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Allahabad High Court · body

1979 DIGILAW 991 (ALL)

M. A. Aziz v. Municipal Board, Sahaswan

1979-09-12

DEOKI NANDAN

body1979
JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - These three appeals are between the same parties and arise from a common judgment in three suits by M. A. Aziz since deceased, against the respondent Municipal Board. The points involved being the same these appeals are also being disposed of by a common judgment. 2. The first suit was suit No. 66 of 1964. It was filed on 30th January 1964 in the Court of the Munsif Bisauli, district Budaun. The relief claimed was an injunction restraining the respondent Municipal Board from taking dver charge from the plaintiff M. A. Aziz of his post of an Assistant Teacher in the Panna Lal Municipal Higher Secondary School, Sahaswan from which he was deemed to be due to retire on attaining the age of 58. years on 31st January 1964 under a notice dated 22nd November 1963 served on him by the Respondent Municipal Board, and for restraining the Respondent Municipal Board from terminating his service before he attained the age of 60 years, which, according to the plaintiff, M. A. Aziz, was the age of superannuation under the relevant orders of the Government in force at that time. The Second Appeal No. 686 of 1968 has arisen from the dismissal of that suit by both the courts below. 3. The second suit was suit No. 30 of 1965. The relief claimed therein was for recovery of Rs. 2160/- on account of the plaintiffs emoluments for 8 months from 1-2-1964 to 30-9-1964. The Second Appeal No. 685 of 1968 has arisen from the dismissal of that suit. 4. The third suit was suit No. 45 of 1965, and by that suit the plaintiff M. A. Aziz claimed recovery of Rupees 1900/- as salary for the period of 7 months from 1-10-1964 to 30-4-1965. The Second Appeal No. 652 of 1968 arises from the decree dismissing it. 5. The trial court consolidated the three suits and tried them together, treating the first suit No. 66 of 1964 as the leading case. It dismissed all the three of them by a common judgment dated 26th October 1966. The lower appellate court dismissed the plaintiffs appeals by a common judgment dated 13th November 1967. The plaintiff M. A. Aziz died during the pendency of the second appeals in this court, oft the 28th October 1974. His heirs and legal representatives were substituted in Second Appeals Nos. The lower appellate court dismissed the plaintiffs appeals by a common judgment dated 13th November 1967. The plaintiff M. A. Aziz died during the pendency of the second appeals in this court, oft the 28th October 1974. His heirs and legal representatives were substituted in Second Appeals Nos. 652 and 685 of 1968, by the Courts order dated 24th May 1978, but the substitution application dated 10th January 1975 (Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 1293 of 1975) in Second Appeal No. 686 of 1968 appears to have remained pending, and deserves to be allowed as there is no counter-affidavit in opposition although notice of it was issued on 10-1-1975. I allow the application and order that in place of the deceased plaintiff appellant, M. A. Aziz, the names of his heirs and legal representatives as disclosed in the application may be substituted and the record of this Court amended accordingly. 6. The plaintiff relied on paragraph 143 (k) of the U. P. Educational Code (1958) which prescribed the age of superannuation of teachers of recognised non-Government institutions as 60 years, and a Government Order dated 24th December 1963 conveying the decision of the Government to raise the age of retirement of teachers working under the local Bodies including Municipal Boards from 58 to 60 years and directing' that pending finalisation of rules in that direction the Local Bodies may not retire such teachers as have not attained the age Of 60 years. 7. The defence was that the plaintiff had no right to force himself on the Municipal Board, and the bar of the provisions of the Specific Relief Act and want of notice under U. P. Municipalities Act were pleaded. Other pleas were also raised. In the suits for money besides the technical, plea of Order 2, Rule 2, Civil P. C. it was pleaded that the U. P. Educational Code did not apply to employees of Municipal Boards, and the Government Order did not have any binding effect, and that no salary was due to the plaintiff. 8. The trial court framed several issues in the three suits separately. The fifth issue in each of the two suits for money, namely "Whether the plaintiffs service was rightly terminated by the Board, if not, its effect?" was treated as the main issue. 8. The trial court framed several issues in the three suits separately. The fifth issue in each of the two suits for money, namely "Whether the plaintiffs service was rightly terminated by the Board, if not, its effect?" was treated as the main issue. The trial court found that the form in which plaintiffs agreement of service was executed was taken from the U. P. Educational Code, but that did not make that Code applicable to the plaintiff; that his conditions of service were governed by the U. P. Municipalities Act that under the regulations framed thereunder as in force at that time the plaintiffs age of superannuation was 58 years; and that therefore the notice calling upon the plaintiff to hand over charge on 31-1-1964, when he attained the age of 58 years was valid. The plaintiff was accordingly not entitled to any salary, and all the three suits it was held were liable to be dismissed and that it was not necessary to give any findings on any other issue. 9. Before the lower appellate court also the only question raised was about the validity of the termination of the plaintiffs service on 31-1-1964 on the ground that the age of superannuation was 58 years. The lower appellate court held that paragraph 143 (k) of the U. P. Educational Code did not apply to institutions maintained by Municipal Boards and the Government Order could not override the regulations then in force under the Municipalities Act. 10. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant I was unable to discover any error in the findings of the two courts below. Indeed as observed by the lower appellate court, the suit for injunction had become infructuous by lapse of time even before the trial courts judgment. There was no claim for any declaration in either of the three suits that the termination of the plaintiffs service on 31-1-1964 was invalid and that he must be re-instated or deemed to continue or to have.. continued in service until he attains the age of 60 years. Without such a declaration no salary could accrue to the plaintiff, and the claim for recovery of the sums claimed as salary could not have been decreed. continued in service until he attains the age of 60 years. Without such a declaration no salary could accrue to the plaintiff, and the claim for recovery of the sums claimed as salary could not have been decreed. May be the plain tiff could have claimed damages for wrongful termination of his service, if he thought that re-instatement could not be had in good time, after the dismissal of his application for temporary injunction in the first suit, but the measure of damages cannot always be the salary which an employee might have received if his service had not been wrongfully terminated. Salary is payable when a person is in employment and the consideration is the obligation to work which employment carries with it. A person who is out of employment is under no Obligation to do any work. He must prove the loss which he suffers by wrongful termination of his employment, and must also do his best to mitigate the minimising his loss. He cannot sit back and idle away. He must do all that he is capable of doing in order to minimise his loss occasioned by a wrongful termination of his service. 11. These are some additional reasons for which I think these three appeals must be dismissed. However, in the circumstances I direct that the parties shall bear their own costs throughout.