JUDGMENT B.D. Agarwal, J. - These two writ petitions raise common questions of law for decision. The petitioners in these writ petitions are holders of stage carriage permits for plying their stage carriages on various routes, parts of which fall within the District of Ghazipur and Varanasi. They have challenged the validity of the bye-laws framed by Zilla-' Parishad, Ghazipur in purported exercise of power under Section 239 (2) (F) of U- P. Kshetra Samitis and Zilla Parishads Adhiniyam, 1961 (hereinafter referred as the Adhiniyam) and as published in the-U. P. Gazette dated 5th of May, 1973. These bye-laws specify places for stands (Addas) and Paraos and for their regulation. These bye-laws provide that no vehicle shall stop at a place other than the places specified for stopping and halting of vehicles. Further, these provide for levy and charge of fee per trip for use of the specified stands and Paraos. In case of stage carriages, a fee in the sum of 50 P. per trip at every stand is chargeable. 2. The petitioners assert that the places specified by the impugned bye-laws are all on the roads belonging either to the Central Government or the State Government, under whose control and management these roads are, and the-Zilla Parishad has no concern with its control or management. It is further asserted that no construction had been made on these specified places and that no facility or amenity of any kind is provided. The petitioners have further asserted that the State Government is empowered to fix halting stations and parking places and that this power has been delegated to the District Magistrate who can specify these places, and, the Zilla Parishad, Ghazipur has no authority to do so. The right to collect fee has been auctioned in favour of certain contractors who collect fee from the petitioners, as well as others, plying vehicles, at the-rate of 50 P. per station per vehicle per trip, and the petitioners are being stopped forcibly and money is being charged with the connivance and consent of the-Zilla Parishad and this charge is illegal. The petitioners claim for quashing the bye-laws framed by the Zilla Parishad, and for the issue of a direction commanding the respondents not to give effect to these Bye-laws. 3. The case set up by the Z. P-is that the Parishad was fully entitled to frame the impugned bye-laws. The petitioners claim for quashing the bye-laws framed by the Zilla Parishad, and for the issue of a direction commanding the respondents not to give effect to these Bye-laws. 3. The case set up by the Z. P-is that the Parishad was fully entitled to frame the impugned bye-laws. It has been providing various facilities and amenities to the petitioners and public at large, and staff has been engaged for proper regulation of traffic etc- It has further been asserted that the fee in question is payable only in case of vehicles stopping at the specified place, and, if a vehicle does not so stop no charge of any fee is made. 4. The question, therefore, which arises for consideration is, as to whether the Zilla Parishad could in law do what it has purported to do under the impugned Bye-laws, namely, as to whether it could fix the bus stands or parking places and compel the persons plying the vehicles to use the places so fixed, and none else; and to charge fee for these bus stands. 5. In Municipal Board, Pushkar v. State Transport Authority, Rajasthan ( AIR 1965 SC 458 ), the Supreme Court had an occasion to analyse the provisions of Section 68 (2) (r) and Section 76 of the Motor Vehicles Act, in relation to specification of places for stands, parking places and halting places. It held that though S- 76 of the Act uses the words 'places at which motor vehicles may stand but this does not include fixation of what is known as bus stands. It was further held that fixation or alteration of bus stands could be done under rules framed by the State Government acting under Section 68 (2) (r) & (s) of Motor Vehicles Act. 6. In Municipal Council, Bhopal v. Sindhi Sahiti Multipurpose Transport Co-operative Society ( AIR 1973 SC 2420 ), the Supreme Court held that the M. P. Municipalities Act did not empower a municipality to make bye-laws declaring certain places as municipal bus stands, and, that, it cannot specify places where alone, and, nowhere else, buses could be parked for purposes of taking up and setting down of passengers. The aforesaid case of Municipal Board, Pushkar (supra) was referred to, and, it was again held that specific provision in this regard is made in Section 68 (2) (r) and (s) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The aforesaid case of Municipal Board, Pushkar (supra) was referred to, and, it was again held that specific provision in this regard is made in Section 68 (2) (r) and (s) of the Motor Vehicles Act. It was further held that if a Municipal Board wanted to provide for a bus stand, it could do so without compelling persons to use if, and, it could charge fee from those using it voluntarily. Again in the case of Jagdish Chandra v. State of U. P. (1975 All LJ 571), a learned single Judge of this Court in similar circumstances held that the Bye-laws framed by the Municipal Board, Pithoragarh was beyond the bye-law making power under the U. P. Municipalities Act. Sections 298 (1) and 298 (2) (H) (b) and (m) of the U- P. Municipalities Act were sought to be taken aid of by the Municipal Board, in order to justify the Bye-law. It was held that under the U. P. Municipalities Act, no power has been-conferred upon the municipalities to fix. a bus stand or parking place and to compel motor vehicles to be parked at that place, and nowhere else. It was further-held that no Municipal Board could compel the user of bus stands set up by the Board itself, and if in the interest of public convenience, prohibition is introduced by any bye-law, for the use in street or places within the Municipal Board limits, for parking of vehicles, but then it would only amount to regulation of traffic. Section 239 (1) and Section 239 (2) (P) (a) and (e) of the Adhiniyam are provisions similar to those in the U. P. Municipalities Act, referred to above. 7. In the light of the view taken by the Supreme Court in this regard as also by the learned single Judge of this Court, with which we are in agreement, we find that no power has been conferred upon a Zilla Parishad to provide a bus stand or parking place, and to compel the parking of vehicles at specified places and nowhere else. The impugned bye-laws, therefore, in this regard are beyond the bye-law making power of the Zilla Parishad, and, are hence without any authority, and the provisions in the Bye-laws regarding charge of fee for user of these bus stands or parking places, and, provisions providing for punishment for breach of the bye-laws, being clearly consequential, cannot stand on their own, and hence must also fall. 8. In this view, both these writ petitions are liable to be allowed. The writ petitions are, accordingly, allowed with costs. The Bye-laws of the Zilla Parishad, Ghazipur, as published in the U.P. Gazette dated 5th May, 1973, and annexed as Annexure I to both the petitions, are quashed. The respondents are restrained from enforcing or giving effect to these Bye-laws.