ORDER Satish Chandra, C.J. -This is a plaintiffs application in revision. It arises out of a suit for ejectment of the defendant-tenant on the ground that the defendant has failed to pay the arrears of rent for more than three months in spite of service of notice of demand. 2. The suit was contested on the ground that the defendant was not in arrears. The trial court decreed the suit. On revision, the decree was set aside and the suit was dismissed. 3. The facts found are that the parties entered into an agreement dated February 4, 1964, whereby the defendant took the accommodation in dispute on rent of Rs. 6/- per month. The agreement was a registered one. Under it the tenancy was to be for five years. The defendant paid a sum of Rs. 180/- to the plaintiff. For this the agreement provided that it will represent rent for the last 2V2 years of the tenancy. The defendant did not pay the rent from August 1965 to August 1966. The plaintiff-landlord served a notice of demand on Dec. 28, 1966. The notice was served on Dec. 30, 1966, but, in spite of it, the defendant did not make any payment. It has further been found that the defendant did pay the rent due up to July, 1965. 4. The trial court found that since the deposit of Rs. 180/- was earmarked as payment of rent for the last 2V2 years, the defendant could not refuse to pay rent for the first 2V2 years of the tenancy as and when it fell due. Since he did not pay the rent which was due and which was demanded in spite of the service of notice of demand, he committed default and was liable to ejectment. The lower appellate court, however, held that the provision in the agreement that the advance of Rs. 180/- shall be liable to be adjusted towards the rent for the last 2V2 years was opposed to public policy. Since the defendant had already paid as an advance a sum of money which was in excess of the amount claimed as rent in the present suit, the defendant, was not a defaulter. 180/- shall be liable to be adjusted towards the rent for the last 2V2 years was opposed to public policy. Since the defendant had already paid as an advance a sum of money which was in excess of the amount claimed as rent in the present suit, the defendant, was not a defaulter. Reliance was placed upon Murlidhar Agarwal v. Ram Agyan Singh (1975 All LJ 270 (271)) for the proposition that an agreement which is opposed to a statutory provision which is based on public policy, was not binding between the parties. 5. The agreement between the parties was that the tenancy will be month to month and will extend for a term of five years. The tenant paid Rs. 180/- in advance under an agreement that the same will be adjusted towards rent payable for the last 2V2 years of the period of tenancy. The question is whether this latter clause offends any provision in the Rent Control Act of 1947 which, in its turn, was based on public policy, with the result that the parties could not contract themselves out of the statutory provision. 6. Reliance was placed upon S. 3 of the Rent Control Act of 1947. Section 3 aforesaid afforded protection to tenants against ejectment except on grounds mentioned in that Section. Section 3 has no relevance to an agreement as to the mode of payment of rent. No part of that section says anything either way on the mode of payment. No other provision in the Rent Control Act of 1947 was brought to my notice which prohibits payment of advance rent for a specific period agreed to between the parties. The Rent Control Act of 1947 did contain a prohibition against charging exorbitant rent, but no one says in the present case that Rs. 6/- per month was an illegal exaction as rent. There being no statutory provision in respect of the mode of payment of rent, the advance of Rs. 180/- made by the defendant om the condition that it will be adjustable towards the rent payable for the last half of the tenancy, was valid, it was lawful for the parties to enter into such an agreement. The fact that the defendant continued to pay monthly rent from March 1964 till July 1965 shows that the parties acted upon this clause of the agreement. 7. The fact that the defendant continued to pay monthly rent from March 1964 till July 1965 shows that the parties acted upon this clause of the agreement. 7. The case of Murlidhar Agarwal v. Ram Agyan Singh (1975 All LJ 270 (271) (SC)) is distinguishable. There the parties had entered into an agreement that the tenancy would not be governed by the provisions of the Rent Control Act of 1947. The Supreme Court held that Section 3 which afforded protection to the tenants against ejectment is based on public policy and hence the tenant could not, in law, waive its benefit. In the present case the tenant by entering into the aforesaid agreement, did not purport to waive any protection that the Rent Control Act may have conferred on tenants. This clause of the agreement is confined to an area left open by the Rent Control Act for contractual stipulations. 8. Since the defendant had agreed that the advance shall be adjustable towards the last half of the period of tenancy, he could not legitimately insist that it be utilised in payment of rent for the first half of the tenancy period. In fact, he had not paid rent for the period August, 1965 to August, 1966. He did not comply with the notice of demand served on him. He was hence a defaulter within the meaning of Clause (a) of Section 3 of the Rent Control Act of 1947. The trial court correctly decreed the suit on this ground. 9. The trial court further found that the defendant had made material alterations which substantially diminished its value and so the defendant was liable to ejectment under clause (c) of Section 3 of the Rent Control Act of 1947. This finding was reversed by the lower appellate court. It was held that the constructions made by the defendants were temporary and did not diminish the value of the house. This finding of fact does not disclose any jurisdictional defect or error. The revision is liable to succeed on the first point. 10. In the result, the revision succeeds and is allowed. The decree passed by the lower appellate court is set aside and that of the trial court is re: with costs throughout.