Judgment Hari Lal Agrawal, J. 1. - This application is by the plaintiff and is directed against an order of the learned Munsif rejecting its petition for striking out the defence of the opposite-party tenants for non-compliance of the orde passed under section 11-A of the Bihar Buildings Control Act, 1947. The relevant facts may be briefly stated : 2. The petitioner instituted a title suit in the year 1967 against both the opposite party for their eviction from the premises, bearing municipal holding No.15 in Circle No.174 of the Patna Municipal Corporation. I am not concerned with the details of grounds for eviction. In that suit, on 19-6-1968 the trial court passed an order under section 11-A of the old Act directing the opposite party to deposit the arrears as well as current and future rents in terms of the aforesaid provision. It appears that although arrears were deposited in time. The opposite party defaulted in depositing the furture rent. For example, rent for the months of October and November, 1976 was deposited on 30-6-1977; for the months of December, 1976 and January 1977 was deposited on 1-7-1977 ; for the months of February and March 1977 was deposited on 2-7-1977; for the months of April and May, 1977 was deposited on 4-7-1977 and the rent for the months of August and September, 1977, was deposited on 20-9-1977. It is not disputed that the deposits made by the opposite party were not in terms of section 11-A of the act inasmuch as according to the said provision as well as according to the order dated 19-6-1968, as rent for each month was to be deposited within 15 days of the each succeeding month. 3. On 31-3-1976, the 1947 Act expired. However, the legislature enacted Bihar Act 16 of 1977, namely, Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and eviction) Control Act, 1977 on 8-9-1977. Some of the provisions were made retrospective in the sense that by the second proviso to sub-section (3) of of the new Act, any liability incurred under the old Act or any punishment incurred in respect of any contravention of that Act or any order made thereunder was not to be affected notwithstanding the expiry of the old act on 31-3-1976. 4. The learned Munsif rejected the application of the petitioner filed on 31-1-1978. 4. The learned Munsif rejected the application of the petitioner filed on 31-1-1978. On the ground that on account of the expiry of the 1947 Act, the defendants could not be said to have defaulted in payment of current and future rent "unless the plaintiff files a fresh application under the new B. B. C. Act and gets a fresh order. " 5. Mr. Chunni Lal appearing for the petitioner, placed reliance on the decisions in Sailendra Nath Roy V/s. Dr. (Miss) Geeta Mazumdar, (1978 b. B. C. J.214) and in Sardar Para Singh V/s. Srimati Priti Lall, (C. R.430 of 1977 disposed of on 2-7-1977 ). published in Short Note No.9 of 1978 b. B. C. J. and contended that the second proviso to section 1 (3) of the new act kept alive the order dated 19-6-1968 passed under section 11-A of the old Act and the consequential liability suffered by the tenants on account of its non performance in terms of the said order. The contention finds full support from both the decisions, referred to above, where it has been clearly observed that the orders which have been passed under the Act were saved by the second proviso of the new Act mentioned above. 6. Learned counsel, appearing for the opposite party, on the other hand, contended that what was saved by the proviso, if at all, was the liability already incurred under the old Code and not the liability which was to be incurred after the expiry of the said Act. In other words, the argument is that inasmuch as the defaults were committed for the period, subsequent to the expiry of the old Act, that is, October, 1976, the liability of their defence against ejectment to be struck off was not incurred, during the subsistance of the old act and, therefore, this was not saved by the proviso. In my opinion, the argument of the learne 1 counsel is entirely erroneous and must be rejected. The liability to pay past and future rent was already incurred by the opposite party under the order dated 19-6-1968 and the consequence of its default was also contemplated under that order. In my opinion, the argument of the learne 1 counsel is entirely erroneous and must be rejected. The liability to pay past and future rent was already incurred by the opposite party under the order dated 19-6-1968 and the consequence of its default was also contemplated under that order. To make it more clear, I would say that by the order dated 19-6-1968 passed under section 11-A of the Act, the tenants incurred the liability to deposit the past as well as current and future rents punctually in accordance with the terms of that order. It is, therefore, obvious that this liability is saved by the proviso in question. Its default is a more consequential the consequence default already known and indicated in the order. In other words, the liability of the defence against ejectment to be struck off was already founded on 19-6-1968 itself and, therefore, it cannot be argued that the liability in question has been incurred by the tenants after expiry of the old Act. Such a construction would make the entire proviso redundant and frustrate its very purpose. 7. Counsel for the opposite party also referred to an unreported decision of this Court in Jai Nandan Singh V/s. District Magistrate, (CWJC 668 of 1975 disposed of on 20-5-1977), a decision which was relied upon by M. M. Prasad, J. in Prabhat Kumar Das V/s. Santhal Paharia Sewa Mandal, ( 1978 bbcj 297 ) where he took a somewhat contrary view. In Jai Nandan Singhs case, (supra) the situation was that although an order was passed on 24-2-1975 by the District Magistrate directing the applicant to vacate a house as provided under Rule 3 (6) of the Rules framed under the old Act, when that order was sought to be enforced, the applicant challenged the same in this Court on the ground that the Act under which the order was passed by the District Magistrate had expired inasmuch as the case came up for consideration before the division Bench before the 1977 Act had come into force on 28-5-1977 itself. There was no other way out for the Bench than to quash the order of the district Magistrate on the ground that the order ceased to have any force on account of expiry of the old Act. 8. There was no other way out for the Bench than to quash the order of the district Magistrate on the ground that the order ceased to have any force on account of expiry of the old Act. 8. For the reasons given above, I must hold that the learned Munsif has committed an apparent error and the order passed by him is misconceived, i would accordingly allow this application and direct him to strike out the defence of the opposite party against ejectment. In the circumstances, I shall make no order as to costs. 9. Before parting with this judgment, I my also dispose of a further contention raised on behalf of the opposite party, and that was that the Munsif has not considered a plea of set off or adjustment of a sum of Rs.1736/-. I am afraid, since the defendants themselves purported to deposit the rent without making an appropriate application for adjustment under section 8 of the act, no such plea is available to the opposite party. The question that apparently fell for consideration before the Court was as to whether the deposits made by the opposite party were in terms of the order passed under section 11-A or not and once it is found that they were not, then the inevitable result that was bound to follow was to strike off the defence against ejectment. 10. It appears that the title suit has become too old being of the year 1967. The learned Munsif is accordingly directed to dispose of the suit as quickly as possible.