts below have rejected the pleas raised by defendants and Doth the courts have come to the conclusion that a notice of demand for ejectment was served on the defendant No. 1 and she had committed default in payment of rent. It was further held that defendant No. 2 was neither a co-tenant nor a tenant in the house in question and on this finding the suit of the plaintiff was decreed which was maintained in the lower appellate court also. 5. Before this Court the following points were urged: - 1. That the defendant No. 1 was not served with notice by the previous landlord or by the plaintiff about purchase of this property and therefore the notice of demand was bad: 2. 5. Before this Court the following points were urged: - 1. That the defendant No. 1 was not served with notice by the previous landlord or by the plaintiff about purchase of this property and therefore the notice of demand was bad: 2. That notice of demand and ejectment was not served on defendant No. 1; 3. The defendant No. 1 did not commit any default in the payment of rent; 4. The notice of demand was invalid; 5. The defendant was entitled to get the benefit of Section 39 of U. P. Act, No. 13 of 1972; 6. The defendant was entitled to be relieved against ejectment under Sec. 114 of Transfer of Property Act; and 7. Defendant No. 2 was also a tenant of the premises in question. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant at great length but I do not find myself persuaded to agree with any of these contentions. 7. As regards points Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 7 are concerned they need not deain us at all as these points are concluded by findings of fact recorded by the two courts below and they do not require to be disturbed by this Court in second appeal. 8. In support of the 4th point the learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the notice of ejectment was invalid in as much as no notice was given to defendant No. 2. In this connection primarily it is to be considered whether defendant No. 2 had any right of tenancy in respect of the premises in suit or not. There is no rent note on the record which may go to show that she was tenant of the house in suit. A suit was filed against defdt. 1 by previous owner Bandhu Lal in the year 1957. Ex. 2 is a copy of the plaint in which defendant No. 1 was alleged to be the tenant in the house in question. Ex. 3 is the written statement filed by Smt. Ram Kumari defendant No. 1 and it is clearly admitted in Para 3 thereof that the house was taken on rent by defendant No. 1 alone. The said suit was decreed. Ex. 3 is the written statement filed by Smt. Ram Kumari defendant No. 1 and it is clearly admitted in Para 3 thereof that the house was taken on rent by defendant No. 1 alone. The said suit was decreed. Therefore from her own admission it is clear that she alone had taken the premises on rent from the previous landlord and Smt. Champa Devi had nothing to do with the tenancy of the same. If at any stage subsequently Champa Devi acquired any interest as a tenant in the house the same should have been specifically pleaded and proved by the defendants. From the written statement on record it is clear that no such plea has been taken. On the contrary defendant No. 2 in her statement stated that she was co-tenant along with her mother from the very inception of the tenancy. This stand is obviously false and does not reconcile with the statement of the defendant No. 1 made in her earlier written statement in the suit of 1957 referred to above. In view of this neither defendant No. 2 had any rights in the tenancy in respect of the house in dispute nor on that account the notice of demand and ejectment could be said to be invalid. 9. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that she was entitled to get benefit of Section 39 of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The opening words of the said section clearly say that it shall apply only to those accommodations to which the old act was not applicable. The present suit was filed in 1969 and there is no allegation anywhere that it Was said in respect of such a premises which had been constructed on or after 1-1-1951. That being so, the benefit of Section 39 cannot be availed of by the appellant. 10. It was lastly and most vehemently argued that the defendant appellant was entitled to benefit of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act. 11. That being so, the benefit of Section 39 cannot be availed of by the appellant. 10. It was lastly and most vehemently argued that the defendant appellant was entitled to benefit of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act. 11. Section 114 reads as under: - "Where a lease of immoveable property has determined by forfeiture of non-payment of rent, arid the lessor sues to eject the lessee, if, at the hearing of the suit, the lessee pays or tenders to the lessor the rent in arrear, together with interest thereon and his full costs of the suit, or gives such security as the Court thinks sufficient for making such payment within fifteen days, the Court may, in lieu of making a decree for ejectment, pass an order relieving the lessee against the forfeiture; and thereupon the lessee shall hold the property leased as if the forfeiture had not occurred." 12. Before this section can apply it is necessary that the lease must have been determined by forfeiture for non-payment of rent. In order to understand the meaning of the term "forfeiture" one has to turn to Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act which reads as under: - "Sec. III (g); by forfeiture; that is to say (1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that, on breach. thereof, the lessor may re-enter; or (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as. such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title himself; or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event and in any of these cases in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease." 13. In order to attract the application of this clause it is necessary that one of the three conditions should be present: (1) In case the lessee breaks an express, condition which provides that on breach thereof the lessor may re-enter; (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in. a third person or bv claiming title in himself; (3) Tenant becomes an insolvent when, any of the three conditions is present the lessor or his transferee has also to give a. notice in writing to the lessor of his intention to determine the lease. 14. a third person or bv claiming title in himself; (3) Tenant becomes an insolvent when, any of the three conditions is present the lessor or his transferee has also to give a. notice in writing to the lessor of his intention to determine the lease. 14. Therefore, before any forfeiture* can take place it is essential that there must be a condition in the lease deed providing for re-entering by the lessor. If there is no written lease deed containing a term giving right to the lessor to reenter and the terms of the lease are oral but it is not proved that there is any such term on breach of which condition lessor may re-enter then the applicability of Section 111 (g) becomes impossible. 15. In the present case none of these conditions are present. There is neither any proof of die conditions on which tenancy was entered into except for the fact that it was let out to defendant No. 1 at a certain rate of rent. The notice which has been, served on defendant No. 1 was also not a notice as contemplated in Clause (g) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. It, therefore, follows that the tenancy-had not been terminated or determined by-forfeiture. If the tenancy of the defendant No. 1 had not been determined by taking , recourse to forfeiture, then no question can arise for giving any benefit to the tenant to relieve her against forfeiture only because she had complied with the conditions laid down in Section 114, T. P. Act i. e. the payment of the entire amount of rent due from her. 16. Apart from this Section 114 was. designed to give benefit to tenants at a time when there were no restrictive rent control laws and the landlord was entitled to) evict the tenant in any of the modes given in Section 111 T. P. Act. The landlord could also get oppressive conditions written in the lease deeds. The courts in the country as courts of equity were given the right to relieve the tenant against ejectment in certain cases. However, the whole scene has now changed drastically. The various rent control legislations have brought many restrictions on the rights of the landlords in the matter of freedom of setting rate of rent and right to evict. Now, only under certain conditions a tenant can be evicted. However, the whole scene has now changed drastically. The various rent control legislations have brought many restrictions on the rights of the landlords in the matter of freedom of setting rate of rent and right to evict. Now, only under certain conditions a tenant can be evicted. The tenant is already sufficiently protected against eviction if he confines himself within the framework of law. In such a situation application of Section 114 of T. P. Act to grant any relief to the tenant becomes ludicrous and inapt. 17. Only those tenants who were somewhat unprotected were those against whom eviction proceedings were pending in respect of houses constructed on or after 1-1-1951. They too have now been protected by incorporating Section 39 in U. P. Act 13 of 1972 which is almost akin to Section 114 T. P. Act at least in principle. Thus I am of opinion that Section 114 of T. P. Act has no application to the present case and the appellant is not entitled to get any benefit under it. 18. In the result, I find no force in this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed with costs.