Judgment :- 1. We regret our inability to agree with the views of the learned judge in his judgment which has given rise to this appeal. The appellant's writ petition was to quash Ext. P5 order of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Kasaragod informing the appellant that as her mother Khadeejumma was dead, further action in respect of the application under S.75 (3) of the Land Reforms Act, preferred by the mother Khadeejumma had been dropped by the Government. Khadeejumma filed Ext. P1 application on 10-6-1961 to shift the 1st Respondent from the Kudikidappu and to acquire land for the purpose of shifting as she was possessed only of less than 1 acre of land. (The 1st Respondent died and Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 are the legal representatives). The application was allowed by Ex. P2 order dated 5-4-1973 of the Revenue Divisional Officer which stated: "4. In view of the facts stated above, the shifting of Kudikidappu in this case is allowed. The kudikidappu will be shifted to the proposed plot, R. S. No. 93/2 of Kudlu Village of Kasaragod Taluk. An extent of 0-10 acre (ten cents) from R. S. No. 93/2 of Kudlu Village will be acquired for the purpose subject to the condition that the petitioner deposit 871/2% of the land value of the land measuring 0-10 acre and the expense reasonably required to shift the kudikidappu and also towards the encharged. The total amount to be deposited towards land value and towards the expenses for shifting the kudikidappu shall be deposited on further intimation from this office." After the passing of the said order, mother Khadeejumma died on 22-5-1974. A memorandum was filed to implead the writ-petitioner her only daughter as heir and legal representative of Khadeejumma. Ext. P4 application was made by the writ petitioner to the Land Board, Trivandrum, for expediting the matter. It was by way of response to the said application and after receipt of the relevant proceedings that Ex. P5 order was passed stating that as the mother Khadeejumma was dead further action had been dropped by the Government. 2. In dismissing the writ petition, the learned judge observed: "I may straight away say that an order of this nature cannot be equated with a decree in a civil suit. Whether it could be placed on par with an order passed under the Rent Control Act also is beset with difficulties. 2. In dismissing the writ petition, the learned judge observed: "I may straight away say that an order of this nature cannot be equated with a decree in a civil suit. Whether it could be placed on par with an order passed under the Rent Control Act also is beset with difficulties. Where an order of eviction under the Rent Control Act is passed a right to property is created. An order of shifting does not create such a right. It has to be followed by other procedures, the scheme of which is contained in S.75 (3A) to (31)) when alone the kudikidappukaran becomes entitled to the property acquired and shifting becomes a reality. It is only then that the legal representatives could be said to have acquired any right. Till then the said right remains inchoate. In dealing with applications for shifting, one has to bear in mind the special safeguards built in the Act to protect the kudikidappukars. To allow the present petition to remove the kudikidappukaran at the instance of a person who owns a house and is possessed of three acres and more on 1-9-1969 would be to defeat the provisions in the Act. In my judgment therefore Ex. P2 cannot be equated to an order under the Rent Control Act or a decree in a civil suit. It is only when an alternate site is acquired, compensation paid, expenses given and the kudikidappukaran transplanted in the acquired property that the scheme of shifting becomes complete, creating right in property which could be inherited." 3. Counsel for the appellant complained that after Ext. P2 order which had recognised the right of Khadeejumma, and by which the said right had become crystallised, the authorities were wrong in dropping proceedings, as the appellant, as the legal representative of her mother had acquired the right to prosecute the proceedings and could not be deprived of the same. We think the position thus taken up by Counsel for the appellant is correct and must be accepted. S.75 (1) of the Act enacts that no kudikidappu shall be liable to be shifted except on the grounds enumerated therein. We pass over the grounds. Sub-section (2) provided for the conditions to be satisfied for shifting the kudikidappukaran on the ground that the applicant bona fide requires the land. We pass over the same also. S.75 (1) of the Act enacts that no kudikidappu shall be liable to be shifted except on the grounds enumerated therein. We pass over the grounds. Sub-section (2) provided for the conditions to be satisfied for shifting the kudikidappukaran on the ground that the applicant bona fide requires the land. We pass over the same also. Sub-section (3) provides: "(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), where the total extent of land held by a person, either an owner or as tenant, is less than one acre and there is a kudikidappu on any land held by him, he may, if he requires the land occupied by such kudikidappu for constructing a building for his own residence, apply to the Government for the acquisition of land to which the kudikidappu may be shifted: Provided that after the expiry of a period of two years from the commencement of the Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969, an application shall not be made under this sub-section except with the consent of the kudikidappukaran. Explanation. For the purposes of this sub-section, (a) the total extent of land held by a person shall be computed as on the Ist day of July, 1969; (b) in calculating the total extent of land held by a person who is a member of a family, the extent of the land held by any member of his family or jointly by some or all of the members of such family shall also be taken into consideration." Despite the strenuous arguments of Counsel for Respondents, we are satisfied that the right to shift has been recognised by Ext. P2 order and that has been sufficiently crystallised by the same, so as to make it transmittable to the legal representatives on the death of the mother Khadeejumma subsequent to the said order. The Respondent's objection is that the section requires performance of certain conditions before shifting can be implemented, and as the applicant died before the fulfilment of these conditions, nothing survived to the legal representatives. The generally accepted principle is that, with a few exceptions all causes of action survive to and against legal representatives - wide 0.22, R.1 of the CPC., S.37 of the Contract Act and S.306 of the Indian Succession Act. The position disclosed is more or less similar to a decree for recovery of possession on payment of value of improvements. The generally accepted principle is that, with a few exceptions all causes of action survive to and against legal representatives - wide 0.22, R.1 of the CPC., S.37 of the Contract Act and S.306 of the Indian Succession Act. The position disclosed is more or less similar to a decree for recovery of possession on payment of value of improvements. If the plaintiff who has been granted the decree, dies subsequent thereto, but before deposit of the value of the improvements, the rights under the decree still survive to the legal representatives. It seems to us to make no difference that before payment of the whole or the required part of the purchase price, or decision as to the suitability of the alternate site, the applicant who applied under S.75 (3) had died and the legal representative had been seeking to prosecute the proceedings initiated by the predecessor. Nor does it make any difference that the legal representative in his or her personal capacity is disentitled to apply under S.75 (3) for acquisition of land to shift a kudikidappukaran, as he/she, in his/her, independent capacity is possessed of more than the requisite extent of land needed to make an application to the Government for acquisition. The legal representative is prosecuting the application, not in any independent capacity, but as representing the predecessor. In this view we are unable to sustain the reasoning or conclusion of the learned judge. We allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the learned judge and direct that O.P. No. 3999 of 1975 will stand allowed and Ext. P5 order will stand quashed. Further steps in pursuance of Ext. P2 order will be proceeded with in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. Allowed.