JUDGMENT : H.L. Agrawal & V. Mishra, JJ. The petitioner has filed this writ application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the ORDER :dated 4th November, 1976, passed by the District Controller of Stores, North Eastern Railway, Samastipur (respondent no. 2) by which he reverted the petitioner from the post of Material Checker (to which post he was promoted on officiating basis) to his substantive post of Khalasi, as the petitioner was found 'unfit for' the job' (Es pad ke liye ayog paye jate hain). 2. Learned counsel, appearing fop the petitioner; challenged this ORDER :mainly on two grounds; namely, (1) the petitioner had acquired a right to hold the post on account of the expiry of the period of probation of one year and, therefore, the ORDER :amounted to reduction of his rank which could not be done without following the principles laid down in Article 311 of the Constitution and, (2) the ORDER :contained a stigma against the petitioner it could not have been passed without giving an opportunity to the petitioner of being heard. 3. In ORDER :to appreciate the questions raised for our consider ration, we may state the relevant facts in brief. The petitioner was appointed as a Khalasi on 30.10.1955 in the North Eastern Railway and was working in the office of respondent no. 2. Later on he was confirmed in the post and was also found suitable for promotion to the next higher post of Material Checker. The petitioner was temporarily promoted to officiate as Material Checker in the leave vacancy of one Yakub Indar, a Material Checker, who bad gone on leave for forty five days with effect from 28.7.1975 to 11.9.1975, by an ORDER :dated 29th July; 1975 (Annexure 2). It is, however, not clear as to what happened after the expiry of the aforesaid period of forty five days but it appears from another ORDER :dated 23.4.1976. (Annexure 3) of the same officer that the petitioner continued to officiate even, thereafter in the post of Material Checker. Hut as to whether he continued as stop gap arrangements from time to time on officiating basis or was promoted on probation is not clearly stated anywhere. It was, however, contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and conceded on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner was promoted to the said post on probation. Hut as to whether he continued as stop gap arrangements from time to time on officiating basis or was promoted on probation is not clearly stated anywhere. It was, however, contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and conceded on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner was promoted to the said post on probation. But whereas according to the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner, the period of probation aforesaid right from 29th July, 1975, according to the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, that could not be said to be so Inasmuch as, that ORDER :clearly stipulated that the promotion of the petitioner was merely as an ad-hoc arrangement and he was promoted only on officiating basis in the leave vacancy of Sri Yakub Indar, as already mentioned above. 4. In this connection we may refer to Rule 4 of Chapter I of Section B of the Indian Railway Establishment Manual which deals with the rules for the "recruitment and training of Class III, IV and workshop staff." Rule 4 fixes the period of probation as one year only. On the basis of the above provision it was contended that if the period of probation aforesaid was counted from 29tb July, 1975, then it wag, completed on 28th July, 1976, and the petitioner would be deemed to have been confirmed on his post on 4.11.1976 and, therefore, there was no question of his reversion to his substantive post thereafter on the ground that he was not suitable to hold the same. Reliance in support of this proposition; that on the expiry of the period of probation in the absence of its enlargement the incumbent acquires a permanent status, was placed on the case of (1) State of Punjab. V. Dharam Singh (A. I. R. 1968 Supreme Court 1210). Reliance in support of this proposition; that on the expiry of the period of probation in the absence of its enlargement the incumbent acquires a permanent status, was placed on the case of (1) State of Punjab. V. Dharam Singh (A. I. R. 1968 Supreme Court 1210). In this case, no doubt, the supreme court observed that the respondent must be deemed to have been confirmed in the post after the expiry of the period of probation as the appointing authority had no power to dispense with his services under Rule 6 (3) of the Punjab Educational Service Rules on the ground that his work and conduct during the period of probation was unsatisfactory and ones that Fight was lost to the appellant the removal of the respondent from his services amounted to removal by way of punishment and the procedure laid down in the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules. 1952 was to be followed which provides similar protection as in Article 311 of the Constitution. It may be mentioned that in this case the Impugned ORDER :was passed after several years of the completion of the period of probation. In the case before us, however, the position is not similar. Here the Impugned ORDER :was issued only after three months of the alleged date of the completion of the period or probation. After the completion of the period of probation the authorities arc certainly entitled to take a reasonable time to assess the suitability of the petitioner; and complete the official formalities which also is bound to take some time. A period of three months cannot be said to be unduly long. The respondents could not possibly, much less wore bound to, inform the petitioner of their decision the very next day the petitioner purported to have completed the period of probation. The ratio of the authority cited by the learned Advocate, therefore, cannot be applied to the facts of the case. But having held this we should not be mistaken to have accepted the case of the petitioner that he was put on probation from 29.7.1975. He has failed to furnish all the relevant materials in this regard to come to a definite position but as the point was argue4 by Mr. But having held this we should not be mistaken to have accepted the case of the petitioner that he was put on probation from 29.7.1975. He has failed to furnish all the relevant materials in this regard to come to a definite position but as the point was argue4 by Mr. Jha with great emphasis we thought it better to consider the same and record our conclusion on the assumption that the petitioner had already completed his probationary period. The petitioner therefore whether he might have been permitted on an officiating basis or as a probationer, had acquired no right to the post in question and, it was open to the authority to revert him back to his substantive post. We would, accordingly, reject the first point urged by Mr. Jha in support of this application. 5. Paced with this difficulty learned counsel pressed the second point with a still greater emphasis and contended that the ORDER :cast a stigma on the petitioner and therefore the respondents were bound to observe the rule of Natural Justice. 6. The Supreme Court, in the case of (2) S. P. Vasudeva. V. State of Haryana and others (A. I. R. 1975 Supreme Court 2292) very clearly observed that in a case where an ORDER :of reversion of a person who had no right to the post does not show ex-facie that he was being reverted as a measure of punishment or does not cast any stigma on him, the courts will not normally go behind that ORDER :to see if there were any motivating factors' behind that ORDER :. Having once held that the petitioner bas failed to establish his case that he had acquired any right to the post, we now proceed to examine as to whet hell the ORDER :contained in Annexure-9 really cast any stigma on him. This question is not resintergra and has fallen for consideration in a large number of cases. In the case of (3) Hari Singh Mann. This question is not resintergra and has fallen for consideration in a large number of cases. In the case of (3) Hari Singh Mann. V. State of Punjab and others (A. I. R. 1974 Supreme Court 2263) where the service of a Police Officer on probation was terminated by the Punjab Government at the end of the period of probation as he was found unfit for appointment in the State Police Service, it was held by the Supreme Court that the words “unfit to be appointed" did not amount to a stigma and the authorities were entitled to judge the fitness for work or suitability of the candidate for the post at the time of his confirmation. To borrow the language of the Supreme Court, it was observed that to hold otherwise would be to rob the authorities of the power to judge the fitness for work or suitability to the post at the time of confirmation and that termination of services on account of inadequacy for the job or for any temperamental or other defect not Involving moral turpitude was not a stigma which could be called a discharge byway of punishment. 7. Recently in the case of (4) Bishan Lal Gupta V. The State of Haryana and others (A. I. R. 1978 Supreme Court 363) the Supreme Court observed that a summary inquiry to determine the suitability of a probationer to continue in the service was permissible. It was painted and that there should be at least same difference, as to the nature of or the death of the inquiry to be held, as between a probationer whose service can be terminated by a notice and a confirmed Government servant who has a right to continue in service until he reaches a certain age. A formal inquiry to determine whether a probationer who has no. fixed or fully farmed right to continue in, service was contemplated to be permissible In this case. A formal inquiry to determine whether a probationer who has no. fixed or fully farmed right to continue in, service was contemplated to be permissible In this case. The Supreme Court, In the case of (5) Union of India and anather V. Gajinder Singh etc., (A. I. R. 1972 Supreme Court 1329) which was a case of promotion of a Government Servant an officiating basis who was subsequently reverted to his substantive past as he was not found suitable to be promoted, observed that a Government servant promoted to a higher past an officiating basis acquires no right to the past and, the reversion was not attended with any penal consequences. 8. Again in the case of (6) State of Mysore and others V. N. K. Gadgoli and others (A. I. R. 1977 Supreme Court 1617) a Government servant holding a substantive past of a clerk was promoted as Aval Karkun in officiating capacity but was subsequently reverted to his substantive past for “unsatisfactory work." The ORDER :was challenged an the ground of infraction of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and the Supreme Court again held that a person officiating in the past has no. right to hold it for all times and if he is given a higher officiating past to test his suitability to be made permanent later he holds it an the implied term that he would have to be reverted if be was found unsuitable. It was accordingly held that the reversion in such a case an the ground of unsuitability was an action in accordance with the terms an which the officiating past was being held and was not a reduction in rank by way of punishment. We have already said earlier that according to annexure-3 the petitioner was holding the past of Material Checker on an officiating basis and was reverted back to his substantive post on the ground that he was not competent to hold the same. The case of the petitioner, in our opinion, is fully covered by the principles laid dawn by the Supreme Court in the above cited authorities and the contention of the learned counsel far the petitioner that the reversion amounted to punishment which could not be done without following the principles of natural justice, has gat no substance. The case of the petitioner, in our opinion, is fully covered by the principles laid dawn by the Supreme Court in the above cited authorities and the contention of the learned counsel far the petitioner that the reversion amounted to punishment which could not be done without following the principles of natural justice, has gat no substance. We, therefore, do not feel any doubt in our mind to hold that the reversion of the petitioner by the ORDER :contained in the notice dated 23.4.1976 (Annexure-3) is not in any way invalid and accordingly cannot be quashed. 9. Before parting with this case we would also like to notice yet an other contention that was advanced in challenge of the alder in question namely that it was mala fide. The petitioner in ORDER :to make out a case of mala fide, no doubt, alleged a few facts in the petition but all these allegations have been controverted in the counter affidavit filed by the respondents. The allegations even on their race value are not sufficient to establish a case of malafide but even these faint allegations have been controverted and therefore, it is not possible far this court to determine the disputed question of facts and to hold the ORDER :to be invalid on the ground of malafide. 10. The result of all the above discussions therefore, is that we do not find any substance in this application and would, accordingly dismiss the same. In the circumstances of the case, however, we shall relieve the petitioner from costs. Application dismissed.