Avadh Behari ( 1 ) PARTIES were married onl0. ll. 73. Soon after disputes arose. Wife found that husband was already married in 1966. She filed petition u/. Ss II, 12 and 13 (1) (IA) and prayed for 3 reliefs, (a) Decree of nullity as husband s previous wife was living (b ). Decree of nullity for fraud by concealing previous marriage, (c) Decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty. Trial Court found that previous marriage was dissolved on 23. 3. 72 and refused first two reliefs. He however granted her decree on the ground of fraud. She filed an appeal against the relief refused. [ After giving above facts, para 6 onwards is : ] ( 2 ) AT the very thresh hold a preliminary objection has been raised. It is that the appeal is not maintainable. The wife made 3 prayers in the alternative. In prayer (a) and (b) she asked for a decree of nullity. In prayer (c) she sought a decree of divorce. The decree of divorce has been given to her. What grievance can she have now ? And no one can appeal unless he or she is aggrieved. The choice of reliefs is always with the plaintiff. He is the dominus litus. He is the master of litigation. He can ask for more than one relief. He can ask for independent relief or reliefs in the alternative. In alternative relief if the court trying the suit grants him one relief then it follows that he has got what he sought. He cannot agitate the matter further in the appellate court and ask for the relief denied to him which as already stated he only asked in the alternative. alternative is an expression which indicates a choice of the person and if that choice is once exercised by him, he cannot afterwards blow hot and cold and also ask for the other alternative relief. To allow him to agitate the matter even though he has exercised the choice of asking for reliefs in the alternative is to encourge litigation. In my opinion the wife is seeking to approbate which she cannot do. ( 3 ) IN Duxters Limited v. Hill Crest Oil (1926) I. K. B. 348 (358 ). To allow him to agitate the matter even though he has exercised the choice of asking for reliefs in the alternative is to encourge litigation. In my opinion the wife is seeking to approbate which she cannot do. ( 3 ) IN Duxters Limited v. Hill Crest Oil (1926) I. K. B. 348 (358 ). Scrutton L. J. said : "so in my opinion, you cannot take the benefit to a judgment as being good and then appeal against it as being bad. It startles me to hear it argued that a person can say the judgment is wrong and at the same time accept the payment under the judgment as being right. " ( 4 ) THIS illustrates the rule that a party cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time. These propositions are so well known that no possible exception can be taken to them. ( 5 ) SIR D F. Mulla says, "where however the plaintiff had sued for alternative reliefs and has been granted relief in respect of one such relief a question as to whether he can appeal against the decree, which has refused the other relief, the trend of decisions is that he cannot appeal. " Civil Procedure Code 13th Ed. 421 and 422. ( 6 ) CHITALEY and Rap, "where the plaintiff asks for one of two alternative reliels and is granted one, he cannot in appeal contend that he should be given the other relief. " (Code of Civil Procedure, 9th Edition Vol. III p. 40 ). ( 7 ) REAJUDDIN Patwari v. Syed Abdul Jabbar A. I. R. 1924 Cal 445 Somasundararn v. Chindambaram AIR. l951 Mad. 282 (283) D. B. and Sakku Sati v. Babu Reddlar A. I. R 1977 Mad. 223 (B D.) On this point may be referred to with advantage. ( 8 ). I, therefore, come to the conclusion that the wife has debarred herself from appealing against the judgment. She having obtained a decree of divorce cannot turn round and appeal insisting that she be further granted a decree of nullity. The court has given her what she asked for. Reasons and justice demand that she would be estopped from claiming a decree of nullity. She having obtained a decree of divorce cannot turn round and appeal insisting that she be further granted a decree of nullity. The court has given her what she asked for. Reasons and justice demand that she would be estopped from claiming a decree of nullity. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to pronounce upon the validity of the decree which declared that the respondent and Hardeep Kaur were no longer husband and wife. The appeal falls on the preliminary point. (Next the judgment then discusses, applications under 0. 6. R. 17c. P. C. andu/s 21, Hindu Marriage Act,which are dismissed.