Judgment Vishwanath Mishra, J. 1. This is an application under Article 226 of the constitution of India for quashing the orders contained in Annexures 1, 3 and 5 of the writ petition. These are the orders arising out of a proceeding under the Kosi Area (Restoration of Lands to Raiyats) Act, 1951 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act ). It would be useful to mention here that in the areas ravaged by the floods of Kosi sometime before 1930 the raiyats used to leave their lands and go elsewhere, as a result of which quite often rent was not paid to the landlord, who in most cases was Raj Darbhanga. The result was that the lands of the raiyats were sold for non-payment of rent and that were auction purchased by the landlord in execution of the decree. Ultimately, the State Legislature realising this misfortune of the raiyats passed the Act to enable the raiyats to get back their lands from the landlords or others after depositing the amounts due against them. This act had, therefore, operation only in respect of the areas declared by the state Government, under Sec.1 of the Act, 2. In the instant case the land covered by khatas 642 and 643 of village Bangana, Tole Jhitki, Police Station Laukahi, district Madhubani, having an area of about 20 bighas stood recorded in the name of Bhagwat budhanagaria. The rent of the two khatas fell in arrear and so the Raj darbhanagaria, the landlord, obtained a rent decree and put the same in execution in the court of 2nd Munsif, Madhubani, in Execution Case no.2375 of 1938. The khatas were sold in the execution case on 14-12-38. Delivery of possession was taken on 11-4-39. The raiyat Bhagwat budhanagaria also filed two objection-petitions which were dismissed and the sale was confirmed. 3. The said land, which was in possession of Raj Darbhanga, was later settled in the name of one Bishan Prasad. Whether the actual settlement was taken by one Rajeshwar Prasad alias Buchu Babu or by Sri Srichand prasad in the name of Rajeshwar Prasad is not of importance here, but there is no dispute on the point that the entire property came to Sri srichand Prasad either by settlement or by a deed of Atainama, in the year 1940. Whether the actual settlement was taken by one Rajeshwar Prasad alias Buchu Babu or by Sri Srichand prasad in the name of Rajeshwar Prasad is not of importance here, but there is no dispute on the point that the entire property came to Sri srichand Prasad either by settlement or by a deed of Atainama, in the year 1940. Petitioners 1 to 3 are the sons of Sri Srichand Prasad who is dead and petitioner no.4 is the mother of petitioners 1 to 3. Therefore, according to their case, it is they who are coming in possession since 1940. 4. In the year 1973-74, Case no.27 of 1973-74 was started in the court of the Anchal Adhikari Laukahi under Sec.3 of the Act, which reads as follows : - "if the holding of raiyat or portion thereof was sold in execution of a decree for arrears of rent or if a raiyat was rejected from a holding or portion thereof in execution of decree passed under sub-section (2) of Sec.66 of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885, or if the holding of raiyat or portion thereof was treated as abandoned under Sec.87 of the said Act at any time between the 1st day of January, 1939, and the 31st day of december, 1950, and is in the possession of the landlord or any other person, the Collector may, if he thinks fit, of his own motion or otherwise, take steps for the restoration of such holding or portion thereof to the said raiyat. " It is clear from this that if, between the 1st day of January, 1939 and the 31st day of December, 1950, a holding of a raiyat was sold in execution of a decree for arrears of rent and if he was ejected from a holding or a portion thereof, then Collector, of his own motion or otherwise, could take steps for the restoration of such holding or portion thereof, to the said raiyat. It is under this provision that the proceeding was started for restoring possession to the old raiyat, whose son is respondent no.3, Thakai budhagaria in this case. Here itself it may be added that Thakai Budha-garia had sold this land to respondents 4 to 6 on 21-9-1912. This proceeding was, therefore, for restoration of possession in favour of respondents 3 to 6. Here itself it may be added that Thakai Budha-garia had sold this land to respondents 4 to 6 on 21-9-1912. This proceeding was, therefore, for restoration of possession in favour of respondents 3 to 6. The petitioners also filed objection (under Sec.7 of the Act) in that proceeding as would appear from the order contained in annexure 1 (order passed by the Anchal Adhikari ). Two-fold objections were taken by the petitioners. The first objection was that village Bangama Tole Jhitki in which the land lies, is not in the list of villages notified by the State government where the Act applies. The second point was that the sale had taken place before 1st of January, 1939 and so the provisions of the Act did not apply to the case. Both these objections were overruled by the Anchal adhikari who, by his order dated 5-8-1975 contained in annexure 1, directed possession of the land in question to be restored to respondents 3 to 6 under section 3 of the Act. This order was passed ex pane because the petitioners did not take any interest in it after filing their objections though the Anchal adhikari has considered the objections all right. Thereafter the petitioners preferred a miscellaneous appeal under Sec.16 of the Act (no.11 of 1975) before the Additional Collector (respondent no.1 ). That appeal was dismissed as time barred as would appear from the order (contained in annexute 5) dated 9-4-1977 Thereafter respondents 3 to 6 applied before the anchal Adhikari for giving them the delivery of possession. By that time the Anchal Adhikari had changed and the new Anchal Adhikari passed an order to say that village Bangama is not amongst the villages notified where the Act was in operation and so there could by no occasion for effecting any delivery of possession. This order was passed on 21-5-1977 (vide annexure 2) Thereafter an application was again filed before the additional Collector who observed that it was none of his business to pass that order and he hud only to execute the orders passed earlier by the anchal Adhikari and confirmed by the Additional Collector in appeal. On receipt of that order, the Anchal Adhikari; through an order contained in annexure 3, directed respondents 3 to 6 to deposit the amount of Rs.454.92 in order to get the delivery of possession over the land. On receipt of that order, the Anchal Adhikari; through an order contained in annexure 3, directed respondents 3 to 6 to deposit the amount of Rs.454.92 in order to get the delivery of possession over the land. In pursuance of that order, money was deposited as would appear from the order dated 5-11- 1977 of annexure 3. it is after this that the petitioners filed this writ petition for quashing annexures 1, 3 and 5. 5. It will not be out of place to mention here itself that in the meantime petitioner no.3 filed a partition suit (no.31 of 1977) in the court of the Subordinate Judge, Darbhanga, against his brothers and also impleaded respondents no.3 to 6 in that suit. Amongst the properties in that suit the lands in question here were also included and a prayer was also added for declaring those orders, which are impugned here, as illegal and invalid. When this fact came to light in this Court, the petitioners withdrew that partition suit. 6. In this Court four points have been urged. The first point is that the sale in this case had taken place on 14-12-1938 and so section 3 of the act does not apply to the case. Sec.3 has been quoted early which shows that it will apply to those cases also in which the raiyat was ejected after 1st day of Januay, 1939 and before 31st day of December, 1950. There is no dispute on the point that in the instant case though the sale had taken place on 14-12-1938, the. delivery of possession was effected on 11-4-1939 which is after 1st of January, 1939. This Act, therefore, has full application in the case. It would be idle to say that even though delivery of possession was effected on 11-4-1939, the Act would not apply because the sale had taken place before 1-1-1939. There is absolutely no force in this contention. Hence this argument is ruled out. 7. The second point urged is that village Bangama of Police Station laukahi does not find place in the list of villages notified by the State government in which the Act applied. That notification has been attached as annexure 4. It has been contended, as the Anchal Adhikari also once thought (vide annexure 2), that this land lies in thana Phulparas and not in thana Laukahi. That notification has been attached as annexure 4. It has been contended, as the Anchal Adhikari also once thought (vide annexure 2), that this land lies in thana Phulparas and not in thana Laukahi. A look at the notification clearly shows the error committed by him. In the scheme of this notification first the name of the thana is mentioned and under the thana there are different circles and the names of villages under those circles have been mentioned. Under Laukahi thana in Circle no. IV Tola Jhitki finds place. Of course the full name of the village is Bangama Tole Jhitki but in this notification only Tola Jhitki has been mentioned. When the list of villages of Circle IV ends, the circles of phulparas begin. Perhaps, finding the words thana Phulparas at the end of Circle IV, the Anchal Adhikari thought and also the learned Advocate for the petitioners in this case urgej that the land lies in Phulparsa thana and not in Laukahi to which, it is said, it originally belonged. As we have seen the list, the village lies in Laukhai thana and only the absence of the name of the village is immaterial because the smaller detail, namely, the tola has been mentioned in it. Thus this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners also has no merit. 8. The third point urged is that no notice was given to the petitioners of the proceeding started in the court of the Anchal Adhikari. this also is relied by a perusal of anaexures 1 and 5. It is amply clear that they had appeared and filed their objections. Even the order in appeal also shows this. Hence, this point also has no merit. 9. Lastly, it has been contended that the case comes under Article 137 of the Limitation Act and the period of limitation of 3 years with effect from the date when the right to apply accrued, has application in this case, and as such the petition which was filed in the year 1978 was very much barred by time, the sale and delivery of possession having taken place in the years 1938 and 1939. Article 137 of the Limitation Act finds place in third division of the schedule to the Limitation Act. The third division relates to applications. Article 137 of the Limitation Act finds place in third division of the schedule to the Limitation Act. The third division relates to applications. Article 137 particularly refers to those applications for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the third division. It is clear from Sec.3 of the Act that for an action under Sec.3 no application at all is required. The section has already been quoted above and it would appear therefrom that the Collector has the power, of his own motion or otherwise, to take steps for restoration of the holding to the original raiyat. There is no mention of any application to be filed in this section Obviously, therefore, Articles 137 of the limitation Act has no application in this case. In this very connection, I may also refer to an argument advanced by the learned Counsel for the petitioners to the effect that it is much beyond even 12 years of the date of the sale or delivery of possession. There is no dispute on the fact that the act does not provide for any limitation whatsoever. Moreover, this Act came into force in 1951 and the period of sale and dispossession having between 1st January, 1939 and 31st December, 1950, has been covered. This also sufficiently indicates that there is no question of any limitation running with effect from either the date of sale or of delivery of possession. 10. It would thus appear that there is no merit in any of the points raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners. 11. The application is accordingly dismissed ; the parties will bear their own costs. 12. I, respectfully agree with the judgment of my learned brother. I would, however, like to add certain points on the legal position. The object of the Kosi Area (Restoration of Lands to Raiyats) Act, 1951 (Bihar Act 30 of 1951) (hereinafter referred to as the act) was "to provide for the restoration to former raiyats of certain lands which were sold for arrears of rent or from which they were ejected for arrears of rent of (or)which were treated as abandoned, between the 1st day of January, 1937 and the 31st day of December, 1950, in the absence of the raiyats due to floods in the Kosi River". The lands of respondents no.3 to 6 were sold in auction on the basis of a rent decree passed in favour of Raja Darbhanga in execution the Raj Darbhanga purchased the disputed lands and made these lands as khudkast lands. The Raj Darbhanga settled a portion of the disputed lands to Rajeshwar Prasad in 1940. Thereafter rajeshwar transferred the lands settled to Srichand Prasad by registered atainama. Petitioners 1 to 3 are the sons of Sri Chand Prasad and petitioner no.4 is the widow of Sri Chand Prasad. The area fell in the Kosi areas. According to the case of respondents 3 to 6, these respondents were ejected in pursuance of the rent decree on 11-4 1930. I am, therefore of the opinion that the provisions of the Act apply in favour of respondents 3 to 6. Respondent no.3 is the original raiyat and respondents 4 to 6 are the the transferees from the original raiyat in respect of a portion of the disputed lands. It is mentioned in Sec.2 (c) of the Act that the definition of raiyat mentioned in the Bihar Tenancy Act shall apply for the purpose of the present Act. Sec.5 (2) of the Bihar Tenancy Act 1885 defines raiyat. According to Sec.5 (2) "raiyat" includes the successor-in-interest of the original raiyat. Hence, respondents 4 to 6 shall be deemed to be former raiyat within the purview of the Act. 13. Under Sec.5 of the Act, an objector can raise objection only on the ground, namely, (i) that he has constructed any building or planted any garden on the holdinig or any portion thereof before the commencement of the Act ; and (ii) that he has excavated any pucca well on the holding or any portion thereof before the date of commencement of the Act. These petitioners did not raise any such objection before the Collector under the Act. The Collector made enquiry under Sec.7 of the Act and held that respondents 3 to 6 are entitled to restoration of possession and as such a writ of delivery of possession should be issued in favour of respondents 3 to 6. These petitioners preferred an appeal under Sec.16 of the Act which was also dismissed (vide order annexure 5 ). 14. The matter was referred to the Collector for a decision that delivery of possession he affected in favour of respondents 3 to 6. These petitioners preferred an appeal under Sec.16 of the Act which was also dismissed (vide order annexure 5 ). 14. The matter was referred to the Collector for a decision that delivery of possession he affected in favour of respondents 3 to 6. In that proceeding these petitioners raised the objection that the village in question was not notified under sub-section (1) of Sec.1 of the Act and as such the area in question did not fall within the Kosi area. The objection was accepted (vide annexure 2) by the Anchal Adhikari. 15. The point for consideration in this writ petition is Whether these petitioners can raise any such objection when they had already appeared on receipt of a notice from the Collector under Act Sec.10 of the act provides that a person, who had no notice of the proceeding, can object to delivery of possession. In the present case, the finding of the Anchal adhikari in annexure 1 is that these petitioners appeared in pursuance of the notice issued under Sec.4 of the Act and raised objection and filed documents before the Anchal Adhikari. The Anchal Adhikari (vida annexure 1) rejected the objection raised by the petitioners. In appeal, (vide annexure 5) the Additional Collector upheld the order contained in annexure 1. If it is so, in view of Sec.10, these petitioners had no jurisdiction in law to raise any question for the simple reason that they had already appeared in pursuance of notice before the Collector. The person who can raise any objection at the time of delivery of possession is the person who has not received any notice in the proceeding under the Act. Hence, the order contained in annexure 2 is contrary to law. 16. Learned Counsel for the petitioners contends that in view of the fact that no limitation is prescribed under the Act for filing a petition under Sec.3 of the Act, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall apply. I am unable to accept this proposition of law. The Act does not provide any period of limitation for filing a petition under Sec.3 of the Act. It is a special Act, and as such the provisions of the Limitation Act ; 1963 shall not apply. I am unable to accept this proposition of law. The Act does not provide any period of limitation for filing a petition under Sec.3 of the Act. It is a special Act, and as such the provisions of the Limitation Act ; 1963 shall not apply. The provisions of the Limitation Act shall apply to suit, to appeal and to application, la other words, the Limitation Act shall apply to suit and the appeal arising out of the suit and the application arising out of the suit, or in execution proceeding. Any application made under the special or local law will not be covered by the provisions of the limitation Act. The Act provides a complete machinary for the redress of the grievance of the former raiyats who have been ejected for arrears of rent between 1st January, 1930 and 31st December.1950. If the special act does not mention about the applicability of the Limitation Act then the provisions of the Limitation Act shall not apply. In this connection learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on Sec.29 (2) of the Limitation act, 1963. It is relevant to quote Sec.29 (2) of the Limitation Act which runs as follows : - "where any special or local law prescribes for any suit appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Sec.3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. " Sec.29 (2) of the Limitation Act provides that if a different period of limitation is prescribed for a suit, appeal or application under any special or local law then in that case the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act shall apply in so far as, and to the extent to which they are not expressly concluded by such special or local law. So far as the present Act is concerned no period of limitation is prescribed for preferring an application under Sec.3 of the Act to the Collector. So far as the present Act is concerned no period of limitation is prescribed for preferring an application under Sec.3 of the Act to the Collector. In such circumstances, I am of the opinion, Sec.29 (2) of the Limitation Act shall not apply to the facts of this case. The word application occurring in Sec.3 of the Limitation Act means applications mentioned in the schedule of the act and not applications under any special or local law. Hence, I am of the opinion that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply to the Act. 17 In the result the petition is dismissed. We uphold the validity of Annexures 1 and 5. Petition dismissed.