Judgment : Mookerjee, J. : Appellants have preferred this appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against summary rejection of their writ petition by the judgment of Sabyasachi Mukerji, J. The learned Single Judge has held that the petitioners were guilty of inordinate delay. Therefore their writ petition was not entertainable. 2. We have heard Miss Chaturvedi for the appellant and Mr. Sircar for the respondents. We are not inclined to interfere with the order appealed against. We, however, make it clear that the reasons for our decision are somewhat different from those given by the learned Single Judge for rejecting in limine the writ petition. It is undisputed that on February 17, 1964 the State Government issued a Notification for bringing into force the provisions of Chapter VIII of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act relating to the transfer of territories with effect from March 1, 1964. Thereafter, a fresh Notification under Section 4 of the said Act was made in respect of the District of Purulia and with effect from April, 14, 1964 the interests of intermediaries including raiyats and under-raiyats vested in the State free from encumbrances. According to the determination made in a proceeding under Section 6(1) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, the respondent No.5, Sri Jagadish Tewari, was an intermediary, possessing khas lands in excess of the ceiling prescribed by clause (d) of Section 6(1) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. Therefore, in terms of Section 4 read with Section 5 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, the right, title and interest of the said respondent No.5 had vested in the State free from encumbrances and subject to his right to retain in terms of Section 6 read with the relevant Rules of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Rules. The said intermediary was required to submit a return in Form B exercising his option to retain. In the instant case, before exercising his said option, on September 16, 1964, Jagdish Tewari had purported to transfer 12.43 acres of land by a registered Deed in favour of the present appellants. According to the appellants, their names were recorded in respect of these lands in the finally published Revisional Records of Rights and the local Junior Land Reforms Officer had mutated their names in the rent roll. According to the appellants, their names were recorded in respect of these lands in the finally published Revisional Records of Rights and the local Junior Land Reforms Officer had mutated their names in the rent roll. But in the Big Raiyat Case No. 296 of 1977 under Section 6 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act started against Jagdish Tewari, respondent No.5, the present appellants were not joined as parties. They were not given any hearing. Jagdish, Tewari in his return in Form B did not include the lands transferred to the appellants by the registered Deed dated September 16, 1964, Thus, he did not exercise his option to retain these lands. Total area of non-agricultural and agricultural lands retained by the respondent No.5 was much below the ceiling prescribed by clauses (c) and (d) of Section 6(1) of the Act. 3. Subsequently, there was a proceeding under Section 10(1) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act for taking possession of the vested lands previously belonging to the respondent No.5. No notice of the said proceeding was allegedly served upon the appellants. 4. In our view, the appellants cannot make grievance that they were not given any hearing in the aforesaid B.R. Case under Section 6(1) of the Act started against the respondent No.5, Jagdish Tewari. We have already pointed out that Jagdish Tewari's interest in all his lands including those purported to have been transferred to the appellants vested on and from April 14, 1964. Until Jagdish Tewari, the respondent No.5, by submission of appropriate returns, retained his khas lands in terms of Section 6(1) of the Act, he had no subsisting transferable title which he could validly convey to the appellants. Therefore, the plea of the appellants that they were bona fide purchasers for value without notice is of no relevance. After the date of vesting transfer by an intermediary of a vested land which has not been retained would be invalid and not binding upon the State. The State is not bound to recognize such a post-vesting transferee and to join him as a party in B.R. proceeding commenced against the transferor-intermediary. After the date of vesting transfer by an intermediary of a vested land which has not been retained would be invalid and not binding upon the State. The State is not bound to recognize such a post-vesting transferee and to join him as a party in B.R. proceeding commenced against the transferor-intermediary. The right of an intermediary to retain under Section 6(1) of the Act may be heritable, we are unable to hold such right to retain of an intermediary is also assignable by way of sale so as to entitle a post-vesting transferee from an intermediary to claim right of hearing in a B.R, case under Section 6(1) of the Act. Miss Chaturvedi for the appellants in her fairness herself placed before us the decision of S.K. Datta J. in (1) Ratikanta Mosat v. State of West Bengal, 81 CWN 783. The learned Single Judge took the same view with regard to the effect of transfer by an intermediary after the date of vesting The learned Single Judge, in our view, correctly held that such a post-vesting transferee was not entitled to file returns in Form B to retain under section 9(1) of the Act. 5. Miss Chaturvedi has also placed before us the decision of Sudhamay Basu J. in (2) Probhas Chandra Mondal v. State of West Bengal 81 CWN 1026. This decision does not assist the appellants' case, In the first place, the learned single Judge in Probhas Chandra Mondal's case (supra), found as a fact that the petitioners had been recognised by the State as a tenant under it, their names had been mutated and State had accepted rent from them. The learned Single Judge at page 1032 of the report observed that the petitioners had acquired independent status apart from their rights as transferees. The substance of this finding was that the petitioners 0rtained from the State a fresh tenancy independently of the kobala executed by the intermediary in their favour. If after the vesting the petitioners had acquired fresh tenancy they were obviously no longer claiming under their transferor who was an intermediary and therefore, there could be no question of hearing them in the proceeding under Section 6(1) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act against the said intermediary in question who might have executed a purported kobala in favour of the petitioners. Secondly, presumably the attention of Sudhamoy Basu J. was not drawn to the earlier decision of S. K. Datta J. in Rati Kanta Mosat v. The State of West Bengal (supra), which took a contrary view about the locus standi of a post-vesting transferee from an intermediary to be joined as a party in a proceeding against his transferor under Section 6(1) of the said Act. Thirdly, Sudhamoy Basu J. did not consider whether the Punjab. Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953 contained provisions similar to Sections 4 and 5 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. Therefore, with respect, we may observe that the learned Judge without adequate consideration had applied the Supreme Court decision in (3) Gurcharan Singh v. Prithi Singh AIR 1974 SC 223 . We have already observed upon the publication of a Notification under Section 4, all interests of the intermediaries in the notified area were extinguished. Section 6 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act engrafts an exception by conferring upon toe intermediaries fight to retain lands specified in the different clauses of sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act. This right of retention, as already observed, is to be exercised by an intermediary or his heir on legal representative may exercise the same right when the intermediary dies after the date of vesting. Until appropriate orders under section 6 of the said Act is made on intermediary who owns lands in excess of the ceiling has only inchoate rights over the lands which he opts to retain. When before retaining any particular land an intermediary sells the said land the said transfer is not binding upon the State Again, such right of retention attaches to the status of those who were intermediaries at the date of vesting. They could not transfer by way of sale such rights of retention in favour of strangers. One who is not an intermediary, cannot obviously exercise the rights under section 6 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. We however, make it clear that in this case we are making no ovservation in respect of right of transfer by a raiyat or an under-raiyat whose khas lands are below the ceiling prescribed by clauses (c) and (d) of Section 6 (1) of the Act. 6. We however, make it clear that in this case we are making no ovservation in respect of right of transfer by a raiyat or an under-raiyat whose khas lands are below the ceiling prescribed by clauses (c) and (d) of Section 6 (1) of the Act. 6. In this connection we may also refer to the provisions of Sections 5A and 44(2A) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. Section 5A imposes restriction on certain transfers made between 5th of May, 1953 and the date of vesting. After an enquiry under Section 5A a transfer which is found to be not bonafide shall stand cancelled. Therefore, clause (iv) of sub-section (7) of Section 5A, has provided that the transferor and transferee would include the successors in-interest of a transferor or a transferee. An order under sub-section (2) of Section 5A would affect the intermediary and the person to whom the former might have made a transfer between 9th of May, 1953 and the date of vesting. Therefore, both are entitled to be heard in a proceeding under Section 5A of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. 7. Section 44(2a) of the Act no doubt has not expressly defined the expression "persons interested" who shall be given opportunity of being heard before an entry in the finally published Record of Rights is revised Sudhamoy Basu, J. in this connection had referred to and distinguished the Division Bench decision in (4) State of West Bengal v. Pijus Kanti Roy, 79 CWN 556. It appears that the Division Bench which decided State of West Bengal's case (supra), did not consider some of the important aspects of the matter. 8. It is true that the State Government under Section 39(1) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act for carrying out the purposes of the Act could direct : (a) preparation of the Record of Rights, or (b) revision of the Record of Rights prepared and published under Chapter X of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The purpose of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act is not only to acquire estates, all rights of intermediaries therein but also to make possession for certain other necessary and incidental matters. The Record of Rights prepared or revised under the Act contains the particulars set out in Rule 26 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Rules. The purpose of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act is not only to acquire estates, all rights of intermediaries therein but also to make possession for certain other necessary and incidental matters. The Record of Rights prepared or revised under the Act contains the particulars set out in Rule 26 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Rules. It is undisputed that the Record of Rights prepared under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act contain entries not only in respect of proprietors, tenure-holders, raiyats and under-raiyats but also in respect of persons who are not intermediaries and whose interests on land are not liable to vest. In a given case a revision of the Record of Rights may also affect the later category of persons. Therefore, the expression "persons interested" appearing in Section 44(2a) obviously means persons who are interested in respect of any of the entries made is Record of Rights and which is proposed to be revised either suo motu or upon an application made within the prescribed time. These different entries inter alia record not only the name and status of the tenant but also the name of the landlord, rent payable, conditions and incidents appertaining to such rights like pasturage, forest rights, fishing rights etc., rights and obligations of tenant, special conditions and incidence, easement rights etc. Therefore, before altering any of these entries the Revenue Officer who exercises quasi-judicial powers is bound to hear the persons who would be affected by revision of the entry or entries concerned. The expression "persons interested" under Section 44(2a) clearly mean those whose interests would be affected by proposed revision. The expression "persons interested" appearing in Section 10 of the Land Acquisition Act by various judicial decisions has been interpreted to include those who are interested in the property. The Supreme Court in (5) Srimati Raj Lakshmi Dasi and others v. Banamati Sen and others, AIR 1953 SC 33 , held that the mortgagees were within the definition of the said phrase "persons interested" under Section 10 of the Land Acquisition Act. Similarly, the expression "persons interested" in Section 44(2a) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, in our view, should mean the person having been present interest so far as known to the officer exercising his powers under Section 44(2a). Similarly, the expression "persons interested" in Section 44(2a) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, in our view, should mean the person having been present interest so far as known to the officer exercising his powers under Section 44(2a). We have already stated that the power under Section 44(2a) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act is a quasi-judicial one. Under Section 44(4) every entry in the records has a statutory presumption of correctness. Therefore, an entry made in the Record of Rights may affect claims and contentions relating to the property in question. We should avoid an interpretation of the expression "persons interested" which may result in shutting out the persons having present interest for a property from being heard at the stage of revision of the records and at the same time there would be a presumption of correctness of the said entries as against them. 9. If we hold that the expression "persons interested" mean only those persons who had interest in the land or tenancy at the date of vesting, then the same would be clearly against the principles of natural justice. Ordinarily, no doubt the Record of Rights contain entries with reference to the date of vesting of intermediary interests but there is no reason why the persons acquiring interest in the property subsequent to the date of vesting shall not be given opportunity of hearing and to make submission with regard to the true state of things at the date of vesting. 10. In fact, in the matter of preparation/revision of the records the intention of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act and the Rules made thereunder is clearly to give opportunity to all interested persons including those who have acquired interests subsequent to the date of vesting. The use of the expression "persons interested" in sub-section (2a) of Section 44 is significant and indicates clear intention to give opportunity of hearing to all interested persons. Further, sub-section (3) of Section 44 has conferred a right of appeal upon "any person aggrieved" by an order passed in revision under sub-section (2a). Thus, any person adversely affected by an order under Section 44(2a) can prefer an appeal to the tribunal. Further, sub-section (3) of Section 44 has conferred a right of appeal upon "any person aggrieved" by an order passed in revision under sub-section (2a). Thus, any person adversely affected by an order under Section 44(2a) can prefer an appeal to the tribunal. It is no argument that a post-vesting purchaser purchases a property subject to the risk of the Record of Rights in respect of such property being revised, therefore, he should not be given any opportunity of hearing before the records are revised to his detriment. In order to uphold his persent ownership and possession, a post vesting transferee is entitled to establish in a proceeding under Section 44(2a) of the Act what was the true state of things at the date of vesting. It can be held that a postvesting transferee cannot defend his ownership and status by proving in a proceeding under Section 44(2a) that his predecessor-in-interest had valid title and possession in the plot in question at the date of vesting. 11. The Division Bench which decided the case of (4) State of West Bengal v. Pijush Kanti Roy (supra), did not refer to all the relevant provisions of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Rule relating to the preparation of the records under Chapter V of the Act and to the Appendix 'B' of the said Rules. The Schedule 'B' contains datailed procedure for preparation or revision of the records. These rules contain provisions for hearing the parties at the different stages. In this connection, we may refer to Rule 6 of the schedule B relating to attestation inter-alia provides that a proclamation published before the attestation begins. "The proclamation shall also specify that all Persons who have derived or lost interest in any khatian should invariably be present at the time of attestation and that all changes which occured in any tenancy since the last preparation of the draft or finally published record-of-rights due to-(a) inheritance, succession, transfer or otherwise; (b) amalgamation or subdivision of tenancies; (c) surrender or abandonment of tenancies (d) new settlement; or (e) any other reasons shall be brought to the notice of the Revenue Officer. As each person appears before him the Revenue Officer shall examine his khatian read out all the entries make corrections where required, and see that the khatian is complete in all particulars. As each person appears before him the Revenue Officer shall examine his khatian read out all the entries make corrections where required, and see that the khatian is complete in all particulars. Disputes regarding the ownership of land, or the ownership of any interest in land, shall be decided by the Revenue Officer in a summary manner and on the basis of present possession or possession during -the agricultural year preceding the year in which the date of vesting under Section 4 of the Act falls where notification under that Section has been issued". In case revision is made of the Record-of-Rights previously published in Chapter X of the Bengal Tenancy Act, no fresh enquiry regarding the details indicated in Rule 6 would be necessary if they are found to be correct on the basis of present and actual possession or possession during the period stated above where notification of vesting under Section 6 of the Act has been issued. There is no reason why different standard should be applied at the stage of revision of records under Section 44(2a) to deny right of hearing to persons interested at the stage of revision under Section 44(2a) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. 12. For the foregoing reasons, we are unable to agree with the law laid down by the Division Bench in (4) Slate of West Bengal v. Pijush Kanti Roy (supra), but it is not necessary to make a reference to a larger Bench because the present case relates to a proceeding under Section 6 (1) and not under Section 44(2a) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act. 13. Miss. Chaturvedi also submitted that in their writ petition the appellants have also claimed that they have acquired a fresh tenancy in respect of the lands in question by reason of recording of their names in the finally published records, acceptance of rents and lastly by mutation of their names. In our view, the above questions could be more conveniently agitated in Civil Court. Undoubtedly, entry in the Record of Rights raises a presumption of correctness. Secondly, in considering the effect of acceptance of rents and mutation of names of the appellants in the Rent Rolls, oral and documentary evidence may have to be taken. In our view, the above questions could be more conveniently agitated in Civil Court. Undoubtedly, entry in the Record of Rights raises a presumption of correctness. Secondly, in considering the effect of acceptance of rents and mutation of names of the appellants in the Rent Rolls, oral and documentary evidence may have to be taken. A proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution is not appropriate for adjudication of these disputed questions of fact which may require prolonged trial on evidence to be conducted. We make it clear that although we have not accepted the claim of the appellants with regard to their right to be heard in the impugned proceeding under Section 6(1) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, we are not deciding the other claim of the appellants with regard to the creation of a new tenancy in their favour after the date of vesting of intermediary interests. The acceptance of the second claim may mean negation of the first claim of the appellants that had acquired tenancy rights by reason of transfer deed executed by the intermediary, respondent No.5 and their said right did not vest. It would be open to the appellants to institute appropriate civil proceedings for establishment of their claim with regard to the acquisition or tenancy rights under the State after the vesting in the manner mentioned above. If in fact, the State has recognized the appellants as tenants, then without determining the said new tenancy claimed by the appellants the State cannot interfere with their ownership and possession. We express no opinion on the merits of the said claims and contentions. We also make it clear that in the impugned proceeding under Section 10(1) of the Act no order was against the appellants. The question as to who is in present possession of the lands is a disputed one. Therefore, in an appropriate proceeding both questions of title and possession may be agitated according to law. Subject to the above observations, we dismiss this appeal without any order as to costs. Roy, J. : I agree.