Judgment Pyne, J. A short, but none the less interesting, point of first impression relating to construction and interpretation of Section 73A of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 arises for consideration in this appeal which is directed against a judgment and order of Amiya Kumar Mookerji, J. dated September 24, 1973. For a proper appreciation of the point involved in this appeal it is necessary to refer to some of the relevant facts of this case. 2. The respondent Ashoke Singh (who was the petitioner in the Court of the first instance) was at the relevant time the Karta of a joint Mitakshara Hindu family consisting of himself and his brother. The respondent's father one Ganga Singh died intestate on February 6, 1957 when the respondent and his brother were minors. The respondent's maternal uncle one Prannath Shegal and his brother moved an application in the City Civil Court at Calcutta sometime in Mareh 1967 for appointment of guardian of the minors and in August 1968 the said maternal uncle was appointed as the guardian of the said minors. One Jamuna Singh, the paternal uncle of the minors, i.e. the respondent and his brother, preferred an appeal to this Court against the said order of the City Civil Court and the said appeal was disposed of by a Division Bench of this High Court by its order dated 7th September, 1970 holding, inter alia, that in the interest of the minors concerned the appointment of Prannath Shegal as guardian would continue until 7th December, 1970 when the elder of the minors i.e., the respondent herein would attain majority. The said guardian Prannath Shegal it appears, never filed any account of the properties of the deceased Ganga Singh as required by and in terms of Section 53 and/or Section 56 of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') with Estate Duties Authorities. After attaining majority on 7th December, 1970 the respondent also did not file any such account of properties with the Controller of Estate Duty relating to the properties left by his deceased father the said Ganga Singh as the respondent was unaware that such an account wall required to be filed under the Act within six months from the date of the death of his father. Thereafter, the respondent filed an application for grant of a succession certificate in the City Civil Court at Calcutta wherein by an order dated 25th July, 1972 the learned Chief Judie of the said Court directed the respondent to produce a certificate as required under section 56(2) of the Act because without the same no grant of succession certificate could be made. It appears that, in the aforesaid circumstances, the respondent was advised to file an account with the Estate Duty Authority regarding the estate of his deceased father the said Ganga Singh and on 18th August 1972 the respondent filed an account of the properties left by his deceased father with the Assistant Controller, Estate Duty showing-therein that the value of the estate approximately of Rs.52,000/-. Thereupon the respondent received a notice issued under section 58(2) of the Act dated 4th September, 1972 along with a questionaire sent by the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, 'A' Ward, Calcutta intimating the respondent that the said officer had fixed the date of hearing of the matter on 19th September, 1972. On the fixed date, i.e., 19th September 1972, the respondent appeared before the said Assistant Controller of Estate Duty and contended that inasmuch as 5 years had already expired from the date of death of the deceased no proceeding could be initiated under the said Act in view of Section 73A thereof and, therefore, the said officer had no power, authority and jurisdiction to initiate any proceeding under section 73A of the Act or to issue any notice under section 58(2) of the said Act or to put any questionaire thereunder and by doing the same the said officer was proceeding entirely without jurisdiction. Inspite of the aforesaid objections of the respondent the said officer fixed the date of hearing on the December 15, 1972. In the above circumstances being aggrieved by the said notice dated 4th September, 1972 issued under section 58(2) of the Act and the proceeding taken thereunder the respondent moved an application under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the said notice and the said act of the said officer and obtained a Rule Nisi and an ad interim injunction restraining the said officer from proceeding with the levy of an estate duty under the Act until the disposal of the Rule. 3. 3. Various contentions were advanced on behalf of the parties before Amiya Kumar Mookerji, J. who heard the said application. It was mainly contended on behalf of the petitioner in the said application i.e., the respondent in this appeal that in view of the provisions of section 73A(a) no proceeding under the Act could be commenced in respect of the estate of late Ganga Singh after the expiry of 5 years from the date of his death and as such no duty was payable. Inasmuch as the proceeding for levy and realisation of estate duty in respect of the estate of the said Ganga Singh became barred after 5 years from the date of his death the respondent should got a declaration that he was not liable to pay any duty. On behalf of the Department it was contended that though in the present case no proceeding for levy was commenced by the Department but the respondent for the purpose of obtaining a certificate under section 56(2) of the Act voluntarily submitted a statement of account and although such statement was not filed within the time specified in sub-section (2) of section 53 of the Act, none the less, it should be regarded as a valid statement and the Assistant Controller had jurisdiction to issue a notice under section 58(2) of the Act. Amiya Kumar Mookerji, J. however by his judgment and order dated 24th September, 1973 allowed said application and made the Rule Nisi absolute. His Lordship held that in the instant case in view of section 73A(a) of the Act no proceeding for levy of any estate duty under the Act could be commenced and that in a calc where the said section was attracted there was lack of inherent jurisdiction of the Assistant Controller to commence or initiate any proceeding what so ever under the Estate Duty Act. The instant appeal has been preferred by the Department against the aforesaid judgment and order of Amiya Kumar Mookerji, J. 4. Substantially the same contentions as were urged before the Court of the first instance were urged before us in this appeal. 5. The instant appeal has been preferred by the Department against the aforesaid judgment and order of Amiya Kumar Mookerji, J. 4. Substantially the same contentions as were urged before the Court of the first instance were urged before us in this appeal. 5. Counsel for the appellants has contended that Sec. 73A(a) of the Act does not in any way affect the jurisdiction of the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty to complete the assessment of estate duty on the basis of an account filed under Section 56 read with Section 53 of the Act. No period of limitation is in the Act prescribed for completion for such assessment. It was further contended that Section 73A was introduced only to prescribe a period of limitation for initiation of proceedings by the Estate Duty Authorities under section 59 of the Act. According to Counsel section 73A only bars the initiation of proceedings by the Department. If all the proceedings under the Act were barred then different language would have been used, that is to say, instead of 'no proceeding for levy of duty' expressions 'no proceedings under the Act' or 'no proceedings for assessment under the Act' would have been used. The expression 'no proceeding for levy of any estate duty' really points out the limited scope of the section and, therefore, proceedings under section 56 are not covered. The expression 'first assessment' occuring in clause (a) of Section 73A according to Counsel refers to the assessment under section 59 where originally there is no assessment of Estate Duty at all and, therefore, estate duty has escaped assessment. 6. Counsel has further submitted that the proceeding under section 56 is not a proceeding for levy of duty but a proceeding for grant of representation which follows after filling of accounts. According to counsel when assessment is made as a result of the proceedings taken under section 56 that cannot be said to be a proceeding for levy of duty. Here proceedings are taken for the benefit of the applicant. Proceedings under section 56 includes proceedings for assessment and such proceedings are for the benefit of the applicant. It is also the submission of the Counsel that the question of limitation regarding proceedings under the Act can neither be raised nor be decided in these proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. Proceedings under section 56 includes proceedings for assessment and such proceedings are for the benefit of the applicant. It is also the submission of the Counsel that the question of limitation regarding proceedings under the Act can neither be raised nor be decided in these proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was further submitted that the conduct of the assessee in the facts and circumstances of this case would disentitle him to any relief under the Act. Counsel for the appellant has further submitted that initially there was no provision in the Act for initiation of the proceedings by the Department in cases of properties escaping assessment and such provision was introduced in the Act by 1958 amendment. It has also been submitted that unless there is a provision in the Act limiting the time for assessment it may be completed at any time. Counsel's further submission is that no time limit is fixed for completion of regular or reopened assessment under the Act. According to Counsel in the Act there is no provision parallel to section 139(2) of the Income Tax Act 1961. 7. Counsel for the appellant has also submitted that section 58 applies to both types of assessment. It is submitted that under the Act proceedings can be initiated either at the instance of the Revenue or at the instance of the accountable person. Section 73A is only applicable to proceedings initiated under section 59 because this section says that initiation of proceedings is subject to section 73A. Counsel's submission is that neither 53 nor 56 says that it is also subject to section 73A. It is pointed out by the counsel that section 73A of the Act is parallel to section 139 of the Income-tax Act. It is also the submission of the counsel that while interpreting the Act the purpose of the Act is to be kept in view And such construction should be adopted which would effectuate the purpose of the Act and not to defeat the same. In this connection counsel has referred to the difference between the charging section and the machinery section of the Act. In this connection counsel has referred to the difference between the charging section and the machinery section of the Act. Reference has been made by the counsel to sections 56, 57, 58 and Form E.D. 2 and it has been submitted that it is for the accountable person to see that the machinery under section 56 or 57 is set in motion by him because he is required to get certificate under section 57. These provisions show that the ban of section 73A would not apply when accountable person files an account and as a result thereof proceedings are initiated. 8. It has also been submitted by the counsel for the appellants that the liability to charge arises under the provision of the statute. Next step is computation of tax for which liability has already accrued Provisions relating to assessment are machinery and any irregularity therein may be either waived by the party or regularised subsequently. Any error in the procedure would not affect the validity of the assessment save and except in cases where there is positive limitation against the completion of the assessment. It is further submitted that there is no bar to the assessment after 5 years. Therefore, if there is any bar regarding machinery section the assessee can waive the same. It is the submission of the counsel that like section 153 of the Income-tax Act there is no corresponding provision in the Estate Duty Act providing for an absolute bar to the assessment after the time limit. According to counsel as there is no bar for completing the assessment there is also no bar for a person to come under section 56 or 57 for obtaining a certificate. Further, the Legislature thought that as there was no specific bar regarding assessment assessee can at any time approach the Revenue Authorities for getting the certificate. So long as the assessment, counsel has submitted, is not barred it is open to the assessee to come forward and initiate proceedings by waiving the conditions regarding time. 9. Counsel has further submitted that in the instant case notice dated September 4, 1972 under section 58(2) of the Act has been challenged. This notice has been issued pursuant to the account filed by an accountable person under section 53 or 56(2) of the Act. 9. Counsel has further submitted that in the instant case notice dated September 4, 1972 under section 58(2) of the Act has been challenged. This notice has been issued pursuant to the account filed by an accountable person under section 53 or 56(2) of the Act. The officer has merely issued a notice under section 58(2) for clarification of certain points arising out of the accounts filed by the accountable person. This is a notice which he is bound to give pursuant to the account filed by the accountable person. The officer concerned has acted in accordance with law in issuing the notice. The accountable petition cannot be heard to say that the officer concerned cannot give notice pursuant to the account filed by him. Therefore, according to counsel this application is premature. Counsel has submitted that if section 73A applies to both regular assessment and escaped assessment then there is no necessity to mention section 73A only in section 59. According to counsel by his own action in filing accounts under section 56 for the purpose of obtaining a grant of representation from the Civil Court the accountable person not only invited the jurisdiction of the Controller to make an assessment, (apart from the question of acquiescing to the exercise of his jurisdiction), but he made the adoption of the course of action laid down under section 58(2) by the Controller inevitable. Therefore, the Controller had no option but to take action under section 58 of the Act. Such proceedings, according to counsel, have been commenced by the accountable person and it is being continued by the department and the inevitable result in adoption of the course laid down in section 58(2). It is also submitted that the respondent's conduct would disentitle him to any relief under Article 226. Referring to prayer (b) at page 74 of the paper book counsel submitted that the accountable person accepted the City Civil Court's order, which is at page 22 of the paper book, and did not prefer any appeal against the same. Further, in the instant case there is no question of inherent lack of jurisdiction because section 73A is not grafted upon section 53 and section 56 and where there is no patent lack of jurisdiction thereafter invoking the jurisdiction of the Assistant Controller the accountable person cannot now complain after filing of the account. Further, in the instant case there is no question of inherent lack of jurisdiction because section 73A is not grafted upon section 53 and section 56 and where there is no patent lack of jurisdiction thereafter invoking the jurisdiction of the Assistant Controller the accountable person cannot now complain after filing of the account. It is submitted that after filing of the account it is inevitable for the Assistant Controller to issue notice under section 58(2) of the Act. 10. In support of the above submissions counsel has referred to the following cases, to wit, (1) Commissioner of income-tax. Madhyaprudesh, Bhopal v. Sm. Sedra Devi, 32 ITR 615 : AIR 1957 SC 832 ; (2) The Sold Trustee Loka Sikshana Trust v. The Commissioner of Income-Tax, Mysore, 101 ITR 234: AIR 1976 SC 10 ; (3) Chatturam and Ors. v. Commissioner of Income-Tax Bihar, 15 ITR 302 : AIR 1947 FC 32; (4) Commissioner of Income-Tax West-Bengal III v. Sm. Minabati Agarwalla, 79 ITR 278; (5) Anandji Haridas and Co. (P) Ltd. v. S.P. Kasture and others, AIR 1968 SC 565 ; (6) M/s. Murarilal Mahabir Prasad and others v. Shri B.R. Vad & others, AIR 1976 SC 313 ; (7) P.C. Saxena v. The State, 104 ITR 106; (8) Lalji Haridas v. R.H. Bhatt & Anr., 55 ITR 415; (9) Essex County Council v. Essex Incorporated Congregation AL Church Union, 1963 AC 808 : 1963 (1) AER 326 ; (10) Giusti Patents and Engineering Works Ltd. v. MAGGS (1923) 1 Ch. 515; (11) Kifayatullah Khan v. Registrar of Co-operative Society and others, AIR 1956 Hyderabad 129; (12) Messrs Pannalal Binjraj and others v. Union of India & others, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 397; (13) Mahabir Prasad Poddur v. Income-Tax Officer "B" Ward, Dist. I (2) Calcutta & Ors. 102 I.T.R.478. 11. Counsel for the respondent has submitted that application of section 73A is not limited to proceedings initiated under section 59 only because the language of the section 73A is 'levy of any estate duty under this Act' and not under section 59. The section docs not say that proceedings under section 59 or commencement of proceedings by the Controller. Therefore, by section 73A all proceedings for levy are barred. According to counsel section 73A does not mean that only the commencement of proceedings by the Department under section 58 (4) or 59 is barred. 12. The section docs not say that proceedings under section 59 or commencement of proceedings by the Controller. Therefore, by section 73A all proceedings for levy are barred. According to counsel section 73A does not mean that only the commencement of proceedings by the Department under section 58 (4) or 59 is barred. 12. If section 73A was limited in its application to section 59 then it would have been differently worded like lection 139 of the Income Tax Act. According to Counsel there is no ambiguity in the opening portion of the section. It is further submitted that there are three modes for commencement of proceedings for levy of estate duty under the Act, First, by section 53 (3). Under this section proceeding commences. In the Estate Duty Act there is no parallel provision as that of section 139(2) of the Income-tax Act 1961 or section 22(2) of the Indian Income-tax Act 1922. In the old Act there was a provision for public notice. Secondly, commencement of the proceedings under section 56(1) or (2). Thirdly, where no account is filed under section 53 or 56 Controller may take report to section 59 which also prescribes a mode of commencement of the proceedings for levy of estate duty. Explaining why section 73A is not mentioned in section 53 or 56 of the Act counsel has submitted that under section 59 commencement of proceedings is by a notice al required by that section and in order to put a limit upon the time within which commencement may be made specific mention of 73A is made in section 59. Counsel has referred to and pointed out the difference between section 139 of the Income-Tax Act and section 73A of the Estate Duty Act and submitted that scope of section 73A is wider than that of section 139 of the Income-Tax Act. Explaining why the expression 'first assessment' is used in section 73A counsel has submitted that under the Act there are three modes for commencing proceedings i.e. section 53, 56 and 59. According to counsel under the Act there may be a first assessment, second assessment and re-assessment. Counsel has submitted that under old section 59 (corresponding to present section 73A) the period of limitation for commencing proceedings under section 53(3) or previous section 61(2) was 12 yean from the date of death. Regarding proceeding under old section 57 which is now sec. Counsel has submitted that under old section 59 (corresponding to present section 73A) the period of limitation for commencing proceedings under section 53(3) or previous section 61(2) was 12 yean from the date of death. Regarding proceeding under old section 57 which is now sec. 56) period of limitation was six months. Under present section 73A an uniform period of limitation for commencement of the proceedings is provided for. It is further submitted that in cases where proceeding. are barred under section 73A if a certificate is required under section 56 for obtaining a grant of representation then Controller will issue a certificate to the effect that proceedings are barred and, therefore, no duty is payable. It is further submitted that section 73A if a bar to the commencement of proceedings and not a bar of limitation like the provision of the other Acts and, therefore, it cannot be said to be procedural. Counsel has also submitted that no intention is expressed in section 73A that it is limited in its application only to section 59. It is further submitted that only in case of ambiguity legislative history of the statute may be gone into. Referring to clause 27 of the Estate Duty Bill counsel has submitted that the clear intention of the section is to fetter the commencement of the proceedings for all kinds of assessment. Counsel in support of his above contentions has referred to the following cases, to wit, (14) Janapada Sabha Chhindwara etc. v. The Central Provinces Syndicate Ltd. & another, AIR 1971 S.C. 57 ; (15) Ghanshyamdas v. Regional Assistant Commissioner, Sales Tax, Nagpur and others, 14 STC 976; AIR 1964 S.C. 766 , (16) Commissioner of Agricultural Income-Tax v. Sultau Ali Gharami, 20 ITR 432, (17) D.P. Wadia & Sons v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Poona, 50 ITR 761. 13. The question of applicability of Section 73A to proceedings under Section 56(2) of the Estate Duty Act came up for consideration before the Delhi High Court in the case of P.C. Saxena v. The State, 104 I.T.R. 106. In that case in 1966 the appellant applied in the Court of the Subordinate Judge for grant of a succession certificate to realise various debts and securities of the deceased who had died on October 18, 1959. In that case in 1966 the appellant applied in the Court of the Subordinate Judge for grant of a succession certificate to realise various debts and securities of the deceased who had died on October 18, 1959. The Subordinate Judge allowed the petition and ordered grant of succession certificate subject to the production of a certificate of clearance in respect of estate duty under Section 56(2) of the Estate Duty Act. The appellant thereupon applied for exemption from complying with the condition for production of the clearance certificate in respect of estate duty claiming that in view of section 73A of the Act no proceeding could be commenced for levy of estate duty on the estate of the deceased after expiry of 5 years from his death. The Subordinate Judge rejected the application for exemption. The appellate Court while dismissing the appeal preferred against the said decision of the Subordinate Judge held that Civil Court did not possess any jurisdiction or discretion to waive the condition under Section 56(2) of the Act which was condition precedent to the grant of the representation or succession certificate. Further, the bar imposed by section 73A of the Act could not be claimed by a party who sought a succession certificate and applied to a Civil Court for grant of representation or succession certificate and he was bound to fulfil the statutory conditions, without any exception, before obtaining the certificate. At page 109 of the Report it is observed as follows:- In my opinion, the provisions of section 73A are applicable where the Controller wishes to initiate proceedings himself for levy of estate duty without any other circumstances or consideration. But the said limitation would probably not be attracted to a case where the party itself approaches the Controller or approaches the court for grant of a succession certificate. It may be emphasised that section 56(2) of the Act does not admit of any exception and it specifies that "in all cases in which a grant of a succession certificate is applied for", a copy of the application shall be furnished. Section 57 further provides that after the receipt of the account delivered under section 56 the Controller may then "at any time" proceed to make a provisional assessment of the estate duty. Section 57 further provides that after the receipt of the account delivered under section 56 the Controller may then "at any time" proceed to make a provisional assessment of the estate duty. The two provisions of law have been inserted at the same time by the amending Act and they must be reconciled and, in my opinion, on the construction I am accepting, they are consistent with each other. If a party does not want to obtain any representation or any succession certificate and does no move the Civil Court, the estate duty authorities have to govern themselves by section 73A and other provisions of law applicable for levy of estate duty. But should a party approach the court for grant of succession certificate and should the application be within time and otherwise in order, a mandatory duty has been cast on the party to furnish a copy of the accounts in cases governed by clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) and a copy of the application under sub-section (2) of section 56 to the Controller. In either case, whether governed by sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), the party is bound to produce a certificate from the Controller to the effect that estate duty has been or will be paid or that none is due. The Civil Court does not possess any jurisdiction or discretion to waive the aforesaid condition which is precedent to the grant of representation or succession certificate. So, there is no escape for a party to comply with the mandatory conditional prescribed by section 56 of the Act. It may be noticed that while section 73A prescribes a time limit and the proceedings under section 59 of the Act have specified that they are subject to the provisions of section 73A no such provision or expression occurs in section 56. The limitation of six months contained in the corresponding provision in the Act prior to the amendment has been deleted and now the provision governs all easel for grant of succession certificate or representation and section 57(1) contains the expression that the Controller may proceed to make in a summary manner a provisional assessment at any time after the receipt of information under section 56. It is, therefore, clear that the bar imposed by section 73A cannot be claimed by a party who seeks to obtain a succession certificate and applies to the Civil Court for grant of representation or succession certificate and so he is bound to fulfill the statutory conditions before obtaining the certificate without any exception." At page 110 of the report the Court further observed that:- "My observations about the non-application of section 73A to voluntary payments of the estate duty by a party must necessarily be tentative because the authorities under the Estate Duty Act are not represented before me. I have however no doubt that, in view of the mandatory provisional of section 56, the parties are not excused from complying with the provisional of law and furnishing a copy of the application to the Controller. It will, however, be for the Controller to deal with the said application according to law and furnish the requisite certificate. If the Controller finds that in view of section 73A, he cannot make the assessment, it will be open to him to furnish the certificate that in the circumstances of the case no estate duty is due. This will certainly relieve the party of the obligations imposed by section 56(2) of the Estate Duty Act and the conditions specified in the order of the Estate Duty Act and the conditions specified in the order of the Court while disposing of the application for grant of certificate." 14. Counsel for the respondent relied on the above observation of the Delhi High Court at page 110 of the report. The laid observations however appear to be obiter dicta as contended on behalf of the department. 15. In this appeal we are really concerned with the question as to whether the period of limitation mentioned in section 73A of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 applies to cases coming under lection 56. In other words, we are concerned with the scope and application of lection 73A. 15. In this appeal we are really concerned with the question as to whether the period of limitation mentioned in section 73A of the Estate Duty Act, 1953 applies to cases coming under lection 56. In other words, we are concerned with the scope and application of lection 73A. The main controversy, as stated earlier, is whether by section 73A only the initiation of the proceedings by the Controller for levy of the estate duty under section 59 of the Act is barred after the expiry of the periods mentioned in clauses (a) and (b) of section 73A or whether proceedings for levy of estate duty initiated pursuant to the application made for grant of representation or succession certificate as provided in section 56 of the Act are also barred after five years from the date of the death of the deceased. In other words, whether section 73A would also apply to and govern the cases coming under Section 56. 16. It is, therefore, necessary to consider the ambit and scope of section 73A and the effect of its application to cases coming under Section 56. For that purpose it is necessary to refer to the scheme of the Act. Section 73A is to be read and understood in the context of the other relevant provisions of the Act and the Estate Duty Rules, 1953. Therefore, to understand properly the scope and effect of the above section a brief reference to the relevant provisions of the Act and the Estate Duty Rules appears to be necessary. 17. Estate Duty Act, 1953 came into force on 6th October, 1953. Thereafter, it was amended by the Estate Duty (Amendment) Acts of 1958 and 1960. Reference is made hereunder to the relevant provisions of the Act as amended. Part II of the Act deals with Imposition of estate duty. Section 5 of the Act provides for levy of estate duty. Part VII of the Act is headed as 'Collection of the Duty' and it consists of 24 sections i.e. 51 to 73A. Amongst other amendments section 56 to 65 of the Act as originally enacted was substituted by new sections by the amending Act of 1958. Reference is made to the relevant amended sections of Part VII of the Act. Part VII of the Act is headed as 'Collection of the Duty' and it consists of 24 sections i.e. 51 to 73A. Amongst other amendments section 56 to 65 of the Act as originally enacted was substituted by new sections by the amending Act of 1958. Reference is made to the relevant amended sections of Part VII of the Act. Sub-section (3) of Section 53 speaks of the various persons who are accountable for the estate duty in respect of the property that passes on the death of the deceased. Sub-section (3) provides that-"Every person accountable for estate duty under this section shall, within 6 months of the death of the deceased, deliver to the Controller an account in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner of all the properties in respect of which estate duty is payable. Provided that the Controller may extend the period of six mouths aforesaid on such terms which may include payment of interest as may be prescribed." 18. Section 55 of the Act provides, inter alia, that every person accountable for estate duty shall, if required by the Controller, deliver to him and verify, to the best of his knowledge and belief, a statement of such particulars together with such accounts, documents, evidence or information as the Controller may require relating to any property which be has reason to believe to form part of an estate in respect of which estate duty is leviable on the death of the deceased. 19. Section 56 of the Act deals with the cases of grant of representation of the deceased and under the section grant of representation etc. not to be made unless particulars are furnished to the Controller. 19. Section 56 of the Act deals with the cases of grant of representation of the deceased and under the section grant of representation etc. not to be made unless particulars are furnished to the Controller. The section reads as follows:- "(1) In all cases in which grant of representation is applied for (a) the executor of the deceased shall, to the best of his knowledge and belief specify in an appropriate account annexed to the affidavit of valuation filed in court under Section 19-1 of the Court-fees Act 1870, all the property in respect of which estate duty is payable upon the death of the deceased and shall deliver a copy of the affidavit with the account to the Controller, and (b) no order entitling the applicant to the grant of representation shall be made upon his application until he has delivered the account prescribed in clause (a) and has produced a certificate from the Controller under sub-section (2) of Section 57 or Section 67 that the estate duty payable in respect of the property included in the account has been or will be paid, or that none is due, as the case may be, (2) In all cases in which a grant of a succession certificate is applied for, a copy of the application shall be furnished by the applicant to the Controller and no order entitling the applicant to the grant of such a certificate shall be made upon his application until he has produced a certificate from the Controller under sub-section (2) of Section 57 or Section 67 that the estate duty payable in respect of the property mentioned in the application has been or will be paid, or that none is due, as the case may be." 20. Section 57 of the Act provides, inter alia, for provisional assessment by the Controller upon receipt of the account delivered under section 53 or section 56 and for grant of a provisional certificate. 21. Section 58 which deals with the assessment of estate duty is as follows:- "58. Assessment. (1) If the Controller is satisfied without requiring the presence of the person accountable that an account delivered under Section 53 or Section 56 is correct and complete, he shall assess the principal value of the estate of the decease and shall determine the amount payable as estate duty. Assessment. (1) If the Controller is satisfied without requiring the presence of the person accountable that an account delivered under Section 53 or Section 56 is correct and complete, he shall assess the principal value of the estate of the decease and shall determine the amount payable as estate duty. (2) If the Controller is not satisfied, he shall serve a notice on the person accountable, either to attend in person at his office on a date to be specified in the notice, or to produce, or cause to be produced on that date, any evidence on which the person accountable may rely in support of his account. (3) The Controller, after hearing such evidence as the person accountable may produce and such other evidence as he may require on any specified points, shall, by order in writing, assess the principal value of the estate of the deceased and determine the amount payable as estate duty. (4) In any case where no account has been delivered as required by Section 53 or Section 56, or the person accountable fails to comply with the terms of the notice served under sub-section (2) the Controller shall make the assessment to the best of his judgment and determine the amount payable as estate duty." 22. (4) In any case where no account has been delivered as required by Section 53 or Section 56, or the person accountable fails to comply with the terms of the notice served under sub-section (2) the Controller shall make the assessment to the best of his judgment and determine the amount payable as estate duty." 22. Section 59 deals with cases of properly escaping assessment and it is in following terms:- "If the Controller,- (a) has reason to believe that by reason of the omission or failure on the part of the person accountable to submit an account of the estate of the deceased under Section 53 or Section 56 or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment any property chargeable to estate duty has escaped assessment by reason of under-valuation of the property included in the account or of omission to include therein any property which ought to have been included or of assessment at too law a rate or otherwise, or (b) has in consequence of any information in his possession, reason to believe notwithstanding that there has not been such omission or failure as is referred to in clause (a) that any property chargeable to estate duty has escaped assessment whether by reason of undervaluation of the property included in the account or of omission to include therein any property which ought to have been included, or of assessment at too low a rate or otherwise, he may at any time, subject to the provisions of Section 73-A, require the person accountable to submit an account as required under Section 53 and may proceed to assess or re-assess such property as if the provisions of Section 58 applied thereto." 23. Section 67 provides for grant of certificate of payment of estate duty and it provides as follows:- "Where the amount of estate duty determined by the Controller as payable on an assessment made under Section 58 has been paid by the person accountable, the Controller shall, on application by that person, grant to him a certificate to that effect." 24. Section 72 provides that affidavits, accounts, certificates, statements and forms used for the purposes of Part VII of the Act shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed by the Board. 25. Section 72 provides that affidavits, accounts, certificates, statements and forms used for the purposes of Part VII of the Act shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed by the Board. 25. Section 73A of the Act with which we are mainly concerned in this case, provides for the period of limitation for commencing proceeding for assessment or reassessment and it is as follows:- "No proceeding for the levy of any estate duty under this Act shall be commenced- (a) in the case of a first assessment after the expiration of five years from the date of death of the deceased in respect of whose property estate duty became payable; and (b) in the case of a re-assessment, after the expiration of three years from the date of assessment of such properly to estate duty under this Act." Brief reference to the relevant rules of the Estate Duty Rules, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') may now be made. 26. Rule 20 prescribes the form of account required to be delivered under sections 53(3), 53(4) and 56(1)(a) and also in cases where a grant or representation is not required but an exemption from duty is claimed by reason of the smallness of the estate of the Act in cases where death occurred before the commencement of the amending Act of 1958 and Rule 20A provides for the aforesaid kinds of form of account where death takes place on or after commencement of the amending Act of 1958. Rule 26 prescribed the forms of the certificate. Certificate under section 67 or 68 or 69 of the Act shall be in Form E.D. 4. A discharge certificate where no duty is payable shall be in Form No. E.D. 6, Forms E.D. 4 and E.D. 6 are as follows :- "E.D.-4. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ESTATE DUTY Controller of Estate Duty, Circle No. ……………………... The…………………….19 Certificate under Sections 67, 68 or 69 (See Rule 26) In the Estate of …………………… Official Reference No. E.D./File……………………………..., 19 It is hereby certified that the full estate duty has been paid in respect of the property hereinafter described as passing on the death of... , late of... ..., who died on the ... ... day of... ..., 19. The property hereinbefore referred to Seal of Office Controller of Estate Duty ………………………………Secretary, Central Board of Direct Taxes". "E.D. 6. , late of... ..., who died on the ... ... day of... ..., 19. The property hereinbefore referred to Seal of Office Controller of Estate Duty ………………………………Secretary, Central Board of Direct Taxes". "E.D. 6. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ESTATE DUTY Office of the Controller of Estate Duty, Circle No…........................the ……………………………………..,19 Discharge certificate where no duty is payable See Rule 26(4) In the Estate of... … … … Official Reference No. E.D. file... … … …,19 It is hereby certified that there is no claim for Estate Duty under the Estate Duty Act, 1953, in respect of the property hereinafter described as passing on the death of ... …. late of ... …, who died on the ... … day of... ... …19 The property hereinbefore referred to...................................... Assistant* Controller of Estate Duty. Deputy* Date... Place... * Delete the items; not applicable." Relevant sections of the Act before 1958 amendment were as follows:- "Old Sec. 57. In all easel in which a grant of representation is applied for within six month, of the death of the deceased – (a) the executor of the deceased shall, to the best of his knowledge and belief, specify in an appropriate account annexed to the affidavit of valuation filed in Court under section 19-I of the Court-fees Act, 1870. (VII of 1870), all the property in respect of which estate duty is payable upon the death of the deceased and shall deliver a copy of the affidavit with the account to the Controller, and (b) no order entitling the applicant to the grant of representation shall be made upon his application until he has delivered the account prescribed in clause (a) and has produced a certificate from the Controller under section 60 or Section 67 that the estate duty payable in respect of the property included in the account has been or will be paid, or that none is due, as the case may be." "Old Sec. 59. No proceeding for the levy of any estate duty under this Act shall be commenced after the expiration of twelve years from the date of the death of the deceased in respect of whole property estate duty became leviable." "Old Sec. 61(2). No proceeding for the levy of any estate duty under this Act shall be commenced after the expiration of twelve years from the date of the death of the deceased in respect of whole property estate duty became leviable." "Old Sec. 61(2). In any case where no account has been delivered al required by section 53 or clause (a) of section 57 the Controller may cause an account of the property passing on the death of the deceased to be prepared in such manner and by such means as he thinks fit and may call upon any person who in his opinion is accountable for the payment of estate duty in respect of the property to accept such account, and if that person does not accept the account or his liability, the Controller may determine the estate duty payable by that person." 27. On a careful consideration of the scheme of the Act it appears to us that application of section 73A to cases coming under section 56 would make the latter section unworkable and if Section 73A applies to cases under section 56 then no grant of representation or succession certificate can be made after the expiry of five years from the date of death of the deceased where there had not been any assessment of estate duty earlier or where an application for grant of representation or for succession certificate is made three years after the date of assessment of property and the question of reassessment arises because in such cases the conditions laid down in section 56 for the purpose of grant of representation or succession certificate cannot be fulfilled as stated hereinafter. 28. From the relevant provisions of the Act it appears that where grant of representation or succession certificate becomes necessary it is obligatory for the executor of the deceased or the person claiming representation or the applicant for a succession certificate to deliver to the Controller a copy of the affidavit with the account or a copy of the application for succession certificate and no order for grant of representation or a succession certificate shall be made until the account or copy of the application is submitted and the Controller's certificate under section 57(2) or section 67 is produced. Here it should be noted that the provisions of the corresponding old section i.e. section 57 applied only when a grant of representation (which according to section 2(18) means probate of a will or letters of administration) was applied for within six months of the death of the deceased. It should also be noted that the time limit of six months was specifically mentioned in the old section and the section had no application to cases of grant of succession certificates. 29. The conditions of section 56 required to be complied with when application for grant of representation and succession certificate is made are mandatory and do not admit of any exception. It is incumbent upon a party who wants a grant of representation or a succession certificate to comply with the conditions as laid down in section 56. After receipt of the account delivered under section 56 the Controller may proceed to make a provisional assessment under section 57. Under that section estate duty shall be due from the date of death of the deceased and the Controller may at any time after the receipt of the account proceed to make in a summary manner a provisional assessment of estate duty. Thereafter, when the person so assessed pays to the Controller or furnishes security to the satisfaction of the Controller for payment of estate duty if any, payable on the provisional assessment the Controller shall grant a certificate to the effect that such duty has been or will be paid or that none is due, as the case may be, in respect of the property mentioned in the certificate. Regular assessment is however made under section 58. Under that section when the Controller is satisfied without the presence of the accountable person that the account delivered under section 56 is correct and complete he shall assess the value of the estate and determine the amount payable as estate duty. Sub-section (2) of Section 58 empowers the Controller to call for personal attendance of or production of document by the accountable person. Sub-section (3) of section 58 provides for making of assessment after evidence is produced by the accountable person. Sub-section (4) empowers the Controller to make the best judgment assessment in cases where either no account is delivered or when there is failure to comply with the notice under sub-section (2). Sub-section (3) of section 58 provides for making of assessment after evidence is produced by the accountable person. Sub-section (4) empowers the Controller to make the best judgment assessment in cases where either no account is delivered or when there is failure to comply with the notice under sub-section (2). It, therefore, appears that after 1958 amendment according to the provisions of section 56 in all cases and without any exception no grant of representation or succession certificate shall be made unless the account or the copy of the application is delivered to the Controller and a provisional certificate under section 57(2) or a final certificate under section 67 of the Act is produced. Therefore, if the time limit mentioned in section 73A of the Act is made to apply to cases covered by section 56 then in cases where five years have expired after the death of the deceased or where three yean have passed after the assessment made previously and there is question of re-assessment no grant of representation or succession certificate can be made because the Controller cannot issue a certificate under section 57(2) or section 67 unless there is an assessment and the assessed duty has been paid or provided for or he comes to the conclusion that no duty is payable in respect of the property passing on death of the deceased. In other words the mandatory provisions of Section 56 cannot be fulfilled. 30. It has been contended on behalf of the respondent that in cases where five years have expired from the date of the death of the deceased or where three years have expired from the date of first assessment and there is question of re-assessment the Controller will give a certificate to the effect that there is no claim of estate duty or that no duty is due from the accountable person. It should however be noticed that under the relevant provisions of the Estate Duty Act and the Estate Duty Rules (namely, Sections 57 and 67 and Rule 26) certificate can be given only after the assessment and depending upon the result thereof. The prescribed froms of certificate are E.D.4 and E.D.6 which have been set out earlier. From E.D.6 cannot apply to cases like the instant one because here it cannot be said that there is no claim for estate duty under the Act. The prescribed froms of certificate are E.D.4 and E.D.6 which have been set out earlier. From E.D.6 cannot apply to cases like the instant one because here it cannot be said that there is no claim for estate duty under the Act. The claim remains but cannot be enforced. Section 73A does not do away with the liability of the accountable person for payment of duty; it only bars the initiation of proceedings for levy of duty. Therefore, if the liability remains but proceedings cannot be initiated there is no question of full payment of duty. In such cases it cannot also be stated in the certificate by the Controller that there is 'no claim' of estate duty from the accountable person. 31. Therefore, if section 73A is so construed as to apply to and govern cases coming under section 56 then the latter section would become inapplicable in certain cases as mentioned above. Not only that such a construction of section 73A would also be in conflict with the provisions of the Indian Succession Act whereunder no time limit is fixed for making application for grant of representation or a succession certificate. Therefore, in removing the bar of the 6 months from the section, which was in the corresponding old section 57, by the 1958 amendment the legislative intent appears to be that in all cases of application for, grant of representation or succession certificate provision of section 56 would apply. It, therefore, appears that the bar of limitation as provided in section 73A is not applicable to cases where application is made for grant of representation or succession certificate and the account or the copy application is delivered to the Controller as required by section 56. 32. The language of section 73A should also be noted. It states that 'No proceedings for levy of any estate duty under this Act shall be commenced........". This, in our opinion, means, as contended on behalf of the appellant, only those cases where the initiation or commencement of the proceedings for levy of estate duty is at the instance of the Controller such as under section 59 or 58(4) of the Act when no account is delivered or there is question of property escaping assessment. It should also be noticed that although section 73A is specifically mentioned in section 59 yet that section is not mentioned in section 56. It should also be noticed that although section 73A is specifically mentioned in section 59 yet that section is not mentioned in section 56. This shows that the legislative intent is not to apply the limit mentioned in section 73A to cases coming under section 56 of the Act. Section 73A, therefore, does not apply to cases where proceedings commences in consequence of the application for grant of representation or succession certificate. Under section 56 initiation or commencement of the proceedings is not fit the instance or behest of the Controller but it follows upon submission of account or copy application by the accountable person and what Controller is required to do is to proceed with the assessment, either provisionally or in a regular manner, upon receipt of such account or copy of the application. Therefore, in such easel there cannot be any commencement or initiation of proceedings for levy of duty by the Controller. 33. The observations made by us herein are strictly on the basis of and limited to the facts of the instant case i.e. where an application for grant of representation is made by the accountable person and copy of the affidavit with account is delivered to the Controller in compliance with the provisions of Section 56 of the Act. 34. In the above view of the matter we are unable to agree with the view of the learned Judge of the Court of the first instance. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The orders under appeal are set aside. Rule Nisi is discharged. Interim order, if any, will stand vacated. There will however be no order as to cost. Ghosh, J,: I agree.