Judgment M. P. Varma, J. 1. This revision has been filed against an order dated 13-9-1977, passed by Shri Ambujakshya Tripathi, Sessions Judge, Purnea, by which he has set aside the earlier order dated 18-8-1977, passed by Sri Pradhan uma Kant, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Purnea. To appreciate the paints involved, it is necessary to put, in brief the facts of the case, which are as follows :- 2. On 27-2-1977, the petitioner lodged an informition at Kasba police station against the opposite party nos.2 to 4 and some others unknown alleging therein that in the evening at about 7.30 p. m. the opposite party along with 14 persons variously armed came to the rented house of the petitioner entered into the two rooms which were in occupation of the petitioners and took forcible possession thereof and also removed articles worth Rs.7,000/-. The police drew up an F. I. R. , and after instituting a case, took up investigation and came to the place of occurrence locked up the two rooms forcibly occupied by the members of the opposite party and took them into custody, but later they were released on bail. It is stated that the police, thereafter, on approach by the members of the opposite party unlocked the rooms and put them in possession thereof. The petitioner-informant challenged the action of the police and filed an application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, purnea, with a prayer for making over the possess/on of the two rooms to him. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shri Pradhan Uma Kant gave notice to the accused-opposite party, called for a report from the police, and after hearing the parties struck down the earlier action of the police and by his order dated 18-8-77 directed that the possession of the two rooms be restored to the informant-petitioner. The concluding portion of the order runs as follows :- "however my this order will be without prejudice to any right or interest of any parties to the rooms in question. I accordingly direct the officer-in-charge of Kasba police station to deliver the possession of the rooms for the informant petitioner Abdul Wahab. " The opposite-party preferred revision before Shri Ambujakshya Tripathi, sessions Judge, Purnea. The learned Judge as aforesaid by his order dated 13-9-1977 set aside the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. I accordingly direct the officer-in-charge of Kasba police station to deliver the possession of the rooms for the informant petitioner Abdul Wahab. " The opposite-party preferred revision before Shri Ambujakshya Tripathi, sessions Judge, Purnea. The learned Judge as aforesaid by his order dated 13-9-1977 set aside the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. It is against this order that the informant Abdul Wahab has now come in the revision to this court. 3. Shri Parmeshwar Prasad Sinha, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has raised two questions for consideration by this Court. Firstly, that the earlier order dated 18-8-1977 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate was an interlocutory one and revision against the same was not competent and maintainable before the Sessions Judge ; secondly, the learned Sessions Judge committed error in telling that the provision laid down under section 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate of dealing with immoveable property. Sri Parmeshwar Prasad, Advocate, at the Bar contends that the word property in section 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure includes both moveable and immoveable, and its meaning cannot be confined to only moveable property. 4. I would first like to take up whether the provisions enumerated under section 457, Criminal Procedure Code refers to immovable property as well. Sec.457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with the marginal headnotes reads as follows :- "procedure by police upon seizure of property.- (1) Whenever the seizure of property by any police officer is reported to a magistrate under the provisions of this Code, and such property is not produced before a Criminal Court during an enquiry or trial, the Magistrate may make such order as he thinks fit respecting the disposal of such property or the delivery of such property to the person entitled to the possession thereof, or if such person cannot be ascertained, respecting the custody and production of such property. (2) If the person so entitled is known, the Magistrate may order the property to be delivered to him on such conditions (if any) as the Magistrate thinks fit and if such person is unknown, the magistrate may detain it and shall, in such case, issue a proclamation specifying the articles of which such property consists, and requiring any person who may have a claim thereto, to appear before him and establish his claim within six months from the date of such proclamation. " Shri P. P. Sinha, Advocate contends that since there is no qualifying word attached to the word property used in the section, there does not appear to have any justification to restrict its meaning only to movable property. It has been urged that there are specific provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure for disposal of movable property, at two successive stages, disposal of property pending trial and even after conclusion of the trial ; and in case of immovable the criminal court has been empowered under section 456 to deal with only after conclusion of the trial, and there being no such correspondence provision for disposal of immovable property pending trial, section 457 of the Code shall apply to such cases. 5 The provisions laid down under Chapter XXXIV of the Code of criminal Procedure under the heading disposal of property relate to various stages of disposal of the property both movable and immoveable by a criminal court. It may be stated that section 451 of the Code applies in cases when any property is produced before any criminal court during enquiry or trial and the court may make such order as it thinks fit for proper custody of such property pending the conclusion of enquiry or trial and section 452 of the Code is applicable for disposal of such property when the trial concludes. Thus it is explicit that a court may order for custody and disposal of such property which is produced before any criminal court. Question arises whether a court can pass any such order with respect to property seized by the police but not produced before the court ; and to my mind, section 457, Criminal Procedure Code provides the answer to it. Question arises whether a court can pass any such order with respect to property seized by the police but not produced before the court ; and to my mind, section 457, Criminal Procedure Code provides the answer to it. Sec.457 says that whenever the seizure of the property by any police officer is reported to a Magistrate under the provision of this Code and such property is not produced before a criminal court during an enquiry or trial the Magistrate may make such order as he thinks fit respect ing the disposal of such property. I am, therefore, not inclined to accept the plea raised at the bar that section 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure confers jurisdiction on the judicial Magistrate for making orders for the disposal of properties, both movable and immovable. To my mind, the learned Magistrate under this provision of section 457, Criminal Procedure Code may make such order for disposal only with respect to such movable property which is reported to have been seized by the police, but not produced in court during an enquiry or trial. The marginal head-note makes the meaning all the more clear. The head-note reads as "procedure by police upon seizure of property" and this by any stretch of imagination can not be interpreted to mean that under this provision the police may lay a seize of immovable property as well true it is that the word property has not been qualified as being movable or immovable, but proviso (2) of section 457, Criminal Procedure Code can very well be safely interpreted that the word property mentioned in this section refers to and qualifies only movable property and nothing beyond The Proviso (2) of section 457, Criminal Procedure Code has already been referred above.5. We get now from the aforesaid provision that it provides two alter natives, in the first, the Magistrate may order the property to be delivered to a person so entitled is known, on such condition, as the Magistrate thinks fit and in the second, if the person is not known, the Magistrate may detain the property aud in such case he will issue a proclamation specifying the articles of which such property consists, and requiring any person who may have a claim thereto, to appear before him and establish his claim within the specified period. The word "article" used in proviso relates to such material articles to which the police or the court prepared a list and has been seized by the police. Therefore for all intents and purposes that the word property as used under section 457, Criminal Procedure Code restricts the meaning to movable property only. 6. Section 456 of the Code of Criminal Procedure confers power on the court to restore possession of immovable property when a person is convicted of an offence attended by criminal force or show of force or by criminal intimidation, and if, it appears to the court that, by such force or show of force or intimidation, any person has been dispossessed of any immovable property. But, I do not find any enabling provision in the Code for passing interim order for restoration of immovable property pending enquiry or trial. 7. In the circumstances referred to above, the revision must fail. There is no substance in the argument advanced by Sri Parmeshwar Prasad Sinha, advocate, at the Bar and his contention, therefore, is ruled out. The view which I have taken leads me to hold that the Chief Judicial Magistrate was in error in passing order for restoration of possession of the two rooms in favour of the petitioners who are accused in the court below. Sec.457 Criminal Procedure code does not confer any such power on the Chief Judicial Magistrate and the impugned order dated 18-8-77 must be held to be without jurisdiction and the learned Sessions Judge in revision before him rightly interferred with the order and set aside the same. This application is accordingly dismissed. Application dismissed.