Judgment Birendra Prasad Sinha, J. 1. The question for consideration in this writ application is whether the District Judge exercising appellate powers in Gram panchayat election disputes can stay the operation of the order passed by toe election Tribunal pending disposal of the appeal. 2. The petitioner along with respondents nos.2 and 5 contested the election for the post of Mukhiya of Lohna Gram Panchayat in the district of madhubani. Respondent no.2 Gangai Kamat was declared elected as Mukhiya. The petitioner challenged his election by filing Election Petition No.3 of 1978-79 before the Election Tribunal, Jhanjharpur. His main ground was that the valid votes polled by him were more than the valid votes polled by respondent no 2 and that the votes were wrongly counted by the Election Officer. The tribunal allowed the recounting of votes and found that the petitioner had received more votes than respondent No.2. Accordingly, the Tribunal set aside the election of respondent No.2 and declared the petitioner as duly elected. That order is contained in Annexure 1 to the writ application. Against that order respondent No.2 filed an appeal before the District Judge as provided under rule 70 of the Bihar Panchayat Election Rules (hereinafter referred to as the Election Rules ). The appeal was registered as Miscellaneous Appeal No.26 of 1978. Along with it an application was also filed praying to stay the operation of the order passed by the Election Tribunal. The petitioner filed a rejoinder stating, inter alia, that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain any such application. The learned District Judge by his order dated the 10th of November, 1978, stayed the operation of the order of the Election tribunal till the disposal of the appeal. It is this order contained in Annexure 4 which is under challenge in this writ application. It has been stated that the petitioner after having been declared elected by the Election Tribunal took oath on 6.10.78 and started functioning as the Mukhiya. 3. Shri T. K. Jha, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that under the scheme of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act and the election Rules, the District Judge, as the appellate authority, had no power to grant stay. 4. 3. Shri T. K. Jha, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submitted that under the scheme of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act and the election Rules, the District Judge, as the appellate authority, had no power to grant stay. 4. Rule 70 of the Election Rules provides that no election held under these Rules shall be called in question in any other manner on any ground whatsoever other than by a petition before the Election Tribunal appointed under these Rules. A proviso has been later added to rule 70 which provides that a candidate or a voter aggrieved by the judgment of the Election Tribunal may within thirty days from the said judgment appeal to the District Judge, who shall deliver his judgment within six months. Rule 79 lays down the procedure for the trial of the election petition. According to rule 79 (2), subject to the provisions of these Rule, every election petition shall be tried by an Election tribunal as early as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure to the trial of suits. It may be sufficient for the election Tribunal to make a memorandum of the substance of evidence of any witness and it is not necessary to take down the evidence of any witness at length, unless the Tribunal thinks it fit for any special reason to do so. Rule 19 further provides that so long as the election petition is not disposed of, the Election tribunal shall not grant any temporary injunction restraining any respondent from exercising any right or performing any duty which such respondent is entitled to, or required by law to perform. According to rule 86, an Election tribunal shall have the following powers which are vested in a court under the code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit- (a) enforcing the attendance of witness ; (b) compelling the production of documents ; (c) examining witness on oath ; (d) granting adjournments ; (e) reception of evidence taken on affidavit; and (f) issuing summons for examination of witnesses ; and may summon suo motu any person whose evidence appears to him to be material ; and shall be deemed to be a criminal court within the meaning of sections 480 and 482 of the Criminal Procedure code, 1890. In respect of any other matter not specifically provided for in these Rules, the election Tribunal can proceed in such manner as it considers proper in the circumstances of the case. 5. Powers of an appellate court can be found in section 107 or the Code of civil Procedure. According to section 107 (2), the appellate court shall have the same powers and shall perform, as nearly as may be, the same duties as are performed and imposed by this Code on the Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. This means that the appellate court has the same powers as the trial court. The question, therefore, is whether an Election tribunal has the right to grant an injunction restraining the returned candidate from discharging his functions pending trial of the election petition. The answer is in the negative. As stated above, the second proviso to rule 79 (2) of the election Rules forbids an Election Tribunal from granting any temporary injunction restraining the returned candidate from exercising any right or performing any duty. If the Election Tribunal as a court of original jurisdiction has no power to grant temporary injunction, the appellate court haying same powers as the trial court can surely have no power to grant temporary injunction. The whole Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable while trying an election petition. Rule 86, which has been quoted above, is in respect of certain specified matters. It docs not provide for the grant of temporary injunctions. It may be argued that an appellate court has an inherent power of granting interim orders in the nature of injunction or stay pending the hearing of the appeal. That power is inherent in the appellate court only in two circumstances. Firstly, if the trial court has also the power to grant interim injunctions and, secondly, if the power to do so is not specifically barred under the Panchayat Raj act or the Election Rules. In the present case, I find that under the Election rules the Election Tribunal, as the court of original jurisdiction, has been specifically forbidden from issuing temporary injunctions. It is apparent, therefore, that the appellate court cannot have a power which is not vested in the original trial court. A District Judge while exercising appellate powers in election disputes, acts as statutory appellate authority and has to act according to the Election Rules. It is apparent, therefore, that the appellate court cannot have a power which is not vested in the original trial court. A District Judge while exercising appellate powers in election disputes, acts as statutory appellate authority and has to act according to the Election Rules. If the Rules do not permit the Election Tribunal to grant any interim injunction, it surely does not permit the District Judge an appellate authority under the Election Rules to grant any order of injunction. While trying civil causes, according to the Code of Civil Procedure, the District Judge has an inherent power, which is saved by section 151 of the Code, to pass orders in order to meet the ends of justice in cases where there may be no direct statutory provision therefor. That power cannot be said to be inherent in the district Judge while hearing election appeals under the Election Rules. As stated above, the whole of the Code of Civil Procedure is not available in election matters. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable in the election disputes are specifically enumerated in rule 86 of the Election Rules. Moreover, the inherent powers are exercisable only when there is no specific provision in that regard. The Election Rules provide that the Election Tribunal cannot grant interim injunctions. That being so, the inherent power, even if it be there, cannot be exercised in matters of granting injunctions. 6. It may be relevant in this connection to refer to some of the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Originally, the Election tribunals tried election disputes under the said Act. Under section 107 of the act, as it originally stood, an order of the Tribunal passed under section 98 or section 99 could not take effect until it was published in the Gazette of India. There was no right of appeal provided in the Act and the aggrieved parties came to the High Court or the Supreme Court under the provisions of the Constitution. The publication in the Gazette used to be merely stayed. The question regarding an absolute stay or a qualified stay of unsitting verdict did not and could not arise. In 1956, section 107 of the Act was amended and it was provided that the order of the Tribunal shall take effect as soon as it was pronounced by the tribunal. The publication in the Gazette used to be merely stayed. The question regarding an absolute stay or a qualified stay of unsitting verdict did not and could not arise. In 1956, section 107 of the Act was amended and it was provided that the order of the Tribunal shall take effect as soon as it was pronounced by the tribunal. An appeal was also provided from the orders of Election Tribunal to the High Court. Sec.116-A (4) of the Act clothed the High Courts with power to stay the operation of the order appealed from. Against the appellate orders passed by the High Courts, the aggrieved party could go to the Supreme Court under the provisions of the Constitution. The law was further amended in 1966 and the High Courts were conferred original jurisdiction to try election petitions. It was provided that the order of the High Court shall take effect as soon as it was pronounced. A limited power to stay operation of the order of the High Court was conferred by section 116-B (1) of the Act on the High Court itself. A statutory right of appeal to the Supreme Court was provided by section 116-A. Sec.116-B further provided that when an appeal had been preferred to the Supreme Court against the order of the High Court, the supreme Court on cause being shown, and on such terms and conditions, as it may think fit, stay the operation of the order. Thus a plenary power to grant stay, conditional or otherwise, was vested in the appellate court independently of the constitutional remedies, for the first time. It would be relevant to state here that there is no similar provision in the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act or the election Rules vesting in the statutory appellate authority, namely, the District judge, with such plenary powers of granting stay conditional or otherwise. No doubt, rule 83 (2) of the Panchayat Election Rules provides that when an election is declared void under sub-rule (1) of rule 82 and the Election Tribunal passes an order declaring any party to the petition to have been duly ele:ted, the district Magistrate shall, as soon after the said order as possible, issue a notification in the official Gazette declaring such party to have been elected. This, of course, means that a person who has been declared elected by the Election tribunal does not become a Mukhia unless a notification in the official Gazette declaring him to have elected is published by the District Magistrate. It is, therefore, obvious that the Legislature did not intend to clothe either the Gram panchayat Tribunal or the District Judge appellate authority with similar powers of granting injunctions. Having given my anxious consideration to this question, I have come to the conclusion that under the schema of this law, a district Judge exercising the appellate power in election disputes has no authority to stay the operation of the order passed by an Election Tribunal. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.2 brought to my notice a decision of Lalit Mohan Sharma, J. , in Mohiuddin V/s. The State of Bihar (C. W. J. C. No.4995 of 1978, decided on the 18th of January, 1979) and submitted that the District Judge has the power to stay an order passed by the election Tribunal. In that case, the question whether the District Judge had power to grant stay or not did not come up for consideration. It had only been argued that the District Judge had passed the stay order without giving any opportunity to the writ petitioner to be heard. As such, the power of the district Judge to grant stay had been assumed and the only grievance was that an opportunity should have been given to the petitioner to be heard before passing any such order. 7. Shri Jha also submitted that the District Judge has not considered the effect of taking oath by the petitioner after the order of the Election Tribunal and, for that reason also, the order passed by him was vitiated. In view of my finding above, I need not deal with this question. 8. In the result, this application succeeds and the order dated the 10th november, 1978 passed by the District Judge as an appellate authority under the election Rules, as contained in Annexure 4, is quashed. In the circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs. Application allowed.