JUDGMENT I.B. Singh, Member. - This is a defendant's second appeal against the Judgment and decree of learned Additional Commissioner, Jhansi Division dated February 14, 1974 allowing the appeal, setting aside the decree and Judgment of trial court dated April 20, 1972 passed by Assistant Collector Ist Class Karwi, district Banda in a suit under Section 229-B of Act I of 1951 declaring plaintiff as sole Sirdar of the disputed land. 2. Ram Deo, plaintiff-respondent, had filed a suit for declaration to be sole Sirdar in possession of 22 plots with a total area of 25-12-19 situate in village Raipur, Pargana Karwi, district Banda and that the name of Chunkai was wrongly reported that the land in suit was of Bal Govind and his father Ram Kumar and Ram Jiawan who were real brothers; that Bal Govind was Karta of the family; that Ram Kumar had died first, then died Bal Govind who was inherited by his widow Malhi; that Malhi died in 1942 who was inherited by Ram Jiawan. 3. Chunkai defendant contested the suit claiming to be sole Sirdar in possession of the land in suit; that the name of the plaintiff was wrongly recorded; that the land in suit was only of his maternal grand-father Balgovind, that the suit was bad for non-joinder of daughters of Ram Jiawan. 4. The trial court had dismissed the plaintiff's suit holding defendant to be co-tenant to the extent of ?rd share in the land in suit. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. 6. The following pedigree is not disputed:- 7. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that the lower appellate court has erred in ignoring the long standing entries in the name of Chankai and that it had not considered that co-tenancy is also created by estoppel acquiescence and that where both the parties have exaggerated their case, it is open to the court to arrive to the truth and to true state of facts. Reliance has been placed on (1) 1941 R.D. 449, (2) 1967 R.D. 396, (3) 1949 R.D. 218 and (4) 1925 R.D. 617. It was argued in reply that estoppel must be specifically pleaded. Mere entry of co-tenancy is not enough. There must be evidence for possession and payment of rent etc. to support the entry. Reliance has been placed on (1) 1941 R.D. 449, (2) 1967 R.D. 396, (3) 1949 R.D. 218 and (4) 1925 R.D. 617. It was argued in reply that estoppel must be specifically pleaded. Mere entry of co-tenancy is not enough. There must be evidence for possession and payment of rent etc. to support the entry. Reliance has been placed on (5) 1958 A.L.J. 53(R) and (6) 1957 R.D. 35. 8. In the Khasra of 1333 Fasli name of Bal Govind alone was recorded and in 1349 Fasli Smt. Malhi widow of Bal Govind, Ram Jiawan and Ram Phal brother of plaintiff Ram Deo were recorded on the disputed plots. In 1356 and 1359 Faslis in place of Smt. Malhi her daughter's son Chunkai is recorded and after the death of Ram Jiawan and Ram Phal only the plaintiff and defendant were recorded and continued to be recorded in the present papers. It appears that the defendant Chunkai was recorded after the death of Smt. Malhi as he was co-opted by Ram Jiawan etc. as a co-tenant and became co-tenant by estoppel and acquiescence or even by adverse possession. Because two co-tenants remained recorded in revenue papers for more than 18 years and, therefore, they had acquired co-tenancy rights by virtue of their names being recorded in revenue papers for a very long period and also being in possession as held in 1967 R.D. 396. 9. Where the entries in the revenue papers have stood for more than 12 years the burden of proving the contrary rests on the party challenging the entries, as held in 1941 R.D. 449. The entry in the name of defendant Chunkai continued after the death of Malhi for more than 30 years. The burden of proving to the contrary lies on plaintiff which he has failed. 10. The entry in the name of defendant Chunkai continued after the death of Malhi for more than 30 years. The burden of proving to the contrary lies on plaintiff which he has failed. 10. It is true that plea of estoppel and acquiescence must be specifically pleaded as held in 1958 A.L.J. 53 and 1957 R.D. 35 but where both the parties have exaggerated their case so that both had pleaded the exclusion of each other and both of them have not disclosed the truth, a court ought not to set up, on behalf of a party, a new case which has never been pleaded by him, but if neither party in his pleadings discloses the entire truth and the evidence adduced discloses a set of facts which is either midway between, or at any rate different from, the case which either party has set up in his pleadings, the court is obviously bound to take notice of the true state of facts as proved by the evidence, and to give effect to the legal rights which arise on that state of facts, as held in 1925 Oudh 617. In the present case both the parties have not pleaded true fact. Both have claimed exclusive Sirdari rights to the exclusion of each other. There is evidence on oath of the plaintiff against statement on oath of the defendant, therefore, the rule of prudence requires that only the paper entries should be relied upon which as mentioned above disclosed that the defendant is also recorded as a co-tenant with the plaintiff for more than about 30 years and continues to be recorded so and the defendant has stated that he used to pay rent through the plaintiff who is maternal uncle. The plaintiff has not stated any thing about payment of rent. In all these circumstances it appears that the truth lies midway. Neither the plaintiff is sole Sirdar in possession of the plaintiff in suit nor the defendant is sole Sirdar in possession of the plots in suit but both are co-tenants in possession and the long standing entries in favour of the defendant also go a long way and the truth appears to lie midway and both the parties have failed to discharge the burden of proving contrary to the long standing entries in the revenue papers which have stood for more than 30 years. The trial court had come to the right conclusion but the first appellate court appears to have last view of the effect of such long standing entries in revenue papers and of the fact that both the parties had exaggerated their case, therefore, it was the duty of the first appellate court to ascertain the truth which lay mid-way and it drew a wrong conclusion and its findings as such are liable to be set aside and the findings of the trial court are liable to be confirmed and the appeal is liable to be allowed. 11. In view of the above, this appeal is allowed with costs. The Judgment and decree passed by first appellate court are set aside and the Judgment and decree of the trail court are hereby confirmed.