JUDGMENT N.D. OJHA, J. 1. An application u/s 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was filed by Respondents 2 to 9 against the Petitioner before the Prescribed Authority, Jaunpur, Respondent No. 1. This application appears to have been filed in the year 1977, its number being 4 of 1977. During its pendency the Petitioner made an application that the matter had been compromised and a decree be passed in terms of the compromise. No compromise in writing was, however, produced before the Prescribed Authority by the Petitioner. The Prescribed Authority relying on the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Mohd. Anwar vs. Additional District Judge, 1978 RCC UP 468, wherein it was held that in view of the amendment made by the Allahabad High Court in Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which came into force on 31st August, 1974, no decree could be passed on the basis of a compromise which had not been reduced to writing, dismissed the application made by the Petitioner by its order dated 20th November, 1978. It is this order of the Prescribed Authority which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 2. It was urged by counsel for the Petitioner that Section 34 of the Act made it clear that the provisions contained in Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code off Civil Procedure had been incorporated by reference in the act and consequently the provisions of Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as it stood on the date when the Act came into force would alone be relevant and the amendment in the CPC by this Court in 1974 would be of no consequence. Reliance in-support of this submission was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of M.P. vs. M.V. Narasimhan, AIR 1975 SC 1935 , where, after considering earlier decisions on the point, it was held: On a consideration of these authorities, therefore, it seems that the following proposition emerges: Where a subsequent Act incorporates provisions of a previous Act then the borrowed provisions become an integral and independent part of the subsequent Act and are totally unaffected by any repeal or amendment in the previous Act. This principle, however, will not apply in the following cases: (a) where the subsequent Act and the previous Act are supplemental to each other. (b) where the two Acts are in pari-materia. (c) where the amendment in the previous Act, if not imported into the subsequent Act also, would render the subsequent Act wholly unworkable and ineffectual. (d) where the amendment of the previous Act, either expressly or by necessary intendment, applies the said provisions to the subsequent Act. 3. According to counsel for the Petitioner since the case did not fall within any of the exceptions (a) to (d) enumerated above the amendment made in Order 23 Rule 3 of CPC by this Court in 1974 was ineffective so far as Section 34 of the Act is concerned. 4. Having given our anxious consideration we find it difficult to accept the above submission. As was pointed out by the Supreme Court in The Collector of Customs, Madras vs. Nathella Sampathu Chetty, AIR 1962 SC 316 there is a clear distinction between a mere reference to or a citation of one statute in another and an incorporation which in effect means the bodily lifting of the provisions of one enactment and making it part of another so much so that the repeal of the former leaves the latter wholly untouched. In the case, however, of a reference or a citation of one enactment by another without incorporation, the effect of a repeal of the one "referred to" is that set out in Section 8 of the General Clauses Act. Here we are concerned with an U.P. enactment and as such it will be pertinent to refer to Section 8 of the U.P. General Clauses Act. It reads: Where any Uttar Pradesh Act, repeals and re-enacts with or without modification, any provision of a former enactment, then references in any other enactment or in any instrument of the provision so repealed shall, unless a different intention appears, be construed as references to the provisions so reenacted. 5. In paragraph 40 of the report in the case of Collector of Customs (supra) certain illustrations have been given in regard to the legislation by incorporation. 5. In paragraph 40 of the report in the case of Collector of Customs (supra) certain illustrations have been given in regard to the legislation by incorporation. In that case the question which came up for consideration was whether Section 23-A of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act had the effect of incorporating in the said Act the provisions of Section 19 of the Sea Customs Act. The question was answered in the negative and it was held that it was a case of mere reference to or a citation of one statute in another. In our opinion Section 34 of the Act also does not incorporate in the Act Order 23 Rule 3 of the CPC but only makes a reference to the powers exercisable under the said provision. Section 34(1)(f) of the Act, which is relevant, reads as follows: 34. Powers of various authorities and procedure to be followed by them - (I) The District Magistrate, the Prescribed Authority or any appellate or revising authority shall for the purposes of holding any inquiry or hearing any appeal or revision under this Act have the same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely: .........(f) recording a lawful agreement, compromise or satisfaction and making an order in accordance therewith..... 6. The authorities referred to in Section 34 of the Act have been given the same power which are vested in the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 "when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely." The words "when trying a suit" are relevant. Section 34(1) does not even refer to the wordings of Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. What it contemplates is that in the matter of recording a lawful agreement, compromise or satisfaction and making an order in accordance therewith, the authorities enumerated in Section 34 of the Act shall have the same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under the CPC "when trying a suit." In our opinion it is a case of mere reference or a citation of one enactment in another without incorporation. In Mani Ram vs. State, AIR 1952 All 40 a Full Bench of this Court held: A provision in an enactment that a certain act to be done under it would be done in the manner prescribed in another enactment is for the future. What has been done or what is a matter of the past is simply permitting the act to be done in that manner. What is the manner would be considered when the act is about to be done, and the manner would be ascertained from the law that would be in force at that time. 7. As seen above even the application u/s 21 of the Act was made in 1977, i.e. long after the amendment of Order 23 Rule 3 of the CPC by this Court in 1974. The impugned order was passed on 20th November, 1978, and on that date it was the amended provision of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC which was in force. For this reason we are of opinion that the power which was exercisable by the civil court in the matter of recording a lawful agreement, compromise or satisfaction and making an order is accordance therewith on 20th November, 1978, or at any rate on the date on which the application on which the impugned order was passed, will regulate the power of the authorities mentioned in Section 34 of the Act in this regard and this is precisely the view which has been taken by the Prescribed Authority. 8. Even if for the sake of argument it may be accepted that it was a case of legislation by incorporation, we are of opinion that the amended provision of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC would still be applicable to the facts of the instant case. It is only in those cases where either expressly or by necessary implication there is nothing in the Act which contains legislation by incorporation to the contrary that the provisions of the Act which have been incorporated would apply as they stood on the date of incorporation. It is only in those cases where either expressly or by necessary implication there is nothing in the Act which contains legislation by incorporation to the contrary that the provisions of the Act which have been incorporated would apply as they stood on the date of incorporation. For instance, had it been expressly mentioned in Section 34 of the Act that the authorities mentioned therein shall have the same power in regard to the recording of a compromise as may be contained in the CPC from time to time it could not be argued that it is only that provision of Order 23 Rule 3 of the CPC which was on the statute book on the date of the incorporation would apply. In that event the amended provision would, by virtue of the express language of Section 34, be applicable. On the language of Section 34 as it stands, we are of opinion that even though it does not make any such express provision but by implication it makes such a provision. When the said Section states that the authorities mentioned therein shall have the same powers as are vested in the civil courts under the CPC "when trying a suit" it clearly refers to the powers conferred on the civil court at the point of time when the application for according a lawful agreement, compromise or satisfaction and making an order in accordance therewith comes up for consideration. This view of ours finds support from the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Mani Ram's case (supra) and this would bring the present case within category (d) of the exceptions enumerated in the case of State of M.P. vs. M.V. Narasimhan (supra). 9. In this connection reference may also be made to the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 11 of the decision in the case of State of M.P. vs. M.V. Narasimhan (supra). It was held: In The State of Madras vs. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer, AIR 1958 SC 61 this Court while construing the meaning of the phrase it shall be presumed appearing in Section 4 of the Act utilised the construction placed on the phrase shall presume in the Evidence Act by holding that the Evidence Act was a statute in pari-materia with the Prevention of Corruption Act. There can be no doubt that the Evidence Act and the Prevention of Corruption Act form part of one system, because the rules of the Evidence Act, with minor exceptions, apply to trials of offences created under the Act. 10. In the instant case also Section 34 of the Act makes the same power, as is vested in the civil court under the CPC in the matter of recording a lawful agreement, compromise or satisfaction and making an order in accordance therewith, applicable to the authorities mentioned in Section 31 of the Act. To that extent it can be said that the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC are in pari-materia to the Act and the case may thus come even under category (b) of the exceptions enumerated in the aforesaid ease. 11. In the result we find no merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.