JUDGMENT B. N. Sapru, J. -The plaintiffs are owners of a large compound known as Uma Shanker compound, in Mohalla Jokhan Bagh, Jhansi. The predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff sold various plots to different persons and left a passage for them about 15 feet wide. The Municipal Board treating it as street started paving it. The plaintiffs Instituted a suit and prayed for an injunction restraining the defendant from paving the land with stone etc. The land was shown as XYZ and XPQE in the plaint map. 2. The trial Court decreed the suit, The lower Appellate Court has reversed the decree of the trial Court and dismissed the suit. 3. Admittedly, the suit was filed without notice under S. 326 (1) of the U. P. Municipalities Act. The lower Appellate Court was of the view that in the absence of any notice, the suit was not maintainable. It is settled law that even a suit for injunction cannot be filed without notice, unless the purpose of the suit will be defeated during the period of the notice. If the plaintiffs had given notice and waited for the statutory period, the paving of the land would have been completed or partially completed and the purpose of the suit defeated as the nature of the land would have been changed. 4. The lower Appellate Court has held the land to be a street, because under the sale-deeds the vendees have right of ingress and egress from the 15 feet wide passage leading to a public road. Thus, it is clear that the land sought to be paved is a "street" as has been defined by the U. P. Municipalities Act. Section 212 gives power to the Municipal Board to require levelling, paving etc. Section 212 (1) provides that if any private street or part thereof is not levelled, paved, metalled, flagged, channelled, severed, drained, conserved, or lighted to the satisfaction of the Board, the Board may by notice require the owners or occupiers of premises or lands fronting or abutting such street or part thereof to carry out any work which in its opinion may be necessary and within such time as may be specified in such notice. Sub-sec. (2) of the above section enables the Board, after giving notice as contemplated by sub-s. (1), to execute the work itself and to recover the expenses from the owners or occupiers. Sub-sec. (2) of the above section enables the Board, after giving notice as contemplated by sub-s. (1), to execute the work itself and to recover the expenses from the owners or occupiers. In this case, admittedly, no notice as contemplated by S. 212 (1) was given to the plaintiffs, who are admittedly the owners of the land in suit. 5. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, the power of the Board to execute the work itself under S. 212 (2) could not be exercised, as notice contemplated under sub-s. (1) has not been given to the plaintiffs. 6. In the result the appeal is allowed and the decree of the lower Appellate Court is set aside and the plaintiffs suit for injunction is decreed in the terms prayed for. It is, however, made clear that the power of the Board under S. 212 (1) to serve a notice on the plaintiffs requiring them to carry out the work of paving of the street is not effected; and if such notice is served on the plaintiffs and work is not done, the power of the Board under S. 212 (2) shall in no manner be affected. There is no prayer in the plaint for the grant of a mandatory injunction requiring the removal of the construction already made. As such, no decree in that regard is passed. There will be no order as to costs.