ORDER S.D. Agarwala, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the order of the Additional District Judge, Kanpur, dated 20th of July 1977. Briefly, the relevant facts giving rise to the present controversy are as follows: - The property in dispute is house No. 52/24,' Nayaganj, Kanpur. Initially one M/s. Kishan Chand Gulab Chand was the tenant of the said premises. Thereafter according to the case of the contesting parties, M/s. Gupta Ayurvedic Pharmacy respondent No. 1 came into possession of the premises. In paragraph 4 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 in this Court it is admitted that the accommodation in dispute was used for residential purposes by the employees of M/s. Gupta Ayurvedic Pharmacy. 2. Thereafter an application was made for allotment of the premises on the ground that the property should be deemed to be vacant under the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972, hereinafter referred as the Act. The Inspector visited the spot and oh 31st December 1973, he submitted his report, under Rule 8 of the Rules framed under the Act, hereinafter referred to as the Rules. Thereafter proceedings in respect of declaration of vacancy started. Respondent No. 1, M/s. Gupta Ayurvedic Pharmacy filed objections to the vacancy report submitted by the inspector. The proceedings went on in this connection and on 31st July 1975 the landlord of the premises Munni Lal Gupta also gave a statement before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. After hearing respondent No. 1 the alleged occupant of the premises in dispute and respondent No. 2, the landlord, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer declared the property as vacant on 2nd January 1976. After declaration of vacancy the Rent Control and Eviction Officer pasted this notice on the notice-board and waited for a month and half and thereafter on 18th February 1976 allotted the premises in favour of the petitioner Roshan Lal Agarwal. Against the allotment order, an appeal was filed by respondent No. 1 before the Additional District Judge, Kanpur. The appeal was allowed by the Additional District Judge, Kanpur on 20th July 1977 and the order of allotment passed in favour of the petitioner was set aside. Against the allotment order, an appeal was filed by respondent No. 1 before the Additional District Judge, Kanpur. The appeal was allowed by the Additional District Judge, Kanpur on 20th July 1977 and the order of allotment passed in favour of the petitioner was set aside. The petitioner aggrieved by the said decision cancelling his allotment Order has filed the present petition in this court challenging the order dated 20th July 1977. By the impugned order the court held that legally the house fell vacant under Sec. 12 (3) of the Act, but set aside the allotment order on the sole ground that there was non-compliance of Rule 8 (2) of the rules inasmuch as the inspection was not done in the presence of the landlord. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the view taken by the appellate court that there was non-compliance with Rule 8 (2) of the Rules is manifestly erroneous. His submission is that Rule 8 (2) of the Rules is only directory and not mandatory. 4. Sri A. N. Srivastava, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 has supported the order on the ground that the Rule 8 (2) of the rules is mandatory and as such the order passed by the appellate court is valid in law. 5. In order to decide the controversy between the parties, it is necessary to examine the scope and effect of Rule 8 and Rule 9 of the Rules framed under the Act. Rule 8 (1) lays down that before making any allotment or release in respect of any building, it is necessary for the District Magistrate to get the said building inspected. The terms of this sub-clause (1) of Rule 8 are clearly mandatory. Clause (2) of rule, consists of two independent requirements. The first part of the said sub-clause (2) requires that the inspection of the building so far as possible, shall be made in the presence of the landlord and tenant or any other occupant and wherever practicable, the facts may be elicited from at least two respectable persons in the locality. Clause (2) of rule, consists of two independent requirements. The first part of the said sub-clause (2) requires that the inspection of the building so far as possible, shall be made in the presence of the landlord and tenant or any other occupant and wherever practicable, the facts may be elicited from at least two respectable persons in the locality. The second part of this sub-clause (2) requires that the District Magistrate shall paste the notice in regard to vacancy on the notice board and the allotment order can only be passed after the expiry of three days from the date of such pasting and if in the meantime any objection is received not before the disposal of such objection. 6. Sub-clause (3) of Rule 8 further directs the District Magistrate to decide the objection, if any, filed under sub-clause (2) after consideration of any evidence that objector or any person concerned may adduce. In the first part of sub-clause (2) of Rule 8 the words used are 'so far as possible and also 'wherever practicable. These two expressions indicate that the first part of sub-clause (2) of Rule 8 is not mandatory but directory because the discretion has been left with the inspector. This does not, however, mean that the inspector shall not follow the procedure prescribed while inspecting the building. The words 'as far as possible came up for interpretation in Smt. Rani v. Dy. Director of Consolidation ( AIR 1959 All 525 ) and it was held that the qualifying words 'as far as possible really mean that the principles are to be Observed unless it is not possible to follow them in the particular circumstances of the case. Again the same words 'as far as possible came up for interpretation in Smt. Ram Katori v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Agra ((1953) All LJ 237). A Division Bench of this court while interpreting Rule 7 of the Rules framed under the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 held that "the words 'as far as possible are important. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer has not an absolute discretion in the matter. A Division Bench of this court while interpreting Rule 7 of the Rules framed under the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 held that "the words 'as far as possible are important. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer has not an absolute discretion in the matter. He is directed to make the allotment ordinarily according to the wishes of the owner." In view of the above decisions, therefore, though the first part of sub-clause (2) Of Rule 8 is directory but still the inspector has to follow the procedure prescribed and must report in case he does not follow the procedure as to why it was not possible or practicable to do so. 7. The second part of sub-clause (2) and sub-clause (3) are clearly mandatory. After pasting of the notice of vacancy on the notice-board, three days must expire and if the objections are filed, objections have to be decided in accordance with sub-clause (3). In Rule 9, sub-clause (3) it is further provided that before the allotment is made a notice has to be issued to the landlord intimating him the date fixed for consideration of the question of allotment. Sub-clause (3) of Rule 9, therefore, is also mandatory. On . a reading of Rules 8 and 9, the procedure which has to be adopted in effect is that first there should be an inspection in respect of the building sought to be declared vacant, then the inspection has to be in accordance with the procedure prescribed. Thereafter the conclusion of the inspectors report has to be pasted on the notice-board for the information of the general public in order to enable the public to apply for allotment and further to enable the landlord if he so desires to apply for release. It is in these circumstances that three clear days have been given for the said purpose. A further mandate has been provided under Rule 9 (3) that before actually passing the allotment order, the landlord must be intimated of the date on which the question of allotment has to be considered. 8. In view of the above, Rule 8 sub-clause (1). the second part of sub-clause (2), sub-clause (3) of Rule 8 and sub-clause (3) of Rule 9 are mandatory. The first part of Rule 8 sub-clause (2) is, however, directory. 8. In view of the above, Rule 8 sub-clause (1). the second part of sub-clause (2), sub-clause (3) of Rule 8 and sub-clause (3) of Rule 9 are mandatory. The first part of Rule 8 sub-clause (2) is, however, directory. The Inspector must, however, report as to why it has not been possible or practicable for him to comply with the procedure prescribed for the inspection. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his submission has relied upon Jagdish Chandra Verma v. Akhi-lesh Pratap Singh (1976 (UP) RCC 87) while the learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon two more cases of this Court, namely Arun Kumar v. District Judge, Orai (1975 All LR 653) and Ram Asrey Lal v. District Judge, Pilibhit (1976 (UP) RCC 344). 10. In Jagdish Chandra Vermas case (supra) K. C. Agarwal, J. held after interpreting the words 'so far as possible that Rule 8 (2) of the Rules is directory. Before K. C. Agarwal, J. the question for interpretation was in regard to first part of Rule 8 (2). The principle laid down in that case is fully applicable in this case. 11. In regard to Arun Kumars case (supra) no inspection was conducted at all and, therefore, that case was a case where there was violation even of Rule 8 (1) and as such there was a clear violation of mandatory provisions of Rule 8 (1) of the Rules. The question in regard to the effect of first part of Rule 8 (2) was not specifically canvassed before the learned Judge deciding that case. 12. In the case of Ram Asrey Lal (supra) objection had been filed by the landlord that he had not been given any notice at any stage of the proceedings and the entire proceedings were taken ex parte against him and the court held the rule to be mandatory. The court was not called upon to specifically consider the effect of various parts of clause (2) of Rule 8. Since there was no notice at all at either stage, the Court held the provision to be mandatory. On the examination of all the cases, mentioned above, I am of the opinion that there is no conflict in either of the cases mentioned above and they support the view which I have taken. 13. Since there was no notice at all at either stage, the Court held the provision to be mandatory. On the examination of all the cases, mentioned above, I am of the opinion that there is no conflict in either of the cases mentioned above and they support the view which I have taken. 13. It is well settled that non-compliance of a mandatory rule results in nullification of the act done in breach thereof. This principle is, however, subject to at least one exception. In Lachoo Mai v. Radhey Shyam ( AIR 1971 SC 2213 at p. 2215) the Supreme Court has laid down the following principle. "The general principle is that one has a right to waive and to agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity which may be dispensed with without infringing any public right or public policy." 14. G. P. Singh in principles of statutory Interpretation, 2nd Edition, at page 217 states: "If certain requirements or conditions are provided by a statute in the interest of a particular person, the requirements or conditions although mandatory may be waived by him if no public interests are involved, and in such a case the act done will be valid even if the requirement or condition has not been performed." 15. From the above principle it is clear that Rule 8 and Rule 9 which are for the benefit of landlord, the tenant or any occupant of the accommodation, can always be waived by the said persons. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. If it is so waived then the mere non-compliance of the above mentioned mandatory provisions would not render the action as invalid. 16. In a case where both the person in occupation as well as the landlord knew about the fact that a report has been submitted by the inspector and thereafter objections were filed to contest the said report the ultimate action could not be declared as invalid merely because of certain irregularity in the conduct of the inspection by the inspector. 17. In the instant case respondent No. 1 who was the occupant filed objections and was heard. He had the opportunity of leading evidence also. The landlord also appeared before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. 17. In the instant case respondent No. 1 who was the occupant filed objections and was heard. He had the opportunity of leading evidence also. The landlord also appeared before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. He knew about the proceedings relating to vacancy and also gave his statement On oath on 31st July 1975. In the circumstances it is clear that if there was any procedural defect in the report of the inspector as required by Rule 8, sub-clause (2) of the Rules the mere non-compliance thereof wOuld not render the ultimate order of allotment as invalid. The view taken by the appellate court is, therefore, manifestly erroneous. 18. The lower appellate Court has found as a fact that there was vacancy as respondent No. 1 had acquired in a vacant state in the same city another accommodation where they had shifted. In view of the fact that there was a deemed vacancy under Section 12 (3) of the Act the allotment order made in favour of the petitioner was valid order and the same could not have been set aside by the appellate court. 19. Learned counsel for the respondent further argued that in fact his possession should be deemed to be regularised under Section 14 of the Act. The appellate court has found that the possession of respondent No. 1 was not with the consent of the landlord and as such he cannot get the benefit of Section 14 of the Act. Even if the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent is accepted that his possession should have been regularised under Section 14 of the Act then too in view of the findings of the appellate court that he has acquired in a vacant state another residential building in the same city the property would be deemed vacant under Section 12 (3) of the Act. In either case the allotment order would not be vitiated in law. 20. In the result the petition is allowed and the order of the appellate court dated 20-7-1977 is quashed. In the circumstances of the case the parties are directed to bear their own costs. 21. After considering all the facts and circumstances, I consider it fit in the interest of justice to grant time till 31st March 1980 to respondent Nd. 1 to surrender the vacant possession of the premises to the petitioner allottee. In the circumstances of the case the parties are directed to bear their own costs. 21. After considering all the facts and circumstances, I consider it fit in the interest of justice to grant time till 31st March 1980 to respondent Nd. 1 to surrender the vacant possession of the premises to the petitioner allottee. Sri A. N. Srivastava, on behalf of the respondent No. 1 gives an undertaking that the vacant possession will be handed over to the petitioner allottee on 1st of April 1980 by respondent Nd. 1. On this undertaking, I further direct that no eviction proceedings shall be taken by the petitioner against respondent No. 1 till that date.