JUDGMENT : K.C. Agrawal. J. 1. This is a Plaintiff's revision filed u/s 115 CPC against a judgment of the Fourth Additional District Judge, Aligarh, dated 17-1-1976. By the said judgment, the Additional District 'Judge accepted the revision of the Defendant opposite party and dismissed the suit of the Plaintiff. 2. The Plaintiff is the Mutwalli of a waqf which owns the property in dispute. This had been let to the Defendant in the year 1949. The terms and conditions of the lease were also reduced to writing. 3. After serving a notice of demand and termination of tenancy dated 18-4-1971, the Plaintiff filed a suit in 1973 for ejectment on the grounds given in Clauses (b) and (c) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972. In a nutshell, the allegations were that the Defendant had without the permission in writing of the Plaintiff made such construction in the building as was likely to disfigure it. 4. The suit was contested by the Defendant, inter alia, on the ground that the constructions had been made with the permission in writing of the landlord, and, as such, the Defendant was not liable to be evicted. 5. Before the Judge Small Causes, the parties filed evidence. The Judge Small Causes held that the Defendant had caused substantial damage to the building, as contemplated by Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20, and, as such, was liable to be evicted. 6. The Defendant took the matter in revision. In revision, the learned Additional District Judge reversed the finding of the Judge Small Causes holding that the constructions were made with the permission of the landlord and, as such, the Defendant was not liable to be evicted. He further found that the Plaintiff had acquiesced to the constructions and had further waived the cause of action which had accrued to him in the past. In other words, the view of the learned Additional District Judge was that since the constructions had been made before the enforcement of U.P. Act XIII of 1972, the Plaintiff could file the suit, on the basis of material alterations. According to the learned Additional District Judge, since the cause of action accrued before the enforcement of U.P. Act XIII of 1972, the same could not be availed for filing the suit u/s 20(2)(b) and (c). According to the learned Additional District Judge, since the cause of action accrued before the enforcement of U.P. Act XIII of 1972, the same could not be availed for filing the suit u/s 20(2)(b) and (c). On these findings, the judgment of the Judge Small Causes was set aside and the suit was dismissed. 7. Aggrieved, the Plaintiff filed the present revision. 8. The first question that arises for determination is whether the constructions made by the Defendant were in contravention of Clauses (b) and (c) of Section 20(2) of the Act. Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 would apply to a case where a tenant has wilfully caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to a building. The constructions found to have been made by the Defendant did not cause any damage to the building. The building let out to the Defendant has not been damaged. Even the learned Counsel appearing for the Plaintiff did not press this point for a decree under Clause (b). 9. Coming to Clause (c) of Section 20(2), a tenant is liable to be evicted if he has made such constructions or structural alterations in a building as is likely to diminish its value or utility or to disfigure it. If, however, the constructions have been made with the permission in writing of the landlord, Clause (c) would not be applicable. In the instant case, the submission of the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff was that the constructions had disfigured the property let out to the tenant. The details of the constructions have been given in the judgment of the revising authority. Since the decision of the case does not require going into the details of the constructions, the same need not be mentioned. The principal case of the Defendant was that the constructions since had been made with the permission in writing of the landlord, Clause (c) of Sub-section 20(2) was not available to the Plaintiff. 10. For the purpose of establishing the permission, the Defendant filed a copy of the registered lease deed, which was Exhibit 4. This lease deed had been, admittedly, executed between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. Under this deed, the terms and conditions on which the property had been taken by the Defendant from the Plaintiff have been fully described. 10. For the purpose of establishing the permission, the Defendant filed a copy of the registered lease deed, which was Exhibit 4. This lease deed had been, admittedly, executed between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. Under this deed, the terms and conditions on which the property had been taken by the Defendant from the Plaintiff have been fully described. After interpreting the aforesaid lease deed, the Judge Small Causes had held that the said document did not give permission to the Defendant to make the constructions which have been found to have been made by him. The revising authority interpreted the lease deed differently and taking the view that the constructions were permitted by it, found that Clause (c) was not applicable. 11. On reading Exhibit 4, I find myself in complete agreement with the view of the learned Additional District Judge. It would appear that the Defendant had been given complete right to make constructions suitable for his needs. It may be remembered that the building had been taken by the Defendant for the purposes of starting a mill and in that connection he was required to make some constructions which could enable him to run the mill. Taking this background in view, it would appear that the constructions made were not unauthorised. 12. Counsel stressed that the words “TARMEEM” used in Clause (7) of the lease deed only enabled the Defendant to make the alterations and, as such, the making of a new room and a staircase could not be covered by the aforesaid Clause (7) of the deed. It is true that the word “TARMEEM” means “amendment, modification, or alteration.” But, reading the document as a whole, it would be found that the word “TARMEEM” has not been used in the sense of only making a few alterations in the existing building which had been let out at the time of execution of the document as under this deed the Defendant had been permitted to make those constructions which were required by him in future. 13. It is undeniable that the first rule of interpretation of a document is that the intention of the parties must be discovered, if possible, from the expressions used in the document. In large majority of cases, this causes no difficulty. But, there are cases where the words used are not apt to express their intention. 13. It is undeniable that the first rule of interpretation of a document is that the intention of the parties must be discovered, if possible, from the expressions used in the document. In large majority of cases, this causes no difficulty. But, there are cases where the words used are not apt to express their intention. In such a situation, the rule of construction is that if the words are not clear and ambiguous, the intention will prevail inasmuch as the most essential thing is to collect the intention of the parties. In the instant case, therefore, applying the aforesaid rule, the only inference which could be drawn was that the Defendant had a right to make suitable constructions in the building which could be required by him for his business. 14. There is yet another point on which this revision is liable to fail. The same is that this Court has no jurisdiction u/s 115 CPC to interfere with the impugned judgment of the court below even if it be assumed that the interpretation placed by it was incorrect. The interpretation is concerned with ascertaining the sense and meaning of the subject matter. This Court has no jurisdiction u/s 115 CPC to interfere with an order even if the order is right or wrong or in accordance with law or not, if it had jurisdiction to make that order. Merely because the High Court would have felt inclined, had it dealt with the matter initially, to come to a different conclusion, would hardly justify interference in revision, when there was no illegality. 15. In Pandurang Dhoni Chougule Vs. Maruti Hari Jadhav, AIR 1966 SC 153 , the Supreme Court held that the error of construction would not amount to excess of jurisdiction. It has further been found in this case that though the construction of a document of title is a point of law, it has no relation to the jurisdiction of the court putting on the construction. It is thus clear that the High Court can interfere only when the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the court to try the dispute itself. In this view of the matter, even if the interpretation placed was found to be incorrect, this Court cannot interfere u/s 115 Code of Civil Procedure. 16. It is thus clear that the High Court can interfere only when the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the court to try the dispute itself. In this view of the matter, even if the interpretation placed was found to be incorrect, this Court cannot interfere u/s 115 Code of Civil Procedure. 16. I do not find any merit in the submission of the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff that the Additional District Judge had no jurisdiction to interfere with the interpretation of the document placed by the Judge Small Causes. Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act empowers a court to examine the decree or order and find out whether the same was according to law. The expression “according to law” implies a right on points of law. The object of the section is to enable the court dealing with a revision u/s 25 to see that there has been no miscarriage of justice and that the decision was according to law. It is settled that the interpretation of a document is a question of law and if therefore, in a revision filed u/s 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act it is found that the interpretation placed by the Judge Small Causes was erroneous, the court will have ample jurisdiction u/s 25 to correct it. 17. There may be some substance in the argument of the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff that the court below wrongly held that since the cause of action to file a suit for ejectment had accrued under the old Act, the same could not be availed by the Plaintiff after the enforcement of the new Act. It is, however, not necessary to go into this question inasmuch as the decision of the first question itself is conclusive of the controversy. But, I wish to point out that the expression “cause of action” has been tersely defined in Mulla's CPC thus: Cause of action means every fact which if traversed, it would be necessary for the Plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. 18. But, I wish to point out that the expression “cause of action” has been tersely defined in Mulla's CPC thus: Cause of action means every fact which if traversed, it would be necessary for the Plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. 18. The grounds of eviction do not constitute a necessary part of cause of action for eviction of a tenant from an accommodation because even if untraversed, the Plaintiff is still not entitled to succeed unless one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 20 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 are proved to exist. Section 20 puts a bar to the institution of a suit for eviction of a tenant. It does not confer a cause of action, to bring a suit for ejectment. The cause of action in a suit filed by a landlord against a tenant is not default, but it is determination of the tenancy by a notice to quit. The default is only one of the grounds which entitles a court to pass a decree for eviction against a tenant. That being so, the court below erred in thinking that since the cause of action had accrued under the old Act, the same could not be availed under the new Act. As already observed, the ground for eviction stated in Clauses (b) and (c) could not be the cause of action. 19. For these reasons, the revision fails and is dismissed with cost.