ORDER S.D. Agarwala, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the order of the 5th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Saharanpur dated 14th October, 1977. Petitioner No. 1 Beant Singh was the tenant of a shop situate in Saharanpur. Respondent 2, Kastori Lal Suri is the landlord of the premises. On 29th March, 1976 an application was made by the petitioner No. 2, Gurdial Singh for allotment of the shop in his favour. In the application it was stated that he had come into possession of the said shop on 26th Nov. 1972 and he has affixed furniture etc., in the said shop. On 14th April, 1976 the respondent No. 2, landlord moved an application for the release of the shop on the ground that Beant Singh had removed his assets from the said shop and he had allowed it to be occupied by Gurdial Singh, his brother and as such the shop should be deemed to be vacant under Section 12 of U. P. Act XIII of 1972. 2. On 19th April, 1976 a joint application was made by Beant Singh and Gurdial Singh under Section 14 of the Act for regularisation of their possession on the plea that they were in the tenancy of the shop with effect from 1-1-1972 with the consent of the landlord. 3. The District Supply Officer by his order dated 27th September, 1976 considered all these applications and thereafter, allowed the regularisation application moved oi; behalf of the petitioners. The landlord Kastori Lal Suri filed a revision against the order dated 27th Sept. 1976 before the District Judge, Saharanpur which came up for hearing before the 5th Additional District and Sessions Judge, Saharanpur who by his order dated 14th October, 1977 set aside the order dated 27-9-1976 and released the shop in question in favour of the respondent No. 2, the landlord. Aggrieved, the petitioners have filed the present petition in this Honble Court. 4. Shri Ravi Kiran Jain, learned; counsel for the petitioners has raised two submissions before me. His first submission is that no revisions lay against the order dated 27th September, 1976 under Section 18 of the Act and as such, the order dated 14th October, 1977 is wholly without jurisdiction. 4. Shri Ravi Kiran Jain, learned; counsel for the petitioners has raised two submissions before me. His first submission is that no revisions lay against the order dated 27th September, 1976 under Section 18 of the Act and as such, the order dated 14th October, 1977 is wholly without jurisdiction. His second submission is that even if a revision lay, the revisional court could not' in the exercise of his jurisdiction under Section 18 of the Act set aside the finding of fact recorded by the District Supply Officer, namely, that the shop in dispute was in possession of the petitioners as the tenants of respondent No. 2 with the consent of the landlord. 5. I have examined the order of the District Supply Officer dated 27th Sept. 1976. In the order he has mentioned in detail all the applications moved by the various parties; firstly, the application for allotment, then application for release-as also the application for regularisation under Section 14 of the Act. In the body of the order the suit number has been given as suit No. 33 of 1976 under Section 16 (1) (a) of the Act. The District Supply Officer was considering all the-applications moved by the various parties. It clearly held that the regularisation application should be allowed. In view of this, he came to the conclusion that there was no vacancy. If there was no vacancy, automatically the release application would be deemed to be rejected by the order dated 27th September, 1978. 6. Section 18 of the Act clearly provides that the aggrieved party can file a revision against' the order passed under Section 16 or Section 19 of the Act. The order rejecting the release application is clearly revisable under Section 18 of the Act. Since I have held that the order dated 27th September 1976 impliedly rejects the release application of the respondent No. 2, the order was clearly revisable and as such, the revision lay against the said order. The revisional court has acted within the jurisdiction in deciding the revision. 7. The allotment application, the regularisation application as well as the release application were dependant upon the decision of one single fact, namely as to whether the property was vacant or not or there was a deemed vacancy within the meaning of Section 12 of the Act. The revisional court has acted within the jurisdiction in deciding the revision. 7. The allotment application, the regularisation application as well as the release application were dependant upon the decision of one single fact, namely as to whether the property was vacant or not or there was a deemed vacancy within the meaning of Section 12 of the Act. The question whether there is a vacancy in fact, or deemed vacancy under Section 12 of the Act is a jurisdictional fact which the revisional court can go into and decide in the exercise of the power conferred under Section 18 of the Act. In Writ Petn. No. 1759-A of 1978, Rajendra Kumar v. District Judge decided on 11-7-1979, I have taken a similar view, namely, the question of vacancy is a jurisdictional fact and as such, the revisional court was well within its power in determining this question. 8. The revisional court has after considering the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that, in fact there was a deemed vacancy and as such the regularisation application under Section 14 of the Act could not have been allowed. The view taken by the revisional court, therefore, does not suffer from any legal infirmity. 9. After holding the vacancy and rejecting the regularisation application, the revisional court has allowed the release application of the landlord. Since there was no counter affidavit, the court accepted the case of the landlord and thereafter allowed the release application. The order of revisional court dated 14th October 1977 is a valid and legal order and (does) not suffer from any legal infirmity. 10. In the result, the petition fails and is accordingly, dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs.