JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a plaintiffs second appeal in a suit for recovery of Rs. 1536/- from the North Eastern Railway Administration. 2. The plaintiff was provided siding facilities by the Railway Administration, leaving certain siding charges during the period from Sept., 1960 to May, 1961. The plaintiff paid a sum of Rs. 1666.60 towards the siding charges on 16th June, 1961. According to the plaintiffs case the amount of Rs. 1536/- was charged in excess of that contracted for. The defendant Railway Administration denied the plaintiffs claim. 3. The two courts below have dismissed the suit on the ground that it was barred by limitation being governed by Art. 62 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. The cause of action pleaded in the plaint was the date of payment namely 16th June, 1961 and the suit was filed on 1st Jan., 1965 that is more than three years after the accrual of the cause of action. All that has been said in the plaint was that the time was also extended by the letter dated 27/31-5-63 wherein there was a promise by the railway to do the needful in the matter. This averment cannot amount to a plea of extension of limitation either under Section 19 or Section 20 of the (Indian Limitation Act, 1908 nor can any (such letter extend the limitation in a case like the present one. The only question (which, therefore, arises before me in this lapped is of limitation. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on Art. 120 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 and contended that Art. 62 could not apply, but the position seems to have been settled finally by the Supreme Court in Venkata Subbarao v. State of Andhra Pradesh ( AIR 1965 SC 1773 ) in which the Supreme Court has laid down at pages 1790 and 1791, that "the language of the Article had reference to the action Tor money had and received as known to the English Law, and that the reference to the receipt being for the plaintiffs use was a technical term of English pleading and law which imposed upon a defendant who received money in circumstances which in justice and equity belonged to the plaintiff rendered its receipt a "receipt- by the defendant to the use of the plaintiff". Here, it was pointed out the money was received by the defendant from the "plaintiff which the plaintiff was not bound in law to pay but which he was compelled or forced to pay because of the threat or apprehension of legal process. The circumstances, therefore, in which the money was received were, it was said such that notwithstanding that the receipt by the defendant purported to be for his own benefit still it was money which at the very moment of the receipt in justice and equity belonged to the plaintiff, and that was the whole basis of the plaintiffs claim on the merits." 5. On principle the facts of the present case are not much different, and I am of the opinion that Art. 62 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 was properly applicable to the claim involved in the present case and the suit was rightly dismissed by both the courts below as barred by limitation. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, relied upon Smt. Ambika Bhawani Devi v. Babu Chandrika Singh ( AIR 1968 Pat 410 ). That decision makes no reference to the decision of the Supreme Court in Venkata Subbaraos case (supra) and if it was contrary to what has laid down in Venkata Subbaraos case, it cannot obviously be relied upon as good law. Learned Counsel next relied upon the case of Union of India v. Watkins Mayor & Co. ( AIR 1966 SC 275 ). That was a case of comparison between Arts. 61 and 120 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 and not a case relating to Art. 62. 7. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.