ORDER A.N. Verma, J. - By means of this petition the validity of the two orders passed by the courts below fixing rent of the building in question at Rs. 2,292/- per month under Section 21 (8) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is challenged. 2. These are the facts Petitioner no. 1 is admittedly the tenant of the building in question and respondent no. 3 is its landlord. The building was allotted to the petitioner in the year 1958. The rent which was being paid by petitioner no. 1 for the building in question until the passing of the impugned order, was Rs. 250/- per month. On 3-1-1977 purporting to take advantage of the provisions of Section 21 (8) of the aforesaid Act providing for enhancement of rent of public building, which the building in dispute admittedly is, the said respondent moved an application for enhancement of the rent to an amount equivalent to one-twelfth of ten per cent of the market value of the building under tenancy. This application was contested by the petitioners on a variety of grounds. It was asserted that the rent was not liable to be enhanced. In support of his application the landlord filed a certificate of an approved value of properties. According to the certificate of the valuer, the market value of the property was Rupees 2,75,000/-. One-twelfth of ten per cent of this amount is worked out to Rs. 2,292/- per month. Accepting the market value of the property as given by the said valuer, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer enhanced the rent from Rs. 250/- to Rs. 2,292/- per month. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioners unsuccessfully appealed to the IV Additional District Judge, Bareilly. The learned IV Additional District Judge concurred with the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and held that the rent of the building had rightly been enhanced to Rs. 2,292/- per month. Hence this petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners first submitted that in view of the provisions of Section 2 (1)(a) read with Section 3 (o) of the Act, the building in question admittedly being a public building, nothing in the aforesaid Act, not even Section 21 (8) of the Act, would apply to the building in question and, therefore, the impugned orders are ex-facie without jurisdiction. Elaborating this argument, the learned counsel contended that in any case as Explanations (ii) and (iv) to Section 21 (1) of the aforesaid Act stood deleted by U.P. Act No. 28 of 1976, the whole of the provisions of sub-section (8) including the provisos thereto were rendered nugatory. An attempt was also made by the learned counsel to challenge the market value of the building as fixed by the courts below. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I find no merit in this petition. In my judgment the application of respondent No. 3 was maintainable and the courts below did have jurisdiction to enhance the rent of the building from Rs. 250/- to Rs. 2,292/-. In determining the enhanced rent the courts below have not committed any error. 5. In order to appreciate the submissions of the learned counsel it would be necessary to extract the relevant provisions. Section 2 (1) (a) reads as follows:- "2. Exemptions from operation of Act. - (1) Nothing in this Act shall apply to....................................................... (a) any public building; or......." Section 3 (o) reads as follows; "3. (o) "public building" means any building belonging to or taken on lease or requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central Government or a State Government (including the Government of any other State), and includes any building belonging to or taken on lease by or on behalf of any local authority or any public sector corporation, ............................. The next relevant provision is Section 21 (8) of the aforesaid Act which runs thus: 21. The next relevant provision is Section 21 (8) of the aforesaid Act which runs thus: 21. (8) "Nothing in clause (a) of sub-section (1) shall apply to a building let out to the State Government or to a local authority or to a public sector corporation or to a recognised educational institution unless the prescribed Authority is satisfied that the landlord is a person to whom clause (ii) or clause (iv) of the Explanation to sub-section (1) is applicable; Provided that in the case of such a building the District Magistrate may, on the application of the landlord, enhance the monthly rent payable therefor to a sum equivalent to one-twelfth of ten per cent of the market value of the building under tenancy, and the rent so enhanced shall be payable from the commencement of the month of tenancy following the date of the application ; Provided further that a similar application for further enhancement may be made after the expiration of five years from the date of the last order of enhancement." 6. In construing the provisions of an enactment, the Court cannot ignore the other provisions of that enactment. Therefore while, no doubt, Section 2 (1)(a) of the Act does say that nothing in this Act shall apply to any public building, the provision of Section 21 (8) of the Act, on the other hand, lays down that nothing in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 shall apply to a building let out to the State Government or to a local authority or to a public sector corporation or to a recognised educational institution unless the prescribed Authority is satisfied that the landlord is a person to whom clauses (ii) and (vi) of the Explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 21 is applicable. This provision is followed by two provisos the first of which has been the subject of arguments. The first proviso is in the nature of an exception to the preceding part of sub-section (8) of Section 21 of the Act. The proviso confers a specific power on the District Magistrate to enhance the monthly rent paid in respect of a public building to a sum equivalent to one-twelfth of ten per cent of the market value of the building under tenancy. 7. The language of the proviso is express and explicit. The proviso confers a specific power on the District Magistrate to enhance the monthly rent paid in respect of a public building to a sum equivalent to one-twelfth of ten per cent of the market value of the building under tenancy. 7. The language of the proviso is express and explicit. In construing the provisions of Section 2 (1)(a) of the Act, one cannot ignore a provision which is so plainly express and un-ambiguous. I do not agree with the learned counsel for the petitioners that with the deletion of clauses (ii) and (iv) of Explanation to Section 21 (1) of the Act the whole of sub-section (8) has become redundant. In the first place there must be strong reasons for declaring a provision as having become redundant or nugatory when the legislature itself has not thought it fit to delete that provision. Secondly, from the mere fact that clauses (ii) and (iv) to the said Explanation have been deleted, it does not automatically follow that even that part of sub-section (8) which precedes the two provisos has also become redundant. The only result of the deletion of clauses (ii) and (iv) of the said Explanation is that now there is an absolute or total bar to the maintainability of an application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act to buildings which are let out to the State Government or a local authority or to a public sector corporation. 8. It is, therefore, not correct to say that as a result of the deletion of the said clauses of the Explanation to Section 21 of the Act, the whole of Section 21 (8) including the first pro-viso under consideration has become nugatory. 9. The learned IV Additional District Judge, was therefore, right in taking the view that the application filed by respondent No. 3 was maintainable and that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was, therefore, competent to enhance the rent from 250/- to 2,292/-. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners also submitted that the courts below should have had regard to the guidelines which are incorporated in the various provisions appearing under Chapter II of the Act pertaining to fixation of standard rent. I cannot agree. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners also submitted that the courts below should have had regard to the guidelines which are incorporated in the various provisions appearing under Chapter II of the Act pertaining to fixation of standard rent. I cannot agree. Section 21 (8) of the Act is a special provision dealing with a particular class of buildings, namely, public buildings, which are let out to the Government or to a local authority or to a public sector corporation and the provisions incorporated therein lay down a specific yardstick for enhancement of the rent to a particular figure. There is, therefore, no warrant for adverting to the provisions which have been laid down in the Act for the determination of standard rent. In fact those provisions cannot apply to a public building because of Section 2 (1) (a) of the Act. 11. As regards the orders passed by the courts below on merit, the only argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners was that there was nothing in the orders to show that the certificate of the valuer produced on behalf of the landlord had been proved according to law. The first observation which I wish to make in this connection is that this complaint does not appear to have been made either before the courts below or even in the petition. It is not alleged in the petition that the certificate of the valuer was not true according to law. Furthermore, I have no reason to think that the said certificate was not brought on the record or proved according to law. This point is, therefore, not available to the petitioners. 12. In view of what has been stated above, this petition fails and is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.