ORDER H. G. Mishra, J.- 1. During the course of hearing of this petition, when it was laid for admission, a preliminary point cropped up for decision, which is to the following effect : Whether a petition under Art, 226/227 of the Constitution of India containing a challenge to the vires of State law can be heard on admission and/or grant of interim writ by this Bench; 2. Shri J.S.L Sinha, placing reliance on the decision contained in para 6 of Janved Singh v. Union of India (M P. No 515 of 1978 decided by Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court at Jabalpur on 24-8-1978), contended that this Bench has no jurisdiction to hear the petition on admission and/or grant ad-interim writ or stay order. Mr. K. N. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the decision in Janved Singh's case (supra) is obiter dictum and that this Court has jurisdiction to hear the case on admission and to either admit the petition and/or to grant interim writ or to reject the petition in those cases, which fall within permissible limits of the ratio of Brij Gopakl v. Stale of M. P., 1978 JLJ 96 = AIR 1978 MP 122 (FB). Mr. B. P. Singhal, learned Additional Government Advocate, appearing on behalf of the State, stated that the State has nothing to say on the point. Mr. P.W Sahasratuddhe and Mr. A. B. Mishra, who appeared as amicus curiae submitted that this Bench has jurisdiction to hear the petition on admission; and that the preliminary objection deserves to be over ruled. 3. After having beard the learned counsel on the preliminary objection, we have reached the conclusion that he preliminary objection deserves to be over-ruled. 4. Para 6 of the order dated 24-8-1978, passed in M. P. No. 515 of 1978 (Janved Singh v. Union of India) runs as under :- "6. It was also brought to our notice by Shri Y. S. Dharmadhikari at this stage that some confusion seems to have been persisting at the two Benches at Indore and Gwalior regarding Motion Hearing of petitions involving the question of vires. It cannot be doubted in any manner that even in the Motion Hearing the petition has to be beard and if it is dismissed, it decides the matter finally, so far as this court is concerned. It cannot be doubted in any manner that even in the Motion Hearing the petition has to be beard and if it is dismissed, it decides the matter finally, so far as this court is concerned. That being so it cannot be said that Motion Hearing does not mean a hearing of a case. In this connection we may refer to the rules framed by this High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 'Motion Hearing' has been included in the hearing. Even in the Stroud's Judicial Dictionary (Fourth Edition, Vol. 2), it has been mentioned as under;- "To 'hear' a cause or matter means to hear and determine. However, a Full Bench of Five Judges in Brijgopal v. State of M. P., 1978 JLJ 96 = AIR 1978 M.P. 122 (FB), has held that 'hearing' includes 'Motion Hearing.' Therefore, we are of the view that any writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India raising the question of vires of any enactment, rule. Orders or Notification has to be placed for, Motion Hearing at the principal Seat in view of Hon'ble the Chief Justice's Order dated 5-2-1976." 5. From the aforesaid paragraph it is clear that in order to hold that 'hearing includes 'Motion Hearing', the Hon'ble Division Bench deciding Janved Singh's case (supra) has placed reliance on Brijgopal's case (supra). We have gone through the Full Bench case of Brijgopal (supra). The ratio of the case is condensed in para 77 thereof, which runs as under :- (1) A writ petition must, in the first instance, be placed before a Division Bench for admission although a question of constitutional validity of a State law has been raised in it. A Division Bench is competent to admit it and also to grant interim relief such as stay, injunction; etc., (2) A Bench of lets than five Judges cannot dismiss a petition when at the admission stage where any question as to constitutional validity of a State law is to be determined, except in the following cases ;- . A Division Bench is competent to admit it and also to grant interim relief such as stay, injunction; etc., (2) A Bench of lets than five Judges cannot dismiss a petition when at the admission stage where any question as to constitutional validity of a State law is to be determined, except in the following cases ;- . (i) When the question is irrelevant and, therefore, does not arise for determination; (ii) When the question .has already been determined by the Supreme Court; (iii) When the position has already been determined by a Bench of at least five Judges of the High Court, and the Division Bench does not feel reconsideration of the decision by a larger Bench to be necessary. From the aforesaid ratio the position of law which emerges and the procedure which has to be followed is to the following effect ;- (i) When a writ petition raising question of constitutional validity or a State law has been presented in Bench Registry, it has to be placed for admission before the Judges constituting a Division Bench in the first instance : (ii) The Division Bench, before which the petition is listed for 'motion hearing' is competent to admit it and also grant interim relief, such as stay, injunction etc ; (iii) The Division Bench can dismiss petition even at admission stage in the following cases :- (1) When the question is irrelevant and, therefore, does not arise for determination; (2) When the question bas already been determined by the Supreme Court; (3) When the question has already been determined by a Bench, of at least five Judges of the High Court, and the Division Bench does not feel re-consideration of the decision by a larger Bench to be necessary. (4) In case not falling within the above said exceptions, the-petition will have to be laid for hearing at the Principal Seat, since in that event rejection will mean 'hearing for determination'. (5) After admission of the writ petition by this Bench, it will have also to be laid for final hearing at the Principal Seat. 6. Even according to the ratio of Brijgopal's case (supra), on which Janved Singh's case seeks reliance, the writ petition containing a challenge to the constitutional validity of a State law has to be, in the first instance, placed before the Judges constituting a Division Bench for admission. 6. Even according to the ratio of Brijgopal's case (supra), on which Janved Singh's case seeks reliance, the writ petition containing a challenge to the constitutional validity of a State law has to be, in the first instance, placed before the Judges constituting a Division Bench for admission. The Division Bench may, thereafter follow appropriate procedure indicated therein. But to hold otherwise, will not only be going contrary to the ratio of Brijgopal's case (supra), but will also have the effect of frustrating the 'very object of establishment of permanent Benches at Indore and Gwalior. With the establishment of permanent Benches, exclusive jurisdiction has been carved out in respect of cases arising in the Districts in respect of which permanent Benches have been established and in respect of which the Judges sitting there have to exercise jurisdiction. Curtailment of territorial jurisdiction of the Principal Seat of the High Court is a necessary condition of the permanent Benches under Section 51(2) of the States Reorganization Act; 1956. This is also what has been held by Hon'ble A.P. Sen, J. (as he then was) and Hon’ble M. L. Shrimal, J., in Ram Rakh v. Union of India, AIR 1977 Raj 242. The Case of Ram Rakh (supra) is based on Manicam v. Assistant Registrar, AIR 1958 Kerala 188 and Abdul Taiyab v, Union of India, 1977 JLJ 279= AIR 1977 MP 116 (FB). 7. Accordingly, after being presented writ petition involving challenge to the vires of a State law will have to be placed, by the Bench Registry, before a Division Bench for admission and/or grant of interim relief. The Bench Registry cannot send such a petition directly to the Principal Seat, because it is not the opinion of the Bench Registry, which is postulate of the law, but it is for the Judges sitting in Division Bench, before which the petition has been laid for hearing on admission, to decide, whether to admit the petition and/or to grant interim relief or to reject it on the. grounds indicated in para 77 of the case of Brij Gopal (supra); or to direct it to be sent to the Principal Seat to be laid for being dealt with in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Full Bench case of Brij Gopal (supra). 8. grounds indicated in para 77 of the case of Brij Gopal (supra); or to direct it to be sent to the Principal Seat to be laid for being dealt with in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Full Bench case of Brij Gopal (supra). 8. As is clear from the order passed in Janved Singh's case (supra), the petition was heard on admission at the Principal Seat; and while rejecting the petition in limine, the Hon'ble Division Bench in para 6 of its order dated 24-8-1978 has given decision on a point, which was not necessary for the decision of the questions raised by that petition. As such, the decision in para 6 of Janved Singh's case, in our humble opinion, is an obiter dictum. Even agreeing with the dictum of the Janved Singh's case, (supra) that 'hearing' includes 'motion hearing' also, in the light of the ratio of Brij Gopal's case (supra) it has to be held that the procedure indicated in para 77 thereof has to be followed and the Bench Registries cannot send writ-petition containing a challengs to the constitutional validity of a State law directly to the Main Registry. 9. So far as we are aware, there was no such confusion, as was alleged to have been persisting at the two Benches at Gwalior and Indore. It might have been in the imagination of the learned counsel, who made the grievance about its persistance at the Benches. If there might have been any apprehended confusion, it ought to have been regarded that it stood dispelled with the pronouncement of Brij Gopal's Case (supra). 10. Accordingly, we over-rule the preliminary objection and hold that: "The writ petition bas been properly bid for hearing on admission before this Bench and that this Bench has jurisdiction to hear the petition in accordance with the procedure laid down in para 77 of Brij Gopal's case". (supra). 11. Before parting with this order, we record our thanks to Shri P.W. Sahasrabuddhe and Shri A.B. Mishra, advocates for the valuable assistance they rendered to us at the time of hearing of the preliminary objection.