JUDGMENT K.M. Dayal, J. - This is a plaintiff's appeal. The plaintiff filed the suit against the defendant claiming that the defendant was a tenant of the disputed accommodation at a Rent of Rs. 50/- per month. He committed default in payment of rent and thereupon a notice of demand and ejectment was served on him by refusal. He consequently claimed arrears of Appeal allowed. (Appellant) rent and ejectment. The plaintiff alleged in the plaint that he was the Karta of Hindu undivided family styled as Navel Kishore Chandi Lal and he was the owner of the premises. 2. A written statement was filed by the defendant denying the case of the plaintiff Service of notice was denies. It was also denied that the plaintiff was sole landlord and had a right to eject the defendant. In paragraph No. 10 of the written statement it was mentioned that Kalka Prasad was the original owner and after his death he was succeeded to, by his four sons. It as also alleged that the defendant had made deposits under Section 7-C of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act No. III of 1947 hereinafter referred to as the Act, and that he was not a defaulter. The rent deposited by him up to 13th Nov., 1964 was accepted by the Munsif, per his order dated 17-2-1965. The notice of demand for rent was up to Bhado Sudi 2 Sambat 2021 corresponding to 8-9-1964. 3. The plaintiff examined Tara Chand, Ramesh Chandra and one Radhay Shyam Ramesh Chandra is the brother of Chhedi Lal, who, has presented the plaint and issued the notice. He admitted in his statement that Kalka Prasad had partitioned the property in his lifetime and disputed property fell to the lot of Ramesh Chand and Chhedi Lal. Tara Chand stated that Ramesh Chand was a politician and was busy in the political affairs and, therefore, he had asked him and his father Chhedi Lal to manage the property on his behalf. 4. The trial Court held that the notice was served on the defendant by refusal and further that the deposits under Section 7-C were valid. It was, however, held that the deposit was not effective and could not save the default as the notice was refused on 15-9-1964 and the first deposit was trade on 21-9-1964. 4. The trial Court held that the notice was served on the defendant by refusal and further that the deposits under Section 7-C were valid. It was, however, held that the deposit was not effective and could not save the default as the notice was refused on 15-9-1964 and the first deposit was trade on 21-9-1964. It also held that the plaintiff, Chhedi Lal was entitled to tile the suit as there was a joint family between him and Ramesh Chand. 5. The delendant filed an appeal and the appeal had been allowed by the lower appellate Court. The lower appellate Court held that the notice was served by refusal on the defendant and consequently the deposits under Section 7-C were not effective. However, it held, relying upon the statement of Ramesh Chand, that Ramesh Chand and Chhedi Lal were co-owners as the joint family, ceased to exist when Kalka Prasad divided the properties amongst his four sons also been found that the disputed shop was not of any joint family but belonged to Chhedi Lal and Ramesh Chand to whom it as allotted on partition. On the finding aforesaid the Court below dismissed the suit for want of joinder of Ramesh Chand in the notice and the suit. 6. I have heard counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for the appellant placed three points before me. The first point was that Ramesh Chand was not necessary party in the notice or in the suit, especially in view of the statement of Bishambhar Nath. According to him Bishamber Nath was a liar, when he stated that he took the disputed accommodation from Kalka Prasad. It was an impossible thing and could not be believed in view of the statement that the shop was taken 20 years ago, though Kalka Prasad had died long before. The plaintiff's case should have been believed. There is no reliable evidence to prove that the disputed shop was let out by Chhedi Lal as Karta. I further find from the statement of Ramesh Chand that his father, Kalka Prasad had divided his three houses amongst his four sons. The plaintiff's case should have been believed. There is no reliable evidence to prove that the disputed shop was let out by Chhedi Lal as Karta. I further find from the statement of Ramesh Chand that his father, Kalka Prasad had divided his three houses amongst his four sons. The same was the statement of Tara Chand, the principal witness of the plaintiff, who stated that house in 46/137 was given to Mauji Lal and Ram Swarup and house No. 46/131 i.e. the disputed house, came to the share of Chhedi Lal and Ramesh Chand; and house No. 46/134 was given to Mauji Lal exclusively. It is thus clear that there was a division and ascertainment of shares and consequent separation of status amongst the sons of Kalka Prasad under Hindu law. Under the circumstances Ramesh Chard and Chhedi Lal were both co-owners and were not the "coparceners" of the joint Hindu family. It was a different thing that they continued to carry on the business jointly, but that could not amount to reunion of the families of the separated members. Thus the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that Ramesh Chanel was a junior member of the joint Hindu family and Chhedi Lal was a Karta cannot be accepted. 7. The second argument of the learned counsel of the appellant was that even one of the co-owners was entitled to bring suit for ejectment against the defendant. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the case of Smt. Kanta Goel v.B.P. Pathak reported in AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1599; that was a case under the Delhi Rent Control Act and under Section 2 (a) of the Delhi Rent Control Act the definition of landlord was very wide. The aforesaid section has been reproduced in paragraph 6 of the judgment. The definition of the landlord in "U.P. Act" is, however, different. Under the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act the landlord has been defined under Section 2(c). In our Act the landlord included every person to whom rent was actully payable ,2nd, therefore, even co-sharers who were not realising the rent but who were entitled to the rent were the landlords. Under the circumstances the Delhi case does not help us. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon some cares reported in 1979 All Rent Cases. Under the circumstances the Delhi case does not help us. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon some cares reported in 1979 All Rent Cases. The first case is Sudhendu Prasad Roy Choudhury v. Kamla Bala Roy Choudhury, 1979 All Rent Cases 27. This is a case decided by the Supreme Court. A notice was given including several minors as landlords. The minors also signed the notice. It was not mentioned in the notice that the father had signed on behalf of the minors. The Supreme Court held that it was not necessary to state that the notice had been signed on behalf of the minors as well. It was clear from the notice that it was for and on behalf of all the co-owners and landlords. 9. The other case relied on by the learned counsel is Panna La/ v. Sharafat All reported in 1979 All Rent Cases on p. 9,). In that case there was a finding that the defendant was a licensee and on that ground a decree for ejectment was granted. The lease deed was held to be invalid. In that case the question of termination of tenancy did not arise and the suit could be filed without any notice. Both these cases are distinguish. able. 10. The third argument of the learned counsel for the appellant was that the suit should not have been dismissed by the Court below on the ground that the notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was invalid as no notice was required to be given in the instant case. The learned counsel for the respondents relied on V. Dharmpal Chettiar v. Yasodai Ammal, AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1745. That was a case under Section 10 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. In that case it was held that in case there was recovery of possession by procedure under the Rent Control Act, general notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was not necessery. For appreciating the law laid down in that case the brief history of that case had to be seen. Respondent in that case moved an application against the appellant under Section 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent control) Act, 1960 hereinafter referred to as Tamil Nadu Act. For appreciating the law laid down in that case the brief history of that case had to be seen. Respondent in that case moved an application against the appellant under Section 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent control) Act, 1960 hereinafter referred to as Tamil Nadu Act. It was contended that no notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act having been given, the tenant could not be evicted. The Supreme Court in after looking the entire law held that in such a case no notice was required to be given and the tenant could be evicted without termination of his tenancy in the proceedings under the Rent Control Laws. Sub- section (3) of Section 10 of the aforesaid Act is reproduced below: "3 (a). A landlord may, subject to the provisions of Clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building- (i) In case it is a residential building, if the landlord requires it for his own occupation or for the occupation of his son and if he or his son is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned. (ii) ... ... ... (iii) In case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord or his son is not occupying for purposes of 'a business which he or his son is carrying on, a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own: 11. Under Clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Act, the Controller was authorised to examine the claims of landlord and tenant compare their respective hardship, put the landlord into possession, and grant reasonable time to tenant for vacating. 12. Under Clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Tamil Nadu Act, the Controller was authorised to examine the claims of landlord and tenant compare their respective hardship, put the landlord into possession, and grant reasonable time to tenant for vacating. 12. It read as under:- (e) The Controller shall, if he is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide, make an order directing the tenant to the landlord in possession of holding on such date as may specified by the Controller and if the Controller is not find he shall make an order rejecting the application: Provided that, in the case of an application under Clause (c), the controller shall reject the application if he is satisfied hat the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by ranting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord: Provided further that the Controller may give the tenant a reasonable time for putting the landlord in possession of the holding and may extend such time so as not to exceed three months in aggregate." 13. In our case the situation is entirely different. The suit had been filed without recourse to the proceedings under Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. It was contended that the bar created by Section 3 (1) of the Act was removed as the tenant had failed to pay the arrears of rent as required by Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 3 and, therefore, the suit for ejectment could be filed without any permission of the District Magistrate, (Rent Control and Eviction Officer). The wordings of Section 3 (1) of the Act may also be examined. It reads: "3. (1) Subject to any order passed under sub-section (3), no suit shall without the permission of the District Magistrate he filed in any civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the following grounds." Then the grounds are enumerated as Class. (a) to of the aforesaid section. It will be thus clear that this section did not authorise the Controller or authority concerned to put the landlord in Possession. The District Magistrate could only permit the landlord to file a suit to evict a tenant. Secondly, where the grounds mentioned in Class. (a) to of the aforesaid section. It will be thus clear that this section did not authorise the Controller or authority concerned to put the landlord in Possession. The District Magistrate could only permit the landlord to file a suit to evict a tenant. Secondly, where the grounds mentioned in Class. (a) to (g) exist, the intervention of the District Magistrate was totally excluded and suit could be filed directly. This sub-section does not require any ether proceeding to be taken except the suit to he filed after obtaining the permission of the District Magistrate. Where, however, no permission is required as in cases covered by the exceptions, the he field as a simple suit between the landlord and tenant. The present case being covered by Section 3 (1)(a) the suit was filed in civil court without recourse to any proceedings under the Act. 14. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon another case decided by a learned single Judge of this Court on 6th August. 1980. It is Second Appeal No. 996 of 1910. Suresh Chand Sinha v. Jwala Devi, Vidya Mandir Anand Bagh, Kanpur, S.A.O. No. 996 of 1970, decided on 06.08.1980(All). The learned single Judge considering the ratio of V. Dhanpal's case (supra) held that where the contract itself in now regulated by various Rent Control enactments, it is wholly futile to fall back on the general law contained in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. 15. In that case permission under Section 3 (1) of the Act as sought and suit was filed after the parties contested the matter before Rent Control Authorities. 16. In our case, the matter never went before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The suit was filed after termination of the tenancy on the ground that the tenant was in arrears of rent and had failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand. I The case of Suresh Chand (supra) therefore, will not apply to the facts of the presew case 17. There is yet another dspect of the matter. In our case there is a finding, recorded by the court below, that the notice should have been given by all the landlords and all the landlords should have joined in the suit. I The case of Suresh Chand (supra) therefore, will not apply to the facts of the presew case 17. There is yet another dspect of the matter. In our case there is a finding, recorded by the court below, that the notice should have been given by all the landlords and all the landlords should have joined in the suit. That will apply not only to a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act but also to the notice under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act. If there is a demand only from a co-sharer, the tenant is not bound to pay entire amount as demanded and such a demand will not be effective demand, , insofar as other co-sharers were concerned, so as to remove the bar under Section 3 (1) (a) of the said Act In these circumeta the notice of demand and termination of the tenancy had to be issued the entire set of landlords otherwise the suit was bound to fail. Even it is assumed that tenancy was not required to be terminated, a demand under Section 3(1)(a) of the Act on behalf of all the landlords necessary. 18. After the argument in the case was over, the learned counsel the appellant moved an application for impleadment of one Ramesh Chandra who was held to be necessary party by the court below. The learned counsel argued that the suit could not be dismissed for non-joinder of a party and, therefore, he may be permitted to implead Ramesh Chandra in the appeal. No notice under S 3(1)(a) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act or under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was is, used on behalf of Ramesh Chandra, as such his impleadment in the case as a plaintiff would be futile. 19. Learned counsel for the respondent has cited Kanakanathanammnal v V.S Loganath Mudaliar, AIR 1965 Supreme Court 271. In para 15 of the aforesaid judment the Supreme Court considered this question and ultimately held that in case of non joinder of necessary parties, the infirmity in the suit as Nund to be fatal and the plaintiff would not he at liberty to implead such patties at a late stage. However, in the present case, as the impleadment of the party will not help the plaintiff in any manner, the application for impleadment of party is hereby rejected. However, in the present case, as the impleadment of the party will not help the plaintiff in any manner, the application for impleadment of party is hereby rejected. 20. In the result, the present Second Appeal fails and is dismissed. Parties are, however, directed to bear their own costs.