P.D. KUDAL, J.—This petition under sec. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is directed against the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 4, Jaipur City dated 23-9-1978. 2. Brief facts giving rise to this petition are that a First Information Report was lodged at the instance of Shri Shiv Charan, Additional District Supply Officer, Jaipur under section 420, IPC against the accused-petitioner for procuring 15 bags of cement by means of three permits, each permit was for 5 bags of cement. A case was registered at the Police Station, Bani Park, Jaipur, and the FIR was numbered as 174 dated 28-6-78. Shri Basir Mohammad, Sub-Inspector Police was investigating into the matter. Anticipatory bail was granted by the learned Sessions Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur to the accused-petitioner on 22-7-1978. During the course of investigation, the accused was asked by the Investigating Agency to present himself in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate on 20-9-78. There he was asked to sign certain forms which he did. Shri Basir Mohammad, Sub-Inspector, it is said, again called the petitioner at the police station and asked him to sign some papers giving his handwriting and signatures. The accused-petitioner was again directed by the Investigating Agency to present himself before the Judicial Magistrate No. 4, Jaipur City and to give signatures and handwritings. The accused protested through his counsel Shri P.C.Jain, and contended that he was protected under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India not to give testimonial evidence against himself. The case was adjourned for hearing on 21-9-1978. 3. On behalf of the accused, certain case laws were produced. The orber was pronounced by the learned Magistrate on 23-9-1978, The accused was then directed to give specimen signatures and handwritings, which he did in compliance with the Courts order. 4. On behalf of the accused-petitioner, it has been contended that the learned Magistrate erred in law in acting without jurisdiction in issuing directions to the accused to give his specimen of signatures and handwriting to the investigating officer at a stage when the matter was still under investigation, it has been contended that the impugned order of the learned Judicial Magistrate is violative of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. It was also contended that such a direction is also nugatory of the provisions of section 162, Cr.P.C. Reliance was placed on Keshavlal vs. State of Gujrat(l); T. Subbiah vs. Rama-swamy (2); Yusuf Ali vs. The State (3) and Smt. Nandini Satpathy vs. P. L. Dani (4). It was further contended that such a direction could not have been issued under section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act. 5. Mr. Khan, appearing on behalf of the State, has contended that the word "inquiry" has been defined in section 2(g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, to mean every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court. It was further contended that the issue of such a direction to the accused-petitioner to give the specimen of his handwritings and signatures to the investigating officer, who was conducting the investigation was not violative either of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India or the provisions of section 162, Cr.P.C. It was further contended that such a direction could be issued under sec. 73 of the Indian Evidence Act. Reliance was placed on State of U. P. vs. Boota Singh(5); The State (Delhi Administration) vs. Pali Ram (SC) (6) and Smt. Nandini Satpathy vs. P. L. Dani (SC) (supra) and State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu (7). 6. Respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties have been considered and the record of the case carefully perused. 7. In Keshavlal vs. State of Gujrat (1), it has been held as under:— "Section 73 gives the Court a power to direct any person present in the Court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare the words or figures so written, with any words or figures alleged to have been written by such a person. Therefore, if an accused person is present in court, then powers given under the section can be used by the Court. But where the accused is not before the court and is let on bail pending investigation of the case against him the Magistrate has no power to ask the accused person to go to the police and give specimen of his signatures and handwriting. Magistrate and police officers can exercise only those powers which are prescribed under various laws and those powers cannot be enlarged. Magistrate and police officers can exercise only those powers which are prescribed under various laws and those powers cannot be enlarged. If there is no provision in the law for, the exercise of a power that power cannot be exercised by a Police Officer, or by a Magistrate or by a Judge. The police have got wide powers of investigation under Ss. 156 of Cr.P.C. but that does not mean that the police can compel an accused person to give his specimen signature and handwriting in exercise of such powers against the express provisions of S. 73 of Evidence Act." 8. In T. Subbiah vs. Ramaswamy (2), it was held that under section 73 an additional power is conferred on the Court to direct any person present in Court to write any words or figures. But to direct a person to write words or figures for the purpose of comparison, there must be (i) a cause before the Court (ii) the person so directed must be a party to the cause, (iii) he should be present in court in respect of the said cause and (iv) such comparison must be necessary to determine the issue raised in the said cause. The sine qua non of applying the provisions of the Evidence Act is the enquiry by a Court. 9. It was further held that the Magistrate cannot take part in the investigation by the police or aid the police in any manner except in cases here such assistance is specifically provided in the Criminal Procedure Code or under any other statute. In this ruling it has been observed as under:— "The Supreme Court was wholly concerned in all the three cases, irrespective of the details of the facts of those cases, with the question whether the taking of finger prints, handwriting etc. from an accused either under the Identification of Prisoners Act or under sec. 73 of the Evidence Act would offend Art. 20(3) of the Constitution. This is made very clear in the first sentence of para 2 of the majority judgment which is as follows : "It is not necessary to state in any detail the facts of each of the cases now before us. We shall, therefore, state only so much of the facts have occasioned calling in aid of the provisions of Cl. This is made very clear in the first sentence of para 2 of the majority judgment which is as follows : "It is not necessary to state in any detail the facts of each of the cases now before us. We shall, therefore, state only so much of the facts have occasioned calling in aid of the provisions of Cl. (3) of Art. 20 of the Constitution." This passage makes it abundantly clear that the Supreme Court was not concerned with any other question in relation to the facts of each of these cases. I am, therefore, of the view, that there is no basis for the contention of the learned counsel that the Supreme Court has at least indirectly approved the point that the Magistrate can take handwriting or signature of the accused in the course of investigation." 10. In Yusuf Ali vs. The State (3), it was held that a Court cannot direct an accused person to give his specimen signature and handwriting to the investigating officer in open Court pending investigation. 11. In Smt. Nandini Satpathy vs. P. L. Dani (4), it was held that even the investigation at the police level is embraced by Art. 20(3), and that an accused shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself. Giving of evidence or furnishing any information likely to have incriminating impact answers the description of being witness against oneself. 12. On behalf of the State, it was contended that under the provisions of section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, the court may direct any person present in the Court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare the words and figures so written with any words or figures alleged to have been written by such person in order to ascertain whether a signature, writing, or seal is that of the person by whom it purports to have been written or made. 13. Reliance was placed on State of U.P. vs. Boota Singh (SC) (supra), in which it has been held as under:— "Mr. Mulla submitted that the act of the investigating officer in taking the specimen signature of the respondent Boota Singh was hit by section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code and also amounted to testimonial compulsion so as to violate the guarantee contained in Article 20(3) of the Constitution. Mulla submitted that the act of the investigating officer in taking the specimen signature of the respondent Boota Singh was hit by section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code and also amounted to testimonial compulsion so as to violate the guarantee contained in Article 20(3) of the Constitution. The matter is no longer res integra and is concluded by a decision of this Court in the case of State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu oghad & Ors. (1962) 3 SCR 10 where the Court observed as follows:— "That is why it must be held that by giving these impressions or specimen handwriting, the accused person does not furnish evidence against himself, so when an accused person is compelled to give a specimen hand-writing or impressions of his finger, palm or foot, it may be said that he has been compelled to be a witness, it cannot however be said that he has been compelled to be a witness against himself." It was also held that merely taking a specimen handwriting does not amount to be giving a statement so as to be hit by section 162 Cr.P.C. In view of this decision of the Court, Mr. Mulla did not pursue the point further." 14. Reliance was placed on The State (Delhi Administration) vs. Pali Ram (SC) (Supra), wherein it was held that in inquiry proceedings on prosecution request Magistrate is entitled to ask accused to give specimen handwriting for examination by handwriting expert but ultimately for the Courts own satisfaction. The two paragraphs of sec. 73 are complementary to each other and be read as a whole. 15. In Smt. Nandini Satpathy vs. P. L. Dani (SC) (supra), it has been held as under:— "The next serious question debated before us is as to the connotation of compulsion under Art. 23(3) and its reflection is section 161(1). In Kathi Kalu Oghads case (Supra), Sinha, C.J. explained: "In order to bring the evidence within the inhibition of Cl. (3) of Art. 20 it must be shown not only that the person making the statement was an accused at the time he made it and that it had a material bearing on the criminality of the maker of the statement, but also that he was compelled to make that statement. Compulsion in the context, must mean what in law is called duress. Compulsion in the context, must mean what in law is called duress. In the Dictionary of English Law by Earl Jowitt, duress is explained as follows:— "Duress is where a man is compelled to do an act by injury, beating or unlawful imprisonment (sometimes called duress in strict sense) or by the threat of being killed, suffering some grievous bodily harm, or being unlawfully imprisoned (sometimes called monace, or duress per minas). Duress also includes threatening, beating or imprisonment of the wife, parent or child of a person." The compulsion in this sense is a physical objective act and not the state of mind of the person making the statement, except where the mind has been so conditioned by some extraneous process as to render the making of the statement involuntary and, therefore, extorted. Hence, the mere asking by a police officer investigating a crime against a certain individual to do a certain thing is not compulsion within the meaning of Art. 20(3). Hence, the mere fact that the accused person, when he made the statement in question was in police custody would not, by itself, be the foundation for an inference of law that the accused was compelled to make the statement. Of course, it is open to an accused person to show that while he was in police custody at the relevant time, he was subjected to treatment which, in the circumstances of the case, would lend itself to the inference that compulsion was, in fact, exercised. In other words, it will be a question of fact in each to be determined by the Court on weighing the facts and circumstances disclosed in the evidence before it." This question of fact has to be carefully considered against the background of the circumstances disclosed in each case." 16. In State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu (Supra), it has been held as under:— "(16). In view of these considerations, we have come to the following conclusions:— (1) An accused person cannot be said to have been compelled to be a witness against himself simply because he made a statement while in police custody, without anything more. In State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu (Supra), it has been held as under:— "(16). In view of these considerations, we have come to the following conclusions:— (1) An accused person cannot be said to have been compelled to be a witness against himself simply because he made a statement while in police custody, without anything more. In other words, the mere fact of being in police custody at the time when the statement in question was made would not, by itself, as a proposition of law, lend itself to the inference that the accused was compelled to make the statement, though that fact, in conjunction with other circumstances disclosed in evidence in a particular case, would be a relevant consideration in an enquiry whether or not the accused person had been compelled to make the impugned statement. (2) The mere questioning of an accused person by a police officer, resulting in a voluntary statement, which may ultimately turn out be incriminatory, is not compulsion. (3) To be a witness is not equivalent to furnishing evidence in its widest significance; that is to say, as including not merely making of oral or written statements but also production of documents or giving materials which may be relevant at a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. (4) Giving thumb impressions or impressions of foot or palm or fingers or specimen writings or showings parts of the body by way of identification are not included in the expression to be a witness. (5) To be a witness means imparting knowledge in respect of relevant facts by an oral statement or a statement in writing, made or given in Court or otherwise. (6) To be a witness in its ordinary grammatical sense means giving oral testimony in Court. Case law has gone beyond this strict literal interpretation of the expression which may now bear a wider meaning, namely, bearing testimony in Court or out of Court by a person accused of an offence, orally or in writing. (7) To bring the statement in question within the prohibition of Art. 20(3), the person accused must have stood in the character of an accused person at the time he made the statement. It is not enough that he should become an accused any time after the statement has been made." 17. In the order dated 23-9-1978. (7) To bring the statement in question within the prohibition of Art. 20(3), the person accused must have stood in the character of an accused person at the time he made the statement. It is not enough that he should become an accused any time after the statement has been made." 17. In the order dated 23-9-1978. the learned Magistrate has observed that the Sub-Inspector Basir Mohammad is directed to take the specimen of signatures and handwriting of the accused Rakesh. It has been further observed that the accused has agreed to give such specimen of signatures and handwritings. The learned counsel for the accused-petitioner has vehemently contended that this observation of the learned Magistrate is without any foundation as the accused has been protesting from the very beginning. He engaged a counsel and moved an application before the learned Magistrate protesting against the procurement of such specimen of signatures and handwriting. The view taken by the Supreme Court in State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu (Supra) was distinguished in T. Subbiah vs. Ramaswamy (supra). This view finds support in Yusuf Ali vs. The State (supra). In The State (Delhi Administration) vs.Pali Ram (SC) (Supra), it has been observed that: "A sample writing taken by the Court under the second paragraph of section 73,is, in substance and reality the same things as "admitted writing" within the purview of the first paragraph of section 73, also The first paragraph of the section, as already seen, provides for comparison of signature, writing etc., purporting to have been written by a person with others admitted or proved to the satisfaction of the court to have been written by the same person. But it does not specifically say by whom such comparison may be made. Construed in the light of the English Law on the subject, which is the legislative source of this provision, it is clear that such comparison may be made by a handwriting expert (Section 45) or by one familiar with the handwriting of the person concerned (Section 47) or by the Court The two paragraphs of the section are not mutually exclusive They are complementary to each other." 18. Similar view has been taken in State of U.P. vs. Boota Singh (SO (supra). 19. Similar view has been taken in State of U.P. vs. Boota Singh (SO (supra). 19. From the above consideration, it appears that taking of specimen of signatures and handwritings it cannot be said that the accused has been compelled to be a witness against himself. In the instant case, whether the signatures which have been obtained from the accused were under compulsion or not, is a question of fact, which has to be decided by the evidence led by the parties. 20. For the reasons stated above, there is no force in this application which is hereby dismissed. 21. At this stage, the learned counsel for the petitioner made a request for permission for special leave to the Supreme Court. As the point involved in this case has been set at rest by the rulings of the Honble Supreme Court referred to above, no case is made out for granting special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The prayer is accordingly refused.