ORDER R.B. Misra, J. - Admittedly one Chhedi Lal was fixed rate tenant of Plots Nos. 345, 349, 350 and 351. He has since died and petitioner Thakur Prasad being the sisters son is heir of Chhedi Lal. Moti Lal, respondent No. 4 was the subtenant of the said plots. It appears that two suits, namely, suit No. 414 relating to Plot No. 345 and suit No. 418 relating to Plots Nos. 349, 350 and 35l were filed by Chhedi Lal under Section 175 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. Both the suits were decreed on 8th of Jan., 1953. The decree-holder started proceedings for execution of the aforesaid two decrees, but the application for execution was stayed and (proceedings) were abated by the Tahsildar. Against the order of the Tahsildar revisions were filed before the Additional Commissioner who by his order dated 6th July, 1968 made references to the Board of Revenue recommending that the revisions should be allowed and the order of abatement of the execution proceedings of the two-decrees should be set aside. The Board of Revenue accepted the references by its order dated 4th of April, 1969. In the meantime Uttar Pradesh Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land' Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) came into force in the disputed locality on the 1st. July, 1965. Section 18 (2) of the Act conferred the-rights of Sirdari on the tenant of 'sir' or a sub-tenant. Moti Lal respondent No. 4 thereafter brought a suit under Section 229-B of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act against Chhedi Lal on 2nd of December, 1970 in respect of the said plot on the allegations that Chhedi Lal was a fixed' rate tenant and plaintiff Moti Lal being a sub-tenant became a Sirdar on the advent of the Act and he be declared to be a Sirdar. In case he is found to be out of possession a decree for possession be also granted. In case he is found to be out of possession a decree for possession be also granted. The suit was contested by Chhedi Lal on the grounds that no Sirdari rights could accrue to Moti Lal as Chhedi Lal was a disabled person, and that in any case -abatement of the execution proceedings had been set aside by the Board of Revenue by its order dated 4th of April, 1969, and that order of the Board of Revenue became final as no appeal or writ was filed against that order. The Assistant Collector, 1st Class dismissed the suit but on appeal the Additional Commissioner came to the conclusion that Chhedi Lal was not disabled person when the land in suit was let out to Moti Lal and on this finding he allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Assistant Collector. The Second Appeal filed by Chhedi Lal was also dismissed by the Board of Revenue by its order dated 14th August, 1974. The petitioner who is the heir of Chhedi Lal has come to challenge dismissed the order of the Board of Revenue by filing the present petition. 2. The contention raised by Sri . A. N. Bhargava learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner is that the Board of Revenue committed a manifest error of law in holding that Moti Lal respondent No. 4 was subtenant on 1st of July, 1965 when the Uttar Pradesh Urban Areas Zamindari . Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956 came into force in the locality. It was further contended that Moti Lal respondent No. 4 could not acquire rights of Sirdari under Section 18 (2) of the Act. 3. On the finding of fact recorded by the Additional Commissioner which was upheld by the Board of Revenue, Chhedi Lal was not disabled person when the land was let out to Moti Lal, respondent No. 4, and, therefore, Moti Lal respondent No. 4 was a sub-tenant of Chhedi Lal who was not a diasbled person. 4. Now the question that arises for -consideration is whether the sub-tenancy in favour of Moti Lal, respondent No. 4 came to an end after the passing of the two decrees under Section 175 of the U P. Tenancy Act. 4. Now the question that arises for -consideration is whether the sub-tenancy in favour of Moti Lal, respondent No. 4 came to an end after the passing of the two decrees under Section 175 of the U P. Tenancy Act. The contention of Sri Bhargava is that after the passing of the decree under Section 175 of the U. P. Tenancy Act, the rights, and title of the tenant came to an end, and if the rights had come to an end, Moti Lal, .respondent No. 4 was not a sub-tenant on the date of enforcement of U. P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 5. Moti Lal respondent No. 4 is represented by Sri K. D. Pandey, Advocate, while respondent No. 6 who is "transferee of Moti Lal respondent No. 4 is represented by Sri Daya Saran Sinha, Advocate. 6. It was contended by Sri D. S. Sinha that unless the decree under Section 175 of the U. P. Tenancy Act was executed and Moti Lal respondent No. 4 was ejected from the plots in dispute his tenancy rights could not come to an end. He referred to Section 45 (b) of the U. P. Tenancy Act which reads as under: "45. The interest of a tenant shall be extinguished - (a) ................................... (b) in land, which has been sold in execution of a decree for arrears of rent, or from which he has been ejected in execution of a decree or order of a court." He also referred to other corresponding provisions under the North Western Provinces Tenancy Act, 1901. Section 18 (2) is in the similar terms. Likewise Section 5 of the Agra Tenancy Act 1926 contemplates that the rights of the tenant would come to an end not by passing of decree but by ejectment in execution of the decree. The definition of the word 'sub-tenant is the same as given in the U. P. Tenancy Act and the word 'tenant in Section 45 includes sub-tenant also. Obviously therefore, unless the decree was put into execution and Moti Lal, respondent No. 4 was continued to be a sub-tenant when the U. P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act had come into force in that area he would acquire the rights of a Sirdar. Sri D. S. Sinha referred to the case of Mohd. Obviously therefore, unless the decree was put into execution and Moti Lal, respondent No. 4 was continued to be a sub-tenant when the U. P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act had come into force in that area he would acquire the rights of a Sirdar. Sri D. S. Sinha referred to the case of Mohd. Mushir Ahmad Khan v. Board of Revenue of U. P., Allahabad (1958 All LJ 904). The Division Bench had occasion to consider the provisions of Section 45 (b) of the U. P. Tenancy Act and observed as follows: - "Provision of cl. (b) of Section 45 of the U. P. Tenancy Act contemplates ejectment of a tenant in a decree which has become final not merely in the sense that it is effective and liable to be obeyed but in the sense that it is no more open to being set aside by a superior Court. So long as it is open to be set aside, any ejectment of a tenant in execution of that decree will not lead to the extinction of his tenancy though it certainly leads to his being dispossessed of the land in suit. When the decree is set aside in appeal, its effect is that the possession of actual occupant of that land subsequent to execution would be deemed unlawful and the person entitled to the possession of that land during that period would be the person in whose favour the ultimate decree is. It is on the basis of such a consideration that the ultimate successful party is entitled to restitution of possession and mesne profits from the actual occupant." 7. On the basis of this authority it is contended for the contesting respondent that even if he had been ejected in pursuance of the decree but the decree was set aside in an appeal the judgment-debtor would get back possession by applying for execution. 8. Next reliance was placed on a single Judge decision of this Court in Kanhaiya Lal v. Board of Revenue, (1972 All LJ 30). In this case the Court had the occasion to consider the provisions of Rr. 38 and 39 of the Rules framed under the U, P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act read with R. 40 of the .Act. In this case the Court had the occasion to consider the provisions of Rr. 38 and 39 of the Rules framed under the U, P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act read with R. 40 of the .Act. It was held: - "Where a suit or proceeding is stayed, it shall be decided on the merits bearing in mind the provisions of the U. P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules. Where the decree passed before the date of vesting is stayed under cl. (viii) of R. 38, .it will be abated under R. 39 (l). After abatement the claims of the parties to the execution proceedings will be decided in accordance with the provisions of the Act." 9. It was next contended by Sri Bhargava that in view of the order of the Board of Revenue setting aside the order of abatement of the execution proceedings which has been allowed to become final it is not open to the contesting respondent to claim Sirdari rights in the disputed plots. It was open to Moti Lal, respondent No. 4 to have claimed Sirdari rights in those proceedings and if he failed to claim Sirdari rights, then principle of constructive res judicata will bar the claim of the petitioner. In support of his contention Sri Bhargava referred to the case of Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Smt. Deorajin Debi ( AIR 1960 SC 941 ). The law' laid down by the Supreme Court in this case was that "the principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a Court whether the trial Court or a higher Court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings. 10. There is no quarrel with the proposition of 'law' laid down in his case. The question here is what would operate as res judicata. 10. There is no quarrel with the proposition of 'law' laid down in his case. The question here is what would operate as res judicata. In the decision given by the Board of Revenue dated 4th April, 1969 (Annexure l to the Writ Petition) all that was held is that the order of abatement passed by the Tahsildar was an incorrect order inasmuch as under -.sub-r. (2) of O. 39 of the U. P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Be forms Rules only those cases had to be stayed in which final orders and decrees have not been passed. Sub-rule (3) says that cases which are not abated shall be continued and decided. As the suit in the present cases had been decreed before the date of vesting therefore there was no question of abatement to the suits. It is this finding which will operate as res judicata. But that does not affect the position in the least'. The precise question with which I am concerned in this case is whether Moti Lal, respondent No. 4, was entitled to the benefit of Section 18 (b) of the U. P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. So even if suits are not to be abated the question was whether the decree so passed in suits under Section 175 of the U. P. Tenancy Act would be executable after the enforcement of the U. P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Actt. 11. In view of the discussion in the earlier paragraph it is evident that Moti Lal, respondent No. 4 continued to be sub-tenant despite the passing of the decree under Section 175 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. His rights would come to an end only after the execution of the decree. 12. Even otherwise Moti Lal, respondent No. 4 can claim the benefit of Section 18 (2) of the U. P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and can claim that the decree has ceased to be executable in view of the higher rights acquired by Moti Lal, respondent No. 4 under Section 18 (2) of the U. P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 13. 13. Sri Bhargava, however, as second link to his argument has contended that' if Moti Lal, respondent No. 4 had no claim of Sirdari rights in proceedings before the Tahsildar and the Board of Revenue constructive res judicata would stand as a bar to the claim of the contesting respondent No. 4. If once it is accepted that the judgment-debtor can contend that the decree has become inexecutable on account of subsequent change in law there is no question of principle of constructive res judicata operating against him. 14. Sri D. S. Sinha on the other hand contended that under the changed circumstances there is no question of applying the principle of res judicata or constructive res judicata. In support of his contention he had relied upon the case of Amvar Khan Mahboob Co. v. State of Madhya Pradesh ( AIR 1966 SC 1637 , paras 12 and 13). 15. Respondent No. 6 as stated earlier is represented by Sri D. S. Sinha. He is a transferee from respondent No. 4. It was contended for the petitioner that the transfer during the pendency of suit was a bad transfer, and therefore no right could accrue to respondent No. 6. I am afraid this contention is devoid of force. A transfer lis pendens is not a bad transfer. It is a transfer subject to the result of the ultimate decree that might be passed in the case. If the petitioner had succeeded in the Writ, Moti Lal, respondent' No. 4 would have lost rights. In that case no title would have passed to respondent No. 6 under the transfer made by respondent No. 4. But as the claim of the petitioner has not been accepted and the writ petition stands dismissed on the finding that respondent No. 4 has become Sirdar of the disputed plots under Section 18 (2) of the U. P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act he has every right to transfer the property to respondent No. 6 after obtaining the Bhumidhar certificate. 16. For all these reasons the Writ Petition has no force and it is accordingly dismissed. As the petitioner loses the prise on account of change in law, the parties will bear their own costs.