JUDGMENT : K.C. AGARWAL, J. 1. In view of a conflict between the two judgments given in Faqir Singh vs. Bhim Singh, 1978 AWC 608 and Second Appeal No. 1112 of 1956 Ratan Singh vs. Afli Singh decided on 10th March, 1972, brother Deoki Nandan, J. referred the present case for deciding whether the Civil Court may even alter traditional boundary of a village as fixed at the latest settlement. 2. For appreciating the point we may refer to the facts. The Plaintiff-Appellants filed suit No. 54 of 1964 in the court of Munsif, Pauri Garhwal. This suit has been filed in representative capacity on behalf of the residents of village Peera against the residents of the adjoining village Khairpani. The dispute relates to two different plots of land. One of them lies in the north of the village Khairpani and the other in the south. Disputing the correctness of the boundary demarcation of the Ibbot-son Settlement, the Plaintiffs sought the relief of declaration that the aforesaid two plots were situated within the boundary of their village. 3. The suit was contested by the Defendants, who are the residents of village Khairpani. The Defendants claimed that the boundary demarcated in the Ibbotson Settlement is correct and that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit for declaration filed by the Plaintiffs. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed several issues, one of the issues was relating to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The trial court dismissed the suit. In appeal, the only question raised by the Plaintiffs was whether the two pieces of lands in dispute lie within the boundary of village Peera? If not, have the residents of that village got a customary right of Gauchar, fuel etc. over those lands? Its effect? 5. Agreeing with the trial court, the lower appellate court found that the two areas of land in dispute did not lie within the boundaries of village Peera and that the residents of the village had no customary right of Gauchar etc. of the said land. On these findings, the appeal was dismissed by the lower appellate court. Against the aforesaid judgment, the present second appeal was filed. 6. In the second appeal, the question that was argued before the learned single Judge was about the maintainability of the suit in the Civil Court. of the said land. On these findings, the appeal was dismissed by the lower appellate court. Against the aforesaid judgment, the present second appeal was filed. 6. In the second appeal, the question that was argued before the learned single Judge was about the maintainability of the suit in the Civil Court. The argument raised was that the jurisdiction of re-determining the traditional boundaries of any village as settled by the latest settlement does not lie with the Civil Courts. According to the Defendants u/s 13 of the Kumaun Nayabad and Waste Land Act, 1948, jurisdiction of the Civil Court is confined to interpret traditional boundary of a village as fixed by latest settlement in force. The Civil Court is empowered to decide the rights of a party on the basis of the settlement entries but cannot examine the Correctness of the traditional boundary of a village itself and take a view different from to that taken by the revenue authorities in preparing the settlement papers. 7. In Faqir Singh's case (supra) Hon'ble Deokinandan, J. found that the provisions of Section 13 is limited to a suit for declaration or injunction on the basis of the traditional boundaries as defined in the latest Settlement or revision of the records in the village. The Civil Court could not entertain a suit which seeks declaration of the traditional boundary. In Ratan Singh's case, however, Hon'ble K.N. Srivastava, J. had taken a different view. Interpreting Section 13 of the aforesaid Act, K.N. Srivastava, J. found that a suit for declaration of traditional boundary was maintainable before a Civil Court. 8. For appreciating the points involved, we may make a brief reference of the Kumaun Nayabad and Waste Land Act, 1948. This Act had been passed in 1948. Whereas it is expedient to amend the law relating to the cultivation and use of unmeasured lands in the hill pattis of the Kumaun Division. 9. Section 3(10) of the aforesaid Act defines the expression traditional boundary as under: "traditional boundary" means the boundary of a village defined at Mr. Trails Settlement of 1923 (Sambat 1880) or as established in 1939 (Sambat 1896) subject to any subsequent rectification by order of a Settlement or Record Officer or by a judicial decision. The other relevant provision is Section 13. It lays down that: Suits relating to traditional boundaries and easementary rights. Trails Settlement of 1923 (Sambat 1880) or as established in 1939 (Sambat 1896) subject to any subsequent rectification by order of a Settlement or Record Officer or by a judicial decision. The other relevant provision is Section 13. It lays down that: Suits relating to traditional boundaries and easementary rights. A suit may be filed in a Civil Court for a declaration of injunction or for both:- (a) in respect of the traditional boundary of a village. (b) in respect of easement rights in unmeasured land. 10. At the outset, we may observe that jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is all embracing except to the extent it is excluded by an express provision of law or by clear intendment arising from such a law. This is the purport of Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 9 has been a subject matter of Interpretation in various cases. In Dhula Bhai vs. State of M.P. 1969 SC 78, the Supreme Court discussed the scope of Section 9 from the CPC and also the question as to the effect of a finality given to the orders of the special tribunals. After having discussed a large number of cases, the Supreme Court laid down principles regarding exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Court. 11. In the instant case, reliance had been placed on Section 13. We have already quoted Section 13 above. It would be relevant to point out that Section 13 instead of putting a bar of the jurisdiction of this Court, provides that a civil suit may be filed for a declaration or injunction in respect of traditional boundary of a village. The words important are 'relating to' used in the head note in respect of used in Clause (a) of Section 13. The words 'relating to' are the words of comprehensiveness which might both have a direct as well as the indirect significance depending on the context. They are not words of restrictive contents and are not to be so construed. That being so, it appears to us that the expression was comprehensive enough to include a suit for declaration and relating to the correctness of traditional boundaries as well. Since the words have not been used restricting the right to sue, they cannot be interpreted to mean that the suit only on the basis of the entries made in the settlement papers could be filed. 12. Since the words have not been used restricting the right to sue, they cannot be interpreted to mean that the suit only on the basis of the entries made in the settlement papers could be filed. 12. The words in respect of also support the above view. These words are of wide amplitude. They do not confine the maintainability of the suit only in respect of the rights based on the entries made in the settlement papers treating those papers as final and correct. 13. The words in respect of admit of a wide connotation. Lord Greene Mr. in Cunard's Trustees vs. Inland Revenue Commissioner, (1946) LT 174, calls them colourless words. In S.S. Light Railway Co. Ltd. vs. Upper Doab Sugar Mills Ltd. AIR 1960 SC 695 , interpreting these words in connection with Section 3(14) of the Railways Act, held that they are wide. The view was taken in Union of India vs. Vijay Chand, AIR 1978 SC 1302. Under this clause, a suit for a declaration and injunction in respect of the traditional boundary of a village can be filed. This would mean that the correctness of the traditional boundaries of a village can also be challenged by means of a suit. 14. It may be true that the question whether a dispute lay within a traditional boundary of one village or the other is plainly a question of fact which can be decided or resolved by survey. But there is no reason to think that if a mistake is made in the course of settlement, the civil court would not be empowered to correct the same by adopting such methods as may be prescribed under the law. There is no denying that strong presumption of correctness attaches to settlement entries. This proposition would apply with greater force to the settlement entries demarcating the boundaries of villages, but that is no ground to hold that a civil suit is not maintainable. The Civil Court would be obliged to take into account the presumption of correctness of the settlement entries demarcating the traditional boundaries and disturb the same only when strong and compelling reasons are found to do so. 15. For the purposes of applying the bar, the law requires an expression made to that effect. There is no such provision in the Act. 15. For the purposes of applying the bar, the law requires an expression made to that effect. There is no such provision in the Act. Since there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the principal Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary. In the instant case, we are unable to find, which could be said as laying down implied bar to the entertainment of the suit. In fact Section 13 gives a right to challenge the correctness of traditional boundaries as may have been suited by the revenue authorities. 16. In this view of the matter, we are unable to agree with the view taken by Deoki Nandan, J. in Faquir Singh vs. Bhim Singh, 1978 AWC 608 . 17. A similar controversy relating to the maintainability of the suit came up for decision before a Division Bench in Second Appeal No. 158 of 1945 Devi Singh vs. Kumar Singh decided on 11.2.1949. The Division Bench held that the suit was maintainable. It is true that there is not much of discussion in this decision, but the said decision of the Division Bench is binding on us. 18. Let the papers of this case be sent to the learned single Judge with the aforesaid answer.