KOSITY v. CHANCELLOR, CALICUT UNIVERSITY — 1979 DIGILAW 93 (KER)

Judgment :- 1. The petitioner in this case was appointed as the Registrar of the Calicut University and he was functioning in that capacity thereafter at all material times. The first respondent is the Chancellor of the Calicut University and the second respondent is the Calicut University, represented by the Registrar-in¬charge. 2. Complaints were received alleging maladministration in the Calicut University and the first respondent, on the strength of Statute 69(2) of Chap.4 of the Calicut University First Statutes, 1977, secured the assistance of the Director of Vigilance Investigation, Kerala, to enquire into the allegations. That agency conducted an enquiry, and, Ext. P12 dated 7-9-1978 is the copy of the report submitted by the Director of Vigilance Investigation, setting out the various complaints and his findings on each charge. The accounts of the University also were caused to be audited by the Examiner of Local Fund Accounts, which led to another report. On perusal of the two reports the first respondent was minded to take action against the petitioner, who was functioning as Registrar of the University, and issued Ext. P13 order dated 27-2-1979 placing the petitioner under suspension and informing the Syndicate to initiate disciplinary action against the petitioner. Ext. P14 is a communication sent by the Secretary to the Chancellor to the Vice-Chancellor of the University conveying Ext. P13 decision. Ext. P15 is a memo dated 1-3-1979 issued by the Acting Vice-Chancellor to the petitioner and serving with a copy of the letter of suspension. Ext. P16 dated 1-3-1979 is the Circular issued by the Acting Vice-Chancellor declaring the suspension of the petitioner and also relieving him of his duties as Registrar of the University with effect from the Afternoon of 1-3-1979. The petitioner challenges the legality and propriety of Ext. P3 and the consequential orders. 3. Ext. P13 inter alia states that the order of suspension was issued by the first respondent, in exercise of the powers conferred on her by Statute 19 of Chap.4 of the First Statutes of the Calicut University. The petitioner challenges the legality and propriety of Ext. P3 and the consequential orders. 3. Ext. P13 inter alia states that the order of suspension was issued by the first respondent, in exercise of the powers conferred on her by Statute 19 of Chap.4 of the First Statutes of the Calicut University. Sub-s. (1) of Statute 19, which alone is relevant for the purpose of this case, may be read: "(1) The appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or any other authority empowered by the Syndicate in that behalf may, at any time, place a University employee under suspension (a) Where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending or (b) Where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial; or (c) Where in the opinion of the authority aforesaid he has engaged himself in activities prejudicial to the interests of the University; (d) Where final orders are pending in the disciplinary proceeding, if the appropriate authority considers that in the then prevailing circumstances it is necessary, in the interest of the University, that the University employee should be suspended from service of the University." The petitioner challenges Ext. P13 on the ground that it is violative of Statute 19(1) (a). According to that provision, an order of suspension can be passed by (a) the appointing authority; (b) any authority to which it is subordinate; and (c) any other authority empowered by the Syndicate in that behalf. It is common case that the first respondent can fall only under clause (b). The argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the competency of the first respondent to pass Ext. P13 order is two fold: In the first place it is pointed out that the first respondent is not an "authority" within the meaning of the Statute; and secondly, that at any rate, the first respondent cannot be considered as an "authority" to which the Syndicate is subordinate. Each of these contentions, though inter-related, may properly be considered separately. 4. According to the petitioner, the first respondent is not an "authority", and in support of that argument he relies on S.16 of the Calicut University Act, 1975, (Shortly the Act). The relevant provision is extracted below: "16. Each of these contentions, though inter-related, may properly be considered separately. 4. According to the petitioner, the first respondent is not an "authority", and in support of that argument he relies on S.16 of the Calicut University Act, 1975, (Shortly the Act). The relevant provision is extracted below: "16. Authorities of the University: (i) the Senate; (ii) the Syndicate; (iii) the Academic Council; (iv) the Faculties; (v) the Boards of Studies; (vi) the Students' Council; (vii) the Finance Committee; and (viii) such other boards or bodies of the University as may be declared by the Statutes to be authorities of the University." Apparently, the first respondent is not mentioned as an "authority" in S.16 of the Act, and, consequently, the petitioner would contend that the first respondent is not an "authority" for the purpose of Statute 19. Though superficially persuasive, a scrutiny of certain provisions of the Statute would show unmistakably, that S.16 is not an exhaustive definition of the "authorities" made mention of in the Statutes. The expression "authority" is not defined, and, it cannot be said that S.16 of the Act has the trappings of a definition clause, as strictly understood in the Legislative Drafting. That apart, a reference to Statute 27 shows, that the "authorities" enumerated in S.16 of the Act cannot be construed as an exhaustive enumeration of the categories of "authorities" under the Act and the Statutes for all purposes. Statute 27, which deals with "Disciplinary Authority" reads as follows: "(a) The penalties specified in items (i), ~~~~~~~~~~~~ and (iv) of Statute 25 may be imposed on a University employee by the Registrar or the Head of Department. (b) The penalties specified in:items (i) to (viii) of Statute 25 may be imposed on any of the members of the establishment of the University office whose pay or maximum pay does not exceed Rs. 560 per mensem by the Registrar. (c) The penalties specified in items (v) to (viii) of Statute 25 may be imposed on a University employee below the rank of a Deputy Registrar by the Vice-chancellor. Officer of and above the rank of Deputy Registrar by the Syndicate." Under clauses (a) and (b) the "authority" competent to impose the penalties mentioned in the two clauses is the Registrar. Under clause (c) the "authority" mentioned is the Vice-Chancellor. Under Clause (d) the authority mentioned is the Syndicate. Officer of and above the rank of Deputy Registrar by the Syndicate." Under clauses (a) and (b) the "authority" competent to impose the penalties mentioned in the two clauses is the Registrar. Under clause (c) the "authority" mentioned is the Vice-Chancellor. Under Clause (d) the authority mentioned is the Syndicate. The Registrar and the Vice-Chancellor are not "authorities" specifically mentioned in S.16 of the Act. Still, for the purpose of taking disciplinary action, these Officers are treated as "disciplinary authority". Statute 28 may also be read in this context: "The powers which an authority may exercise under Statute 27 shall be exercisable by the higher authorities also." The wording of that Statute shows that the persons-mentioned in Statute 27 are treated as "authorities" and by Statute 28 that authorities, who are higher in status to the authorities mentioned in Statute 27, are also competent to exercise the powers mentioned in Statute 27. It is, thus, abundantly clear, that the "authorities" mentioned under S.16 of the Act are not the only bodies, who are deemed to be "authorities" for the purpose of disciplinary proceedings. "Disciplinary Procedure" is contained in Part III of the Statutes. Statute 18 is a definition clause, and, clause (b) defines 'Disciplinary authority' as follows: "'Disciplinary authority' in relation to the imposition of a penalty on a University employee, means the authority competent under these Statutes to impose on him that penalty." By virtue of that definition it is clear that the Officers and the Syndicate, referred to in Statute 27, are authorities for the purpose of disciplinary procedure. From the nature of the categories enumerated in S.16 of the Act it could be seen that that section deals with only'bodies' and not'individual officers'. There is, thus, no substance in the contention of the petitioner that because of the absence of a specific mention of the Chancellor, in S.16 of the Act, the first respondent cannot be deemed to be an "authority". 5. The second and rather the alternative argument advanced by the petitioner is that even if, for the purpose of Part III of the Statutes, the first respondent is an authority, it cannot be said that the Syndicate, which is the authority competent to appoint the Registrar of the University, is not an authority subordinate to the Chancellor. 5. The second and rather the alternative argument advanced by the petitioner is that even if, for the purpose of Part III of the Statutes, the first respondent is an authority, it cannot be said that the Syndicate, which is the authority competent to appoint the Registrar of the University, is not an authority subordinate to the Chancellor. That question, apparently, has to be examined on the basis of the position which the Chancellor occupies under the Act and the Statutes in relation to the University. S.7 of the Act contains various provisions regarding the Chancellor. By sub-section (1) the Governor, by virtue of his office, is to be the Chancellor of the University. Subsections (2), (3) and (4), which are relevant for the purpose of this case, read as follows: "(2) The Chancellor shall be the head of the University and shall, when present, preside at meetings of the Senate, and at any convocation of the University. (3) The Chancellor may, by order in writing, annul any proceeding of any of the authorities of the University which is not in conformity with this Act, the Statutes, the Ordinances, the Regulations, the rules or the bye-laws: Provided that, before making any such order, the Chancellor shall call upon such authority to show cause why such an order should not be made and consider the cause, if any, shown by such authority within a reasonable time. (4) The Chancellor shall, when an emergency arises, have the right to suspend or dismiss any of the authorities of the University and to take measures for the interim administration of the University." Sub-section (5) stipulates that the confirmation of the Chancellor is necessary for conferment of an honorary degree. Sub-section (6) constitutes the Chancellor as an Appellate Authority against any order of dismissal passed by the Syndicate or the Vice-Chancellor against any person in the service of the University. Sub-section (7) recites time limit for an appeal provided by subsection (6). Sub-section (8) enjoins that before passing any order on an appeal under sub-section (6), the Chancellor shall refer the matter for advice to a Tribunal appointed by him for the purpose. Sub-section (9) conveys power on the Chancellor to remove the Vice-Chancellor or the Pro-Vice-Chancel for from office. Sub-section (7) recites time limit for an appeal provided by subsection (6). Sub-section (8) enjoins that before passing any order on an appeal under sub-section (6), the Chancellor shall refer the matter for advice to a Tribunal appointed by him for the purpose. Sub-section (9) conveys power on the Chancellor to remove the Vice-Chancellor or the Pro-Vice-Chancel for from office. Sub-section (10) is in the nature of a residuary provision in the sense that it provides that the Chancellor shall have such other powers as may be conferred on him by the Act or the Statutes Sub-section (2) of S.7 unambiguously states that the Chancellor is the Head of the University (emphasis given by me). By sub-section (3) the Chancellor has got the authority to annul any proceeding of any of the authorities of the University, which is not in conformity with the Act, Statutes etc. Such authority will, undoubtedly, include the Senate and the Syndicate which is the appointing authority as far as the Registrar is concerned. According to sub-section (4), when an emergency arises, the Chancellor has the right to suspend or dismiss any of the authorities and to take appropriate measures for interim administration of the University. These provisions would show that the Chancellor is the highest authority as far as the University is concerned. The term 'subordinate' appearing in Clause.1 of Statute 19 is not defined. The expression necessarily implies the existence of a superior authority and an inferior authority, which may be based on the functions to be discharged by the concerned authorities or the ranking in the case of executive officers or both. The superior status of a person or a body can also be declared by statutory law, as could be seen from sub-section (1) of S.19 of the Act, which declares that the Senate shall be the supreme authority of the University. But, the question whether one authority is subordinate to another would depend upon the nature, functions, powers etc., of the respective authorities. S.7 of the Act places, beyond any doubt, the Chancellor as the Head of the University and he is given the authority of overruling decisions of all the other authorities and also, in cases of emergency, to dismiss all the authorities. Such being the position of the Chancellor it is not possible to contend that the Syndicate is not a body subordinate to the Chancellor. Such being the position of the Chancellor it is not possible to contend that the Syndicate is not a body subordinate to the Chancellor. On an analysis of the provisions of the Act and the relevant Statutes I have no hesitation to hold that the Chancellor is an "authority", to which the Syndicate is subordinate for the purpose of Clause (1) of Statute 19. 6. The only other contention urged by the petitioner is that even if the first respondent is a competent authority to issue an order of suspension sub-clause (a) of clause (1) has not been complied with in the instant case. Sub-clause (a) mentions the circumstances under which the competent authority can pass an order of suspension. Under sub-clause (a), an order of suspension can be passed where a disciplinary proceeding, against the officer suspended, is contemplated or is pending. In the present case it is admitted by the respondents that no disciplinary proceeding is pending against the petitioner. So, the only other question that survives for decision is whether any disciplinary proceeding was contemplated by the authority, which issued the order of suspension. There was no contemplation on the part of the Syndicate to take any disciplinary action against the petitioner. So, the question is whether the first respondent contemplated any disciplinary action against the petitioner. That question has to be answered on the basis of the statements contained in Ext. P13. Ext. P13, when read as a whole, leaves no room for doubt that the first respondent had in contemplation the initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, and, that what the first respondent did was to leave the actual initiation of disciplinary action to the Syndicate, which is the appointing authority and hence the more appropriate agency for taking disciplinary action. The main handle in support of the petitioner's contention that disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner were not in the contemplation of the first respondent is provided by a statement contained in Ext. P14. Ext. P14 is a communication sent by the Secretary to the first respondent to the Vice-Chancellor. The main handle in support of the petitioner's contention that disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner were not in the contemplation of the first respondent is provided by a statement contained in Ext. P14. Ext. P14 is a communication sent by the Secretary to the first respondent to the Vice-Chancellor. It inter alia states as follows: "The Chancellor feels that the Syndicate of the Calicut University may examine the serious irregularities and misconduct and dereliction of duty pointed out in the report of the Director of Vigilance Investigation and Audit report of the Examiner of Local Fund Accounts and if considered necessary take suitable disciplinary action against the officers concerned." Much emphasis is laid by the petitioner on the expression "if considered necessary", occurring in the above passage. The argument of the learned counsel for petitioner is that the discretion, to initiate disciplinary proceedings, is given to the Syndicate, and, consequently, it is not possible to hold that the first respondent had in contemplation any disciplinary proceedings. It has to be remembered that Ext. P14 is a communication sent by the Secretary to the Chancellor. Ext. P13, which is the regular order passed by the first respondent, does not contain the expression "if considered necessary", or any analogous expression suggesting that, all questions relating to disciplinary proceedings are simply left to the decision of the Syndicate and that the first respondent, by herself, has not taken any decision. Again, the expression "if considered necessary", occurring in Ext. P14, if understood in the proper perspective, would only mean that the actual initiation of the disciplinary proceedings is left for the decision of the Syndicate. That does not mean that disciplinary action was not in the contemplation of the first respondent. If the first respondent never contemplated any disciplinary action there was no necessity to direct the Syndicate to initiate proceedings. Reading Ext. P13 as a whole I have no doubt that the first respondent, undoubtedly, had in contemplation the initiation of disciplinary action against the petitioner. There is, thus, compliance with sub-clause (a) of clause (1) of Statute 19, and, the contention to the contrary urged by the petitioner cannot be accepted. 7. On an analysis of the relevant provisions of the Act and the Statutes and the contents of Ext. P13 I hold that the first respondent had the authority to pass Ext. P13 order of suspension and that Ext. 7. On an analysis of the relevant provisions of the Act and the Statutes and the contents of Ext. P13 I hold that the first respondent had the authority to pass Ext. P13 order of suspension and that Ext. P13 does not suffer from any of the infirmities alleged before me by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In the result, this Original Petition fails and it is hereby dismissed with costs. Dismissed.