PATEL SHANKERBHAI MAHIJIBHAI v. STATE — 1980 DIGILAW 102 (GUJ)

S. H. SHETH, S. L. TALATI, J. ( 1 ) ALL these petitions are directed against the land acquisition proceedings. Notification under sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 16th June 1972 and was published in Gujarat Government Gazette on 13th July 1972. It was in respect of four survey numbers with their sub divisions. Therefore as many as five petitions have been filed challenging that notification. Thereafter on 11th of April 1974 Town Planning Scheme in respect of the area in question was finalized and notices to the parties were issued under the Bombay Town Planning Act. On 11th July 1975 declaration under sec. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued and it was published in Gujarat Government Gazettes Extraordinary on the same day. On 15th October 1979 an addendum to the declaration under sec. 6 was issued and it was published on 27th December 1979 The addendum was issued because the survey numbers in respect of which the impugned acquisition proceedings were instituted had become a part of the Town Planning Scheme and had come to bear final plots numbers. By the addendum therefore in addition to the description of the land in terms of their survey numbers description of the land in terms of final plots and the extent of the areas in terms of square metres was published. The extent of the area of the land under the impugned acquisition was in the first instance published in terms of the hectares. ( 2 ) BEFORE we deal with the contentions which Mr. Patel has raised before us on behalf of the petitioners it is necessary to state that the first four petitions were posted for hearing today and that the fifth petition was not posted for hearing. However we are deciding the fifth petition with the consent of parties because the subject matter of challenge in that petition is the same as in the other four petitions. ( 3 ) THE first contention which Mr. Patel has raised is that the notification issued under sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was void ab initio and non est because it did not specify public purpose in respect of which the impugned land acquisition proceedings were instituted. In order to examine the contention which Mr. Patel has raised it is necessary to reproduce the opening part of the first paragraph of that notification. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was void ab initio and non est because it did not specify public purpose in respect of which the impugned land acquisition proceedings were instituted. In order to examine the contention which Mr. Patel has raised it is necessary to reproduce the opening part of the first paragraph of that notification. It reads as under:-WHEREAS it appears to the Government of Gujarat that the lands specified in the schedule here to are likely to be needed for a public purpose viz. for Gujarat Housing Board it is hereby notified under the provisions of sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 (I of 1894) that the said lands are likely to be needed for the purpose specified above. According to Mr. Patel a mere statement that it was required for a public purpose did not indicate any public purpose. The argument raised by Mr. Patel is eminently correct. ( 4 ) THE second argument which he has raised is that reference to the Gujarat Housing Board is a reference to the instrumentality and not reference to the public purpose. ( 5 ) MR. Takwani who appears on behalf of the respondents has argued that reference to the Gujarat Housing Board is a reference to the public purpose. It is difficult for us to uphold this argument because the public purpose and the instrumentality are two different things. An instrumentality cannot be substituted for a public purpose. That instrumentality and public purpose are different is made clear in the instant case by the declaration made under sec. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. It in terms stated that the lands under acquisition were required for construction of houses by the Gujarat Housing Board. This specification in Column 4 of the declaration made under sec. 6 clearly distinguished between the purpose and the instrumentality. It is clear therefore that the notification issued under sec. 4 did not specify any purpose whatsoever but specified only the instrumentality. ( 6 ) THE next question which has arisen for our consideration in this context is whether omission to specify the public purpose renders notification under sec. 4 void ab initio and nonest or merely invalid. It is necessary to decide this point because finding on this point will have a material bearing on the question of delay which Mr. Takwani on behalf of the respondents has very strenuously argued. 4 void ab initio and nonest or merely invalid. It is necessary to decide this point because finding on this point will have a material bearing on the question of delay which Mr. Takwani on behalf of the respondents has very strenuously argued. Our attention has been invited by both the learned Advocates to a few decisions. ( 7 ) THE first decision is in Munshi Singh and Others v. Union of India AIR 1973 S. C. 1150. It has been observed in that decision that when the notification merely mentions that the land is needed for planned development of the area and when there is no proof that the interested persons are either aware of or shown the scheme or the master plan in respect of the planned development it must be held that they are unable to object effectively and therefore the acquisition proceedings must render themselves liable to be quashed. In that case it was not a complete omission on the part of the Land Acquisition Officer to specify the purpose. He had specified the purpose which read as follows:- Planned development of the area. Such a purpose in the facts and circumstances of the case was regarded as no purpose at all because according to the Supreme Court unless the persons interested were aware of any such plan they would not be able to effectively exercise their right of lodging objections against the proposed acquisition. If such a vague description of a purpose renders a notification issued under sec. 4 invalid because it does not give an effective opportunity to the persons interested to lodge objections under sec. 5a it must be more so when notification issued under sec. 4 does not specify the purpose at all. A declaration under sec. 6 is not a cure because it follows the enquiry under sec 5a of the Land Acquisition Act. ( 8 ) IN order to convince us that a notification which does not specify the public purpose is void or nonest and is not so much required to be set aside. Mr. A declaration under sec. 6 is not a cure because it follows the enquiry under sec 5a of the Land Acquisition Act. ( 8 ) IN order to convince us that a notification which does not specify the public purpose is void or nonest and is not so much required to be set aside. Mr. Patel has invited our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Tarachand Gupta and Bros AIR 1971 S. C. 1558 It was a case under the Imports and Exports (Control) Act 1947 The principle which has been laid down in that case is that an order which is passed in excess of jurisdiction is a nullity. Therefore the question of having such an order set aside does not arise. ( 9 ) THE third decision to which our attention has been invited is in Collector of Monghyr and Others etc. v. Keshav Prasad Goenka and Others etc. AIR 1962 S. C 1694. It was a case under Bihar Private Irrigation Works Act 1922 The principle which has been laid down in that decision is that what sec. 5a requires is the conclusion that irrigation works for the purposes set out in sec. 5a should be immediately taken on hand and completed and that there is such an emergency in having the work completed that it can not brook any delay. This decision does not have much relevance to the contention which Mr. Patel has advanced before us. ( 10 ) THERE is no doubt in our minds that specification of a public purpose which would enable the interested persons to lodge the objections effectively under sec. 5a is the core of sec. 4. If that requirement of sec. 4 is not satisfied notification issued under sec. 4 must be held to be void. ( 11 ) ON behalf of the respondents it has been argued by Mr. Takwani that these petitions are barred by delay and laches and that therefore we should not entertain them. The facts which he has placed before us in that behalf are as follows. Declaration under sec. 4 was published on 15 July 1972. Notification under sec. 6 was published on 11th July 1975. The present petitions were filed in 1980. Takwani that these petitions are barred by delay and laches and that therefore we should not entertain them. The facts which he has placed before us in that behalf are as follows. Declaration under sec. 4 was published on 15 July 1972. Notification under sec. 6 was published on 11th July 1975. The present petitions were filed in 1980. In other words according to him these petitions were filed a little less than eight years after the impugned notification under sec 4 was issued. So far as these facts are concerned there is no controvery. It may however be stated in order to complete the narrative in this context that the addendum to the declaration under see. 6 was published on 27th December 1979. According to Mr. Takwani such stale petitions should not therefore be entertained. He has invited in that behalf our attention to three decisions of the Supreme Court. ( 12 ) THE first decision is in Aflatoon and Others v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Others AIR 1974 S. C. 2077. In that decision the Supreme Court has observed as follows:-A valid notification under sec. 4 is a sine qua non for initiation of proceedings for acquisition of property. To have sat on the fence and allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notification under sec. 4 and the declaration under Sec. 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were available to them at the time when the notification was published would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The Supreme Court therefore dismissed the writ petitions. The principle which Mr. Takwani has asked us to apply to the facts of this case is that the petitioners had sat on the fence for such a long period as eight years and allowed the Land Acquisition Officer to complete the acquisition proceedings. Therefore they cannot be allowed to turn round and challenge the validity of the notification issued under sec. 4. In Afalatoons ease (supra) the land acquisition proceedings were completed. In the instant cases they have not been completed. Award of compensation has not set been made. The Government itself took nearly three years in making declaration under sec. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act again took three years to publish the addendum and then issued notices to the interested persons under sec. In the instant cases they have not been completed. Award of compensation has not set been made. The Government itself took nearly three years in making declaration under sec. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act again took three years to publish the addendum and then issued notices to the interested persons under sec. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 So far as Afalatoons case (supra) is concerned it appears to us that the Supreme Court refused to entertain stale petitions not merely on the ground of delay and laches but because the passage of time had given rise to the rights of third parties. Paragraph 12 of the report makes it clear that after the acquisition proceedings were finalized the Government had allotted a large position of land to cooperative housing societies. The Supreme Court therefore expressed the view that to quash the notification at that stage would deprive the parties who were not before the Court of their right to represent. The rule of prudence which the concept of delay and laches enunciates therefore cannot be applied to the facts of the instant cases firstly because the land acquisition proceedings have not been completed and secondly because the rights of the third parties have not yet come in existence. ( 13 ) THE next decision to which our attention has been invited is in Smt. Ratni Devi and Another v. Chief Commissioner Delhi and Others AIR 1975 S. C. 1699. It was a case under Land Aquisition Act 1894 It has been laid down in that decision that a valid notification under sec. 4 is a sine qua non for the initiation of proceedings for acquisition of a property. It also appears to us from the report that the acquisition proceedings in that case had been allowed to be completed on the basis that the notification issued under sec 4 and declaration made under sec. 6 were valid. In that case notification tinder sec. 4 was issued in 1959 It was followed by a declaration under sec. 6 made in July 1960 and again in October 1961. The writ petitions were filed in 1971 that is to say after a lapse of nearly a decade. Therefore since the land acquisition proceedings had been allowed to be completed by the petitioners in that case without challenging the validity of the notification under sec. 4 and declaration under sec. 6 made in July 1960 and again in October 1961. The writ petitions were filed in 1971 that is to say after a lapse of nearly a decade. Therefore since the land acquisition proceedings had been allowed to be completed by the petitioners in that case without challenging the validity of the notification under sec. 4 and declaration under sec. 6 the Supreme Court pressed into service the doctrine of delay and laches and refused to give to the petitioners therein any relief. ( 14 ) THE next decision to which our attention has been invited is in Babu Singh and Others v. Union of India and Others AIR 1979 S. C. 1713. It was a case under Land Acquisition Act. In that case a writ petition challenging the declaration made under sec. 6 was filed nearly six years and one month after the publication thereof and about five years after the award was made. No explanation was tendered by the petitioner showing why the petition was filed after such an inordinate delay. The entire process of acquisition was over. The Supreme Court therefore took the view that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed in limine on account of delay. While doing so the Supreme Court has observed that if a person allows the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notification under sec. 4 and the declaration under sec. 6 are valid and then attacks the notification on the grounds which were available to him at the time when it was published it would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics. It has been further observed in that decision that the length of delay is an important circumstance because of the nature of the acts done within the interval on the basis of the notification and the declaration. Therefore the challenge to a notification under sec. 4 and a declaration under sec. 6 of the Act should be made within a reasonable time thereafter. If it is not so done the petition is liable to be dismissed. In Babu Singhs case (supra) the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the acquisition in question because the entire acquisition proceedings had been completed. ( 15 ) THE decisions to which we have made reference firstly lay down the principle which supports our finding on the first contention raised by Mr. Patel. In Babu Singhs case (supra) the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the acquisition in question because the entire acquisition proceedings had been completed. ( 15 ) THE decisions to which we have made reference firstly lay down the principle which supports our finding on the first contention raised by Mr. Patel. The validity of notification under sec. 4 is a sine qua non of all valid land acquisition proceedings. So far as delay is concerned what we find in the decisions referred to above is as follows. If the land acquisition proceedings have been completed or if the rights of third parties have come into existence during the period intervening between the issuance of notification under sec. 4 or the declaration under sec. 6 and the institution of the writ petition delay assumes avery grant importance and should be pressed into service in order not to disturb the settled rights or proceedings which have been finalized. ( 16 ) IN the instant case it is true that the petitioners have not explained in the petitions why they filed these petitions nearly eight years after the impugned notification under sec. 4 was published. However there are certain facts which speak for themselves. Before we summarize them in this judgment it is necessary to note that on behalf of the respondents a cursory affidavit has been filed. Such an affidavit has left many a statement made by the petitioners uncontroverted. We do not propose to dismiss these petitions in limine on the ground of delay on account of the following reasons. Firstly the impugned notification issued under sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was void and nonest because it specified no public purpose at all and was not merely invalid as would be the case if some public purpose was specified but was found to be vague or inadequate. In case of an invalid notification fence sitters cannot be allowed to challenge it after undue delay. In case of a notification which is void abinitio and nonest bar of delay cannot be invoked because since it is nonexistent in the eye of law it can be called in question in any proceedings. Secondly acquisition proceedings which started with the publication of the notification under sec. 4 have not yet been over. Thirdly no rights of third parties have come into existence during the intervening period. Secondly acquisition proceedings which started with the publication of the notification under sec. 4 have not yet been over. Thirdly no rights of third parties have come into existence during the intervening period. In a given case they will have to be taken into account even where the notification is void and nonest and not merely invalid. Fourthly the Land Acquisition Officer or the Government as the case may be has itself acted in a leisurely and tardy manner. The last conclusion is evidenced by the following facts which we recapitulate for the purpose of ready reference. Notification under sec. 4 was published on 13th July 1972. Declaration under sec. 6 was made nearly three years thereafter that is to say on 11th July 1975. Addendum to the declaration under sec. 6 was published more than four Scars after the publication of the declaration under sec. 6 that is to say 27 December 1979. Notice under sec. 9 was issued on 25th February 1980. Indeed it was issued very quickly after the addendum was published. The Land Acquisition Officer has not yet made his award for compensation even though eight years have passed since the publication of the notification under sec. 4. Though we do not propose to observe as a matter of rule we are constrained to say that if the Land Acquisition Officer or the Government as the case may be acts in such a leisurely and tardy manner a person who is aggrieved by such an acquisition cannot be called upon to act quickly and post haste. The objection raised by Mr. Takwani to the maintainability of the present petitions is therefore rejected. ( 17 ) THE next contention which Mr. Patel has raised and we can appropriately deal with at this stage is that the notice under sec. 9 was issued as late as on 28th February 1980 that is to say 4 1 years after the publication of the declaration under sec. 6. According to Mr. Patel unless there are circumstances to explain the reasons why such an inordinately long time was taken to issue notice under sec. 9 it must be struck down. Before we examine the proposition which Mr. Patel has advanced before us it is necessary for us to note that on behalf of the respondents no explanation has been placed on record to show why notice under sec. 9 it must be struck down. Before we examine the proposition which Mr. Patel has advanced before us it is necessary for us to note that on behalf of the respondents no explanation has been placed on record to show why notice under sec. 9 was issued about 4 1/2 years after the publication of the declaration under sec. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. ( 18 ) TURNING now to the contention which Mr. Patel has raised we must note that according to Mr. Patel exercise of power by Government or by any public authority must be within a reasonable period of time. He has in that behalf invited our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gujarat State Transport Corporation v. Valji Mulji Soneji and Others 20 GLR 810 it was a case under the Land Acquisition Act. Therein the decision of this Court reported in Valji Mulji Soneji v. State of Gujarat and Ors. 11 GLR 95 was challenged. This Court had taken the view that power to make a declaration under sec 6 must be exercised within a reasonable period of time after the publication of notification under sec. 4 because if undue delay is caused in the exercise thereof the rights of the interested parties are likely to be adversely affected. On a close reading of the decision of the Supreme Court we find that the Supreme Court has approved the principle that the statutory power must be exercised reasonably which implies that it must be exercised within a reasonable period of time though it has not said so expressly. When the Supreme Court said that. . the High Court primarily relied upon the postulate that every statutory power must be exercised reasonably a doctrine too firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence to brook any refutation. . it appears to have referred only to what was argued before the High Court and what was decided by it. It does not appear to have expressly approved that principle. However the Supreme Court has also not refuted it. If this principle was refuted by it the Supreme Court would have allowed the appeal by writing a very short judgment and without examining on facts whether delay of fifteen years was satisfactorily explained and without bringing into play the amendment to sec. However the Supreme Court has also not refuted it. If this principle was refuted by it the Supreme Court would have allowed the appeal by writing a very short judgment and without examining on facts whether delay of fifteen years was satisfactorily explained and without bringing into play the amendment to sec. 6 made by the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance 1967 That is why we say that the Supreme Court has by necessary implication approved the principle that the statutory power must be exercised within a reasonable period of time. In this behalf we may state that the Supreme Court in the context of the provisions of Bombay Land Revenue Code has expressly laid down this principle in State of Gujarat v. Raghav Natha and Ors; 10 GLR 992 (D. C.) and a Division Bench of this Court has in a different context in a case under the same Code has applied it in Habib Nasir Khanji v. The State of Gujarat 11 GLR 307. ( 19 ) IT has been argued by Mr. Takwani that the principle laid down by this Court in a decision which has been reversed by the Supreme Court cannot be relied upon. The argument raised by Mr. Takwani is in principle sound. However it does not prevent us from discovering what Supreme Court has expressly laid down and what it has approved by necessary implication. The reversal of the decision of this Court is based upon the following grounds :- (1) On facts the Supreme Court appreciated evidence and recorded the conclusion that delay of 15 years between the publication of notification under sec. 4 and making of the declaration under sec. 6 was caused by the litigation which the land owner in that case instituted and which consumed such a long period of time. In that litigation the State of Gujarat succeeded in all Courts except the Supreme Court and the State could have done nothing during the pendency of litigation in anticipation of its probably losing in the litigation in Supreme Court when it had succeeded in all Courts below; (2) there was no unreasonable delay between the issuance of notification under sec. 4 10th) October 1952) and the first declaration under sec. 6 (14th August 1953 ). Delay of 15 years was caused by the protracted litigation which intervened between the issuance of notification under sec. 4 10th) October 1952) and the first declaration under sec. 6 (14th August 1953 ). Delay of 15 years was caused by the protracted litigation which intervened between the issuance of notification under sec. 4 (10th October 1952) and the second declaration made under sec. 6 (10th October 1967) on the conclusion of the litigation which started in the Civil Court in 1953 and ended in Supreme Court on 8th May 1963 and which was followed by a review petition in the Supreme Court which in its turn was granted on 13 September 1965 (3) proviso to sec. 6 (2) inserted by the Amendment Ordinance referred to above specifically saved all declarations under sec. 6 if they were made within 2 years of the said Amendment Ordinance in cases in which notifications under sec. 4 were issued prior to the promulgation of the said Amendment Ordinance. In that case second declaration was made under sec. 6 within 2 years from the date of the promulgation of the said Ordinance and (4) if the statute prescribes a period of time for doing a particular thing no further fetter on the exercise of that power can be placed upon the general notion that the power ought to have been exercised within a reasonable period of time. ( 20 ) THESE grounds of reversal do not affect the implied acceptance or approval by the Supreme Court of the principle that where the statute does not prescribe any period of time for the exercise of a particular power it must be exercised within a reasonable period of time. . ( 21 ) IN the instant case we are concerned with delay between the declaration made under sec. 6 and the notice issued under sec. 9-a period of 4 1/2 years. Therefore this delay can be tested on the ground of reasonableness. Now what is a reasonable period of time in a given case depends upon the facts of that case. It is a highly flexibe concept and its application varies from case to case depending upon the facts of each case. ( 22 ) THERE is nothing on record in the instant case to show why notice under sec. 9 was issued after a lapse of 4 1/2 years from the date of the declaration under sec. It is a highly flexibe concept and its application varies from case to case depending upon the facts of each case. ( 22 ) THERE is nothing on record in the instant case to show why notice under sec. 9 was issued after a lapse of 4 1/2 years from the date of the declaration under sec. 6 except that the addendum was issued some time in December 1979 We have already held that the addendum was purely elucidatory and did not bring about any change in the area or the identity of the land under acquisition. Secondly need to issue the addendum could not have withheld the issuance of notice under sec. 9. Assuming that we are wrong in making this observations addendum could have been issued in 1977 when the Town Planning Scheme become a part of the Bombay Town Planning Act. We therefore see no reason why more than 4 1/2 years should have been taken for the issuance of the notice under sec. 9. Such a long lapse of time subjects the land owner to a number of unforeseen and avoidable hardships. Some of them are listed below:- (1) it freezes the investment of the owner in the land for an unduly long time (2) he can only get market value as on the date of the notification under sec. 4 (3) he will not be able to take advantage of rises in the land prices (4) he will not be able to improve the land or repair the building if a building is under acquisition even though it may be requiring urgent repairs except probably at the cost of losing such an outlay (5) the owner will enjoy only a qualified ownership and enjoyment of his property during this period because he cannot build upon the land under acquisition (6) he cannot profitably let it out because no good tenants under the fear of being thrown out at any time will take it on rent and (7) the Government can always withdraw under sec. 48 from acquisition before possession has been taken if prices are falling while the owner has no corresponding choice if the prices are rising. The interest on the amount of compensation allowed at 4 1/2% per annum is no substitute or solace for the loss which the owner suffers under several heads. 48 from acquisition before possession has been taken if prices are falling while the owner has no corresponding choice if the prices are rising. The interest on the amount of compensation allowed at 4 1/2% per annum is no substitute or solace for the loss which the owner suffers under several heads. Profits which investment in business brings or the interest which a Bank charges his unsecured borrower are manifold higher than this paltry interest at 4 1/2% p. a. We are therefore of the opinion that notice under sec. 9 ought to have been issued within a reasonable period of time from the publication of the declaration under sec. 6 and since it was not done in this case it requires to be struck down. ( 23 ) THE last contention which Mr. Patel has raised is that the recitals made in the notification issued under sec. 4 and the declaration made under sec. 6 are vitiated because at the relevant time there was was no need for the land. In other words the impugned acquisition was arbitrary. In that behalf he has invited our attention to paragraph 14 A in the petition. The material averments which have been made and which have not been controverted on behalf of the respondents are as follows. The first averment is that Gujarat Housing Board did not have any scheme on hand at the relevant time for the construction of houses. Proceeding further it has been stated by the petitioners that the need for land for a public purpose must be an existing need or a need in a proximate future. It is further stated in paragraph 14a of the petition that since no steps were taken for eight years after the publication of the notification under sec. 4 there was no existing need for the acquisition of the land in question nor was there any need in the near future for in at that time. Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act provides:- Whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The expression is needed has reference to the existing need. The expression is likely to be needed has reference to the future need. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The expression is needed has reference to the existing need. The expression is likely to be needed has reference to the future need. It cannot be gainsaid that a future need has reference to a foreseeable future. If land is not needed for a public purpose in a foreseeable furure but is likely to be needed at a very distant or remote point of time for an anticipated need which may or may not come into existence then unless the need can be foreseen in a foreseeable future no report can be had to sec. 4n In support of this argument of his it has been urged by Mr. Patel that looking back it can be said without any fear of contradiction that in 1972 the State Government did not need the land until 1980. The argument which Mr. Patel has raised is well founded. It appears to us that the notification under sec. 4 was issued in 1972 more for an illusory need in a distant future than for a need which could be visualized and foreseen in near future. ( 24 ) IT is necessary in this context to note another averment which has been made in the petition in paragraph 15. :- This the petitioner has reason to believe as the petitioner understands that the Land Acquisition Officer has kept ready his award only for declaration. This averment has not been controverted on behalf of the respondents. However even in absence of any denial it is difficult to hold that the petitioners had a definite knowledge that the Land Acquisition Officer had prepared before he heard the petitioners his award and had kept it ready for being pronounced. But this averment which has not been controverted by the respondents tends to show that whereas for eight years the respondents were not in a hurry to complete the land acquisition proceedings they appear to be in not hurry now to complete them. This aspect lends factual weight to the observation which we have made that in 1972 when the State Government issued notification under sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act it not only did not have any existing need but it also did not have any need which could be foreseen in a foreseeable future. This aspect lends factual weight to the observation which we have made that in 1972 when the State Government issued notification under sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act it not only did not have any existing need but it also did not have any need which could be foreseen in a foreseeable future. Therefore the land acquisition proceedings which began with publication of the notification under sec. 4 were vitiated and they did not fall within the compass of sec. 4. ( 25 ) WE have answered all the contentions which Mr. Patel has raised before us and also one which has been raised on behalf of the respondents by Mr. Takwani. In view of the findings which we have recorded on all the contentions raised by Mr. Patel except one we are of the opinion that notification issued under sec. 4 and the declaration made under sec. 6 and the notice under sec. 9 of the Land Acquisition Act are liable to be quashed. ( 26 ) IN the result all the petitions succeed. The impugned notification under sec. 4 declaration under sec. 6 and the notice under sec. 9 are quashed. Rule is made absolute in each of the five petitions. The respondents shall pay to the petitioners costs in Special Civil Application No. 724 of 1980. In other writ petitions there shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. .