JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - This is a plaintiff's second appeal arising out of a suit for a declaration to the effect that the plaintiff's purported removal from service is illegal, null and void, that the plaintiff continues to be in service of defendant No. 1, namely, the Union of India as an Inspector in the Central Excise Department. The plaintiff also prayed for recovery of Rs. 4519/28 with pendente lite and future salary with increments and allowances admissible to him. 2. Briefly stated, the facts relevant for the determination of the points urged before me are these. The plaintiff was employed in the Central Excise Department as an Inspector on 1-3-1945 and was confirmed on 1-10-1951. In 3.9.57, he was posted as an Inspector incharge of Saraswa range, district Saharanpur, where Sri Kishan Singh, Deputy Superintendent was his immediate superior. The relations between these two persons became strained for some reason. It is alleged that the said Sri Kishan Singh made some inquiries against the plaintiff on the basis of which the plaintiff was suspended by the Collector, Central Excise, Allahabad by an order dated 28-1-1958. Simultaneously, a charge-sheet was issued by the Collector to the plaintiff on 21-3-1958. An inquiry is alleged to have been held pursuant to the charge-sheet by the Assistant Collector (Vigilance) New Delhi, to whom the Collector is said to have delegated the task of the inquiry. On 27-6-1959, the plaintiff was removed from service. 3. The plaintiff appealed to the Central Board of Revenue, but it was rejected. Thereupon, the plaintiff filed a writ petition in this Court which was allowed on 18-4-1962 and the order dated 27-6-1959 was quashed on the ground that the plaintiff had not been given reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charges. The plaintiff was thereupon reinstated on 2-5-1926. The reinstatement was immediately followed by an order dated 3-5-1962 passed by the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) Central Excise, Allahabad. By this order, the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) directed suspension of the plaintiff with immediate effect purporting to exercise powers under sub-rule (1) of Rule 12 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957. Thereafter, a charge-sheet dated 14-5-1962 was issued by the same officer, namely, the Assistant Collector (Headquarters). By this order, the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) directed suspension of the plaintiff with immediate effect purporting to exercise powers under sub-rule (1) of Rule 12 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957. Thereafter, a charge-sheet dated 14-5-1962 was issued by the same officer, namely, the Assistant Collector (Headquarters). It was stated in the above charge-sheet signed by the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) that it was proposed to hold an inquiry against the plaintiff under Rule 15 of the aforesaid Rules. The charge-sheet contained three charges. The charge-sheet was served on the plaintiff on 23-5-62. Along with the charge-sheet, a statement of allegations on which the charges framed against the plaintiff were said to be based was also served on the plaintiff. 4. Broadly stated, the substance of three charges was as follows:- Charge No. 1 - It was alleged that the plaintiff had failed "to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to the duty as enjoined upon a Government servant under Rule 3 of the aforesaid Rules", inasmuch as he illegally extracted money from a tobacco grower, namely, Sri Abdullah from whom the plaintiff is alleged to have demanded Rs. 15/- which was ultimately reduced to Rs. 6/- which Sri Abdullah was said to have paid to the plaintiff. Charge No. 2 - The plaintiff was guilty of dishonest misappropriation of Government money realised by him in his capacity as a public servant from a tobacco grower, It was alleged that though he realised Rs. 80/-, he entered in the record the figure of Rs. 30/-only. Charge No. 3 - The plaintiff while functioning as Inspector in the Department "was guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his official duty". 5. This was followed by a departmental inquiry, which according to the plaintiff grossly violated the principles of natural justice as well as the provisions of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 and also Article 311 of the Constitution of India. Eventually, by an order dated 18-3-63 the petitioner was removed from service on the aforesaid grounds. Thereupon, the petitioner filed the present suit for the relief mentioned above. 6. Eventually, by an order dated 18-3-63 the petitioner was removed from service on the aforesaid grounds. Thereupon, the petitioner filed the present suit for the relief mentioned above. 6. In the plaint, the plaintiff challenged the validity of the order of removal passed against him, broadly on three grounds:- (1) The Department had no power or authority to proceed against the plaintiff de novo on the basis of the same charges and complaints after the High Court had quashed his order of removal dated 27-6-1959 passed on the previous occasion; (2) The Assistant Collector (Headquarters) had no jurisdiction to frame charges against the plaintiff. The plaintiff having been appointed by the Collector Central Excise, disciplinary action could be initiated only by the Collector Central Excise or an officer of equal rank. The Assistant Collector (Headquarters) being an officer lower in rank than the Collector Central Excise, was, therefore, not competent to initiate proceedings against the plaintiff; and (3) The inquiry held against the plaintiff on the charges was vitiated by reason of the plaintiff not having been afforded reasonable opportunity to defend himself and to show cause against the charges. There was, therefore, violation of the aforesaid Rules as well as Article 311 of the Constitution of India. 7. The suit was defended by the respondents. They denied the plaint allegations. It was asserted that the Department was fully authorised to start proceedings against the plaintiff, de novo; that the plaintiff was given adequate opportunity to show cause against the charge-sheet, and the proposed punishment, that the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) was competent to frame and issue a charge-sheet under Rule 15 (2) of the aforesaid Rules. 8. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed by the trial court.- 1. Whether after quashing the order of removal dated 27-6-59 by the Hon'ble High Court on 14-8-1962, defendant No. 3 was not competent to start de novo proceedings against the plaintiff as alleged in paras 12, 13, 15 and 30B of the plaint ? 2. Whether the order of the defendant No. 4 dated 14-5-1962 was illegal and beyond his competence as alleged in paras 14 and 30A of the plaint ? 3. Whether the subsequent enquiry against the plaintiff was illegal, ultra vires and void on the grounds alleged in paras 16 to 26 and 30-C to 30-K of the plaint ? 4. 2. Whether the order of the defendant No. 4 dated 14-5-1962 was illegal and beyond his competence as alleged in paras 14 and 30A of the plaint ? 3. Whether the subsequent enquiry against the plaintiff was illegal, ultra vires and void on the grounds alleged in paras 16 to 26 and 30-C to 30-K of the plaint ? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration claimed and a decree for Rs. 4519.28 ? 9. The trial court answered all the aforesaid issues against the plaintiff and dismissed the suit. 10. Aggrieved, the plaintiff appealed which also having been dismissed, he has filed this second appeal. 11. In the second appeal, learned counsel for the appellants submitted three points for my consideration, and these are;- (1) The Assistant Collector (Headquarters) was not the disciplinary authority in the case of the plaintiff, and was consequently not authorised to frame and issue the charge-sheet against the plaintiff. That being so, Rule 15 (2) of the aforesaid Rules has been violated. Consequently, the entire proceedings resulting in the removal of the plaintiff from service were null and void, having been initiated by an authority who was not competent in law to do so. (2) The plaintiff was denied reasonable opportunity to defend himself and thereby deprived of the guarantee enshrined in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India inasmuch as, (a) The plaintiff was not supplied the statements of witnesses on whose complaint charges were framed against the plaintiff, and who were subsequently examined at the inquiry with the result, the plaintiff could not effectively cross-examine these witnesses; (b) The complaint upon which the charges were framed was not supplied to the plaintiff, (c) The application of the plaintiff to inspect the record was disallowed by the Department on totally arbitrary and unjustifiable grounds. This refusal has seriously prejudiced the cause of the plaintiff and deprived (him) inevitably of the opportunity to defend himself effectively. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that none of the aforesaid grounds has any substance or is sustainable. 13. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at some length, I am clearly of the view that this appeal must succeed on each of the aforesaid three grounds. 14. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that none of the aforesaid grounds has any substance or is sustainable. 13. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at some length, I am clearly of the view that this appeal must succeed on each of the aforesaid three grounds. 14. Taking the first point first, the position is as follows:- In order to appreciate the submission of the charges it would be useful to notice and reproduce the relevant provisions of the Service Rules and Notifications having a bearing on the issue involved. Before I do that, I may point out that the plaintiff was admittedly appointed by the Collector Central Excise in the year 1945. Under the Notification issued under the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1932, being Notification No. F/9/19/30 Estt. dated 27-2-1932 as amended up to 1952 in regard to Inspectors and Supervisors of Central Excise Authorities, both the "appointing" as well as "disciplinary authority" was the Collector of Central Excise in respect of penalty of removal or dismissal. The appellate authority was the Central Board of Revenue. This was not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondents the aforesaid Rules of 1932 were replaced by the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957. These Rules would govern the case as the disciplinary proceedings were started and concluded against the plaintiff during the years 1962-63. Under the 1967 Rules also, a Notification was issued which has an important bearing on the controversy and it will be useful to reproduce it in its entirety; as regards Inspectors and Supervisors of the Central Excise Department :- Title of Service Appointing Authority Disciplinary Authority empowered to impose penalties Penalty that can be imposed Appellate Authority 1 2 3 4 5 2. Ministry of Finance (Department of Revenue) S.R.O. 612, Published in the Gasette of India, Extraordinary, S. 3, Part II, pages 777-781 (January and February, 1957). Extract Inspector, Supervisor of Central Excise Asstt. Collector (Hqrs.) where there is no Asstt. Collector (Hqrs.) the Collector. (i) Asst. Collector (Hqurs.) where there is no Asstt Collector (Hqrs.) (ii) Collector. (iii) Asstt. Collector Incharge Division All (i) to (iii) All Collector C.B.R. Collector. 15. The first question to be determined in this case is who was the "appointing authority" within the meaning of 1957 Rules in the case of the plaintiff. Collector (Hqrs.) the Collector. (i) Asst. Collector (Hqurs.) where there is no Asstt Collector (Hqrs.) (ii) Collector. (iii) Asstt. Collector Incharge Division All (i) to (iii) All Collector C.B.R. Collector. 15. The first question to be determined in this case is who was the "appointing authority" within the meaning of 1957 Rules in the case of the plaintiff. It was not disputed that the Collector Central Excise was the authority which actually appointed the plaintiff. However, the "appointing authority" has been defined under the aforesaid Rules 1957 which reads as follows:- "Interpretation.- In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires:- (a) 'Appointing Authority' in relation to a Government servant means- (i) the authority empowered to make appointments to the service of which the Government servant is for the time being a member or to the grade of the service in which the Government servant is for the time being included, or (ii) the authority empowered to make appointments to the post which the Government servant for the time being holds, or (iii) the authority which appointed the Government servant to such service, grade or post, as the case may be, or (iv) Where the Government servant having been a permanent member of any other service or having substantively held any other permanent post, has been in continuous employment of the Government, the authority which appointed him to that service or to any grade in that service or to that post, Whichever authority is the highest authority". It is now settled by a series of decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court and of other High Courts that an 'appointing authority' is not only the authority which actually appointed the Government servant, who is sought to be removed or dismissed or otherwise punished but might also be one who is empowered by statutory rules to make appointment to the post which the Government servant for the tune being holds. It was, therefore, permissible for the Government to nominate the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) as the authority to make appointment to the post, of Inspectors in the Central Excise Department. However, as R. 2 (a) itself lays down, for the purpose of determining in each case as to who is appointing authority, it will be necessary to find out, which amongst the four categories of authorities enumerated under Rule 2 (a) is the highest authority. However, as R. 2 (a) itself lays down, for the purpose of determining in each case as to who is appointing authority, it will be necessary to find out, which amongst the four categories of authorities enumerated under Rule 2 (a) is the highest authority. Assuming, therefore, that Assistant Collector (Headquarters) was by virtue of the Notification quoted above also an 'appointing authority' empowered to make appointments to the post of Inspectors, in view of the words "whichever authority is the highest authority" occurring in Rule 2 (a) the Collector as the authority which actually appointed the plaintiff would, be the "appointing authority" in the case of the plaintiff, inasmuch as the Collector Central Excise was indisputably "an authority" higher in rank than the Assistant Collector. Thus in the case of the plaintiff, it would be the Collector who would be regarded as the 'appointing authority' for the purpose not only of the application of these Rules to the present case, but also in the context of Art. 311 of the Constitution of India. 16. Having determined 'Appointing authority' in the case of the plaintiff, I not proceed to consider the question as the who was 'the disciplinary authority'. 17. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that in the case of the plaintiff, the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) was not and legally could not be treated as the 'disciplinary authority' because of the constitutional mandate embodied in Art. 311 (1) of the Constitution of India. He urged that the Collector being the appointing authority, no officer lower in rank could be regarded as 'disciplinary authority' in the case of the plaintiff. He relied on several decisions of the Supreme Court as well as other High Courts in support of this proposition. He submitted that even if the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) was nominated as the 'disciplinary authority' in respect of Inspectors under the Notification of 1957 mentioned above, he could not be the 'disciplinary authority' vis-a-vis the plaintiff in view of provisions of sub-rule (4) (a) of Rule 14 of the aforesaid Rules as well as the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution of India. He argued that to an Inspector appointed in the Central Excise Department prior to the coming into force of the Notification of 1957 quoted above, the said Notification would not apply and that such Inspectors would continue to be governed by the Notification of 1932. He argued that to an Inspector appointed in the Central Excise Department prior to the coming into force of the Notification of 1957 quoted above, the said Notification would not apply and that such Inspectors would continue to be governed by the Notification of 1932. 18. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted that the Notification of 1957 as well as the provision of R. 14 (2) (b) made it abundantly clear that the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) was the 'disciplinary authority' in the case of the plaintiff and the contentions of the appellant's counsel to the contrary are wrong. 19. In order to appreciate the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, it would be useful to reproduce here the relevant provisions of 1957 Rules. R. 2 (d) reads as follows:- "(d) 'Disciplinary Authority' in relation to the imposition of the penalty on a Government servant means the authority competent under these Rules to impose on him that penalty;" 20. It is, therefore, clear that the 'disciplinary authority' must be an authority who is competent under these Rules to impose on the Government servant, the penalty in regard to which disciplinary "proceedings are proposed to be taken against the Government servant concerned. Rule 13 of the said Rules lays down the various penalties which can be imposed on a Government servant. Clause (vi) of Rule 13 mentions removal from service as one of the penalties which can be imposed on a Government servant. Then comes the crucial Rule 14 which may be reproduced in its entirety; "14. Disciplinary Authorities. - (1) The President may impose any of the penalties specified in rule 13 on any Government servant. Clause (vi) of Rule 13 mentions removal from service as one of the penalties which can be imposed on a Government servant. Then comes the crucial Rule 14 which may be reproduced in its entirety; "14. Disciplinary Authorities. - (1) The President may impose any of the penalties specified in rule 13 on any Government servant. (2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-rule (1), but subject to the provisions of sub-rule (4), any of the penalties specified in rule 13 may be imposed on- (a) a member of a Central Civil Service other than the general Central Service, by the Appointing Authority or the authority specified in the Schedule in this behalf or by any other authority empowered in this behalf by a general or special order of the President; (b) a person appointed to a Central Civil Post, included in the General Central Service, by the authority specified in this behalf by a general or special order of the President or where no such order has been made, by the Appointing Authority or the authority specified in the Schedule in this behalf. (3) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (4) the power to impose any of the penalties specified in Rule 13 may also be exercised, in the case of a member of a Central Civil Service, Class III (other than the Central Secretariat Clerical Service), or a Central Civil Service, Class IV, (a) if he is serving in a Ministry or Department of the Government of India of India in that Ministry or Department; (b) if he is serving in any other office by the head of the office, except where the head of that office is lower in rank than the authority competent to impose the penalty under sub-rule (2). (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule,- (a) except where the penalty specified in clause (iv) of Rule 13 is imposed by the Comptroller and Auditor General on a member of the Indian Audit and Accounts service, no penalty specified in clauses (iv) to (vii) of that rule shall be imposed by any authority lower than the appointing authority. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this rule,- (a) except where the penalty specified in clause (iv) of Rule 13 is imposed by the Comptroller and Auditor General on a member of the Indian Audit and Accounts service, no penalty specified in clauses (iv) to (vii) of that rule shall be imposed by any authority lower than the appointing authority. (b) where a Government servant who is a member of a service other than the General Central Service or is substantively appointed to any civil post in the General Central Service, is temporarily appointed to any other service or post, and the authority which would have been competent under sub-rule (2) to impose upon him any of the penalties specified in clauses (iv) to (vii) of Rule 13, had he not been so appointed to such other service or post is not subordinate to the authority competent to impose any of the said penalties after such appointment, the latter authority shall not impose any such penalty except after consultation with the former Authority". Sub-rule 14 (2) aforesaid on which the learned counsel for the respondents relied refers to a general or special order of the President by which an officer may be authorised to impose penalty on a Government servant specified in Rule 13. The Notification of 1957 quoted above is such a general order of the President. However, sub-rule (2) of Rule 14 is subject to sub-rule (4) which mandates that no penalty specified in clauses (iv) to (vii) of Rule 13 shall be imposed by any authority lower in rank than the 'appointing authority'. In my judgment, therefore, in the case of Inspectors appointed by Collector prior to the coming into force of 1957 Notification, the said Notification would not apply and in the case of those Inspectors, it would be legitimate to assume that either there is no general or special order of the President nominating the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) as the Disciplinary Authority in the case of the Inspectors of Central Excise Department or that in the case of such. Inspectors, the Notification of 1932 would continue to apply. Inspectors, the Notification of 1932 would continue to apply. In either view of the matter inasmuch as the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) was not competent to impose the penalty of removal; on the plaintiff both in view of the provision of sub-rule (4) of Rule 14 and of Article 311 (1) of the Constitution of India, learned counsel for the appellants is right in submitting that the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) could not legally be regarded as the Disciplinary Authority in the case of the plaintiff. Both Rule 2 (d) as well as sub-rule (4) of Rule 14 in my judgment were plainly intended to give effect to the constitutional guarantee which is enshrined in Article 31.1 of the Constitution of India. Considering, therefore, the various provisions of 1957 Rules, in my view in the case of the plaintiff, the Collector of Central Excise as the Appointing Authority of the plaintiff was the Disciplinary Authority within the meaning of sub-rule (2) of Rule 15 of 1957 Rules. 21. Learned counsel for the appellants invited my attention to a number of cases (See AIR 1977 SC 747 ; Om Prakash v. Union of India, (1975) 2 Serv LR 226 (SC); (1973) 2 Serv LR 350 (Delhi); and another case at page 588 of the same Report AIR 1975 SC 1265 , State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Raj Mohammad (1971) 1 Serv LR 828 (FB) (Para 8) in support of his argument that must accept that construction of these various Rules which is consistent with the mandate contained in Article 311 of the Constitution of India and hold that Authority to be the "Disciplinary Authority" which was legally competent to impose the penalty of removal on the plaintiff. In my view, learned counsel for the appellants is right. In the case of Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Mirza Khasim Ali Beg ( AIR 1977 SC 747 Supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed as follows - "The expression 'competent authority' occurring in sub-section (2) of Section 116 of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 cannot, therefore, be considered in isolation apart from the rest of the provisions of the Act. It has to be read in conjunction with, construed and understood as having the same meaning as the expression "appropriate authority" contemplated by sub-section (1) of that section which in turn according to Article 311 (1) of the Constitution means the appointing authority or an authority equivalent to or co-ordinate in rank with the Appointing Authority. The Constitution being the transcendental law, the legislature by enacting Section 115 (7) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, took care to see that the constitutional guarantee enshrined in Article 311 (1) of the Constitution which was available to the civil servant before the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 was not destroyed or wiped away on their allotment to a new State. That the construction placed by us on the expression 'competent authority' is in consonance with the meaning and import of the word 'subordinate' occurring in Article 311 (1) of the Constitution of India is apparent from a catena of decisions." Following the above dictum of their ; Lordships if the Supreme Court, I hold that the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) was not the Disciplinary Authority, and he was, therefore, not competent to frame and issue the charge-sheet in question. The lower appellate court has found that the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) was the Authority which had framed and issued the charge-sheet in question. That finding was not questioned before me in second appeal by the learned counsel for the respondents. Indeed, the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) has in his order suspending the plaintiff asserted that he was doing so in the exercise of the power vested in him under sub-r. (1) of R. 12 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957. He has also issued the charge-sheet purporting to exercise power under sub-rule (2) of R. 15 of the aforesaid Rules. 22. That being so, it is clear that the Collector, who in my judgment was the Disciplinary Authority did not frame charges and initiate proceedings against the plaintiff. These things were done by the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) who was not competent to do so. That the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) was not competent to take disciplinary action against the plaintiff is also recognised by the Central Board of Revenue. 23. These things were done by the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) who was not competent to do so. That the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) was not competent to take disciplinary action against the plaintiff is also recognised by the Central Board of Revenue. 23. Learned counsel for the appellant invited my attention to a letter which was written by the Collector Central Excise, Allahabad to the Central Board of Revenue seeking clarification on the question whether in regard to Inspectors appointed by the Collector, Central Excise before coming into force of 1957 Rules, the Assistant Collector (Headquarters) was competent to impose any of the penalties specified in, clauses (iv) to (vii) of Rule 13 of the 1957 Rules. The reply of the Central. Board of Revenue was as follows;- No. V. 500/S/51(Custom & Central Excise) Directorate of Inspection (Vigilance Wing) "From Shri B.B. Barman, Director of Inspection, Customs and Central Excise, New Delhi To, The Collector of Central Excise, Allahabad. New Delhi, the 16th April 1957. Sir, C.C.S. (C.C.A. Rules, 1957 -Interpretation of Rule 2) A copy of letter C. No. II-7 (i) Secret/57/1690 dated the 28th March, 1957 from the Collector of Central Excise, Delhi to the Board and Board's reply F. No. 19/28/57-AD. V dated 4-4-1957 are enclosed for your information and guidance. 2. The Assistant Collector (Headquarters) is not competent to impose any of the penalties specified in clauses (iv) to (vii) of Rule 13 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957 on persons who were appointed by the Collector in the past. This clarification may kindly be brought to the notice of all officers who are now appointing authorities in respect of posts to which the appointing authority was formerly an officer higher in rank than themselves. Yours faithfully, Sd/- B.B. Barman, Director of Inspection, Customs and Central Excise,' 24. That being so, the entire proceedings culminating in the order of removal of the plaintiff were wholly without jurisdiction and unauthorised. The plaintiff was, therefore, clearly entitled to the declaration sought by him and, the courts below were wrong in dismissing the suit. 25. I shall now take up the second point urged on behalf of the appellant. That being so, the entire proceedings culminating in the order of removal of the plaintiff were wholly without jurisdiction and unauthorised. The plaintiff was, therefore, clearly entitled to the declaration sought by him and, the courts below were wrong in dismissing the suit. 25. I shall now take up the second point urged on behalf of the appellant. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in order to enable the plaintiff effectively (to) cross-examine the witnesses examined on behalf of the Department, the plaintiff ought to have been supplied with full statements of witnesses recorded before the charge-sheet was served so that the plaintiff could confront those witnesses when examined subsequently at the inquiry with their previous statements. On the same ground, learned counsel contended, the plaintiff was also entitled to get a copy of the complaint. 26. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand urged that the only grievance of the plaintiff as set out in the plaint was that the plaintiff had not been supplied with the list of witnesses who were proposed to be examined on behalf of the Department. Learned counsel contended that in the present case, the charge-sheet as well as memo of charges submitted therewith to the plaintiff complied with the letter and spirit of sub-rule (2) of R. 15. 27. Having heard learned counsel for the plaintiff, I am clearly of the view that the plaintiff was denied reasonable opportunity to defend himself against the charges framed against him. The lower appellate court has disposed of the entire grievance of the plaintiff on the short ground that the memo of charges clearly contained the names of the persons on whose statements or complaints, the charges were framed and who were going to be examined as witnesses to prove various charges against the plaintiff. The lower appellate court contented itself with the investigation of the question whether formalities of sub-rule (2) of Rule 15 had been complied with. It did not consider the further question whether the plaintiff had been denied the guarantee, enbodied in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. The lower appellate court contented itself with the investigation of the question whether formalities of sub-rule (2) of Rule 15 had been complied with. It did not consider the further question whether the plaintiff had been denied the guarantee, enbodied in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. Assuming that technically the requirements of Rule 15 sub-rule (2) had been complied with in that the plain-tiff had been supplied along with the charges a statement of allegations on which the charges were based, and that even the names of the witnesses could be found out from the memorandum of charges, the provisions of sub-Art. (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution of India had still to be adhered to. 28. Learned counsel for the respondents is not right in saying that the plaintiff's only grievance was that he had not been supplied with the list of witnesses. The plaintiff had expressly asserted that he "had not been given a reasonable opportunity of defence as contemplated in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution of India." In my view, the plaintiff had laid sufficient foundation in the plaint for investigation of a complaint that there has been an in-fraction of the plaintiff's right guaranteed under Article 311 (2) on account of his not having been supplied with the previous statements of the witnesses and the complaint on the basis of which proceedings were initiated against the plaintiff. The lower appellate court thus totally omitted to consider this vital part of the case, namely, whether failure of the Department to supply statements of witnesses to the plaintiff did not prejudice the plaintiff in his defence, in that he could not effectively cross-examine those witnesses. 29. Learnel counsel for the appellants invited my attention to a number of decisions (See AIR 1961 SC 1623 Paras 6, 9 and 10; AIR 1963 SC 1719 Para 4, 1970 Lab IC 53 (Pat) (Para 4); AIR 1959 SC 1111 (Paras 4 to 7); (1967)1 Serv LR 759 (SC) at p. 765; AIR 1974 SC 2335 ) in support of his submission that a Government servant against whom disciplinary proceedings are being taken must be supplied with the copies of the statements of witnesses examined at the preliminary inquiry in order to enable the Government servant to cross-examine those witnesses effectively at the regular inquiry. The decisions quoted above do lend support to the appellant's submission. The decisions quoted above do lend support to the appellant's submission. In the case Triloki Nath v. Union of India reported in 1967 (1) Serv LR 759 (SC) (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as follows at p. 765:- "Therefore in our view the failure of the inquiry officer to furnish the appellant with copies of the documents such as first information reports and the statements recorded at Shedipura House during investigation, must be held to have caused prejudice to the appellant in making his defence at the inquiry. The inquiry made must, in these circumstances, be regarded as one in violation not only of Rule 55 but also of Article 311 (2)." Again in the case of State of Punjab v. Bhagat Ram reported in AIR 1974 SC 2335 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that it is unjust and unfair to deny the Government servant copies of the statements of witnesses examined during investigation and produced at the inquiry in support of the charges levelled against the Government servant. It was further held that a synopsis does not satisfy the requirements of giving the Government servant a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken, and that though the Government servant is given an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, unless the statements are given to him, he will not be able to have an effective and useful cross-examination. In my judgment the dicta laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the cases cited above go the whole length in support of the plaintiff's contention. The plaintiff was clearly denied a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as a result of the failure of the Department to supply to the plaintiff copies of the statements of witnesses examined during preliminary investigation as well as of the complaint which was the basis of initiation of proceedings against the appellant. The courts below have erred in holding otherwise. Both the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant under the second point mentioned above are, therefore, well founded. 30. I shall next take up the last point urged on behalf of the appellant. 31. The plaintiff had made an application for inspection of the record. In that application, the plaintiff had given particulars of the various documents which he wished to inspect. 30. I shall next take up the last point urged on behalf of the appellant. 31. The plaintiff had made an application for inspection of the record. In that application, the plaintiff had given particulars of the various documents which he wished to inspect. Among the documents which he wished to inspect was the original complaint of Shri Abdullah or any other person who might have made complaint against the plaintiff which formed the basis of the action which was eventually commenced against the plaintiff. The plaintiff also asked for copies of the statements of the witnesses. In addition, the plaintiff asked for various other documents. The plaintiff also took care to specify against those documents the charges in connection with which he wished to inspect, the record and take notes thereof. The Assistant Collector permitted inspection of some of the documents but refused inspection of various others. The refusal is contained in the application dated 23-6-1962 (vide paper No. 29A Ex. 50). The plaintiff was denied inspection of the complaint of Sri Abdullah on the ground "It is the same as his statement dated 25-7-1957". In regard to various other documents the reason disclosed was that they had no bearing in the case. 32. As regards the preliminary inquiry report, the refusal was on the ground, "It is confidential in nature". A perusal of the said letter dated 23-6-396-2. shows that the grounds disclosed for refusal of the inspection, or taking extracts of the papers on the record were entirely unjustified and whimsical. The complaint of Sri Abdullah should certainly have been allowed to be extracted, if a copy could not be given to the plaintiff. It is difficult to comprehend what could possibly have been the objection or prejudice to the Department by letting the appellant have a copy of the same. The plaintiff could have demonstrated that the complaint was very different from the subsequent statement of Sri Abdullah. 33. Whether a particular document had bearing on or relevance to the issues involved could not be decided solely and unilaterally by the Department. A perusal of list of documents in respect of which inspection was refused would show that the documents were relevant and the Department was entirely unjustified in refusing inspection of the same. Even the claim that the inquiry report was confidential does not appear to be convincing. A perusal of list of documents in respect of which inspection was refused would show that the documents were relevant and the Department was entirely unjustified in refusing inspection of the same. Even the claim that the inquiry report was confidential does not appear to be convincing. Learned counsel' invited my attention to a recent decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in which a claim that a certain material relied on by the Government was a privileged document was not recognised by the Supreme Court. It was held that such a claim cannot stand in the way of the guarantee of reasonable opportunity being afforded to the Government servant embodied in Art. 311 of the Constitution of India, (See AIR 1977 SC 241 Para 36). It is, therefore, clear that inspection of the record claimed by the plaintiff has been denied by the Department on unsustainable, improper and flimsy grounds. The plaintiff's grievance, therefore, that he has been denied reasonable opportunity in consequence of refusal of the Department to allow inspection appears to be justified. 34. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that the plaintiff was allowed inspection of a large number of documents and that he has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the refusal of the Department to allow inspection of other documents. Learned counsel contended that the lower appellate court was justified in recording a finding that the plaintiff was not prejudiced in anyway. I do not agree. The plaintiff was refused inspection of such important documents as the complaint itself. The plaintiff was also denied inspection of other documents on the supposed ground that they were not relevant. In my judgment refusal to allow inspection of complaint was A serious omission and the prejudice is inherent and inevitable. The learned counsel for the appellant was right in pointing out the refusal has affected the right of the plaintiff to cross-examine the witnesses who appeared in the Department. There is, therefore, substance in the third point too, urged on behalf of the appellant. 35. Learned counsel for the respondents also urged a point which was not taken in the courts below. Learned counsel contended that the suit of the plaintiff was not maintainable inasmuch as the plaintiff had a remedy by way of a Departmental appeal. There is, therefore, substance in the third point too, urged on behalf of the appellant. 35. Learned counsel for the respondents also urged a point which was not taken in the courts below. Learned counsel contended that the suit of the plaintiff was not maintainable inasmuch as the plaintiff had a remedy by way of a Departmental appeal. In support, learned counsel placed reliance on two decisions, namely, AIR 1969 SC 78 at p. 89 and AIR 1974 All 99 at p. 102. In my view, the submission has no substance. Firstly, the respondents ought ; not to be permitted to raise this objection for the first time after the suit has gone on for more than fourteen years. In any case, learned counsel for the respondents has failed to point out any bar to the maintainability of the suit, whether express or implied. The plaintiff has filed the present suit on the ground of violation of Art. 311 of the Constitution among other provisions of law. It is too late in the day to contend that such a suit is not maintainable. 36. For the reasons stated above, this appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgments and decrees passed by the courts below are set aside. The plaintiff's suit is decreed for the reliefs (b) and (c) claimed in the suit with costs throughout.