JUDGMENT V.S. DESUPANDE J.- The appellant was employed as a driver by respondent No.1 on his motor-lorry No. MRS 8847. While this lorry was on its way from Bombay to Sholapur on July 3, 1968, it met with an accident. Another lorry MHO 7464, collided with this lorry and the appellant got injuries and was admitted as an indoor patient in J. J. Hospital. His lett leg was required to be amputated up to the knee. The Hospital Authorities assessed his permanent partial disability at 40%. The appellant consulted one Doctor viz. Dr. Katrak, according to whom the permanent partial disability was to the extent of 70%. He found that the amputation was made in a defective manner. 2. The appellant then made an application under section 3 of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1923 (hereinafter referred to as the Workmen's Compensation Act). He claimed compensation of Rs. 12,600 therein alleging his permanent disability to be total. The employer respondent No. 1 did not contest the claim. At the instance of the claimant, a notice was issued under section 96 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Motor Vehicles Act) to the M/s. Howrah Insurance Co. Ltd., with whom the lorry was insured by his employer, in compliance with the statutory obligation to that effect, under sections 94 and 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Insurance Co. did not care to appear or seek to be impleaded as party for getting its defences tried. At the trial appellant examined himself and said Dr. Katrak in support of his claim. None was examined in rebuttal. 3. The Additional Commissioner, who tried the claim, found appellant's permanent disability to be not total, but only to the extent of 70% and awarded a total compensation of Rs. 9, 120 inclusive of costs of Rs. 150 and penalty of Rs. 150, in terms of the Schedule (2) of the said Act, in accordance with his wage group. His claim to make the Insurance Co. liable in terms of section 96 (1) of the Act, however, was rejected due to his failure to produce the Insurance Policy. The appellant challenge this order in this appeal both as to the quantum and also as to the liability of the Insurance Company. He also claims interest in terms of section 4 (a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 4. The appellant challenge this order in this appeal both as to the quantum and also as to the liability of the Insurance Company. He also claims interest in terms of section 4 (a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 4. Coming first to the question of quantum, Mr. Solkar the learned advocate appearing for the appellant, contends that, the defect in the leg caused by the required amputation, disabled him from getting any work in the market which the appellant could, have got on the date of the accident. It is true that the medical certificate or the evidence of Doctor, as to the quantum of disability, cannot be conclusive. The Commissioner trying the claim also can come to his own conclusion on other evidence, if any, that permanent disability caused by the accident is more than what the medical evidence indicates. The amputation of the left leg up to the knee or any defect therein by itself cannot lead anyone to the conclusion that the claimant would not be able to do any work whatsoever, which he could have otherwise done on the date of the accident. We may accept Mr. Solkar's contention, based on the judgment of this Court reported in the case of Ahmed Abdul v. H. K. Sehgal1, and on the ratio of the House of Lords Judgment, in the case of Ball (Pauper) ... and William Hunt & Sons Limited, 1912 A. C. page 496, that 'incapacity for work' also means inability to get work done, due to any physical defect, which makes his work unsaleable in any market reasonably accessible to him. All that the claimant has in this case stated, is that he was unable to do any work and has not succeeded in securing any work. This bald statement does not amount to proving that his defect has made his work unsaleable in the market. In this view of the matter, the finding of the Commissioner as to the assessment of the extent of the permanent disability as also to the compensation, quantified therefor, does not call for any interference. 5. The Commissioner has not awarded interest. He has not given any reason for the same. The wrongful withholding of the amount by the employer as also his insurer, if he is so liable, entitles the claimant to interest under section 4 (a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. 5. The Commissioner has not awarded interest. He has not given any reason for the same. The wrongful withholding of the amount by the employer as also his insurer, if he is so liable, entitles the claimant to interest under section 4 (a) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. His appeal is liable to be allowed to this extent. 6. Coming now to the question of liability of the Insurer to the claimant, the appellant neither cared to file any copy of the Insurance Policy in the lower Court nor did he file it in this Court. When the matter was taken up for hearing, Mr. Solkar, indicated to us that copy of the said Policy is filed in the City Civil Court in Case No. (Award No. 3701 1970) pending in the said Court. As the claimant appeared to be very poor and helpless, we thought it proper to send for the record and proceedings of the said case, in the interest of justice, to avoid any further delay. On examining the Policy, we found that it did comply with section 95 (h) and 2 of the Motor Vehicles Act. We could not see any reason why respondent No.2, the insurer should not be held liable to indemnify the employer insured, found liable to pay the above compensation. Mr. Dave, also could not suggest any defence, made available to the insurer under section 96(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, to avoid its liability. The case was adjourned once to enable him to get instructions in this behalf. We have allowed Mr. Solkar to prepare a copy of the said Policy for the purpose of the record of this case, and file the same with an endorsement of it's being true under his signature. 7. It appears that after the institution of this appeal, general insurance business is nationalised and the respondent No.2 Insurance Co. has been merged with New India Assurance Co. Ltd., in terms of the Government Notification in this behalf under General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act, No. 57 of 1972, enforced on 1-1-1972. Mr. Dave made a statement at the bar, that he was now being instructed by the above successor Company. 8. Mr. Dave's main contention is that the Commissioner is competent to determine and enforce the liability of only the employer under section (3) and (31) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Mr. Dave made a statement at the bar, that he was now being instructed by the above successor Company. 8. Mr. Dave's main contention is that the Commissioner is competent to determine and enforce the liability of only the employer under section (3) and (31) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. He has no jurisdiction to pass any order against any stranger, such as the insurer. Compulsory insurance and the liability of the insurer being entirely the creatures of the Motor Vehicles Act, so contends Mr. Dave, the authorities under the Motor Vehicles Act alone and not the Commissioner can try and decide any such liability of the insurer. In support of his contention, be relied on a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 51 of 1971 dated June 19, 1972. This decision apparently does support Mr. Dave. He also relied on the Judgments of the Delhi High Court reported in Vanguard Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Bahoti and others2, and that of Kerala High Court in the case of K. P. Kurian v. The Managing Partners Hindustan Shipping Co.3. In the first case, claimant employee was not the one required to be covered by the statutory insurance, contemplated under clauses (a) to (c) of the first proviso to section 95(1)(b) of the Motor Vehicles Act. In the second case, maintainability of the employer's appeal in the High Court against the inadequate quantum of compensation fixed under section (3) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, was questioned by the employer on the ground that insurer company was not impleaded as respondent. This contention was overruled saying that insurer was neither a necessary party before the Commissioner nor in an appeal in the High Court. The ratio of these two cases thus can have no relevance to point before us. 9. Mr. Solkar on the other hand relied on the Division Bench Judgments of Gujarat and Karnatak High Court reported in The Northern India Motors Owners Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Magan Shanaji Solanki and others4, and Hindusthan Ideal Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Pappu Poojary and others5, as also on the two unreported Division Bench Judgments of this Court in Premier Life & Gen. Insurance Co. v. Sitabai & others6, and M Is. Eagle Star Ins. Co., Ltd. v. V. B. Potdar Esquire, Commissioner for w. C. A., Bombay'. Co., Ltd. v. Pappu Poojary and others5, as also on the two unreported Division Bench Judgments of this Court in Premier Life & Gen. Insurance Co. v. Sitabai & others6, and M Is. Eagle Star Ins. Co., Ltd. v. V. B. Potdar Esquire, Commissioner for w. C. A., Bombay'. These judgments do lay down that the liability of the car owner determined by the Commissioner can be enforced by him against the Insurance Company. 10. The contention of Mr. Dave, though attractively plausible, is based on a misconception as to the nature of the liability of the insurer under section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act and chapter (viii) thereof and the scope of section (3) and section 19 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Workmen's Compensation Act is enacted in 1923 while Motor Vehicles Act in 1939. The chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act was not enforced till 1946. Section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act requires the insurer merely to indemnify the insured who is mainly and primarily liable for damages to the victims of the car mishaps on the road. Existence of a judgment against the insured, in respect of such primary liability is sine qua non for the accruel of the liability of the insurer. The primary liability of such wrongdoers is not the creature of the Motor Vehicles Act. Running down actions essentially are actions in tort, and the liability and obligations of the wrongdoers and rights of their victims, are regulated by the Law of Torts and Fatal accidents Act of 1855. By requiring the compulsory insurance of the cars under section 94 of the Motors Vehicles Act, in conformity with the terms of section 95 thereof, and making the insurer fictionally a judgment-debtor under section 96 thereof, the Legislature has only provided another source for effective enforcement of the said primary liability. It does not provide for any different mode of trial or any forum. Section 96(2) not doubt requires the trial of the limited defences of the insurer, before any judgment against the insured is enforced against the insurer. The defences are however contemplated to be tried along with the trial of the claim against the insured by the same Court from which the judgment against the insured is sought to be obtained. Section 96(2) not doubt requires the trial of the limited defences of the insurer, before any judgment against the insured is enforced against the insurer. The defences are however contemplated to be tried along with the trial of the claim against the insured by the same Court from which the judgment against the insured is sought to be obtained. Section 96(2) only ensures compliance with the principles of natural justice by requiring (1) a notice to the insurer through the said Court and, (2) his being impleaded a party for the limited purpose of the trial of its defences specified in section 96(2) at his choice. n. Such claims for damages were tried even before the Motor Vehicles Act, against the car owners and the drivers in ordinary civil Courts, as actions in tort. The increase in the load of cars on the road in course of time, and consequential increase in frequency of road accidents, drove the Legislature 'to resort to the insurance mechanism, to extend, at least a limited relief, in 'terms of section 95 (2, of the Motor Vehicles Act, both to the car owners, and their victims. Chapter VIII of the Motor Vehicles Act, of which section 94 to 96 are the parts, aimed mainly for covering what are known as 'third party risks, is designed to achieve this object. The chapter as it stood till its amendment by Act No 100 of 1956 neither sought to displace the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts nor the primary liability of the owners -including their vicarious liability for the acts or omissions of their drivers. Incidental and ancillary liability of insurer, though itself creature of Motor Vehicles Act, is still an integral and inseparable part of the same primary liability of car owner or his driver. Its separate trial is neither possible, feasible nor contemplated under the Motor Vehicles Act. 12 The Workmen’s Compensation Act on the other hand deals with the liabilities of certain employers, for injuries and deaths caused to their employees, in accidents, arising out of and in the course of their employment. Liability of the car owner employer, is only a specie of such liabilities. Liability of the 'employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act has a few distinguishing features. It is absolute in that it is not dependent on the negligence or any wrongful act of the employer or his driver. Liability of the car owner employer, is only a specie of such liabilities. Liability of the 'employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act has a few distinguishing features. It is absolute in that it is not dependent on the negligence or any wrongful act of the employer or his driver. Secondly its quantum is statutorily fixed to ensure speedy relief. When the employee of the car owner becomes the victim of any car accidents he or his dependants, could have recourse to remedies under Workmen's Compensation Act and also under ordinary law till amendment of the Motor Vehicles Act in 1956. Section 3 (5) of the Workmen's Compensation Act leaves it to the choice of the victim or his dependants, to avail of his remedy and be Content with the limited statutory compensation or seek for higher amount, by recourse to the remedy under the ordinary law. Section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act as now amended in 1956, contemplates constitution of the Accidents Tribunals for the trial of actions arising out of the use 'of a car on the public place. Section 110AA however expressly leaves the above choice of the victims Intact. Thirdly such claims under Workmen’s Compensation Act are exclusively triable by a commissioner appointed under the Act. While section 19(2) expressly ousts jurisdiction of civil Courts for claims arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act; section 19 (1) authorises the commissioner to decide all questions including the one of the liability of even "any person" other than the employer. Sections 12 to 13 are illustrative of how persons other than the employer also can be liable to satisfy such claims. 13. Special liabilities arising out of the Workmen's Compensation Act are out side the pale of the Motor Vehicles Act. The employees of the car owner, are not the third parties, whose risk is mainly contemplated to be covered under this compulsory insurance scheme. In fact liabilities of the employer for the injuries or death of the employees caused by the use of car on the road, are expressly excluded under the proviso to section 95 (1) (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act from the contemplated compulsory insurance. In fact liabilities of the employer for the injuries or death of the employees caused by the use of car on the road, are expressly excluded under the proviso to section 95 (1) (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act from the contemplated compulsory insurance. Yet the car owner is placed under a statutory obligation to include in this statutory insurance, his liabilities as employer under the Workmen’s Compensation Act in respect a category of employees covered by clause (a) to (c) to the said proviso as the same are excluded from the exemption clause. The car-drivers are covered by this exception to exception. As however the primary liability of the employer under this exception to exception, continues to be the creature of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the jurisdiction to try the said claim continues to be vested in the Commissioner, since the enforcement of the Workmen's Compensation Act in 1923. As seen earlier, the Motor Vehicles Act does not contemplate displacement of the said jurisdiction, Introduction of section 110 A of the Motor Vehicles Act under 1956 amendment Act, does not make any difference to this legal position. In the case: of Minu B. Mehta and another v. Balkrishna Ramchandra Nayon and another7. 'The Supreme Court has now finally held that jurisdiction of the Accidents. Tribunal under section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act is limited to cases, arising out of negligence of the driver. Claims arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act thus continue to be triable exclusively by the Commissioner appointed thereunder. The statutory liability of the insurer under section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act, to- indemnify the principle debtor, employer thus shall have to be tried and enforced by the Commissioner alone in the manlier indicated therein. 14. The assumption that the Commissioner has no jurisdiction against the insurer is equally misconceived. Firstly the manner, in which, car owners liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act, in respect of the special categories of employees, is required to be covered by the compulsory insurance under section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act, and such liability is made enforceable under section 96, indicates the legislative intent to make these provisions of sections 95 and 96 the part of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, itself, for the limited purpose of such enforcement. Secondly such incidental liability of insurer, being integrally connected with the primary liability of the employer, shall have to be tried and determined by one and the same Court. The Commissioner, being the substitute for the Court under the scheme of the Workmen's Compensation Act, with exclusive jurisdiction, alone can try such claims, against both tire employer insured, and the insurer. Thirdly we have already seen how Commissioner is competent to determine the claim against any person other than employer. The words 'any person' in section 19 (1) are wide enough to include insurer, made statutorily liable, for the liability of the employer under section 96 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The words 'court’ in section 96 (2) and the 'judgment' and 'judgment debtor' in section 96 (1) in the context must be deemed too have been intended to cover Commissioner and his 'orders' under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Section 96 is not amended under the Amendment Act of 1956 under which the trial of claims for damages for 'wrongful driv1ing of the car on the road is vested in the motor Accidents Tribunal. The question arose if the word, 'court' and 'judgment' in section 96 (2) and 96 (1) can be construed to cover the Tribunals appointed under section 110A of the Motor Vehicles Act, and its award. Chief Justice Khanna of Delhi High Court (as he then was) answered it in the affirmation in Vanguard Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rohini Bhan and others, indicating that the words are required to be adapted to the changed context. The same reasoning holds good for the above conclusion of ours. 15. The contention of Mr. Dave that the Commissioner has no power to try or enforce the liability of the employer under Workmen's Compensation Act against the insurer by reference to his liability under section 96 of the Motor Vehicle Act is thus untenable. 16. Our this view accords with the ratio of the Division Bench judgment in Special C. A. No. 1653 of 1965 and other cases cited on by Mr. Solkar. The judgment in Letters Patent Appeal relied on by Mr. Dave no doubt strikes a discordant note. But the decision appears to be per incuriam within the ratio of Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Company, Limited 7. Solkar. The judgment in Letters Patent Appeal relied on by Mr. Dave no doubt strikes a discordant note. But the decision appears to be per incuriam within the ratio of Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Company, Limited 7. Unfortunately all the factors discussed above were not brought to the notice of the learned Judges deciding the Letters Patent Appeal nor their attention was drawn to the reported Judgments of Gujarat and Karnataka High Courts in which some of the factors adverted to above by us, are elaborately discussed. Even the earlier two Division Bench Judgments of this Court in F. A. and Spl. C. A. cited by Mr. Solkar, were not brought to their notice. Arguments before the learned judges proceed as if the liability .of the insurer is merely contractual and some other forum and procedure can be resorted, to enforce it. It is only on principles of equity and not on the statutory compulsion, that the jurisdiction of the Commissioner was sought to be invoked by the appellant therein. The impact of section 95 and 96 was not brought to their notice as was done before the learned judges, hearing the Spl. C. A. 17. The contention of Mr. Dave that, the statutory liability of the insurer under sections 95 and 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act can be enforced only by the authorities thereunder and not by the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act or any other authority under any other law, is apparently so impressive that we ourselves could not realize the untenability of the same, till several sections of the two enactments and the decided cases were brought to our notice, to demonstrate that liability of the insurer created by section 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act is merely incidental and ancillary to the primary liability of the employer, triable exclusively by the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act and Commissioner also is, enabled- under section 19 (1) of the Workmen's; Compensation Act to determine and enforce such incidental liability against strangers. The judgment in Letters Patent Appeal therefore cannot be said to be well considered, in terms of the ratio at the Full Bench, judgment in the case of Parappa Ningappa Khanded v. Mallappa Kallappa Kore8 to warrant its being treated as binding precedent. The judgment in Letters Patent Appeal therefore cannot be said to be well considered, in terms of the ratio at the Full Bench, judgment in the case of Parappa Ningappa Khanded v. Mallappa Kallappa Kore8 to warrant its being treated as binding precedent. On the other hand, the point so specifically raised in the Special Civil Application by the insurer, was overruled by the Division Bench discussing in detail the scope of sections 95 and 96 of the Motor Vehicles Act. This judgment is binding on us in accordance with the ratio of the above F. B. Para 1687 at page 799-800 of Halsbury's Laws of England Third Edn. Vo1. 22 lays down the following guide lines, in such, situation :- "The Court is not bound to follow a decision of its own if given per incuriam. A decision is given per incuriam when the Court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a Court of a coordinate jurisdiction which covered the case before it, or when it has acted in ignorance of a decision of the House of Lords. In the former case it must decide which decision to follow, and in the latter it is bound by the decision of the House of Lords." 18. In view of this reference to Full Bench, as urged by Mr. Dave rather than serve any useful purpose, would only prolong the life of litigation to the harassment of the appellant and waste the time of three judges for no good reason. J9. The result is that the appeal is partly allowed. The order of the Commissioner is modified to this extent that the appellant gets interest on the awarded amount at 6% per annum from the date of the order of the trial Court viz. 28-8- 1970 till the date of recovery. It will also be open for the appellant claimant to enforce this liability against the insurance Co-respondent No.2, in terms of section 96 (1) oil the Motor Vehicles Act. 20. There will be no order as to costs of this appeal. Appeal partly allowed.