JUDGMENT B. N. Sapru, J. - The plaintiff appellant was the owner of what is known as the Uma Shankar Compound in Mohalla Jhokan Bagh, Civil Lines, Jhansi. Lala Uma Shanker, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff transferred some houses and land for constructing houses in the compound. The purchasers constructed the house on the land sold to them. The remaining land and the constructions still belong to the plaintiff. The Municipal Board commenced to lay pipe line to give water connections to the houses of the purchasers without the permission of the plaintiff. The plaintiff protested but the Municipal Board did not desist. Thereupon the plaintiff without serving a notice under S. 326 of the Municipalities Act, filed a suit praying for the grant of an injunction restraining the Municipal Board from laying the pipe lines to the land shown by the letters A B C D, or on any portion of the plaintiffs land without the plaintiffs permission. 2. An interim injunction was prayed for but was refused. The plaintiff thereafter amended the plaint and sought a mandatory injunction directing the removal of the pipe lines laid down by the Municipal Board. 3. The defendants contested the suit. They pleaded that the Municipal Board was entitled to lay a pipe line under the provisions of S. 224 of the Municipalities Act. It was further pleaded that the land over which the constructions were made fell within the definition of the term street in S. 2 (23) of the U. P. Municipalities Act. A further plea was that the suit was not maintainable in view of the fact that no notice as provided for under S. 326 of the Municipalities Act had been served on the Municipal Board. 4. The trial Court held that the suit was not barred by the provisions of S. 326 of the Municipalities Act, as a notice had been given to the Municipal Board before the relief for permanent mandatory injunction was sought. It further held that as the plaintiff had not been given a notice as provided for under S. 224 of the Municipalities Act, the action of the defendant Municipal Board was not protected. The trial Court further held that the Municipal Board could not lay the pipeline over the land in dispute. It further held that as the plaintiff had not been given a notice as provided for under S. 224 of the Municipalities Act, the action of the defendant Municipal Board was not protected. The trial Court further held that the Municipal Board could not lay the pipeline over the land in dispute. Ultimately the trial Court decreed the suit for injunction restraining the Municipal Board from laying down the pipeline over the land in suit without giving a proper notice in writing to the plaintiff. The Municipal Board filed an appeal. The Appellate Court held that the suit was barred by the provisions of S. 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. It came to this conclusion because it held that the suit of the plaintiff for the grant of an injunction would not have been defeated by the service of a notice. The Appellate Court further held that the pipeline could not be ordered to be removed merely because the Board had not given a notice as required under S. 224 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. In the result, the appeal of the Board was allowed, the plaintiffs suit was dismissed with costs. 5. Aggrieved by the order of the lower Appellate Court the instant appeal has been filed. 6. The very first question in the appeal is whether the suit was maintainable. In the case of Ahmad Raza v. Municipal Board, Allahabad, ( AIR 1952 All 711 ), the Full Bench considered the provisions of S. 326 (4) of the U. P. Municipalities Act which permits the institution of a suit against the Municipal Board without the notice contemplated by the provisions of S. 326 (1) of the Act. The Bench held that the suit for injunction could be filed against the Board without a notice only if the object of the suit could be defeated by the giving of the notice. This decision was naturally followed by a Bench of the High Court in the case of Municipal Board, Shikohabad v. Chandra Deo Prasad Srivastava, (1963 All LJ 688). The Bench was of the view that the previous Full Bench case referred to above limited the scope of sub-section (4) of Section 326 only to those cases where the loss could not be compensated by damages. The Bench was of the view that the previous Full Bench case referred to above limited the scope of sub-section (4) of Section 326 only to those cases where the loss could not be compensated by damages. It held that the plaintiffs suit for an injunction against the recovery of circumstance and property tax without notice under the provisions of S. 326 of the Municipalities Act in the absence of a notice under that section was bad as the plaintiffs could have claimed back the taxes collected during the period of notice if the suit had been filed for the refund of the taxes, after the taxes were held to be illegal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the decision of a Bench of this Court in the case of Mohomed Ekram Khan v. Mirza Muhammad Bakar, ( AIR 1935 All 106 ), where it was held that notice under S. 326 of the Municipalities Act was not necessary in a case where the reliefs claimed were those of an injunction if the case came within the last proviso. The plaintiff in the instant case had asserted that the Boards agents had started making the constructions and despite his protest the constructions were going on, and that he would suffer an irreparable loss, if the constructions were not stopped, and therefore, the suit had been filed without giving a notice under S. 326 of the Municipalities Act. The plaintiffs ownership of the property was established and in the normal course he was entitled to restrain any act of trespass over his land. The laying of a pipeline could in law be undone even if it was completed, if it was found to be illegal, but nevertheless, the trespass on the property of the plaintiff by a local authority without complying with the provisions of law was a circumstance in which it could be held that the purpose of the suit could be defeated by the giving of a notice, because before the period of the notice would expire, the action of the Board would be completed. 8. The power of the Board to construct the waterworks includes the power to carry such works through, across, over or under any street or place. 8. The power of the Board to construct the waterworks includes the power to carry such works through, across, over or under any street or place. The compound of the plaintiff appellant would undoubtedly be a place, and the argument of the learned counsel that the action of the Board was outside the scope of the power conferred on the Board under S. 224 (a), cannot be accepted. There is no finding on the question as to whether the place where the constructions were being carried on, was a street or not, and in a second appeal it is not necessary to decide this matter. Section 2 (26) defines 'waterworks and the definition is an inclusive one. The pipes and mains and things for supplying or used for supplying water are undoubtedly waterworks. So, what was being laid over the plaintiffs land was undoubtedly waterworks within the meaning of the U. P. Municipalities Act. 9. Both the Courts have found that no notice in writing to the owner or occupier of the land in dispute was given by the Municipal Board before laying the pipes under S. 224 (a) of the Municipalities Act. The requirement of giving a reasonable notice in writing to the owner or occupier is a condition precedent to the exercise of the powers conferred under that Section. The lower Appellate Court has held that the absence of a notice would not invalidate the exercise of the power under S. 224 (a). This view of the law appears to be erroneous, because the statute says that the constructions can be made after a reasonable notice in writing is given to the owner or occupier. The power given in the section includes the power to establish waterworks under any street, or place and also into, through, over or under any building or land. The laying of the pipeline or construction of waterworks as defined in the Act quite seriously affect the property and interest, the safety and the convenience of the owner or occupier of the building. Thus, the legislature very wisely provided for a reasonable notice in writing, inherent in this appears to be the concept that the owner or occupier may be able to protest or make some alternative suggestions to the Municipal Board regarding the construction of the waterworks. 10. Thus, the legislature very wisely provided for a reasonable notice in writing, inherent in this appears to be the concept that the owner or occupier may be able to protest or make some alternative suggestions to the Municipal Board regarding the construction of the waterworks. 10. In view of the fact that no notice was given, the action of the Municipal Board to establish the waterworks by laying pipes is clearly illegal. 11. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the decree of the lower Appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court is restored.