CHANDRASHEKHAR, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision petition has been referred to a Division Bench by Rama jois, J. , as he doubted the correctness of the view taken by Malimath, J. , in Ex. S. A. No. 43 of 1977 regarding the jurisdiction of the Court of the civil Judge to execute a decree for eviction transferred to that Court by the Court of the Munsiff which had passed that decree. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case are briefly these: The Petitioners herein had filed an application under S. 21 of the Karnataika Rent Control Act, 1961, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for eviction of respondent 4 herein, the Co-operative Tourist and Transport Society Ltd. , in H. R. C. No. 723 of 1971 on the tile of the Addl. First Munsiff, Bangalore who granted a decree for eviction. Later the petitioners filed anexecution application, Ex. Case no. 623 of 1975, in the same Court. During the pendency of the execution proceedings, the Karnataka Rent Control (Amendment) Act, 1975 (Karnataka act No. 31 of 1975) (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment act) came into force. The Amendment Act amended the definition of the word 'court occuring in S. 3 (d) of the Act. The effect of such amendment is that the Court having jurisdiction for the purpose of the Act in the city of Bangalore is the Court of the Civil Judge, and not the court of the Munsiff. The Amendment Act also provided for transfer of proceedings under the Act pending in the Court of the Munsiff to the court of Civil Judges in thq City of Bangalore. ( 3 ) THE lerarned Munsiff before whom the execution proceedings were pending, seems to have taken the view that as a result of such amendment he ceased to have jurisdiction to execute the decree for eviction passed by him and that such decree could be executed only by the Court of the civil Judge. In that view hei transferred the execution petition filed by the present petitioners, to the Court of the Civil Judge, Bangalore. ( 4 ) THEREAFTER the learned Civil Judge proceeded to execute the decree and issued a warrant for delivery of thq petition premises. Respondent-2 offered obstruction to the execution of that warrant. His objection was over-ruled by the learned Civil Judge, against whose order respondent-2 preferred an appeal, Ex. ( 4 ) THEREAFTER the learned Civil Judge proceeded to execute the decree and issued a warrant for delivery of thq petition premises. Respondent-2 offered obstruction to the execution of that warrant. His objection was over-ruled by the learned Civil Judge, against whose order respondent-2 preferred an appeal, Ex. Appeal No. 19 of 1977, to the learned District Judge. As that appeal was dismissed, respondent-2 came up in revision in C. R. P. No. 127 of 1978. On 23. 3. 1978 this Court dismissed that revision petition observing:"sri. Albal, learned counsel for the petitioner, prayed that some reasonable time be granted for the petitioner to vacate the premises. He submitted that his client had automobiles of his customers stationed in the premises for repairs and that immediate eviction would seriously hamper his business and expose him to hardship. Having regard to circumstances stated by Sri Albal, I grant time till 31st of May 1978 to the petitioner to surrender and yield up possession of the premises, which if he fails to do respondents would be at liberty to obtain possession by the process of the executing court. Subject as aforesaid, this petition is rejected at the admission stage. "a petition filed by present rejspondent-2 for review of the aforesaid order was subsequently withdrawn by him and the review petition was dismissed as withdrawn. ( 5 ) AS respondent-2 did not vacate the petition premises, the petitioners moved the learned Civil Judge to issue the necessary process for putting them in possession of the petition premises. At that stage respondent-2 filed I. A. No. 22 wherein he raised, interalia, an objection that the Court of the Civil Judge had no jurisdiction to execute the decree and it was only the Court of the Munsiff which had jurisdiction to do so. That objection found favour with the learned Civil Judge who held that in view of the ruling of this Court in (B. ML. N. Raju v. N. T. Neeiakantiah, Ex. S. A. 43/77 he had no jurisdiction to execute that decre,a He dismissed the execution petition leaving it open to thq petitioners to make a fresh application for execution in the Court of the Munsiff. ( 6 ) THE aforesaid order of the learned Civil Judge is impugned in this petition. N. Raju v. N. T. Neeiakantiah, Ex. S. A. 43/77 he had no jurisdiction to execute that decre,a He dismissed the execution petition leaving it open to thq petitioners to make a fresh application for execution in the Court of the Munsiff. ( 6 ) THE aforesaid order of the learned Civil Judge is impugned in this petition. Though Sri H. S. Rama Rao, learned counsel for respondent-2, urged several contentions, the only question which, in our opinion, arisen for determination in this revision petition is whether or not the Court of the Civil Judge had jurisdiction to execute the decree which had been transferred to that Court. ( 7 ) IN Meenakshamma v. Modur Rangamma, (1968)2 Mys. L. J. 255 this Court held that a decree for eviction made under the provisions of the Act, is executable under the provisions of the, Code of Civil Procedure, Hence in order to determine in which Court such a decree passed before the Amendment act came into force, should be executed after coming into force of the amendment Act, the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure should be looked into. S. 37 C. P. C. defines the expression court which passed the decree'. According to that definition the Court of first instance which passed the decree is undoubtedly such Court. According to that definition where such Court of first instance has ceased to exist or to have jurisdiction to execute, it, the Court 'which,' if the suit wherein the decree was passed was instituted at the time of making the application for the execution of the decree, would have jurisdiction to try such suit, should be regarded as the Court which passed the decree. The Court of the munsiff in Bangalore City which passed the decree for eviction has not ceased to exist. There is nothing in the Amending Act which, expressly or by necessary implication. takes away the jurisdiction of that Court to execute a decree for eviction which it had passed before the Amendment act came into fence. The Court of the munsiff in Bangalore City which passed the decree for eviction has not ceased to exist. There is nothing in the Amending Act which, expressly or by necessary implication. takes away the jurisdiction of that Court to execute a decree for eviction which it had passed before the Amendment act came into fence. Hence, in the present case thei decree for eviction could have been executed by that Court and it did not lose the jurisdiction to do so even after the Amendment Act came into force ( 8 ) WE agree with the view taken by Malimath, J. ,'ex S. A. No. 43 of 1977 that execution proceedings on an application for executant such 'decree for eviction pending in the Court of the -Munsiff immediately before the coming into force of the Amendment Act, did not stand statutorily 'transferred to the Court of the Civli Judge, and that the learned Munsiff should not have transferred such decrees to the Court of the Civil Judge. But the question still is where the Court of the Munsiff, has, on an erroneous understanding of the legal position, transferred such execution petition to the Court of the -Civil Judge, whether the latter court has no jurisdiction to execute that decree. In Ex. S. A. No. 43 of 1977 malimath, J. , has held that in such a situation the Court ef the Civil Judge has no jurisdiction to execute such decree and the execution proceedings should go back to the Court of the 'munsiff. 'with 'great respect to his lordship, it appears to us that he has not considered the provision in S. 38 c P. C that a decree may be excecuted either by the, Court which passed it or by the Court to which it is sent for execution. If the Munsiff who passed the decree has sent it to the Court of the Civil Judge for execution. S. 38 C. P. C. empowers the latter Court to execute the decree. If the Munsiff who passed the decree has sent it to the Court of the Civil Judge for execution. S. 38 C. P. C. empowers the latter Court to execute the decree. ( 9 ) HOWEVER, Sri Rama Rao contended that it is only when a decree has been validly transferred under S. 39 C. P. C. the transfere Court will have jurisdiction under S. 38 C. P. C. to execute that decree, that under sub-section (1) of that section the learned Munsiff could have transferred the decree to the Court of the Civil Judge only on an application by the decree-holder for such transfer and that in the present case there was no such application by the, decree-holder. It was also contended by Sri Rama rao that the leaened Munsiff could not have transferred the decree suo motu under sub-section (2) of that Section because that sub-section empowers the Court which passed the decree to transfer it to any subordinate court of competent jurisdiction and that in the hierarchy of courts the Court of the Civil Judge is not subordinate to the Court of the Munsiff, but is a Court of higher rank. ( 10 ) IN the present case there is no dispute that the Court of the Civil judge is a Court of competent jurisdiction for the purpose of S. 39 C. P. C. as it has after the Amendment Act, jurisdiction to try an application for eviction under S. 21 of the Act. But, no application seems to have been made by the petitioners in the Court of the Munsiff for transfer of the dpcree to the Court of the Civil Judge. Even so, the question is when the court of the Munsiff transfers suo motu to the Court of the Civil Judge an application for execution of a decree for eviction passed by it (the court of the Munsiff) on an erroneous understanding of the legal position as to the Court which has jurisdiction to execute such decree, has the court of the Civil Judge no jurisdiction to execute the decree,. There is a well recognised distinction between inherent lack of jurisdiction and irregular assumption of jurisdiction, Where a Court does not lack inherent jurisdiction, but has irregularly assumed jurisdiction, it is well settled that the proceedings before it are not vitiated. There is a well recognised distinction between inherent lack of jurisdiction and irregular assumption of jurisdiction, Where a Court does not lack inherent jurisdiction, but has irregularly assumed jurisdiction, it is well settled that the proceedings before it are not vitiated. Under sub-section (1) of s. 39 C. P. C. the Court of the Munsiff was competent to transfer the decree to the Court of the Civil Judge if the decrees-holder had made an application for such transfer and on such transfer the Court of the Civil judge would have jurisdiction under S. 38 C. P. C. to execute the decree. In the present case when the Court of the Munsiff transferred the decree to the Court of the Civil Judge in the absence of an application by the decree-holder there was at the highest, irregular assumption of jurisdiction by the Court of the Civil Judge and there was no inherent lack of jurisdiction for the Court of the Civil Judge to execute the decree. That the exercise of jurisdiction by the Civil Judge in such circumstances, is not vitiated, is clear from the decision in Merla Ramanna v. Nellapa Raju, AIR 1956 SC. 87 wherein the Supreme Court quoted with approval the, following observations of the Madras High Court in Venkamamidi Bala Krishnayya v. Nannapaneni Linga Rao, ILR 1943 Mad. 804. "we consider that the true effect of S. 39 is to recognise the transferee court as having inherent jurisdiction, to sell or deliver properties situate within its territorial limits, but only that the jurisdiction is to be, invoked by the machinery provided by the section. From this it follows that the absence of an order of transfer is merely an irregularity in the assumption of jurisdiction by the Tenali Sub Court when proceedings were commenced in it, but that objection not having been taken in the first instance, the judgement debtor must be held to have waived it. " in the present case also, objection as to the jurisdiction to execute the decree, was raised by respondent-2 before the learned Civil Judge more than two years after the decree was transferred to his Court from the court of the Munsiff. However, Sri. " in the present case also, objection as to the jurisdiction to execute the decree, was raised by respondent-2 before the learned Civil Judge more than two years after the decree was transferred to his Court from the court of the Munsiff. However, Sri. Rama Rao submitted that objection as to the jurisdiction can be raised at any time and that since the legal position as to whether the Court of the Civil Judge had jurisdiction to execute the decree for eviction transferred to it was settled only by the ruling of Malimath, J. , in Ex. S. A. No. 43 of 1977, respondent coud not raise such objection regarding jurisdiction at any earlier point of time we are unable to accept this explanation. The mere fact the aforesaid ruling of Malimath. J. , came, later was no ground for respondent-2 not raising the objection as to the jurisdiction at the earliest occasion. ( 11 ) WE hold that the decision of Malimath, J. , in Ex. S. A. No. 43 of 5977 does not lay down the law correctly in so far that decision held that the court of the Civil Judge to which a decree for eviction was transferred by the Court of the Munsiff which had passed that decree, has no jurisdiction to execute that decree and we over-rule that decision to that extent. ( 12 ) IN the result, we allow this revision petition, and reverse the finding of the learned Civil Judge that he had no jurisdiction to execute the decree. The learned Civil Judge is directed to take back the execution case to his file and to proceed with it in accordance with law. ( 13 ) WE have not considered it necessary to pronounce upon the other contentions urged by Sri Rama Rao in this revision petition. ( 14 ) AS the execution proceedings have been pending for a long time, we direct the learned Civil Judge to dispose of the execution petition very expeditiously. ( 15 ) IN this petition parties will bear their own costs. --- *** --- .