JUDGMENT K.N. Singh, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against the orders of the State Government dated 31st October, 1972 and 11th September, 1973 directing the U. P. Police Head Quarters, Allahabad to recover certain amounts from the petitioners alleged to have been paid in excess to them. 2. The petitioners who are ten in number have been in the service of the State of Uttar Pradesh as Noters and Drafters in the office of the Inspector General of Police at Allahabad. The petitioners were promoted to the next higher post of Head Clerks in the scale of Rs. 80-240/- on various dated between 1952 to 1954 and subsequently they were confirmed on those posts between 1955 and 1956. The details relating to the dates of promotion and confirmation of each of the petitioners are given in the Annexue A-l to the petition. At the time when the petitioners were promoted to the higher posts of Head Clerks, their salaries were fixed on the new post in accordance with the orders of the State Government at Rs. 150/-. The petitioners continued to draw their salaries till June 1958 when the State Government issued an order dated June 21, 1958 that Noters and Drafters on their promotion to the post of Head Clerk were not entitled to pay at next higher stage in the scale and that their pay was wrongly fixed and the excess amount should be recovered from them. Thereupon protracted correspondence ensued between the office of the Inspector General of Police and the State Government and the Accountant General, Uttar Pradesh. Ultimately the State Government by its orders dated 11th September, 1963 and 25th January, 1965 directed that the excess amount paid to the petitioners and other similarly situated persons should be recovered. 3. One of the affected persons Sri Pashpati Saran Saxena filed a writ petition in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution (Writ No. 1993 of 1965 Pashpati Saran Saxena v. State of Uttar Pradesh) challenging the validity of the State Governments order directing recovery of the excess amdunt of salary paid to him. The writ petition was contested on behalf of the State Government. The writ petition was contested on behalf of the State Government. A learned single Judge of this Court allowed the writ petition on January 2, 1970 and quashed the order of the State Government dated January 25, 1965 and restrained the State Government from making any deduction from the salary of Pashpati Saran Saxena. The State Government preferred special appeal against the order of the learned single Judge but the special appeal failed and the judgment of the learned single Judge became final. 4. During the pendency of the writ petition the petitioners made a request to the Government not to proceed with the recovery as the matter was pending in this court. The State Government accepted the petitioners request and directed the petitioners and other affected employees to execute a declaration in writing in the nature of indemnity bond that if the writ petition of Pashpati Saran Saxena failed for any reason whatsoever, the Government would be entitled to recover from them the amount alleged to have been paid in excess to them but in case the petition was allowed they would be absolved of all the liabilities. The petitioner No. 5 A. K. Jhauhari executed the indemnity bond which was in the nature of the agreement with the State Government containing the aforesaid conditions. Some of the petitioners made payments under protest while two of the petitioners deposited the amount in the Post Office and pledged the pass books with the Deputy Inspector General of Police. After the decision of the writ petition and the special appeal in the case of Pashpati Saran Saxena, the petitioners represented to the Government that no recovery should be made from them as the writ petition stood allowed and the judgment had become final, but the Government did not accept their request. The State Government issued the impugned order dated 31st October, 1972 directing the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Allahabad (Headquarters) to recover the amount paid in excess to the petitioners. Aggrieved, the petitioners have challenged the validity of the Government orders and the recovery proceedings. 5. The undisputed facts as set out in the petition and the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government, show that the State Government bona fide fixed the petitioners salary at Rs. 150/- on their promotion to the post of Head Clerks. Aggrieved, the petitioners have challenged the validity of the Government orders and the recovery proceedings. 5. The undisputed facts as set out in the petition and the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government, show that the State Government bona fide fixed the petitioners salary at Rs. 150/- on their promotion to the post of Head Clerks. Later on it was found that since the post of Noters and Drafters and Head Clerks carry identical scales of pay, the petitioners salaries were wrongly fixed at Rs. 150/- instead it should have been fixed at Rs. 140/-. It is admitted that the State Government voluntarily paid the salary to the petitioners as fixed by it and the petitioners at no stage had manipulated or played any fraud in obtaining fixation of their salaries at Rs. 150/-. The State Government has, however, taken stand that since the scales of pay of Noters and Drafters and the Head Clerk are identical Fundamental Rule 22 (a) (1) was not applicable and the petitioners pay was wrongly fixed giving benefit of that Rule. The petitioners have on the contrary asserted that the post of Head Clerk involves duties of greater responsibilities, therefore, Fundamental Rule 22 (a) (1) was rightly applied. Rule 22 is in the following terms : - Rule 22 (a) (1) "22. The initial substantive pay of a Government servant who is appointed substantively to a post on a time scale of pay is regulated as follows: (a) If he holds a lien on a permanent post other than a tenure post, or would hold a lien on a post had his lien not been suspended. (1) When appointment to the new post involves the assumption of duties or responsibilities of greater importance (as interpreted for' the purposes of Rule 30) than those attaching to such permanent post, he will draw as initial pay (sic) the stage of the time-scale next above his substantive pay in respect of the old post." 6. The petitioners salary was fixed at the next higher stage in the pay scale of Head Clerk at the time of their initial substantive appointment. Rule 22 (a) (1) is applicable if the appointment to the next higher post involves assumption of duties or responsibilities of greater importance. The petitioners salary was fixed at the next higher stage in the pay scale of Head Clerk at the time of their initial substantive appointment. Rule 22 (a) (1) is applicable if the appointment to the next higher post involves assumption of duties or responsibilities of greater importance. Rule 30, however, lays down that a Government servant who is appointed to officiate in a post shall not draw higher pay than his substantive pay unless the officiating appointment involves the assumption of duties and responsibilities of greater importance. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 30 further lays down that the officiating appointment shall not be deemed to involve the assumption of duties or responsibilities of greater importance if the post to which officiating appointment is made on the same scale of pay as the permanent post. Respondents case is that the scale of pay of Noters and Drafters is the same as that of the Head Clerk. Under Rule 30 the petitioners appointment could not be deemed to involve the assumption of duties or responsibilities of greater importance. Therefore, the petitioners pay could not be fixed at the next higher stage. 7. The question then arises whether the scale of pay of Head Clerk or Noters and Drafters arc the same and whether the petitioners were promoted in officiating or substantive capacity to the post of Head Clerk. In paragraph 5 of the counter-affidavit of Girish Shanker Misra, it is asserted that the pay scale of Noters and Drafters and Head Clerk is identical but it is conceded that the work of Head Clerk is specially of arduous nature and as such the Head Clerk is entitled to special pay of Rs. 25/- per mensem and the seniormost Head Clerk is entitled to special pay of Rs. 40/-per mensem. In view of this averment, requirement of Rule 22 (a) (1) is satisfied. The respondents contention that the petitioners were appointed could not be deemed to involve assumption of duties or responsibilities of greater importance within the meaning of sub-rule (2) of R. 30, cannot be. upheld. As noted earlier, the petitioners were promoted to the post of Head Clerk on various dates between 1952 to 1954 and on the expiry of the period of their probation they were confirmed on those posts in 1955 and 1956. On the face of these facts, sub-rule (2) of Rule 30 is not attracted. upheld. As noted earlier, the petitioners were promoted to the post of Head Clerk on various dates between 1952 to 1954 and on the expiry of the period of their probation they were confirmed on those posts in 1955 and 1956. On the face of these facts, sub-rule (2) of Rule 30 is not attracted. In our opinion, sub-rule (2) of R. 30 applies to a case where officiating appointment to a higher post is made by way of promotion for a short period as a temporary measure. The rule would not apply to promotion made on substantive basis followed by confirmation on the higher post. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the petitioners salary had been fixed correctly by the State Government and the Inspector-General of Police and there was no justification for recovery of any excess amount paid to them. 8. In this context we would like to observe that if different opinions are possible and the appropriate authority acts in a manner which is possible on the interpretation of the rule, then it would not be open to the higher authorities to undo the action merely on the basis of different opinion. 9. The State Government as well as Inspector-General of Police interpreted R. 22 and R. 30 in petitioners favour and fixed their salary in the next higher stage Rs. 150/-per mensem and the petitioners continued to draw the same for a considerable period of time. It was, therefore, not open to the State Government to recover the amount paid to the petitioners merely because some different view was possible on the interpretation of the Rules. It is well settled principle that wages paid to an employee by an employer voluntarily in bona fide manner without there being any element of fraud or misrepresentation, cannot be recovered from the employee subsequently merely on the ground that some mistake of interpretation of rules might have been committed by the employer for which the employee could not be held responsible. This view finds support from the decision of this Court in Gulab Chand v. State of U. P. (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1479 of 1962) decided on 19th March, 1969. 10. The State Government then was estopped from recovering any amount from the petitioners. This view finds support from the decision of this Court in Gulab Chand v. State of U. P. (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 1479 of 1962) decided on 19th March, 1969. 10. The State Government then was estopped from recovering any amount from the petitioners. As noted earlier, the State Government had agreed that if the writ petition filed by Sri Pashpati Saran was allowed, no recovery would be made from the petitioners. As the writ petition of Saxena was allowed, the State Government had no justification to turn round and take a different stand. As noted earlier some of the petitioners executed agreement as directed by the State Government that if the writ petition of Sri Saxena was dismissed, the petitioners would pay the excess amount paid to them but if the writ petition was allowed the petitioners would be absolved of all the liabilities of recovery of any amount. The writ petition filed by Sri Saxena was allowed and the judgment of the learned single Judge was affirmed in the special appeal. Consequently the State Governments claim to recover any excess amount from the petitioners stood negatived. In Saxenas case judgment did not proceed on any special facts applicable to Sri Saxena individually instead the case was decided on the interpretation of rules and legal principles, and the judgment of this court having become final is binding on the State Government. Therefore, the State Government had no legal authority to make any recovery from the petitioners on the same considerations which have already been repelled by this Court in Saxenas case. 11. During the course of hearing it was brought to our notice that recovery has been made from some of the petitioners. This would make no difference. Since the State Government was not entitled to recover the alleged excess amount from the petitioners, it has no authority to retain that amount with it. Therefore, the State Government should refund the amount to the petitioners. 12. For the reasons stated above, we allow the petition and quash the orders of the State Government dated 31st October, 1972 and 11th Sep., 1973 and restrain the respondents from making any recovery from the petitioners. If any amount has been recovered from the petitioners, the same shall be refunded to them forthwith. The petitioners are entitled to their costs.