S. K. DUTTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS rule is directed against the order dated March 18, 1977 passed by the learned Additional district Judge rejecting an application filed by the defendant-appellant for amendment of written statement in a pending appeal. It appears that the plaintiff respondent filed a suit for recovery of possession of the suit premises on the ground of reasonable requirement for his own occupation. The plaintiff claimed to be the owner of the suit premises though in the plaint he did not disclose the devolution of his title and in his written the plaintiff was the owner of the suit premises. The learned Munsifff on a trial on evidence decreed the suit and an appeal was preferred by the defendant against the decree. As this appeal was pending before the learned Judge the application for amendment was filed in the appeal on December 3, 1976. ( 2 ) THE application for amendment sought to be in place of paragraph 7 of the written statement is as follows :-7. With regard to statements made in paragraph 1 of the plaint this defendant submits that this answering defendant does not admit that the plaintiff is the owner of the property at municipal holding No. 189/1, Shibpur Road, P. S. Shibpur, District Howrah and the plaintiff is to prove the same. With regard to paragraph 2 of the plaint it is submitted that this defendant is still a premises-tenant at a rental of Rs. 50/- only originally under the plaintiff and his mother and thereafter under the plaintiff after the death of the mother and with regard to statements made in paragraph 3 of the plaint it is submitted that the description of the suit premises given in Schedule to the plaint is vague and incorrect and the plaintiff is to prove the same. ( 3 ) THE learned Judge in dealing with the petition referred to the delay made in filing the petition for amendment and noted the defendant's case in respect thereof that he was not very much educated and had no knowledge of the Deed of Settlement which was the basis of the plaintiff's title, nor was he competent to make the construction of the document which was not available to him or his lawyer at the time of filing the written statement. The defendant after the decree took inspection of the document and was surprised to find that there was nothing in the said document to identify the suit property with the property that was settled in favour of the plaintiff's mother and the plaintiff. Further the defendant had come to learn on enquiry that there was no material on record to prove the plaintiff's ownership and the original Deed of Settlement, which was the document of title, did not indicate that the property belonged to the plaintiff. The admission in the written statement was made through error without the defendant being aware of the real state of things, and in view of the erroneous admission no issue on the point of owner ship could be framed nor was any evidence adduced by him. The defendant submitted that he was carrying on business in the suit premises for his livelihood and unless the written statement and allowed to be amended he would suffer irreparable loss and injury. ( 4 ) IT will appear that the document of title of the plaintiff Ext. 9 was filed during the examination of the plaintiff on February 3, 1975. The defendant was thereafter cross-examined on August 8, 1975 when also he did not make any statement about the plaintiff not being the owner of the suit premises. The learned Judge noted that under provisions of section 13 (1) Clause (ff) the landlord must prove that he is the owner of the suit premises before he can claim eviction of his tenant on the ground of reasonable requirement and the court also must come to a finding that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit premises before a decree could be passed. Under Section 58 of the evidence Act, which is in pari material with rule 5 order 8 of the Code of Civil procedure, no fact need be proved in any proceeding which the parties or their agents agree to admit at the hearing or which by any rule of pleading in force at the time they are to be deemed to have admitted by their pleadings. The court however in spite of admission may in its discretion require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions. The court however in spite of admission may in its discretion require the facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions. The court noted that the title could not pass by admission but even so in the written statement the relevant paragraphs of the plaint relating to ownership of the premises were said to be substantially correct. In the context of this position and in view of the admission and also the evidence given by the parties the court was of opinion that the suit premises comprised in holding 189, was subsequently changed to 189/1, Shibpur Road and therefore the records showed, according the learned Judge, that the plaintiff was unmistakably the owner of the suit premises and he acquired title to the same on the basis of Deed of Settlement Ext. 9. In view of this position there was no occasion for the defendant were not at all wrongly or vaguely described in the plaint. Te application accordingly was rejected as the admission about ownership made by the defendant was not at all erroneous and the proposed amendment was not necessary for determining the real controversy between the parties. ( 5 ) IN this rule Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee appearing for the defendant petitioner assailed the order on various grounds. He submitted that in respect of written statements greater latitude is given by court as will appear from the decision in Nrisingh Prosad Paul vs. Steel Products Ltd. , AIR 1953 Cal. 15 , in which the court laid down in respect of amendment of written statement that the primary duty of a court is to decide whether the proposed amendment is necessary to determine the real controversy between the parties and ?real controversy? test is the basic test which governs the Court's unchartered powers of amendment of pleadings. According to Mr. Mukherjee the amendment which was sought for was necessary for determining the real controversy between the parties. He also cited several decisions in support of his case. In the case of Manohar Lal vs. National Building Material Supply, AIR 1969 SC 1267 , paragraph 5, it was laid down as follows :- ? Rules of procedure are intended to be a handmaid to the administration of justice. A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction f the rules of procedure. Rules of procedure are intended to be a handmaid to the administration of justice. A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, inadvertence or even infraction f the rules of procedure. The court always gives leave to amend the pleading of a party, unless it is satisfied that he party applying was acting mala fide, or that by his blunder, he had caused injury to his opponent which may not be compensated for by an order of costs. However negligent or careless may have been on the first omission, and however late the proposed amendment, the amendment without injustice to the other side. ? in Dhanraj vs. S. N. S. Sarojini, 1968 (1) M. L. J. 390 it was held that where there is reason to think that the earlier admission might have been made by mistake, in such a case the court might be liberal in allowing the amendment but where there is reason to think that the earlier admission was not made by mistake and that the party deliberately changes his mind, he should not be allowed to amend. In Dharmalinga vs. Krishnaswami AIR 1949 Mad. 467 it was held that amendments are allowed in deserving cases even in the course of first appeal and second appeal. Where the amendment is not inconsistent with the original statement but the plaintiff was found guilty of laches amendment should not be refused but he petitioner must, however, be saddled with costs. The court further observed that truth or falsity of case put in amendment need not be considered while considering whether the amendment should be allowed or not, for if the amendment is false the petitioner would fail in suit. In Abdul Jabbar, AIR 1950 Cal. 379 the court held that if the amendment is necessary to decide the read issue between the parties the amendment should be granted even though the court may think that the party who seeks the amendment will not be able to establish the facts necessary to support the amendment plea or defence. Reference was also made to the decision in Ambica Prasad v. Ram Ekbal Rai, AIR 1966 SC 605 at 612 in which the court held that title cannot pass by mere admission. Reference was also made to the decision in Ambica Prasad v. Ram Ekbal Rai, AIR 1966 SC 605 at 612 in which the court held that title cannot pass by mere admission. ( 6 ) THE position emerging from the above decisions appears to be that normally the court will allow amendment at any stage of the proceeding provided such amendment is necessary for determination of the real controversy between the parties. Such amendment can well be allowed if it causes no prejudice to the other side and the other side may be sufficiently compensated for costs. Further in Bhuramal Agarwalla v. Samla Dalurband Coal Co. 82 C. W. N. 1 it was held that leave to amend written statement should not be granted if the amendment would convert the defence into another of a different and inconsistent character. Further the amendment should be refused if the court is satisfied that the application for amendment has not been made in good faith. ( 7 ) MR. Motilal appearing for the plaintiff-opposite party submitted that the amendment was rightly refused as under the provision of section 58 of the Evidence Act and rule 5 of order 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure the admissions made in course of proceedings are binding on the party that makes them and they constitute a waiver of proof and they also can be made foundations of the rights of parties as held in Ahodhya Prasad v. Bhowani Sanker, AIR 1967 AII. 1. He also referred to the decision in Mahendra vs. Sushila, AIR 1965 S. C. 364 in which the court held that in divorce cases under the Divorce Act of 1869 the court does not decide cases on the basis of admissions in pleading of the parties. But this rule is one of prudence and not a requirement of law since the parties could make collusive statements to gain their common object. Where there gain their common object. Where there is no room for supposing that the parties are colluding thee is no reason why the admissions of parties should not be treated as evidence just as they are treated in the other civil proceedings. Where there gain their common object. Where there is no room for supposing that the parties are colluding thee is no reason why the admissions of parties should not be treated as evidence just as they are treated in the other civil proceedings. The provisions of the Evidence Act and the Code of Civil Procedure provide for the Court's acceptance of the admissions made by parties and courts require no further proof in support of the facts admitted, though a discretion is given to the courts to require no further proof in support of the facts admitted, though a discretion is given to the courts to require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. Mr. Motilal also referred to the decision in Biva's Private Ltd. vs. West Bengal khadi and Village Industries Board, AIR 1977 Cal. 333 in which it was held that an amendment seeking to introduce a new case and to make a new claim and to negative an admission already made in written statement should not be allowed. In Modi Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. v. Ladha Ram and Co. AIR 1977 SC 680 , it was held that the defendants cannot be allowed to change completely the case made in the written statement and substitute an entirely different and new case. ( 8 ) THE effect of admission in pleading was considered by the Supreme Court in several decisions. In Kausalya Debi vs. K. L. Bansal, AIR 1970 S. C. 838 and Ferozilal vs. Manmal, AIR 1970 S. C. 794, the Court held that under the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Controller to pass a decree for recovery of possession of any premises depends upon his satisfaction that one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 (1) of the Act had been established. Where the Court has proceeded solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties, the court was not competent to pass the decree and such decree was a nullity. The Supreme Court considered these decisions in K. K. Chari vs. R. M. Sheshadri, AIR 1973 SC 1311 , and observed that before making an order for possession the court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the truth of the landlord's claim if there is a dispute between the landlord and the tenant. The Supreme Court considered these decisions in K. K. Chari vs. R. M. Sheshadri, AIR 1973 SC 1311 , and observed that before making an order for possession the court is under a duty to satisfy itself as to the truth of the landlord's claim if there is a dispute between the landlord and the tenant. But if the tenant in fact admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other of the statutory grounds mentioned in the Act, it is open to the court to act on the admission and make an order for possession in favour of the landlord without further enquiry at a stage when it is called upon to pas order on agreement. In Nagindas vs. Dalpatram, AIR 1974 S. C. 471, the Supreme Court approving Sheshadri's case observed that the Court must be satisfied on some material before it about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction before passing a decree. Such material may either take the shape of evidence recorded or produced or express or implied admission in compromise petition on itself. Admission in pleadings or judicial admissions admissible under section 58 of the Evidence Act made by the parties at or before the hearing of the case are binding on parties and constitute waiver of proof and can be made the foundation of rights of the parties. ( 9 ) IN the two cases last cited, the Court was considering a decree passed on compromise, providing for possession on certain terms. In such situation and at that stage, where the court is invited to pass a decree on compromise, and there are materials before the court, it is possible to postulate that the court ws satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was based. The court in such circumstances is entitled to act on admission of parties and no judicial order manifesting its judicial satisfaction was necessary. The court in such circumstances is entitled to act on admission of parties and no judicial order manifesting its judicial satisfaction was necessary. ( 10 ) UNDER section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 which relates to suits and proceedings for eviction it is provided as follows :- ?section 13.- Protection of tenant against eviction.- (1) Notwithstanding any thing to the contrary in any other law, no order or decree for recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court in favour of the landlord against a tenant except on one or more of the following grounds, namely**** (ff) Subject to the provision of sub-section (3a) where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held and the landlord or such person is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation****? the provisions set out indicate that no court shall pass a decree or order for recovery of possession under the above ground unless the plaintiff is the owner of the premises are reasonably required by the landlord for his own occupation. The court in granting a decree must firstly come to a decision on these two points, namely, about the ownership and the requirement for this own occupation. This finding will have to be arrived at and order to be passed notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law. The effect of these words appear to be that whether there words appear to be that whether there is an admission or not the court in a contested hearing has to come to its finding on these points though the Court may act or admission of parties on the existence of the material facts. In the circumstances I am of opinion that since it is incumbent for the plaintiff to prove his ownership of the property at the hearing of the case, there will be no prejudice if the amendment is allowed only in respect of the defendant's amended pleading in regard to ownership. In the circumstances I am of opinion that since it is incumbent for the plaintiff to prove his ownership of the property at the hearing of the case, there will be no prejudice if the amendment is allowed only in respect of the defendant's amended pleading in regard to ownership. Since this is a requirement of law and the court has to come to a finding thereon before granting a decree, there will be no question of prejudice to the plaintiff or of any delay in making the application though on the facts indicated above there has been some negligence on the part of the defendant. ( 11 ) I accordingly propose to allow the amendment contained in the first sentence of the amended paragraph 7 quoted above. The prayer for amendment as contained in the rest of paragraph 7 is rejected as being unnecessary. The rule accordingly is made absolute in part and the amendment is allowed in regard to the first sentence of the proposed amended paragraph 7 of the written statement as contained in the schedule of amendment to the application filed by the defendant on 3rd December 1976 before the first appellate court. ( 12 ) THE plaintiff in view of this amendment will be entitled to adduce further evidence before the appellate court in support of his claim that he is the owner of the suit premises with like liberty to the defendant to adduce evidence in rebuttal and the court will thereafter decide the appeal in accordance with law. Let the appeal be heard out expeditiously. ( 13 ) THESE will be no order for costs in this Rule. Let the records be sent down at once. Rule made absolute, no costs.